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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides a comprehensive overview and summary of the published federal 
and state court cases involving Kansas public schools from 1980-2009.  The results of 
this dissertation may be used as a resource by scholars and public school 
administrators seeking knowledge of the types of cases typically heard in Kansas 
courts.   
This study also compares the amount and type of education litigation in Kansas from 
1980-2009 to that found in Kansas from the late 1800's through 1980.  The purpose of 
this comparison is to determine whether the rate and type of litigation heard in Kansas 
state and federal courts has changed over the years.   
This dissertation contains 173 briefs of Kansas public education cases reaching the 
Kansas court system from 1980-2009.  Cases within the study were found through a 
search of the Westlaw database.  When doing this search and selecting cases for 
inclusion, those cases that were repealed or amended and those that are unpublished 
opinions were not included in this dissertation.  Therefore, this study does not include 
all cases heard in the Kansas Courts regarding public education.  It only includes 
those that were reported and are considered good law. 
Summaries of the cases within this study have been placed into categories based upon 
different types of education-related litigation.  Each chapter is composed of cases 
within a specific category and is arranged in chronological order.  A conclusion 
summarizes the findings and provides data tables. 
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Findings from this study show how the types of education litigation in Kansas have 
changed over the years.  Challenges to the state funding formula, cases involving 
employee termination or nonrenewal, special education litigation, and negligence 
claims brought against school employees have all increased in Kansas.   
These findings would indicate that Kansas public school administrators would be 
wise to familiarize themselves with state laws and statutes pertaining to due process 
and nonrenewal procedures for employees.  An increase in the number of special 
education cases shows a need for heightened awareness of state and federal 
regulations regarding special education requirements.  Concerning the increase in 
negligence cases, school districts may want to ensure that all personnel are well 
versed in the elements of negligence and are aware of the measures that can be taken 
to avoid that type of litigation.  
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Introduction 
 
In 1981, Betty Martin Dillon published A Kansas Handbook: Public 
Education in the Appeal Courts for her dissertation at the University of Kansas.  Her 
handbook contained a summary of court cases in Kansas public education that had 
been heard by the appellate courts from the 1800’s through 1980.  Dillon’s book was 
organized into chapters based upon the different categories into which the cases fell, 
i.e. district and school organization, finance, church and state, employee relations, 
student rights, tort liability and civil rights. 
A search for recent research on education law in the courts found studies 
addressing the volume of education-related litigation as well as which issues are 
heard most frequently in court.  The search did not discover an historical study 
detailing the cases heard in a specific state's court system, as did Betty Martin Dillon's 
book.  This dissertation K-12 Public Education in the Kansas Courts:  1980-2009, 
was written to fill in the gap in the literature available dealing with education 
litigation. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an updated version of Dillon’s 
handbook that can be used as a resource for Kansas educators.  It may be a useful tool 
for educators to examine the types of cases that have been most frequently heard in 
the Kansas state and federal court system since 1980, as well as allow them to read a 
brief of the case that provides details of the litigation.  In addition to its use as a 
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reference tool for school administrators, this study could be used to supplement the 
texts used in school law courses in the state of Kansas.  
This study contains 173 briefs of Kansas public education cases reaching the 
Kansas court system from 1980-2009.  Cases within the study were found through a 
search of the Westlaw database.  Westlaw is a major fee-based online legal research 
system.  When doing this search and selecting cases for inclusion in this dissertation, 
litigation with a red flag or noted as a “table” case was not included.  A red flag 
indicates the case has been amended, repealed, suspended, or held unconstitutional in 
whole or part.  Thus, it is not considered good law.  Table cases were not included 
because they are unpublished opinions.  According to Kansas Supreme Court rule 
7.04(f), “unpublished opinions are not precedential and are not favored for citation.”  
At times, cases which have been red flagged or are unpublished may be mentioned to 
provide a deeper understanding of the history of the litigation discussed.  Therefore, 
this study does not include all cases heard in the Kansas Courts regarding public 
education.  It only includes those reported and considered published opinions. 
Briefs of the cases included within this text have been placed into categories 
based upon different types of education-related litigation.  Each chapter is composed 
of cases within a specific category and is arranged in chronological order.  This 
dissertation utilized Imber and Thompson’s typology discussed in their 1991 study 
Developing a Typology of Litigation in Education and Determining the Frequency of 
Each Category.  Imber and Thompson’s typology of education-related litigation was 
based upon previous research and groupings found in education-law textbooks.  Their 
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preliminary typology was tested for “thoroughness and utility by examining more 
than 500 cases chosen randomly” from education-law textbooks and another 500 
cases “chosen randomly from the Westlaw data base to see whether they fit within the 
typology” (Imber & Thompson, 1991, p. 228).  The categories in their final typology 
encompass almost all litigation against schools and provide a higher degree of 
specificity than the typology used by Dillon.  
Imber and Thompson’s typology first separates all litigation into three 
categories based on potential complainants against schools: Category I (students), 
Category II (employees), and Category III (people outside the school environment).  
Each of these three categories is then divided into subcategories to allow for more 
specific data collection.  Relative to students, cases were divided into the 
subcategories of negligence, control of behavior, school program, and equal 
opportunity issues.  Litigation relating to employees was divided into subcategories of 
discrimination in hiring/promotion, termination and other disciplinary action, 
professional negotiations, and torts.  Imber & Thompson divided the final category, 
suits by outsiders, into cases dealing with contract issues, fiscal issues, and the tort of 
negligence. 
Using the categories listed above, this study has been divided into three 
sections: suits by students, suits by employees, and suits by outsiders.  Imber and 
Thompson’s subcategories were then used to form the chapters within those sections.  
If a case was found to fit within more than one subcategory, it was placed into the 
category with which it was most closely aligned.  It was necessary to add a fourth 
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section titled miscellaneous suits, which contains one chapter for the few cases that 
did not fit within Imber & Thompson's classification.  The chapter, titled 
"Miscellaneous," includes court cases dealing with school consolidation and school 
board matters.  The cases within all twelve chapters have been arranged 
chronologically to allow the reader to follow the history of Kansas education law 
relative to each topic.  
Each chapter begins with an introduction to the categories and a discussion of 
the relevant state statutes involved in some of the court decisions within that chapter.  
Every effort has been made to make the briefs within this dissertation as 
understandable to the reader as possible.  A glossary has been added to provide 
definitions for common law terms to assist those unfamiliar with legal terminology. 
At the end of this dissertation, a comparison of the number and topics of the 
cases found in Dillon's book to those appearing in this one has been included.  It is 
provided to give some insight into historical trends and to provide a statistical view of 
the overall education litigation within in the state of Kansas.   
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Suits by Students 
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Chapter 1 
Negligence 
 
The twenty-two cases in this chapter deal with claims of negligence brought 
against school districts by students.  Negligence can be defined as "the failure to 
exercise reasonable care resulting in harm to another person" (Imber & Van Geel, 
2004, p. 502).  In cases of negligence, a reasonable person in a similar position could 
have anticipated the harmful results.  To have a valid cause of action for negligence, 
certain prerequisites must exist: (1) a duty to protect others; (2) a failure to exercise 
an appropriate standard of care; (3) a causal connection between the act and the injury, 
called proximate or legal cause; and (4) an actual injury, damage or loss must exist.  
In education, courts will often seek to determine if the educator should have foreseen 
the injury.   
Many cases within this chapter deal with injuries occurring in a recreational 
setting.  It would be wise for administrators and school districts to familiarize 
themselves with the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq.  This statute 
provides definitions as well as exceptions from liability that are applicable to Kansas 
public schools.  In general, liability is the rule and immunity is the exception for 
governmental entities.  However, one exception that is frequently found in Kansas 
education law cases dealing with negligence is K.S.A. 75-6104(o), the recreational 
use exception.  It provides immunity for "any claim for injuries resulting from the use 
of any public property intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground or open 
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area for recreational purposes, unless the governmental entity or an employee thereof 
is guilty of gross and wanton negligence proximately causing such injury."  In general, 
injuries that are the result of ordinary negligence and take place on any property used 
for recreational purposes have been exempt from negligence claims in Kansas. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324A provides for relief in cases 
of emotional distress.  However, in the state of Kansas a plaintiff must establish that 
they have some sort of qualifying injury that was directly caused by the defendant's 
negligence.  Typically, this must be a physical injury.  Thus, in the cases within this 
chapter dealing with claims for relief on the grounds of emotional distress, the courts 
have required a showing of physical injury.    
Claims of negligence for incidents occurring off campus have generally not 
been attributable to the school unless a duty of care has been established.  In 
Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan.451, 836 P. 2d 1128 (1992) the courts found no 
duty to protect a student on the way home after leaving school grounds finding it 
would “create an intolerable burden" for schools to assume such a duty. 
 
Paulsen v. Unified School District No. 368 
717 P.2d 1051 (Kan. 1986) 
 
James Paulsen was a high school student in an advanced woodworking class 
at Paola High School.  On February 10, 1982, Paulsen was working on a project in 
class that required him to cut boards with an Oliver table saw.  About twenty minutes 
before Paulsen used the saw, his teacher, Leroy Detwiler, removed the safety guard in 
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order to replace the saw's blade.  Rather than replace the guard, Detwiler left it lying 
on the floor beside the table saw.  Paulsen used the saw without a safety guard and 
after cutting several boards, he reached around to remove a scrap of wood and 
severely cut his hand on the blade.  Detwiler came to his aid immediately and Paulsen 
was taken to the hospital where he eventually had surgery on his hand.  Paulsen filed 
a personal injury action against his teacher and U.S.D. No. 368 in district court.  He 
claimed his teacher failed instruct him properly on the safe use of the saw, failed to 
keep the saw in working order, and failed to properly supervise the classroom.  
Paulsen's claims against the District were that it had failed supervise an instructor 
properly and failed to provide a reasonably safe environment to students.  The 
defendants moved for a directed verdict.  The district court first determined that 
Detwiler owed Paulsen a duty to supervise him and that the District owed a duty to 
supervise Detwiler and to provide a reasonably safe environment for students.  
Paulsen took a beginning woodworking class the previous year and received 
instruction in the proper use of power tools at that time.  The class spent four to six 
weeks on safety of all tools, including the Oliver table saw.  Paulsen passed a safety 
test on use of the saw.  During his advanced woodworking class, Paulsen was again 
instructed in the safety of power tools and again passed a safety test.  While evidence 
showed that Detwiler had failed to enforce the safety rule that the table saw not be 
used without a guard, he had taught all of the students how to put the guard on and 
take it off.  There was also some evidence that Detwiler did not always enforce safety 
requirements for using the table saw.  After hearing all of the testimony, the district 
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court held that the defendants had not breached their duties and granted their motion 
for a directed verdict.  The plaintiffs appealed this finding and the defendants cross-
appealed, all of them claimed that the trial judge had made numerous errors during 
the trial. 
The appellate court reviewed the record.  One of the justices of the court was 
disqualified to participate in the decision and the remaining six judges were equally 
divided in their conclusions.  Details regarding the appellate court's discussion were 
not provided.  Kansas Constitution, Article 3, Section 2 provides that the agreement 
of four judges is necessary for a decision.  In a case where there is an even split, the 
judgment of the trial court must stand.  Therefore, the judgment of the district court 
was affirmed by an equally divided court.   
 
Greider v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512, Johnson County 
710 F. Supp 296 (D. Kan. 1989) 
 
Alexander Greider was an eighth grade student in the fall of 1985.  He was 
enrolled in an industrial arts class taught by Mark Isenberg and was injured in that 
class while using a table saw.  Greider had been classified as behaviorally-disturbed 
and was therefore "handicapped" under the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act of 1975.  As he was considered handicapped, Greider was required to have an 
Individual Education Plan (IEP) developed by school representatives and his parents 
to meet his needs.  One of his special education teachers determined that Greider 
should be placed in Isenberg's woodworking class, where he severely injured his hand 
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on the table saw.  Greider brought suit through his father contending that the school 
district and Isenberg were negligent.  He claimed that the defendants failed to take 
reasonable steps to protect his safety by: placing him in the class despite his disability, 
failing to properly notify Isenberg of his disability, failing to properly instruct him on 
safety procedures, and failing to provide proper guards and warnings on the table saw.  
The defendants made a motion for summary judgment arguing that all actions of 
which Greider complained were discretionary and were therefore entitled to immunity 
under the Kansas Tort Claims Act, K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq. (KTCA). 
The KTCA is applicable to school districts and their employees.  K.S.A. 75-
6104 provides that "a governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of 
the employee's employment shall not be liable for damages resulting from...  (e) any 
claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty...whether or not the discretion is abused and regardless 
of the level of discretion involved."  As no workable definition of "discretionary" is 
provided by the statute, the court turned to a line of court cases cited within Dougan v. 
Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 757 P.2d 272 (1988) which dealt with 
discretionary exception to give them some guidance.  In Dougan, the court held that 
in general, under KTCA, liability is the rule and immunity is the exception.  The court 
also noted in Dougan that the discretionary function exception was available only 
when no mandatory duty or guidelines exist.  The line of Kansas cases cited in 
Dougan relied on the presence or absence of a legal duty in deciding whether the 
discretionary exception should apply.  In this case, the school board would only be 
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entitled to immunity if its actions were not governed by any "readily ascertainable 
standard," or if no legal duty to act in a certain manner existed.  The court found here 
that the defendants were under a legal duty to supervise Greider in the woodworking 
class and to take reasonable steps to protect his safety.  At the minimum, he should 
have been properly instructed on safety procedures and guards should have been 
placed on the table saw.  Those are not "discretionary" matters.  Therefore, the 
discretionary function exception did not apply to this case and the defendants were 
not entitled to immunity under the KTCA.  The defendant's motion for summary 
judgment was denied. 
 
Hackler v. Unified School District No. 500, Kansas City 
777 P.2d 839 (Kan. 1989) 
 
Stephen Hackler brought a personal injury action against USD 500 because he 
had been hit by a car when he tried to cross the street after getting off a school bus.  
On April 15, 1989, Stephen rode the school bus home, as he had all year, and got off 
at a bus stop on the south side of Leavenworth Road, which was across the street 
from his home.  He did not cross the street immediately, but walked along the south 
side of the road for a while.  After the bus had left the area, he attempted to cross 
Leavenworth Road about a block from his house and was hit by a car.  Leavenworth 
Road was a busy street and there were school bus stops on both sides of the road.  
Before school had started, a letter was sent to all parents asking them to select the bus 
stop nearest their home and on their side of the street.  The bus driver had been told 
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not to allow students to cross Leavenworth Road but stated that she was not aware of 
the fact that Stephen lived on the north side of the street.  Stephen's father claimed 
that he had not seen the letter and did not know there was a bus stop on the north side, 
so he chose the south side bus stop.  The Plaintiffs filed action claiming the District 
owed several duties to Stephen and their breach in duty was the cause of Stephen's 
accident.  The trial court found that the school district did not owe any duty to the 
plaintiff that was breached.  The plaintiffs appealed this decision.   
The questions raised on appeal were:  Did the school district breach any duty 
it owed to Stephen?  If it had, was the District exempt under the discretionary 
function exemption of the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 75-
6104(e)?  Moreover, were any acts or omissions of the school district the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff's injuries?  The plaintiff relied on provisions of K.A.R. 36-13-31.  
This regulation outlines the duties of transportation supervisors and bus drivers, such 
as planning bus routes, supervising the loading and unloading of passengers, 
requiring students to cross the street in front of the school bus, and not moving the 
bus until all students needing to cross the street have done so.  The court found that 
the school district did not owe the duty of selecting the bus for a student to ride.  That 
decision was delegated to parents who would better know which stop was nearest to 
their homes.  The court also found that although the regulations required bus drivers 
to supervise children crossing the street, that duty only applied to children who had to 
cross the street.  As far as the bus driver was aware, none of the children she 
transported had to cross Leavenworth Road.  The driver had no duty to direct children 
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to cross the road in front of the bus when as far as she knew none of them intended to 
do so.  The court also found nothing in the regulations that required a school district 
to unload students on the side of the street on which they live.  It was the courts' 
opinion that the school district had not ignored or violated any of the provisions of 
K.A.R. 36-13-31.  As the district had not breached any duty owed to Stephen, the 
other two questions did not need to be addressed.  The judgment of the trial court was 
affirmed. 
 
Nichols v. Unified School District No. 400 
785 P.2d 986 (Kan. 1990) 
 
Jeffrey Nichols played football for Smoky Valley High School and was 
injured after a nighttime practice held on August 23, 1985.  When practice ended, the 
head coach told the players to run to the locker room from the practice field.  In 
between the practice field and the locker room was a waterway that provided drainage 
for a playground.  As he was going to the locker room, Nichols stumbled as he ran 
through the waterway and then continued on to the locker room.  After he showered, 
Nichols sat down and felt a sharp pain in his back.  Nichols sued the school district 
alleging the football coach was negligent in requiring players to run to the locker 
room in darkness and negligent in failing to proper supervise the team.  All parties 
agreed that the coach did not intentionally hurt Nichols.  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the school district based upon the discretionary 
function and recreational use exceptions to the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), 
K.S.A. 75-6104.  Nichols appealed this decision.  In an unpublished opinion, the 
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Court of Appeals, 777 P.2d 861, affirmed the decision of the district court.  The court 
held that the recreational use exception provided immunity to the school district and 
to the football coach as an employee who acted within the scope of his employment.  
Nichols appealed to the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
The KTCA is an act which makes governmental liability the rule and 
immunity the exception.  However, K.S.A. 75-6104(n) provides for statutory 
exceptions to liability.  It provides that an employee of a governmental agency acting 
within the scope of employment will not be liable for "damages resulting from any 
claim for injuries resulting from the use of any public property intended or permitted 
to be used as a park, playground or open area for recreational purposes, unless [the 
employee] is guilty of gross and wanton negligence proximately causing such injury."  
Nichols and amicus curiae Kansas Trial Lawyers Association argued that the 
recreational use exception did not apply to injuries that occurred during a supervised 
activity by a school district.  The Supreme Court found this argument to be without 
merit due to the "plain language of the statute."  The language of the statute clearly 
stated that immunity existed for any injury resulting from the use of property intended 
for recreational purposes.  Next, amicus curiae argued that immunity was only 
available to the school district when the injury was a result of the condition of the 
public property.  To support their argument, amicus relied on previous cases in which 
they claimed that immunity was granted because the injuries were the result of the 
condition of the premises.  Here, Nichols claimed the injury was the result of 
negligent supervision, not of any defective condition of the field.  The court disagreed, 
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pointing to Boaldin v. University of Kansas, 242 Kan. 288, 747 P.2d 811 (1987) in 
which a student was injured when he hit a tree while sledding down a campus hill.  
The court stated, "Trees at the bottom of Daisy Hill are no more a defective condition 
of the premises than the grassy waterway at Smoky Valley High School" (p. 989).  
The injury in Boaldin resulted from the use of the premises, not the condition.  The 
court further held that it would be too restrictive a reading of the recreational use 
exception statute if the injury had to be the result of the condition of the property in 
order for the governmental entity or employee to gain immunity.  The language of the 
statute clearly states "use" of property.  If the legislature had wanted to limit 
immunity to situations in which an injury was caused by the conditions on the 
property, it would have stated as much in the statute.  The judgment of the district 
court was affirmed.  
     
Kansas State Bank and Trust Company v. Specialized Transportation Services, 
Inc. 
819 P.2d 587 (Kan. 1991) 
 
This case is a tort action that arose out of the alleged sexual molestation of 
H.R. by her school bus driver.  H.R., a six-year-old girl with Down's syndrome, 
entered Bryant Elementary School in September 1985 and was placed in the trainable 
mentally handicapped (TMH) classroom.  H.R. was transported to and from school in 
a van operated by Specialized Transportation Services (S.T.S.) who had a contract 
with U.S.D. No. 259.  H. Aron Davidson was H.R.'s van driver from the fall of 1985 
until December 1986.  H.R.'s mother reported that in November 1985 Davidson 
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became irate when she asked him to park five or ten feet forward so that she could see 
his van from her kitchen window.  Mrs. R stated that Davidson became angry, yelled, 
and began to drive the van away before she could shut the door.  Mrs. R called Jerry 
Burns, the Bryant principal to report the incident the following day.  Burns initially 
told Mrs. R that he would see if he could switch Davidson to another route, he later 
told her that was not possible.  The day after the van door incident, Davidson required 
H.R. to sit in the front passenger seat next to him.  Mrs. R claimed that she began 
noticing a change in H.R.'s behavior following the door incident.  Mrs. R's babysitter 
also reported problems with Davidson and asked that Mrs. R call the school.  She 
again called Burns who said he would handle the problem.  H.R.'s behavior continued 
to worsen throughout the spring; however when she attended summer school and was 
driven by a different driver, her behavior improved.  In the fall of 1986, Davidson 
was once again H.R.'s van driver.  In October, Mrs. R attended H.R.'s IEP meeting 
with H.R.'s teacher, Kim Brown.  At that meeting, Brown reported that H.R. had been 
displaying some inappropriate behavior in school.  On December 10, Mrs. R was told 
that H.R. had been uncontrollable on the bus.  When Mrs. R talked to H.R. that 
evening about her behavior on the bus, H.R. reported that Davidson had touched her 
inappropriately in the genitals and buttocks.  Mrs. R requested a meeting the 
following day with Burns, Brown, the school counselor, the school psychologist and 
someone from the bus company.  She did not tell Burns the reason for the meeting.  
Paul Pritchard, the director of transportation, stated that Burns called him on the 
morning of December 11, 1986, to schedule the meeting and told him there was the 
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possibility that H.R. was being sexually molested by Davidson.  Pritchard contacted 
the manager of S.T.S. and requested that Davidson be taken off the route until the 
matter was investigated.  At the meeting, Burns stated that in hindsight he should 
have known something was wrong when Mrs. R had complained about Davidson and 
he had seen H.R. sitting on Davidson's lap.  Brown discussed H.R.'s behavior 
problems and stated that she did not suspect abuse.  H.R. had never shown any 
reluctance to get on the bus and Brown stated that she had no indication that 
Davidson would sexually molest one of the students.  After the December 11 meeting, 
Burns reported the allegations to the Kansas Department of Social Rehabilitation 
Services.  The investigators found that Davidson had not been arrested for any 
previous crime, nor had he been involved in any sort of sexual molestation.  An 
examination by a pediatrician showed a number of signs that indicated H.R. had been 
sexually abused.  Davidson denied all allegations against him.  He said that he 
required H.R. to sit in the front with him because she was uncontrollable in the back.  
He admitted allowing the younger students to sit on his lap.  Davidson reported that 
he had written up his concerns regarding H.R.'s behavior on the bus.  He wrote 
discipline slips until the bus supervisor, William Benjamin, told him not to.  Nelda 
Treadwell, the manager of the bus company, told Davidson to write up slips until 
something was done at the school.  The school bus incident reports were a five-copy 
form that was to be distributed to the parent, principal, bus contractor, driver, and 
district transportation department.  Mrs. R never received any discipline reports.  
Problems with Davidson had never been brought to the attention of Thurman Mitchell, 
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former supervisor of Student Transportation Services.  If he had been aware of such 
problems, he stated that he would have requested a conference with the driver, 
parents, and school administration to try to resolve the issue.   
The plaintiff , Kansas State Bank & Trust Company (Kansas State Bank) as 
conservator and next friend of H.R, filed suit against Davidson for intentional battery 
and against U.S.D. No. 259 and S.T.S. on theories of respondeat superior, negligent 
hiring, and negligent retention and supervision of Davidson.  U.S.D. 259 and S.T.S. 
were granted summary judgment on respondeat superior and negligent hiring claims 
when the trial court determined that the intentional criminal act of Davidson was 
outside the scope of his employment and facts showed Davidson was  competent and 
qualified for employment as a bus driver.  Summary judgment was denied as to 
negligent retention and supervision of Davidson.  The trial court also held that U.S.D. 
259 was not immune from liability under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) 
because the actions alleged by plaintiff to be wrongful were not discretionary 
functions.  U.S.D. 259 and S.T.S. moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiff 
rested its case.  They argued that they neither knew nor should have known that 
Davidson had a propensity to sexually molest children.  U.S.D. 259 again argued that 
it should have been granted immunity under the discretionary function provision of 
the KTCA.  The trial court denied the motion and sent the case to a jury to determine 
whether or not it was foreseeable that Davidson would commit a battery.  The jury 
returned a verdict for $1,800,000.  U.S.D. 259 and S.T.S. appealed the judgments and 
the case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Kansas Supreme Court. 
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U.S.D. 259 and S.T.S. appealed the denial of their motions for summary 
judgment and directed verdict on the issue of negligent retention and supervision of 
Davidson.  They argued that no evidence had been presented which showed that 
either U.S.D. 259 or S.T.S. should have known that Davidson would sexually molest 
one of the students riding on his bus.  There was no information that Davidson had 
mistreated his any of his student passengers, only that he had been rude towards 
parents and teachers.  The plaintiffs asserted that there was sufficient evidence to 
establish foreseeability.  They pointed out that H.R.'s teacher, Kim Brown had 
testified that she believed some of H.R.'s behavior problems were the result of 
exposure to sexual conduct and she had even questioned Mrs. R about this.  Principal 
Burns had told Pritchard that there was a possibility Davidson had molested H.R. 
before Mrs. R had told Burns the purpose for their meeting.  In light of these 
allegations, and after viewing all evidence in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court 
held that the trial court had not erred when it denied the defendants motions for 
summary judgment on this issue because foreseeability of the risk of harm was a jury 
question.  U.S.D. 259 next asserted that it should have been granted immunity under 
K.S.A. 75-6104(e), the "discretionary function" exception to the KTCA.  This statute 
states in relevant part that a governmental entity will not be liable for damages that 
result from "any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty."  The determining factor in 
deciding whether a governmental employee is exercising "discretionary function" is 
the nature and quality of the discretion exercised.  The more a judgment involves the 
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making of policy, the more it is of a nature and quality to be recognized as 
discretionary.  A failure to follow mandatory guidelines would not be subject to 
immunity under the discretionary function exception to the KTCA.  In this case, the 
U.S.D. 259 contract with S.T.S. addressed student discipline by bus drivers.  It stated 
that a driver "shall make prompt written reports to the Principal or principal's 
designee of the names and manner of conduct of any pupils who are undisciplined..."  
The testimony indicated that this policy was not followed.  Davidson had stated that 
he was told not to write so many reports.  The procedures called for Mitchell to 
receive a copy of the disciplinary slip.  Had he received five or six slips in a given 
time period he might have investigated and switched Davidson off the route if he 
could not handle a particular student.  Another copy of the bus incident report was 
supposed to go to the parent.  H.R. finally told her mother what was happening when 
her mother asked why she was not behaving on the bus.  H.R. might have told her 
mother sooner if U.S.D. 259 had followed its bus incident reporting procedure and 
sent a copy of Davidson's incident reports involving H.R. to her mother.  The court 
believed that the testimony indicated that if the reporting procedure had been 
followed, some type of remedial action might have been taken.  The development of 
the bus incident report was a discretionary act that involved the formulation of a 
policy.  However, U.S.D.259's employees were not making policy when they decided 
not to follow the required reporting procedure.  Based on the facts in this case, the 
Supreme Court held that it was for a jury to decide whether U.S.D. 259 would have 
been alerted to the problem if the reports had been made and distributed as required.  
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For this reason, the court found that the trial court had been correct in ruling that 
U.S.D. 259 was not entitled to immunity under the discretionary function exception.  
The court also found that the amount awarded in damages was fair.  The $500,000 
limit on liability under K.S.A. 75-6105 of the KTCA was not applicable because 
U.S.D. 259 had entered into a contract of insurance that provided coverage in excess 
of that amount.  
 
Honeycutt By and Through Phillips v. City of Wichita 
836 P.2d 1128 (Kan. 1992) 
 
Jeremy Honeycutt was a kindergarten student at Irving Elementary School.  
Jeremy was usually taken to school by his grandfather, who sometimes walked and 
sometimes drove.  If his grandfather could not transport him, either his mother or a 
friend provided transportation.  On March 5, 1987, Jeremy was walking home 
unsupervised.  Railroad tracks ran on a diagonal between the school and Jeremy's 
home.  As a train was passing by, Jeremy ran alongside of it and tried to touch the 
train.  He fell under the wheels and lost parts of both legs.  A negligence suit was 
filed on Jeremy's behalf against Union Pacific Railroad Corporation and Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Company (Railroads), the City of Wichita (City), and U.S.D. No. 
259.  Jeremy claimed that U.S.D. No. 259 owed him the following duties: (1) to retain 
him until an authorized adult took custody of him, (2) to retain him on school 
property through a "hold back" policy, and (3) to establish a safety patrol at the 
railroad crossing.  He also claimed that the school district was not immune under the 
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Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).  The District Court granted the guardian's motion 
for partial summary judgment that the child could not be comparatively at fault.  On 
appeal, the Supreme Court, 247 Kan. 250, 796 P.2d 549, reversed and remanded.  On 
remand, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district.  
The trial court ruled that U.S.D. No. 259 did not owe a duty to supervise Jeremy off 
school property and after school hours.  Jeremy appealed this decision.  U.S.D. 259 
argued that Jeremy's appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 
because the first notice was premature and the second notice of appeal was filed too 
late.  
After reviewing the timeline of events, the court found that Jeremy's second 
notice of appeal was filed after the 30-day deadline and therefore the court did not 
have jurisdiction.  However, although his first notice of appeal was premature, it was 
validated by the final judgment of the trial court which disposed of all claims and all 
parties.  The court held that the premature notice of appeal in this case would not 
harm the school district because they would have known of "the intent to appeal prior 
to the final judgment and would be in the same position as if a notice of appeal had 
been filed after the final judgment" (p. 1136).  Once the issue of the timeliness of the 
appeals was settled, the court turned to the argument that U.S.D. No. 259 owed 
Jeremy a duty of care.  Jeremy relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 
324A (1964) which provided that one who undertakes to provide services to another 
"which he should recognize as necessary to the protection of a third person, is subject 
to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
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reasonable care to protect his undertaking."  The courts have established principles 
that must be met in order for Section 324A to be applied.  The "threshold 
requirement" for the application of Section 324A is that the defendant did more than 
act, but "through affirmative action assumed an obligation or intended to render 
services for the benefits of another" (p. 1137).  Furthermore, the person to whom the 
services are directed must accept such services.  U.S.D. No. 259's Board of Education 
Policy No.  P1360.01 stated that school personnel were "neither legally liable nor 
legally responsible" for students traveling to and from school if the students walked 
or furnished their own transportation.  This is relevant because it shows that the 
school district had not affirmatively assumed a duty to protect Jeremy on his way to 
and from school.  The District had no policy that prohibited kindergartners from 
walking home alone.  Jeremy's guardians had never asked that the school retain him 
until one of them arrived to pick him up.  While policy allowed the placement of a 
safety patrol at the railroad tracks by the school principal "as needed," it was not 
required.  Jeremy could not prove that U.S.D. 259 had assumed a duty to him through 
its conduct or written policies.  Jeremy's second reason for the claim that the school 
district owed a duty was that the "special relationship" between the District and 
Jeremy created such a duty.  Jeremy argued that the school district policies that 
described safety procedures and mentioned safety patrols caused a special 
relationship between the school and the safety patrol which created a duty.  The 
appellate court did not agree with this argument and cited the finding of the trial court 
which had held that the policy was not a "specific mandatory set of guidelines" 
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sufficient to give rise to a duty.  The policy left it up to the administrator to determine 
when safety patrols are "needed."  There was no mandatory language in the policy 
such as "shall" or "must."  For these reasons, the decision of the district court was 
affirmed.  
 
Boos v. The National Federation of State High School Associations  
889 P.2d 797 (Kan. App. 1995) 
 
In 1985, Philip Boos, his parents, the National Federation of State High 
School Associations (NFSHSA), the Kansas State High School Activities Association 
(KSHSAA), and USD 428 together with the insurance carrier, Fund Company 
Limited (the Company), entered into a settlement agreement in a suit which sought 
damages for negligence for injuries Boos suffered when he dove into the high school 
swimming pool.  The settlement agreement provided stipulations for the payment of 
damages to Boos and his family.  In 1993, Boos filed a motion that alleged the 
Company had failed to pay a portion of his medical expenses as required by the 
agreement.  He claimed that all of the defendants were liable under the agreement 
because the Company was simply their agent for payment.  Defendants claimed that 
the settlement agreement had released them from all liability in connection with the 
accident.  The trial court found in favor of Boos.  It determined that although the 
parties intended to compensate Boos and release the defendants from liability, it was 
the court's belief that "the intent of the parties was the Defendants were obligated and 
 
28 
 
responsible to see the payments were made to the Plaintiffs as set forth in 
the ...Settlement Agreement" (p. 801).  The defendants appealed.   
The central issue was whether the original settlement agreement bound the 
defendants to pay the plaintiff if the Company did not do so.  The court turned to the 
language of the settlement agreement to make its decision.  All parties agreed, and the 
court held, that the contract was not ambiguous.  The failure of the contract to address 
whether the defendants would incur future liability did not make it ambiguous; it 
more likely meant that there was no such obligation.  It was the plaintiff's burden to 
prove the contract required the defendants to bear the responsibility for the 
Company's failure to pay.  The only duties placed on the defendants under the terms 
of the agreement were the payment of $3,811.57 and $1,000 in attorney's fees.  
Paragraph 3 of the contract imposed only on the Company the duty to perform all 
other payment obligations set forth in its subparagraphs.  No provisions were made 
for the defendants to make payments under paragraph 3 if the Company failed to do 
so.  Boos had agreed to the terms of the contract that clearly bound the Company to 
make payments, not the defendants.  The appellate court found the trial court in error 
when it did not enforce the "clear and unambiguous wording" of the contract.  The 
trial court's decision was reversed. 
If the settlement agreement had stated that the defendants would be 
responsible for the insurance company's obligations, they would have been required 
to pay the damages.  In the absence of such language, the defendants were not liable 
for the failure of the insurance company to cover medical expenses.  The trial court 
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could not rewrite the terms of the settlement agreement to make the defendants 
responsible for the error of their insurer. 
 
Lanning By and Through Lanning v. Anderson 
921 P.2d 813 (Kan. App. 1996) 
 
On May 12, 1993, Marcus Lanning was hit in the head by a discus while he 
was at track practice at Cherryvale Middle School.  Marcus and other members of the 
relay team were walking toward the school, taking a sidewalk that went through the 
middle of the playground, when the discus was thrown from 80-90 feet away.  As a 
result of the accident, Marcus suffered various cognitive defects and was told he 
could never participate in contact sports again.  The practice was supervised by two 
track coaches, Jeff Anderson and Chuck Stockton.  At the time of the accident, 
Stockton was working with the girls' relay team.  Anderson had told the boys' relay 
team to run two laps and then go to the locker room.  Anderson did not tell the boys 
to take any particular route and he did not see them walking down the middle 
sidewalk.  Middle school track practice normally took place at the high school track, 
but Anderson decided to use the middle school playground because of muddy 
conditions at the high school track.  Coaches had held discus practice at the middle 
school playground approximately 10 times previous to the date of the accident and 
there had been no incidents.  Lanning brought a personal injury action against Coach 
Anderson and the Board of Education of Unified School District No. 447.  After all 
evidence had been presented to the district court, the defense moved for a directed 
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verdict on the grounds that there was not sufficient evidence to go to jury on the 
question of gross and wanton negligence.  The district court denied the motion and 
the case went before a jury.  The jury found the defendants guilty of gross and wanton 
negligence and awarded Lanning $252,731.94 in damages.  Anderson and the school 
district moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for 
another trial.  The district court judge denied the motion.  Anderson and the school 
district appealed arguing that the district court had erred when it refused to grant a 
directed verdict and that there was not sufficient evidence to prove gross and wanton 
negligence. 
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the court must resolve all facts and 
inferences drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is 
sought and, where reasonable minds could reach a different conclusion based on the 
evidence, the motion must be denied and the issue submitted to a jury.  It is only 
when reasonable persons could not reach a different conclusion from the same 
evidence that the issue can be decided as a question of law.  Under the Kansas Tort 
Claims Act (KTCA), governmental liability is the rule and immunity is the exception 
as determined by Nichols v. U.S.D. No. 400, 246 Kan. 93, 785 P.2d 986 (1990).  
However, K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 75-6104 allows an exception for public property that is 
used or intended for recreation.  This statute provides that governmental entities or 
employees acting within the scope of their employment "shall not be liable for 
damages resulting from (o) any claim for injuries resulting from the use of any public 
property intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground or open area for 
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recreational purposes, unless the governmental entity or employee is guilty of gross 
and wanton negligence..."  Court cases that had previously interpreted the recreational 
use exception defined gross and wanton negligence as knowledge of a dangerous 
condition and indifference or reckless disregard to the consequences.  In the case at 
hand, there had been no prior accident or "close call" that might have give the 
coaches some sort of notice that a dangerous condition existed.  The coaches 
indicated in their testimony that if they had realized the imminence of danger, they 
would have done things differently at practice.  The coaches did not foresee that the 
boys would cut across the middle of the field nor did they foresee that the discus 
throwers would fail to see the group on the sidewalk in time to warn them.  The team 
had practiced at the same field several times that same spring without any incident.  
Because of this, the appellate court found that there was "no evidence to support a 
finding that the coaches realized the imminence of danger or that the coaches had 
reason to believe that someone would be injured at track practice" (p. 820).  It further 
held that the district court had erred when it allowed the gross and wanton negligence 
question to go to the jury.  Lanning argued that the recreational use exception did not 
apply to school-sponsored, supervised activities.  In Nichols, the Kansas Supreme 
Court held that K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 75-6104(o) applied when a student was injured 
after the football coach had told the athletes to run in darkness to the locker room 
through a grassy waterway.  The Nichols court specifically rejected the argument that 
the KTCA did not apply to supervised activities.  Thus, the appellate court concluded 
the same in this case.  The court also found against Lanning's argument that the 
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middle school playground was not a public recreational area as contemplated by 
K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 75-6104(o) when it pointed out that the language of the statute 
specifically mentions the term "playground."   
 
Kimes v. Unified School District No. 480, Seward County 
934 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Kan. 1996) 
 
Janet Kimes, the plaintiff, was a student in the welding program at Liberal 
Area Vocational Technical School.  She brought action against the school district 
alleging negligence arising from a fall she took in the school's welding area.  On 
October 30, 1992, Kimes fell while walking through the welding shop.  As she fell, 
she grabbed onto a welder to catch her balance and a cylinder of pressurized gas 
detached from the welder and landed on Kimes.  She suffered head and facial injuries.  
Kimes accident occurred at the end of the class while students were cleaning up.  
Kimes had not been working in the welding shop that afternoon and she had no 
reason for walking through the shop.  Neither Kimes nor any witness to the accident 
knew what caused her to fall.  A few witnesses noticed water and some welding beads 
on the floor in the area where Kimes fell.  Another mentioned seeing the power cord 
from the welder on the floor.  Kimes alleged that the defendant school district had 
failed to maintain the floor of the shop in a safe manner, that they had failed to 
maintain the welder and its attached gas cylinder in accordance with the 
manufacturer's recommendations, and that they failed to provide adequate supervision 
of the welding students.  The school district moved for summary judgment. 
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To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a 
duty to the plaintiff, that the defendant breached that duty, and that a causal 
connection existed between the breach and the plaintiff's injury.  The court first 
addressed whether the defendant had failed to maintain the floor of the welding shop 
in a reasonably safe condition.  The court found that the items mentioned by 
witnesses did not "constitute concealed dangers of which the defendant had a duty to 
warn the plaintiff" (p. 1279).  Welding beads and a power cord were considered to be 
normal components of a welding shop.  Kimes admitted that students were taught to 
weld and use equipment in a safe manner and students in the welding class were in 
the process of cleaning the area when she walked through.  Thus, the court concluded 
that Kimes had failed to establish the defendant had breached any duty regarding the 
floor or the work area.  The water that had accumulated on the walkway could have 
constituted a dangerous condition of which the defendant had a duty to warn if the 
defendant had knowledge of the condition, or the condition had been there for such a 
length of time that the defendant should have known about it.  One witness mentioned 
that it had started to snow and that the walkway was wet from people coming in from 
outside.  However, Kimes could offer no evidence as to how long the walkway had 
been wet or that the defendant knew it was wet.  In Carter v. Food Ctr., Inc., 207 Kan. 
332, 485 P.2d 306 (1971), the court held that "where the plaintiff fails to show that an 
allegedly dangerous substance had been on the floor for any length of time prior to 
her fall, or that the defendant had knowledge of its presence, the plaintiff cannot 
recover for negligence" Carter, 485 P.2d at 310.  Next, the court turned towards the 
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claim that the welder had not been maintained in accordance with the manufacturer's 
recommendations.  The school district admitted that it had the responsibility to 
maintain the school's welder.  While Kimes alleged several ways she believed the 
welding assembly was unsafe, she did not provide the court with anything showing 
what the relevant industry standards were for such equipment.  She referred the court 
to excerpts from the operating manual that accompanied the welder, but offered no 
evidence showing that the gas cylinder had been in an unsafe position at the time of 
her accident.  The court found that "in the absence of any proof that the welder and 
gas cylinder were in a dangerous condition at the time Ms. Kimes fell, no reasonable 
jury could find the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care to keep its premises in a 
reasonably safe condition" (p. 1281).  Finally, the court addressed Kimes' claims of 
negligent supervision.  The claims of negligent supervision due to the condition of the 
floor and the welder failed because of the court's decision above.  Kimes' claim that 
the defendant failed to enforce clothing and eyewear safety requirements was related 
to the claim that the defendant had promoted an unsupervised and unsafe activity, that 
being a Halloween party.  The facts of the case established that there had been no 
organized party on the day of the accident.  However, students had been allowed to 
wear Halloween costumes to school that day.  Kimes stated that she was wearing 
boots as a part of her costume.  She also maintained that she had worn the same boots 
to school on previous occasions.  The court noted that if the boots represented Kimes' 
"ordinary footwear, than she cannot claim that the defendant's authorization of 
Halloween costumes caused her to dress in an unsafe manner" (p. 1281).  Mr. Hamey, 
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the instructor, testified that he had told Kimes that she should not work in the shop 
area while dressed in her "biker" costume of boots and sunglasses.  Kimes had 
previously admitted that she had not been working in the welding area and she 
offered no explanation for her presence in the shop that day.  The court could find 
nothing to support that Kimes' injuries were the result of the failure of the school 
district to enforce clothing and safety eyewear requirements.  Accordingly, the court 
granted the school district's motion for summary judgment.   
 
Beshears By and Through Reiman v. Unified School District No. 305 
 930 P.2d 1376 (Kan. 1997) 
 
Brent Beshears, by and through his mother Babette Reiman, claimed that 
negligence on the part of the school district caused his paralyzing neck injury which 
resulted from a fight with Salina South classmate, Michael Jester.  Beshears originally 
sued Jester and Jester’s parents but after discovering Jester had an extensive 
discipline record and had made statements to school officials before the fight, the 
school district was added to the suit.  Beshears alleged negligent supervision on the 
part of USD 305.  Two days before the fight, Jester had told a counselor and assistant 
principal that Beshears and another student had been yelling at him.  He reported that 
he did not think it would get serious but that he wanted the school to know it had been 
going on so that if the boys started something the school would know that it was not 
his fault.  Jester was on a discipline plan for disruptive classroom behavior and knew 
he would receive a long-term suspension from school if he had any further problems.  
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Jester did not say that he was going to fight Beshears, nor did he ever return to the 
counselor or assistant principal to report further problems.  The fight between 
Beshears and Jester took place after track practice on a county road.  Jester’s 
disciplinary records indicated that he had various problems in school dealing with 
such things as off-task behavior, throwing spitballs, and not staying in his seat.  These 
incidents resulted in him being placed on probation.  As long as Jester stayed out of 
trouble and made satisfactory academic progress, he would be allowed to stay in 
school.  If not, he could be suspended for the remainder of the semester.  Jester was 
sent to the office once during his probationary period but because his teachers 
reported he had been showing improvement, he was not suspended.  The district court 
concluded that “neither the law nor the uncontroverted facts of this case” gave rise to 
create a duty whereby the school district should be expected to anticipate or prevent 
the injuries suffered by Beshears or create a duty by reason of the ‘special 
relationship doctrine’ (p. 1381).  No legal duty was owed to the plaintiffs because the 
district had no knowledge of the prearranged fight and thus had no way to intervene 
to prevent it from occurring.  While Jester’s disciplinary file showed him to be a 
disruptive student, there was no evidence from which to conclude that he had “vicious 
tendencies towards other students in general, and the plaintiff Brent Beshears in 
particular” (p. 1381).  The Saline District Court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the district and authorized interlocutory appeal.  The plaintiffs appealed the 
decision. 
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 provides: "There is no duty so to 
control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to 
another unless "(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person 
which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a 
special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right 
to protection."  Beshears argued that this special relationship doctrine should impose 
a duty on USD 305.  The appellate court did not agree stating in part, “we have found 
a duty owing under section 315(a) only in situations in which the party owing the 
duty did have the ability or right to control the third person causing the harm.  The 
school district acknowledges that a special relationship and duty to supervise students 
exists during the school day.  They hold that this special relationship does not exist 
off campus.  USD 305 had neither the ability nor the right to control Jesters or 
Beshears under the facts here” (p. 1382).  The court also discussed the nature of the 
duty owed by school officials to students in three cases:  Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 
251 Kan.451, 836 P. 2d 1128 (1992); Hackler v. U.S.D. No. 500, 245 Kan. 295, 777 
P. 2d 839 (1989); and Sly v. Board of Education, 213 Kan. 415, 516 P. 2d 895 (1973).  
In Honeycutt, the court rejected the notion that the special relationship between a 
school district and a student created a duty to protect the student on the way home 
after leaving school grounds.  To do so would “create an intolerable burden for the 
school” Honeycutt, 251 Kan. at 469.  The court in Sly held that “deliberate and 
malicious assaults by students should not be required to be anticipated by school 
personnel in the absence of notice of prior misconduct...” 213 Kan. at 425.  Sly 
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controls this case.  USD 305 could not have foreseen the off-campus, after hours fight 
between Beshears and Jester.  Beshears claimed this duty of care was owed to him by 
the fact that the school failed to follow its own policies by not suspending Jester when 
he broke his probation.  The court disagreed.  The school districts efforts to keep 
Jester in school rather than expel him should not result in liability.  This liability, 
according to the court would work against the public benefit of educating all students.  
USD 305's expulsion policies, according to the court, gave the school "the authority 
to expel students, but they do not mandate suspension or expulsion.  School officials 
retain discretion" (p. 1384).  None of the circumstances for imposing a duty were 
present in this case.  The district court decision was affirmed.  
Allowing Jester to remain in school did not increase the risk of harm to 
Beshears who voluntarily participated in the fight.  Jester's disciplinary problems did 
not present any risk of danger to other students.  With no knowledge of the 
prearranged fight, there was no way it could have been prevented by school officials. 
 
Jackson ex rel. Essien v. Unified School District No. 259 
995 P.2d 844 (Kan. 2000) 
 
Larry Jackson participated in a required physical education class at Hamilton 
Middle School.  During class, a student asked the teacher if they could use a 
springboard to jump into the air so that they could dunk a basketball.  When Jackson 
attempted this, he fell to the floor and broke his right forearm in two places.  Jackson, 
through his mother Virgie Essien, filed suit against the school district alleging that 
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negligent conduct caused his injuries.  The defendant moved for summary judgment 
under the recreational use provision of the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) K.S.A. 
75-6101 et seq. and claimed that the KTCA provided qualified immunity.  The 
district court granted the school district's motion.  Jackson appealed.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in Jackson v. U.S.D. 259, 26 
Kan.App.2d 111, 979 P.2d 151 (1999).  The plaintiff requested review by the Kansas 
Supreme Court and that requested was granted. 
In order for a governmental entity to avoid liability under the KTCA, it must 
prove that it falls within one of the exceptions found in K.S.A. 75-6104.  K.S.A. 75-
6104(e) provides immunity for "any claim for injuries resulting from the use of public 
property intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground, or open area for 
recreational purposes, unless the governmental entity or employee is guilty of gross 
and wanton negligence."  In this case, the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant 
was guilty of gross or wanton negligence.  The plaintiffs argued that the gym was not 
"public property" because access to the gym was limited.  The court determined that 
"limited access to governmental property does not mean that the property is not 
public" and held that the school gymnasium was indeed public property.  (p. 847) The 
plaintiffs next asserted that the legislation intended for "open area" to be limited to 
outdoor areas.  The court reviewed previous appellate court cases that provided 
immunity from injuries occurring on a football practice field, a school playground, 
and a sledding area.  After this review, the court held that "it defies common sense" to 
hold that K.S.A. 75-6104(o) provides immunity from injuries which occurred in all of 
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these other locations but not on a basketball court just because it is not outdoors.  
Thus, the Supreme Court found that the school gymnasium qualified as an "open 
area."  The plaintiff's argument that because there had been no previous cases which 
applied K.S.A. 75-6104(o) to the inside of a school gym was without merit because 
"there must always be a first case" (p. 849)  Next, the court turned to the issue of 
whether the gymnasium was a property used for "recreational purposes."  Because the 
injury occurred during class, the plaintiffs argued that the gym was not "property 
intended or permitted to be used...for recreational purposes."  In order for a location 
to fall within K.S.A. 75-6104(o), the location must be "permitted or intended" for 
such use, the injury did not have to be the result of "recreation."  The Supreme Court 
reviewed the history of the recreational use exception and could find no committee 
notes that specified locations that would fall under this exception.  The court also 
discussed court cases from Illinois, which had a statute similar to that of Kansas.  In 
Ozuk v. River Grove Board of Education, 281 Ill.App.3d 239, 217 Ill.Dec.18, 666 
N.E.2d 687 (1996), a student fell in physical education class and was injured.  The 
Illinois Appellate Court found that the school gymnasium would fall under the 
immunity statute if it was "encouraged, intended, or permitted to be used for recess, 
extracurricular events, or other recreational, noncompulsory activities..."  Ozuk, 281 
Ill.App.3d at 243.  The Illinois court further remanded the case to the district court to 
determine the permitted use of the gymnasium.  The Kansas Supreme Court adopted 
the holding of the Illinois court and remanded this case to the district court to 
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determine whether the Hamilton Middle School gymnasium was intended or 
permitted to be used for recreational purposes. 
 
Wright v. Unified School District No. 379 
14 P.3d 437 (Kan. App. 2000) 
 
Travis Wright was a student at Clay Center Community High School in 
February of 1996.  Wright participated on the wrestling team during this time under 
the direction of Keith George, the wrestling coach.  Benny Wallace, a former student 
and wrestler at Clay Center, was asked by George to come to practice and wrestle 
Wright because there was no one on the team with Wright's skill and size.  One 
afternoon at practice, Wallace placed a move on Wright that caused a serious injury 
to Wright's knee.  When the accident occurred, George and his assistant coach were 
wrestling with other students.  Wright filed suit against U.S.D. 379, George, and 
Wallace, claiming that the proximate cause of his injury was the negligence of the 
defendants to allow Wallace to wrestle against him.  The defendants moved for 
summary judgment, claiming they were immune from liability under K.S.A. 75-
6104(0), the recreational use exception of the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).  The 
trial court denied the defendants' motion for immunity under the recreational use 
exception holding that K.S.A. 75-6104(o) was only applicable to outdoor areas.  
Instead, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment based 
on the discretionary function exception of the act.  Wright appealed the trial court's 
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decision.  The defendants cross-appealed from the judgment of the trial court denying 
their summary judgment motion on different grounds.  
At issue for the appellate court was:  (1) Whether the defendants were 
immune from liability under the recreational exception of K.S.A. 75-6104(o); and (2) 
if they were, whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on those grounds.  K.S.A. 75-6104(o) provides in relevant part 
that a governmental entity or employee will not be liable for damages that result from 
"any claim for injuries resulting from the use of any public property intended or 
permitted to be used as a park, playground or open area for recreational purposes, 
unless the governmental entity or employee is guilty of gross and wanton 
negligence."  Wright's injury occurred in the wrestling room, which was in the 
southeast corner of the gym, next to the weight room.  The wrestling room, weight 
room and gymnasium were all connected and considered to be part of the school's 
physical education facility.  The wresting and weight rooms had been used by the 
public for weightlifting, aerobics and wrestling activities.  The school district's 
general policy was that if an organized school activity was not using the areas, they 
were open to the public.  The Kansas Supreme Court in v. U.S.D. 259, 268 Kan. 319, 
995 P.2d 844 (2000), addressed the issue of whether an area, such as the wrestling 
room could be considered a "park, playground or open area" within the meaning of 
K.S.A. 75-6104(o).  In Jackson, the court held that the indoor high school gymnasium 
was an open area.  Jackson specifically rejected the argument that K.S.A. 75-6104(o) 
was limited to outdoor areas and further emphasized that the injury need not be the 
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result of participating in recreation as long as the injury occurred on public property 
"intended or permitted to be used…for recreational purposes."  Jackson, 268 Kan. at 
326.  In the case at hand, the wrestling room had been used by the public for 
recreational purposes.  In addition, being a member of and practicing with the 
wrestling team was a noncompulsory activity that would be considered a recreational 
activity.  Accordingly, the appellate court held that the defendants were immune 
under the recreational use exception of the KTCA as the wrestling room was 
considered an "open area" under the Act.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed 
in part and reversed in part.                   
 
Jackson ex rel. Essien v. Unified School District No. 259 
31 P.3d 989 (Kan. App. 2001) 
 
This is Larry Jackson's second appeal.  In his first appeal, Jackson v. U.S.D. 
259, 268 Kan. 319, 995 P.2d 844 (2000) (Jackson I), the Kansas Supreme Court 
remanded the case for a factual determination.  Jackson, who injured his arm in a 
physical education class, sued the school district for negligence.  The trial court 
granted the District's motion for summary judgment based on the recreational use 
exception to the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).  Jackson appealed.  The Supreme 
Court held that a gymnasium fell within the recreational use exception and then 
remanded the case for a determination of whether the school gymnasium was 
intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes.  On remand, the school 
district filed a motion for summary judgment.  Jackson filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment and argued that K.S.A. 75-6104(o) as it was interpreted in 
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Jackson I violated his equal protection and due process rights.  The Attorney General 
intervened to argue the constitutionality of K.S.A. 7506104(o).  The trial court 
granted the District's motion for summary judgment and denied Jackson's motion.  
Jackson appealed this decision. 
        Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that "no state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law..."  Before determining that a statute is 
unconstitutional, the statute "must clearly appear to violate the constitution."  State ex 
rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov. of WyandotteCo./Kansas City, 264 Kan. 293, 300, 955 
P.2d 1136 (1998).  All parties in this case agreed to apply the rational basis standard 
to analyze the statute.  This type of analysis requires a finding of a valid State interest 
and a reasonable relationship between the legislation and that interest.  In Jackson I, 
the court stated, "The purpose of K.S.A. 75-6104(o) is to provide immunity to a 
governmental entity when it might normally be liable for damages which are the 
result of ordinary negligence."  268 Kan. at 331.  This immunity would allow 
governmental entities to build recreational facilities for public use without fear of the 
high cost of litigation that could occur in cases of simple negligence.  The public 
benefits from having recreational facilities for their use, often times at no cost.  This 
creates a valid State interest in the legislation as well as a rational connection between 
the legislation and the State interest.  For these reasons, the appellate court held that 
K.S.A. 75-6104(e) was constitutional.  Jackson argued that the KCTA took away his 
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right to seek recovery for simple negligence.  The court agreed that the recreational 
use exception was a change from the general rule of liability found in K.S.A. 75-
6103.  It noted, however, that "governmental immunity was a part of the common law 
at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted" and this immunity applied to school 
districts (p. 993). Jackson failed to establish that there was ever a remedy for simple 
negligence in cases similar to this.  Finally, Jackson argued that the trial court should 
not have granted the school district's motion for summary judgment and erred in its 
determination that the recreational use of the gymnasium was beyond incidental.  
K.S.A. 75-6104(o) requires that the location be "intended or permitted to be used for 
recreational purposes."  It also requires that the minimum amount of recreational use 
must be more than incidental.  In the school district's motion for summary judgment, 
facts were presented to show that the middle school gymnasium was used by the 
public for many events and by many different groups.  These facts made it clear that 
the gymnasium was used for recreational purposes well beyond incidental use.  The 
court held that the school gymnasium qualified for the recreational use exception and 
affirmed the decision of the district court.  
 
Glaser v. Emporia Unified School District No. 253 
21 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2001) 
 
Todd Glaser was a 12-year-old seventh-grade student when he was injured 
after being hit by a car on a public street adjacent to school property.  Todd had been 
on school property before classes started and was unsupervised by USD 253 
employees.  Prior to the accident, a teacher, Douglas Epp, saw Todd and another 
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student running in an area next to the public street.  Glaser alleged that Epp took no 
action and continued walking towards the school.  Epp claimed he cautioned the boys 
from playing around the cars near the street.  After the accident, Glaser brought a 
personal injury action against the driver, school district, and Epp.  He settled the 
claims against the driver, and the district made a motion for summary judgment from 
the district court.  The district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that, 
under the circumstances, neither Epp nor the school district had a duty to supervise 
Glaser.  The court noted that the school district did not "exercise supervision before 
school until a student was in the building" (p. 574).  Glaser appealed this decision.  
The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
The issue for the court to decide on appeal was whether the school district 
assumed a duty to protect the safety of students gathered on school grounds before 
classes started.  The legal basis for Glaser's argument was the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts Section 324A (1964) and its interpretation in various Kansas court cases 
which involved liability to third persons for negligent performance.  This provided in 
part that, one who undertakes to render services to another which are necessary for 
the protection of a third person, is subject to liability to the third person for physical 
harm that results from a failure to exercise reasonable care if "(a) his failure to 
exercise reasonable care increases the risk of harm, or (b) he has undertaken to 
perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered 
because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking."  In v. City 
of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, 836 P.2d 1128 (1992), the court engaged in discussion of 
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324 A (1964) and established a threshold 
requirement.  This requirement states, "the defendant undertook, gratuitously or for 
consideration, to render services to another.  In order to meet this requirement, the 
evidence must show the defendant did more than act, but through affirmative action 
assumed an obligation or intended to render services for the benefit of another."  
Honeycutt 251 Kan. at 464.  The court cited other Kansas court cases as well as cases 
from several states leading to the determination that no duty had been owed to Glaser.  
In this case, as in Honeycutt, the injury occurred off school property at a time when 
the student was not in school custody.  The court held that the school district had 
never undertaken to "render services calculated to protect or supervise Todd, either by 
affirmative acts or promise to act..."  (p. 581).  Therefore, the decision of the district 
court was affirmed.    
 
Barrett ex rel. Barrett v. Unified School District No. 259 
32 P.3d 1156 (Kan. 2001) 
 
Frances Barrett, mother of Alex Barrett, brought suit against USD 259 and a 
football coach at her son’s high school claiming negligence and gross negligence 
resulted in her son’s death from heat stroke during football practice at the school.  
Barrett filed a motion for partial summary judgment alleging that the defendants were 
not entitled to rely on K.S.A. 75-6104(o), the recreational use exception to the Kansas 
Torts Claims Act (KTCA), because its application to cases where the injury is caused 
by a coach’s negligence and not by a condition of the property violated equal 
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protection under the United States Constitution.  She also claimed that the defendants 
were not entitled to immunity under the discretionary function section of K.S.A. 75-
6104(e) because the coach had a duty of care to the students.  The defendants 
countered with their own motion for summary judgment.  The trial court found in 
favor of Ms. Barrett, ruling that the recreational use exception did not apply to cases 
involving coaching negligence as it violated equal protection by creating a distinction 
between similarly situated students based solely on the location of the injury without 
a rational basis.  In making its judgment, the trial court stated in part: 
  “It is the application of the recreational use exception to the immunity 
statute to the same classes of people under different life situations that creates 
‘unequal treatment’ of constitutional magnitude.  For example, the child injured 
while participating in a mandatory physical education class faces proof of gross 
or wanton negligence if the injury occurred in the gym because the school and 
teacher are entitled to qualified immunity under those circumstances.  When the 
same child is injured in the same way under the charge of the same teacher, but 
that day the teacher conducted the class in the classroom, the student need only 
show ordinary negligence…The same classes of people are discriminated 
against solely based on the location of the tort, a distinction with no sensible 
difference.  Such a rule creates a double standard without a reasonable basis, a 
constitutional anomaly.''  (p. 1163) 
The trial court also concluded that the discretionary function under the KTCA 
was not applicable as the school owed a duty of care to its students and had issued 
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safety policies and guidelines which reinforced this duty of care.  The trial court 
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.  The defendants asked the trial 
court to certify its rulings for interlocutory appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2102(b).  
They argued that the trial court erred in finding the recreational use exception, as 
applied in this case, violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Kansas and 
United States Constitutions.  The defendants contended that such a ruling was not 
supported by case law and that a rational basis did exist for treating similarly situated 
persons differently under the law.  The State of Kansas intervened and asked the trial 
court to certify the case for interlocutory appeal.  The trial court sustained both 
motions. 
Interlocutory appeal is called for when a question of law must be answered by 
an appellate court before a trial may proceed.  In this case, the trial court had found 
K.S.A. 75-6104(o) improperly distinguished between similarly situated students 
based on the location of the tort.  Thus, it called into question the constitutionality of 
a state statute.  Before a statute can be stricken down, it must clearly violate the 
constitution.  The appellate court had to determine if the lower court correctly applied 
the law in striking down the statute.  Under 75-6104 (o) “A governmental entity or an 
employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment shall not be liable 
for damages resulting from: any claim for injuries resulting from the use of any public 
property intended or permitted to be used as a park, playground or open area for 
recreational purposes, unless the governmental entity or an employee thereof is guilty 
of gross and wanton negligence proximately causing such injury.”  The language of 
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the statute only requires that the property be intended or permitted to be used for 
recreational purposes, not that the injury occurred as a result of recreational activity.  
Citing previous cases, the appellate court found that the recreational use exception 
applied to this case.  They next turned to the question of whether this violated equal 
protection by creating a distinction between students based solely on location of the 
injury.  The appellate court found that the trial court did not “fully take into account 
the legitimate purpose of the legislation and whether the statute is rationally related to 
that purpose” (p. 1164).  The purpose of K.S.A. 75-6104(o) is to encourage 
governmental agencies to build recreational facilities for the public benefit without 
fear of litigation for simple negligence.  The appellate court also found that the 
examples given in the trial court’s opinion failed to show that that legislation 
distinguishes between similarly situated persons without a rational basis.  The court 
went on to say that, “…distinguishing between a student injured in the gym and one 
who is injured in the classroom is rationally related to the purpose of the statute” (p. 
1164).  The school district does not need as much incentive to build a classroom as it 
does to build recreational facilities such as a football field.  The recreational facility is 
different from the classroom in its value to the public and in the potential for injury in 
its use.  Without a limited grant of immunity for negligence, a school district may 
decide not to provide these facilities.  That this immunity is extended to coaches 
simply furthers the purpose of the statute.  The legislature “determined that such an 
extension of immunity is necessary to encourage the development of such facilities” 
(p.1165).  The court acknowledged that the classification of injuries, which may 
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occur to a student on a football field being different from those occurring to the same 
student in the classroom, is not perfect.  However, “ ‘[W]here rationality is the test, a 
State “does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications 
made by its laws are imperfect.' ” citing Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 145 
L.Ed.2d 522 (2000).  The appellate court concluded that K.S.A. 75-6104(o) “is 
rationally related to a legitimate government objective, and the trial court erred in its 
finding that it violated the Equal Protection Clause” (p. 1166).  The court found 
K.S.A. 75-6104(o) to be constitutional and applicable in this case.  The appellate 
court did not address the discretionary function exception found in K.S.A. 75-6104(e) 
because the discretionary function exception under the KTCA would only provide a 
defense against ordinary negligence.  The defendants are exempt from ordinary 
negligence based on K.S.A. 75-6104(o).  Therefore, the appellate court found it 
unnecessary to address the applicability of K.S.A.75-6104(e).  The only remaining 
questions involved a determination of whether the defendants' actions amounted to 
gross or wanton negligence.  Thus, the case was reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. 
In this case, the court showed that a rational basis exists for distinguishing 
between injuries occurring on public recreational facilities and those that do not, even 
if the same persons are involved.  This distinction must exist in order to advance the 
legitimate goal of encouraging the development of recreational facilities that are 
available for public use.  Under K.S.A. 75-6104(o), the defendants could not be found 
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liable for ordinary negligence.  However, the plaintiff could still proceed with her 
claim of gross and wanton negligence if she so chose. 
 
Dunn v. Unified School District No. 367 
40 P.3d 315 (Kan. App. 2002) 
 
On December 15, 1995, plaintiffs Michael Dunn and Terry Ballou, seniors at 
Osawatomie High School, broke a plate glass door while returning to class and were 
severely injured.  Ballou’s hand slipped when he reached for the crossbar and struck 
the glass door.  The boys filed separate claims of negligence against USD 367 
pursuant to the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6101 et seq.  Those 
claims were joined for discovery and trial.  USD 367 made a motion for summary 
judgment and argued that it was immune pursuant to K.S.A. 75-6104(m) and that the 
claim was barred by the statute of repose.  The district court denied this motion.  
Following further discovery, the school district renewed its motion for summary 
judgment which was granted in part and denied in part.  The district court granted the 
motion with respect to the governmental immunity found in K.S.A. 75-6104(m) and 
dismissed any claims of negligence for failure to replace the plate glass with safety 
glass.  However, the court denied the motion with respect to the statute of repose 
argument.  The case was tried on the plaintiffs’ allegations of breaches of duties other 
than failure to replace the plate glass.  The jury found each plaintiff to be 10% at fault 
and USD 397 to be 90% at fault.  Each plaintiff was awarded over $100,000 in 
damages.  USD 397 moved for a new judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.  
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They argued that (1) the statute of repose barred plaintiffs’ claims; (2) defendant’s 
liability was barred by K.S.A.75-6104(m); and (3) a private person would not be 
liable under the facts of this case.  The motion was denied and USD 397 appealed. 
The statute of repose provides in part that “in no event shall an action be 
commenced more than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of 
action.”  K.S.A. 60-513(b).  USD 397 argued that the act giving rise to the cause of 
action was the installation of the plate glass door which occurred in the late 1960’s.  
The court determined that the date of the designing of the plate glass doors was 
immaterial to a statue of repose because the designing and planning of a door with 
plate glass is not actionable pursuant to K.S.A. 75-6104(m).  K.S.A. 75-6104(m) 
states in part that a governmental entity “shall not be liable for damages resulting 
from: (m) the plan or design for the construction of or an improvement to public 
property, either in its original construction or any improvement thereto, if the plan or 
design is approved by the governing body” and if the plan was prepared with the 
generally recognized standards in existence at the time the plan was prepared.  In this 
case, any acts which gave rise to the plaintiffs’ cause of action occurred well within 
the statute of repose.  Plaintiffs alleged multiple duties and breaches of those duties as 
being the cause of their injury.  The question the court addressed was whether a 
governmental entity can be liable for damages caused in part by a breach of duty from 
which they are immune pursuant to K.S.A. 75-6104(m) and in part by breaches of 
duty for which they are not immune.  In making their determination, the court looked 
at the recreational use exception found in K.S.A. 75-6104(o) which specifically states 
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that a governmental entity is not liable for damages resulting from “any claim for 
injuries resulting from the use of any public property intended or permitted to be used 
as a park, playground, or open area for recreational purposes…”  The court held that 
“the design exception does not exempt governmental entities from “any claims” 
resulting from the use of a building designed or planned with prior approval…”  (p. 
324).  The court did not believe that the legislature intended to preclude claims for 
injuries caused in part by the plan or design and in part by other tortious acts.  Thus, 
the court found that a “governmental entity is not immune from liability caused by 
negligence independent of design, where that independent negligence is a concurring, 
proximate cause of injury"  (p. 325).  The court next turned to the argument made by 
USD 367 that a private person would not be liable under the facts of this case.  The 
KTCA governs tort claims brought against a school district and it states in part that 
unless there is a statutory exception to liability, a governmental entity is liable for 
damages caused by negligence if a private person would be liable under the laws of 
the state.  The court found Glynos v. Jagoda, 249 Kan. 473, 819 P.2d 1202 (1991) to 
control in this case.  In Glynos, the plaintiff was injured when he went through a plate 
glass window at a private apartment complex.  The Supreme Court held in Glynos 
that the duty of cared owed the plaintiff by the apartment complex “transcends the 
building code issue.  Conformity with the building code is not an absolute defense to 
a claim based on ordinary negligence” Glynos, 249 Kan. at 485.  Compliance to 
building codes may be evidence of due care but it does not preclude a finding of 
negligence where a reasonable person would have taken additional precautions under 
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the same circumstances.  Glynos held a private person liable for injuries resulting 
from a broken plate glass door because it was proven that the defendant breached a 
duty of care to maintain the common area of the apartment complex.  Finally, the 
court addressed the issue of what duty of care was owed to an 18-year-old student and 
a 17 ½-year-old student.  The court found that regardless of their ages, the school 
district owed the students the duty to properly supervise students and take reasonable 
steps to protect their safety.  Thus, the argument that the district owed no duty of care 
to properly supervise the plaintiffs and protect their safety was rejected.  The decision 
of the district court was affirmed. 
 
Kurtz v. Unified School District No. 308 
197 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (D. Kan. 2002) 
 
Merry Kurtz, mother of David Lee Gann, brought tort action against the 
school district for negligent retention and supervision of a speech and language para-
professional.  In 1998-99, David was a 12-year-old 5th grade student at Faris 
Elementary school where he received special education services for a learning 
disability.  Pamela Hart, a speech pathologist for the school district, and Sandra 
Zolman, a para-professional who worked with Hart, became acquainted with David 
during that school year.  At the end of the 1998-99 school year, Zolman introduced 
David to her 11-year-old son Austin and the boys became friends.  David would often 
play with Austin and would sometimes spend the night at his house.  Kurtz and 
Zolman also became better acquainted during this time.  When school started in 
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August 1999, David enrolled in the 6th grade at Lincoln grade school.  Hart and 
Zolman continued to work together at both Faris and Morgan schools.  One evening 
in early October 1999, Zolman went to Hart's house and told her of an incident in 
which David had made contact with her in a "sexual and inappropriate manner."  
After discussing the matter with Hart, Zolman agreed that she would not have any 
more contact with David and that she would speak to Kurtz about the incident.  Hart 
called Kathleen Hall, a school psychologist, and told her that Zolman had come to her 
house and made allegations against David.  The next morning, Hart met with the 
school district Director of Special Education, Dr. Connie Clark, about the situation.  
Hall and Clark agreed that David was confused about his relationship with Zolman 
and that Zolman should not see David again.  Hart was the only employee of the 
school district that spoke to Zolman about the situation.  Zolman claimed that she 
called Kurtz about what had happened, but Kurtz denied that she had done so.  None 
of the officials at David's new school had any information informing them that 
Zolman had agreed not to have contact with David.  After the incident, Kurtz gave 
written permission to the principal and a teacher at Lincoln School for Zolman to pick 
David up after school while Kurtz underwent a surgical procedure.  David stayed with 
Zolman while Kurtz recovered from surgery and during this time he and Zolman 
began a sexual relationship.  No sexual conduct occurred on school property or during 
school hours.  Zolman was arrested in May 2000 and charged with rape and 
aggravated criminal sodomy.  She pled no contest and was serving a jail sentence at 
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the time of this court action.  Kurtz brought action against the school district and the 
district made a motion for summary judgment. 
Kurtz alleged that the defendant school district was negligent in the retention 
and supervision of Sandra Zolman.  In order for a plaintiff to succeed in such a claim 
they must show "some causal relationship between the dangerous propensity or 
quality of the employee, of which the employer has or should have knowledge, and 
the injuries suffered by the third person; the employer must, by virtue of knowledge 
of his employee's particular quality or propensity, have reason to believe that an 
undue risk of harm exists to others as a result of the continued employment of that 
employee" (p. 1320).  In this case, the court found that Kurtz had not established any 
basis for imposing liability on the school district for Zolman's acts.  The information 
that Zolman confided to Hart, which was subsequently relayed to other district 
officials, did not indicate that Zolman was a risk, rather it concerned David's 
inappropriate advances and his confusion about the relationship.  District officials 
only knew that David was having some troubles and that the problem would be 
solved by Zolman refusing to have further contact with him.  Zolman had agreed that 
she should not see David after the incident, and thereafter lied to Hart that she was 
complying with that agreement.  According to the court, the school district had "no 
reason to know of Zolman's propensities, it had no reason to expect more from her 
than a simple agreement that the best course of action, in view of David's advances, 
was to cut off contact" (p. 1321).  Zolman had informed Hart that she had discussed 
the matter with Kurtz, and district officials had no reason to believe she had not done 
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so.  Officials at David's new school had no reason to suspect Zolman because they 
had no knowledge of the events that occurred at Faris.  In light of the evidence 
presented, the court found that "nothing from Zolman's past or her conduct with 
David about which the defendant knew or should have known gave any indication 
that Zolman was a risk to her students" (p. 1321).  The defendant's motion for 
summary judgment was granted.        
* Kurtz appealed in an unpublished opinion, Kurtz v. Unified School District 
No. 308, 65 Fed.Appx. 257, 2003 WL 21224095, (C.A. 10 (Kan.)), 177 Ed. Law Rep. 
930 (2003).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision.  
 
Doe v. Unified School District  
255 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Kan. 2003) 
 
Plaintiff, Jane Doe, brought this suit on behalf of her 16-year old daughter 
who had been sexually abused by her stepfather.  Barbara began attending the school 
district when she was in the second grade.  Her stepfather began sexually abusing her 
during her third grade year.  When she was in the fourth grade, Barbara told three 
classmates about the abuse.  On April 30, 1996, the classmates met with the school 
counselor and told her that Barbara Doe had told them her stepfather had raped her.  
The school counselor failed to report these allegations to the State Department of 
Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) or to any other agency.  She did not talk to 
Barbara about the sexual abuse, nor did she report it to her mother.  The counselor did 
inform the principal about her meeting with Barbara's classmates.  The principal did 
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not notify SRS or do any further investigation.  Although the Elementary School did 
not have a written policy dealing with reporting sexual abuse, the district's policy was 
to follow Kansas reporting statutes.  The counselor knew that state law obligated her 
to report suspected sexual abuse.  When she had been hired, the counselor had not 
obtained her state certification as a counselor.  She was enrolled in the Counseling 
Masters program at a nearby university and the district obtained a waiver of the 
certification requirements from the Kansas State Board of Education.  In April of 
2001, Barbara told her mother of the sexual abuse and in August 2001, Ms. Doe filed 
a notice of a claim with the school district.  The school board reviewed the claim in 
executive session.  Although matters discussed in executive session are supposed to 
be kept confidential, one of Barbara's classmates overheard a board member tell his 
wife about the allegations in Ms. Doe's claim.  This classmate was one of the three 
who had originally reported the alleged abuse.  Ms. Doe then filed her action with the 
court.  She contended that the defendants negligently failed to report or investigate 
the allegations of sexual abuse, that the school district and principal negligently 
supervised and retained the school counselor, and that the defendants invaded 
Barbara's right to privacy when the board member told his spouse about the 
allegations.  Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment.   
Ms. Doe's general negligence claims were founded on three theories.  First, 
that the school district and its employees had a common law duty to report and/or 
investigate the allegations.  Second, that the school counselor had a duty to report the 
alleged abuse.  Lastly, Ms. Doe believed that the defendants assumed a duty to report 
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and/or investigate based upon their acts and conduct toward Barbara.  The first two 
claims were founded on the belief that the defendants had a duty under Kansas 
common law to report and/or investigate allegations of sexual abuse when it was 
reported by someone other than the victim.  The court elected to certify those two 
questions to the Kansas Supreme Court.  The answer from the Kansas Supreme Court 
would be needed to determine Ms. Doe's first two theories.  Thus, the court denied 
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the negligence claims founded on 
the theory that the school and/or its employees owed Barbara a common law duty.  
The court did address the negligence claims that the defendants assumed a duty to 
protect Barbara Doe.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 324 A states in part 
that "one who undertakes...to render services to another which he should recognize as 
necessary for the protection of a third person, is subject to liability to the third person 
for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care...if (a) his 
failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has 
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is 
suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking."  
To succeed in her claims, Ms. Doe needed to show that the defendants undertook a 
duty to protect Barbara from her stepfather, that they negligently failed to perform 
this undertaking, and that such negligence either increased the risk of harm or caused 
Barbara to suffer harm because of her reliance on their undertaking.  Ms. Doe argued 
that because the counselor had educated students about sexual abuse and instructed 
them to report abuse to friends or the school counselor; she had assumed a duty to 
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report.  The court disagreed.  It held that the defendants had not taken an affirmative 
act sufficient enough to create a legal duty.  When the counselor instructed students 
about sexual abuse, she had not agreed to take any affirmative act to protect Barbara 
Doe.  Even if the district had assumed a duty to report the allegations, they could not 
be held liable because their failure to report did not increase the risk of harm.  
Barbara Doe's stepfather created the risk of harm, not the defendants.  Thus, the court 
granted summary judgment to the defendants on negligence claims founded on a legal 
duty to protect.  Next, the court turned to the claim of negligent hiring and retention.  
To succeed on this claim, it must be shown that the "employer had a reason to believe 
that an undue risk of harm to others would exist as a result of the employment of the 
alleged tortfeasor" (p. 1248).  Although the counselor had not yet completed her 
counseling certification when hired, she did have a Bachelor's degree in education 
and almost fourteen years of experience in the field.  The State Board permitted the 
district to hire her when they waived the certification requirements and she was 
actively pursuing her Masters in counseling.  The court could find no reason that the 
school district and principal would believe that the school counselor presented an 
undue risk of harm.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants.  
Finally, the court addressed the allegations that the defendants had violated Barbara's 
right to privacy.  The court turned to Dotson v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan. 201, 531 P. 2d 
1 (1975) in which the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the tort of invasion of 
privacy by adopting the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 
652A.  The Restatement provides in part that the right to privacy is invaded by an 
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unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, the appropriation of the other's 
name or likeness, the unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, or the 
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public.  Ms. 
Doe contended that when the board member shared information with his wife it 
constituted "unreasonable publicity given to [Barbara Doe's] private life" (p. 1249).  
The defendants admitted that the school board member shared this information with 
his spouse and that one of Barbara's classmates overheard the conversation.  They 
contended that this disclosure did not sufficiently publicize the facts enough to create 
liability under Section 652A.  Ms. Doe could not produce any evidence showing the 
information was disclosed beyond the school board member, his spouse, and the 
former classmate who had already known about the alleged abuse.  As such, the court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim.   
The court denied the defendants motion for summary judgment subject to 
refiling after the Kansas Supreme Court responded to the certified questions.   
Simply educating students on matters of public health and safety does not 
mean that a school assumes a legal duty.  Whether or not the school has a legal duty 
to report abuse when it is reported by someone other than the victim was a question 
for the Kansas Supreme Court to answer.   
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Doe v. Unified School District 
255 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (D. Kan. 2003) 
 
Jane Doe, mother of Barbara Doe, had sued the school district alleging 
negligence in their handling of sexual abuse allegations against Barbara's stepfather.  
(See Doe v. Unified School District, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (2003).  On the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, the District Court held that questions regarding the 
defendants' common law duties would be certified to the state Supreme Court.  Ms. 
Doe had alleged that the defendants negligently failed to report information 
concerning the suspected abuse of Barbara Doe after it had been reported to the 
school counselor by three classmates.  She contended that the defendants had a duty 
independent of those under K.S.A. 38-1522 to report the information to the proper 
authorities.  Kansas courts had not addressed what duty, if any, a school district, 
principal, or school counselor owed a student after receiving information from a third 
party that a parent is sexually abusing the student.  As the answer to that question 
would be determinative of the pending action, the district court certified the following 
questions to the Kansas Supreme Court:  
 (1) Whether Kansas common law imposes a duty upon a school 
district and/or its employees, to report to the appropriate authorities 
allegations that a parent is sexually abusing a child or to investigate further the 
validity of such allegations when someone other than the student informs the 
school and/or its employees that the student has been abused?    
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(2) Whether Kansas common law imposes a duty upon school 
counselors, based on their professional status, to report to the appropriate 
authorities allegations that a parent is sexually abusing a child or to investigate 
further the validity of such allegations when  someone other than the student 
informs the counselor that the student has been abused?  (p. 2) 
K.S.A. Section 38- 1522 provides that when teachers, school administrators or 
other employees of a district have "reason to suspect that a child has been injured as a 
result of physical, mental or emotional abuse or neglect or sexual abuse, the person 
shall report the matter promptly...to SRS."  The Kansas Supreme Court has held that 
this statute does not "create a private right of action for those aggrieved by a violation 
of this duty" (p. 1253).  The court did not address whether such a duty existed at 
common law.  Ms. Doe asserted that a duty existed under common law because of the 
special relationship between the school and its students.  Existing court decisions 
regarding a school districts duty to protect its students could permit two different 
outcomes: first, that a school district and its employees owe no duty to protect 
students from third-parties once they leave school grounds, as was found in 
Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 251 Kan. 451, 836 P. 2d 1128 (1992); or, second, that 
the school's special relationship with students extends beyond geographic boundaries 
when it knows or reasonably should know that a third-party poses a risk to the safety 
of that student, as could be inferred from language in Beshears v. Unified School 
District No. 305, 261 Kan. 555, 930 P. 2d 1376 (1997).  No Kansas court had 
addressed what duty a school counselor owed, based on their professional status, to a 
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student when a report of abuse is made by a third party.  The district court believed 
that the answers to these questions involved "substantial public policy choices" (p. 
1254).  It was therefore ordered that the two questions of law be certified to the 
Kansas Supreme Court. 
 
Gilliam v. USD No. 244 School District 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Kan. 2005) 
 
Plaintiff, Rebecca Gilliam, filed a lawsuit alleging she had been harassed by 
her teacher, Joel Vannocker, while she was a high school student.  During her junior 
year, Gilliam complained to another teacher that Vannocker was staring at her, 
inappropriately putting his arm around her, and improperly touching her by leaning 
over her desk.  The teacher reported this complaint to the high school principal, Jim 
Kuhn.  No disciplinary action was taken against Vannocker.  During Gilliam's senior 
year, Vannocker's actions continued.  He made comments to her that she was 
"beautiful" and "more mature than other students" (p. 1285).  Gilliam claimed 
Vannocker paid more attention to her than to the other students, extended privileges 
to her and gave her chocolate candy.  In February of 2004, an ad addressed to Gilliam 
was placed in the school newspaper from a "Secret Admirer."  The ad stated, "you 
make my heart sing."  Later, when Gilliam was making copies in the office for 
another teacher, Vannocker approached her from behind, leaned against her and 
whispered in her ear, "you know, you do make my heart sing" (p. 1285).  On 
February 24, 2004, Vannocker asked Gilliam to come to his classroom after school.  
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When she arrived, he handed her three typewritten poems and a note.  The note said 
that the poems were "inspired by" Gilliam and were not intended to frighten her.  
After school, Gilliam read the poems and claimed that she felt nauseous.  Soon after, 
she began to suffer mental, emotional, and physical injuries, including nausea, 
vomiting, and insomnia.  Gilliam told her father about the poems and the other 
unwelcome actions.  Her father notified school officials and Gilliam filed a police 
report and protective order request against Vannocker.  Gilliam has since been 
diagnosed with medical and psychological disorders arising from the harassment.  
Based on her allegations, Gilliam asserted five claims:  (1) violation of Title IX 
against the school district; (2) violation of Section 1983 against Vannocker, Kuhn, 
and the school superintendent, Dale Rawson; (3) negligent infliction of emotional 
distress against all of the defendants; (4) negligent hiring, supervision and retention 
against the school district and against Kuhn and Rawson; and (5) violation of the 
Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) against the school district.  The matter went before 
the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.   
The court began by addressing Gilliam's Section 1983 substantive due process 
claims against Vannocker, Kuhn, and Rawson.  In order to determine if the 
defendants, as government officials, were entitled to qualified immunity the court had 
to conduct a two-part analysis.  First, the court had to determine if the facts, as 
provided by Gilliam, set forth a constitutional violation.  Second, if Gilliam alleged a 
constitutional violation, the court had to determine whether the violation was clearly 
 
67 
 
established at the time of the defendant's conduct.  The Due Process Clause provides 
that the government cannot "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law."  The standard for judging a substantive due process claim is 
whether the action would "shock the conscience of federal judges" (p. 1287).  The 
action must be more than just an ordinary tort; it must demonstrate a magnitude of 
potential or actual harm that would be considered shocking.  In this case, the court did 
not believe Gilliam had alleged conduct that met this "shock the conscience" standard.  
There was no allegation of sexual molestation or assault.  Vannocker was accused of 
inappropriately putting his arm around Gilliam, touching her by leaning over her desk, 
and pressing his torso into her back one time while she was making copies.  While the 
court deemed this as unacceptable conduct, it did not rise to the level necessary to 
violate Gilliam's constitutional right to bodily integrity.  Accordingly, Vannocker was 
entitled to qualified immunity and Gilliam's Section 1983 claim against him was 
dismissed.  For similar reasons, Gilliam's Section 1983 individual claims against 
Kuhn and Rawson were also dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity.  Cases 
in which administrators have been held liable for a teacher's sexual harassment of a 
student have been limited to instances that involved the teacher's sexual molestation 
or assault of a student.  That type of harassment did not occur in this case.  Rawson 
and Kuhn also sought dismissal of Gilliam's official capacity Section 1983 claims 
against them on the grounds that the claims were redundant.  The court held that 
while the claims might be subject to dismissal for some other reason, they were not 
considered redundant and so that part of the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied.  
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The court next addressed the defendants motion to dismiss Gilliam's state law claims 
on the grounds that under K.S.A. 75-6104(i) if a defendant is entitled to qualified 
immunity on a Section 1983 claim, they are also entitled to qualified immunity on 
related state claims.  K.S.A. 75-6104(i) provides in part that a governmental entity or 
employee will "not be liable for damages resulting from…any claim which is limited 
or barred by any other law or which is for injuries…against an officer, employee or 
agent where the individual is immune from suit or damages."  The defendants in this 
case were seeking immunity from Gilliam's state law claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention.  
Under the provision of K.S.A. 75-6104(i), they would be entitled to immunity if the 
state law claims were barred by some other law or if the defendants are immune from 
damages on these claims.  A state law claim is considered to be separate and distinct 
from a Section 1983 constitutional claim.  Simply being immune from the Section 
1983 claim did not mean the defendants would also be immune from the common 
state law claims.  For that reason, the court denied the defendants' on these claims.  
Finally, the court addressed Vannocker's motion to dismiss Gilliam's claim of 
negligent emotional distress against him.  Under Kansas law, the only way a plaintiff 
can recover on a claim for emotional distress is if the defendant's negligence results in 
physical injury to the plaintiff.  Gilliam claimed she suffered from "extreme mental, 
emotional and physical injuries in the form of nausea, insomnia, nightmares, vomiting, 
difficulty eating, crying, fatigue…"  (p. 1292).  The court determined that these 
generalized physical symptoms failed to satisfy the physical injury rule.  Vomiting 
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could fall under this rule, but Gilliam provided no factual allegations showing she 
vomited with or shortly after any incidents of harassment by Vannocker.  Thus, the 
court granted Vannocker's motion to dismiss.  Motions to dismiss were thereby 
granted in part and denied in part.               
  
C.T. v. Liberal School District  
562 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D. Kan. 2008) 
 
This is actually three consolidated cases from three different plaintiff students 
– C.T., G.B., and J.B. – who alleged that they had been sexually abused and harassed 
by Johnny Aubrey, a volunteer weight training coach in Liberal, Kansas.  Aubrey ran 
a weight training program out of his home in which many students participated over 
the course of several years.  The plaintiffs accused Aubrey of things such as having 
them take nude baths at his house, giving body massages that included some 
inappropriate touching, having them conduct weigh-ins at the school in the nude, and 
engaging in conversations about sex.  The plaintiffs also claimed that Mr. Aubrey 
operated his program in conjunction with the Liberal School District’s athletic 
programs, and so they asserted that the school district and several district employees 
were liable for Aubrey’s actions.  The district maintained that Aubrey was not an 
employee of the school and his weight-training program was not a school program.  
They also contended that they had no knowledge of any problems with Mr. Aubrey’s 
program until the spring of 2003, after G.B.  reported the matter to the police.  The 
district took measures to distance itself from Aubrey at that time.  The plaintiffs, 
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however, sought to impose liability on the district defendants because Aubrey had 
close friendships with many of the district’s coaches and the athletic director; they 
had given him his own key to the school; and, he had access to athletes reserved only 
for the school district’s coaches such as being allowed to assist with practices.  The 
plaintiffs believed that Aubrey was a resource to the sports program at Liberal High 
School who helped athletes get physically prepared for sports at the school.  Parents 
and students perceived that the athletes who participated in Aubrey’s program were 
given special consideration in high school sports.  Aubrey was so enmeshed with the 
athletic program that at least one parent believed him to be a “Rule 10” coach who is 
not a certified teacher but is hired by the school district to coach student athletes.  The 
plaintiffs filed claims against the school district defendants under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq., constitutional 
claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and state law claims which sought to impose 
vicarious liability for Aubrey’s actions, negligent supervision of Aubrey, and 
negligent failure to supervise children.  The matter went before the court on the 
school district defendants’ motions for summary judgment.   
The court first clarified that in resolving the motions for summary judgment, 
the court did not express any opinion about whether Johnny Aubrey’s alleged actions 
were wrongful.  Mr. Aubrey, who appeared pro se in the action, did not move for 
summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims against him.  The only summary 
judgment motions at issue were those filed by the school district defendants.  As to 
the state claims, the school district did not seek summary judgment based on whether 
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Aubrey’s conduct was not actionable.  The districts’ motions were directed only to 
the extent to which it could be held liable for Aubrey’s conduct.   
In this case, the plaintiffs asserted four different types of Title IX violations:  
(1) deliberate indifference to harassment by Mr. Aubrey, (2) deliberate indifference to 
harassment by other students, (3) two students complained about retaliation for 
complaining about Aubrey’s sexual harassment and abuse, and (4) failing to 
implement adequate policies and training to protect them from harassment.  Title IX 
provides in part that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”  20 U.S.C. Section 1681(a).  The court turned to Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) 
to make its determination on whether the district was deliberately indifferent in 
regards to Aubrey’s actions.  In Gebser, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could 
not recover damages under Title IX for sexual harassment of a student  by a teacher 
unless an official of the school who “at minimum has authority to institute corrective 
measures had notice of, and was deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s 
misconduct."  Id. at 277.  In this case, the plaintiffs showed that the wrestling coach 
knew that Mr. Aubrey talked to kids in his program about sex education-type topics.  
However, they could not show that he had any knowledge beyond his assumption that 
it was nothing more than Aubrey talking to the boys about not getting girls pregnant.  
In terms of the nude weigh-ins at school, school officials were aware that they took 
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place but there was no testimony to support that there was any inappropriate behavior 
involved with the weigh-ins.  In fact, it was not uncommon for nude weigh-ins to take 
place when wrestlers were trying to make weight during wrestling season.  The record 
did not show that any school official with authority had any knowledge that Aubrey’s 
behavior was inappropriate.  It was not until G.B. notified police in the spring of 2003 
that the school district had any indication that Mr. Aubrey was inappropriate with 
students.  After the report to the police was made, Aubrey stopped his weight lifting 
program and had no further inappropriate contact with the plaintiffs.  For these 
reasons, the court granted the school districts motion for summary judgment on 
claims it was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Aubrey’s actions.  As to the issue of 
deliberate indifference to harassment by other students, the court turned to Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 
(1999) and found that public schools receiving federal funds can be held liable under 
Title IX for student-on-student sexual harassment.  However, this is only the case 
when it can be shown that the school acted “with deliberate indifference to known 
acts of harassment” and only when the harassment was “so severe, pervasive and 
objectively offensive” that is prevented the victim from having access to educational 
opportunities or benefit.  Plaintiffs C.T. and J.B. only had one incident of harassing 
behavior toward them and neither one of them reported the incidences.  Neither could 
show that they had been deprived of any educational benefit as a result of the 
harassment.  Summary judgment was granted to the school district defendants on the 
peer harassment claims of C.T. and J.B.  When looking at G.B.’s peer harassment 
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claims, the court found more severe allegations.  G.B. had been assaulted in the 
hallway at school and given a black eye.  The football coach was aware of this, but he 
did not report it to the school administration.  G.B. received two death threats, and 
was called “horrible names” every day he went to school for the remainder of the 
spring of 2003.  G.B.’s parents reported that they had notified the school of these 
problems, but there was no evidence that other students had been disciplined for the 
harassment.  G. B. transferred to a school in Oklahoma the following school year.  
The court determined that the school districts lack of response to harassment that was 
so severe that it barred G.B. from completing his education at Liberal High School 
amounted to deliberate indifference.  The school districts motion for summary 
judgment was denied on this claim.  Next, the court addressed J.B. and G.B.’s claims 
that the district had retaliated against them as a result of their complaints regarding 
Mr. Aubrey’s sexual harassment and abuse.  J.B. presented examples of what he 
considered were unwarranted disciplinary action that had been taken against him.  In 
reviewing the record, the court found that J.B. had not made a meaningful attempt to 
develop the record in a way that would establish a connection between his allegations 
against Mr. Aubrey and the discipline he received for his misconduct.  Based on the 
record, the court held that the disciplinary actions J.B. received were a result of “his 
own misbehavior” (p. 1337).  As G.B. did not present any evidence to support his 
retaliation claim, the court found in favor of the school district defendants.  The final 
Title IX claim alleged that the district acted with deliberate indifference by 
“establishing policies, procedures, and practices that caused or promoted an 
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environment or program in which sexual abuse” of students had occurred "or acted 
with deliberate indifference to provide training and guidance that was necessary for 
the implementation of school athletic programs" (p. 1337).  The plaintiffs based this 
claim on Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder, 500 F. 3d 1170, 1178 (10th Circ. 
2007).  The deliberate-indifference-to-obvious-need-for-training standard adopted in 
Simpson for Title IX claims is confined to circumstances in which a recipient of 
federal funds sanctions a specific program that, without proper control, would 
encourage sexual harassment and abuse such that the need for training is obvious.  At 
Colorado, the program at issue was one for football recruiting which involved 
showing recruits “a good time” by pairing them with female “Ambassadors” who 
would show them around campus.  Female students filed claims because they had 
been sexually assaulted by recruits and players as a result of this program.  The court 
did not believe that the facts of the case at hand fell within the framework of the 
Tenth Circuit’s holding in Simpson.  The weight-training program did not bear the 
element of encouragement of misconduct by the school district to the extent that the 
Colorado football-recruiting program did in Simpson.  The operation of a weight-
training program by a school volunteer did not create a risk of abuse that would have 
been obvious to school officials.  In the absence of actual notice of a substantial risk 
of abuse, the school district cannot be held liable.  The court held that the failure to 
implement sexual harassment policies was not sufficient for a Title IX claim because 
this failure did not imply that the school district had actual notice of any sexual 
harassment or showed deliberate indifference.  The school district’s motion for 
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summary judgment on these claims was granted.  Next, the court turned to the 
plaintiffs claims that they were deprived of their constitutional rights to substantive 
due process and equal protection under U.S.C. Section 1983 when they were sexually 
abused and/or harassed by Mr. Aubrey who was acting “under color of law.”  Four 
different tests exist to determine whether conduct will be considered action “under 
color of law” by private parties, such as Aubrey.  See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 939, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) and Gallagher v. Neil 
Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453-56 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing the 
nexus test, the symbiotic relationship test, the joint test, and the public function test).  
Private conduct that is not attributable to the state under these tests is not actionable 
under Section 1983.  The plaintiffs did not discuss any of the tests under which the 
court would evaluate whether Aubrey’s conduct would constitute state action.  They 
based their Section 1983 claim on the nude weigh-ins at school and the school 
district’s policies and inadequate training concerning sexual harassment.  A Section 
1983 claim must be based on a constitutional violation by a person acting under color 
of state law.  Because they did not address whether the nude weigh-ins involved an 
abuse of Mr. Aubrey’s position while acting under color of state law, the plaintiffs 
raised no triable issue of fact as to whether these weigh-ins would constitute state 
action.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of the school district on plaintiffs’ 
Section 1983 claims.  Finally the court addressed the plaintiffs’ state law claims 
against the school district defendants in which they sought to impose liability against 
them for Mr. Aubrey’s conduct either through the doctrine of respondeat superior and 
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ratification, or indirectly by alleging that the defendants had a duty to supervise 
Aubrey to prevent the misconduct.  The school district claimed it could not be liable 
for Mr. Aubrey’s actions because he was not an “employee” of the school district.  
The Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA) provides that a governmental entity is liable for 
“damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any of its 
employees while acting within the scope of their employment…”  K.S.A. Section 75-
6103(a).  The KTCA broadly defines the term employee to include “persons acting on 
behalf of or in service of a governmental entity in any official capacity, whether with 
or without compensation.”  Id. Section 75-6102(d).  Mr. Aubrey’s position would fit 
into this broad definition.  Thus, the court held the fact that Aubrey was not a paid 
employee of the district did not entitle the school district to summary judgment.  The 
school district also argued that it could not be held liable for Aubrey’s misconduct 
because his actions did not occur in the scope of his “employment.”  Under Kansas 
law, an employer is held liable for injuries caused by an employee acting within the 
scope of his employment.  An employee is considered to be acting within the scope of 
his employment when he is performing services for which he has been employed, or 
when the employee is doing anything reasonably incidental to that employment.  The 
court found that at least some of Aubrey’s alleged misconduct was reasonably 
incidental to his volunteer work as a trainer of student athletes.  Although the school 
maintained that Aubrey’s program was a private one run by him, the evidence showed 
that he had so ingratiated himself with district coaches and the athletic director that 
they came to rely on him to train their athletes.  Aubrey had access to property and 
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was allowed to participate in the school’s athletic program in ways in which the rest 
of the public was not.  For these reasons, the school district’s motion for summary 
judgment on this issue was denied.  Next, the court looked at the plaintiffs’ 
ratification claims.  Ratification is the adoption or confirmation by an employer of an 
act performed on his behalf by an employee when that act had originally been 
performed without authority.  Once the employer discovers the employee’s 
unauthorized act, the employer must repudiate the act or the court will presume the 
employer ratified the act.  In this case, the school district took actions to distance 
themselves from Mr. Aubrey and his weight lifting program when the allegations 
became known in the spring of 2003.  As there was nothing to show that the school 
district defendants took any actions that could be viewed as having condoned or 
accepted Mr. Aubrey’s allegedly inappropriate behavior, the court granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ ratification claims.  The 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims that it had negligently 
supervised, retained, and hired Mr. Aubrey was denied.  As previously discussed, the 
court could not say that Aubrey was not “retained” or “hired” as a volunteer for the 
district.  The summary judgment motion on claims for negligent failure to supervise 
children was granted because the plaintiffs did not respond to the defendants’ 
arguments on this issue.  
The only claims against the school district defendants that survived summary 
judgment were G.B.’s Title IX claim of student-on-student harassment, and all of the 
plaintiffs’ state law respondeat superior and negligent supervision, retention, and 
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hiring claims.  The court also ordered that the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate the 
remaining cases for trial be granted. 
 
Ware ex. rel. Ware v. ANW Special Educational Cooperative No. 603 
180 P.3d 610 (Kan. App. 2008) 
 
On October 8, 2002, Daniel Ware, who was 4 years old at the time, fell asleep 
while riding the bus to school.  The bus was operated for the purposes of transporting 
children to and from ANW's preschool.  The driver was not aware that Daniel was 
sleeping and parked the bus in the school district parking lot.  When Daniel woke up, 
he left the bus and began walking.  A relative saw Daniel walking, picked him up and 
took him to his mother at around 1:00 in the afternoon.  Between the October bus 
incident and March of 2003, Daniel expressed apprehensions about going to school.  
When ANW suggested that Daniel get on the bus and ride it again, Daniel stated he 
would only ride if his grandmother's foster daughter rode with him and if his 
grandmother followed in her own car.  In March 2003, Daniel became upset and 
vomited at school when he was told that he would be going on a field trip the next 
day by bus.  In June of 2003, Dr. Doug Wright, Daniel's therapist, diagnosed Daniel 
with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Daniel's parents brought suit against 
ANW alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress.  ANW moved for summary 
judgment arguing that Daniel did not suffer a compensable physical injury following 
the incident on the bus.  The trial court granted ANW's motion holding that under 
Hoard v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 (1983), 
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Daniel had suffered no immediate physical injury following the bus incident and his 
symptoms were not compensable physical injuries for the purposes of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.  Daniel's parents appealed, contending that Daniel's 
PTSD met the physical injury requirement in personal injury cases. 
To succeed on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff 
must first establish that he has a qualifying injury under Kansas law.  Second, Hoard 
held that the qualifying injury must (1) directly result from the emotional distress 
allegedly caused by the defendant's negligence and (2) appear within a short span of 
time after the emotional disturbance.  The purpose of the physical injury requirement 
is to prevent plaintiffs from recovering for emotional distress that is feigned.  
Emotional distress is considered by the courts to be a common experience of life and 
therefore damages are limited to cases involving severe emotional distress, which is 
evidenced by actual physical injury.  In the case at hand, the court concluded that 
Daniel's symptoms of nightmares, anxiety, nervousness, trembling, weight gain and 
sleep difficulties did not qualify as physical injury.  The key symptom emphasized by 
the plaintiffs occurred in March when Daniel vomited after being told he would be 
going on a bus field trip.  This was five months after Daniel had been left sleeping on 
the bus.  The court held that even if Daniel could establish his vomiting as a physical 
injury, it occurred to remote in time from the initial incident, thus failing the 
requirement of Hoard.  Accordingly, the court found that Daniel had not suffered a 
compensable physical injury for purposes of negligent infliction of emotional distress 
under Kansas law.  Daniel next urged the court to expand its physical injury 
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definition to include PTSD.  Daniel presented cases from other states to support this 
argument, but the appellate court noted that Kansas courts have consistently held that 
generalized symptoms of emotional distress, such as those associated with PTSD, are 
insufficient to state a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  
The rule that some sort of physical injury or physical manifestation is required in 
order to recover for such claims is consistent with the rule set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts Section 436A.  Section 436A of the Restatement provides in part 
that "if the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing 
either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such 
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the 
actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance."  The appellate court acknowledged 
that the physical manifestation requirement has been criticized by some courts and 
abandoned by others.  However, a number of states, including Kansas, still require 
some type of objective evidence of a plaintiff's emotional injury.  The decision of the 
trial court was affirmed.   
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Chapter 2 
Control of Behavior 
 
The eleven cases within this chapter were brought by students filing claims 
against school districts for the control of their behavior or for punishment of 
transgressions.  Schools are tasked with providing a safe and orderly school 
environment.  In order to do so, officials must establish rules for conduct and enforce 
consequences for misbehavior.  However, school rules cannot be so broad or vague as 
to allow arbitrary interpretation and application.  School rules and regulations are 
general deemed sufficient by the courts so long as they provide students with 
adequate information on what is expected of them and are stated in such a way that a 
person with common intelligence could understand them.  When establishing rules 
and enforcing discipline, schools must take care "not to suppress or punish behavior 
when there is no legitimate reason to do so" (Imber & Van Geel, 2004, p. 158). 
 When dealing with claims of due process violations, Kansas courts often cite 
the holding in  Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975).  
School administrators faced with the decision to suspend or expel a student must be 
aware of the due process rights that should be afforded a student.  K.S.A. 72-8902 
provides guidelines for the state of Kansas in determining student rights in cases of 
short versus long-term suspensions and expulsions.  This statute also outlines the type 
of notification that must be provided to parents.   
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In determining whether a search has violated a student's Fourth Amendment 
rights schools must meet the requirement of "reasonableness" established by New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).  T.L.O. limits 
searches at schools to situations in which school officials have reasonable grounds to 
conduct the search based on the belief that the search will turn up evidence that a 
student has violated a school rule or the law.  The scope of the search must also be 
reasonable in nature and not too intrusive considering the age and sex of the student 
and the nature of the infraction.   
Recently, cases of student-on-student harassment have shown up in Kansas 
courts.  Students in these cases have claimed violations of Title IX and state law.  
These claims were based on allegations that school officials were deliberately 
indifferent to harassment or negligently failed to supervise students under their 
control.  In general, the courts have held that damages under Title IX are not available 
for simple acts of teasing and name-calling.  Incidents of alleged harassment must be 
so severe and pervasive that the victim was denied equal access to education.  
Schools must show that they have responded to harassment in a manner that was 
clearly not unreasonable.  It would be advisable for districts to have harassment 
policies in place that clearly outline unacceptable behavior and resulting 
consequences.  School officials should also document cases of reported harassment 
and their response to those reports.      
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Boster v. Philpot 
645 F. Supp. 798 (D. Kan. 1986) 
 
This case involves two separate incidents.  In the first incident, several high 
school students and two non-students admitted their guilt in the vandalism of a grade 
school.  The high school principal, Michael Philpot, talked to the students and they 
were suspended from school for three days.  Notice of the disciplinary action was 
mailed to their parents the same day they received the suspension.  The parents came 
to the school the next day and demanded a hearing, which was refused.  The two non-
students were banned from all high school activities for the rest of the school year.  In 
a separate incident later that year, two students who had been reprimanded for their 
unsportsmanlike conduct at a sub-state basketball game were banned from attending 
the next sub-state game.  The students and their parents brought action against the 
high school principal, superintendant, and board members of USD 312 alleging that 
their due process rights had been violated.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the 
defendants had violated the Kansas Open Meeting Act, K.S.A. 75-4317 et seq., which 
deprived them of their liberty interest in participating in public school board meetings.  
The defendants made motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
The court sought to determine four issues: (1) whether the students who were 
suspended for vandalism were denied due process; (2) whether the students who were 
banned from basketball games had been denied a property interest; (3) whether the 
parents were denied due process; and (4) whether the alleged violation by the school 
board of the Kansas Open Meeting Act deprived the parents of a liberty interest.  In 
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looking at the first issue, the court turned to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 
729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) in which the Supreme Court analyzed the rights of 
students in the context of a suspensions of less than ten school days.  The Court in 
Goss determined that students facing a short-term suspension must be given some 
kind of notice and be afforded some kind of hearing.  The hearing could be 
"informal" and held immediately after the notice of suspension.  No rights to counsel 
or to call witnesses were mandated.  K.S.A. 72-8902 complies with Goss and 
provides in part that "no suspension for a short term [not exceeding 5 days] shall be 
imposed upon a pupil without giving the pupil the notice of the charges and affording 
the pupil a hearing thereon."  The Kansas statute goes on to require that during the 
informal hearing the student must be present, be informed of all charges, and be given 
the right to make statements in his/her defense.  In this case, after admitting their 
involvement in the vandalism, the students were called into the principal's office and 
notified of the 3-day suspension.  The suspension was in accordance with the board's 
policy and was found in the student handbook.  Because they admitted their guilt, 
there was no reason for them to present their side of the story.  The court determined 
that the students had received all process due to them under the circumstances of the 
case and as such, the disciplinary decision to suspend them was not reviewable in 
federal court.  The second issue involved the two nonstudents who were involved in 
the vandalism and the two students who were reprimanded for unsportsmanlike 
conduct.  These students claimed that their due process rights were violated because 
they were not given a hearing prior to the imposition of the disciplinary action which 
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banned them from attending future games.  In order to show a violation of due 
process rights, the plaintiffs had to show that attending an interscholastic athletic 
game is a constitutionally protected right.  The court noted that there were abundant 
cases holding that a "student has no constitutionally protected right in participating in 
extracurricular activities" (p. 805).  If there is no constitutional right to participate in 
activities, the court concluded that there clearly was no protected right to be a mere 
spectator at an event.  These claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim under 
Section 1983.  Next, the court turned toward the contentions from the parents of the 
students who were either suspended or barred from attending basketball games.  The 
parents claimed that the discipline imposed on their children was done so without 
sufficient notice to them and that they were not afforded the right to file a grievance.  
As such, they stated that the "defendants interfered with their parental rights in 
violation of their right to due process of the law" (p. 806).  K.S.A. 72-8902 provides 
for parents to receive notification when their child has been suspended from school.  
Under this law, the school must provide written notice of any short-term suspension 
and the reasons for the suspension to the parents or guardians within 24 hours after 
the suspension has been imposed.  The parents in this case received such notice.  
However, the parents claimed they had a right to challenge the discipline that was 
imposed and because they were not allowed to do so, their parental rights were 
interfered with.  The court cited numerous cases holding that the right to a free public 
education belongs to students, not parents.  Therefore, when a student is suspended, it 
is the student who is entitled to due process not the parent.  In this case, the parents 
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had no standing to assert that their due process rights were violated and so their 
claims under Section 1983 were dismissed.  Finally, the court addressed the allegation 
that violations of the Kansas Open Meeting Act infringed upon their liberty interests 
in participating in the political process in violation of their right to due process.  The 
court determined that the Kansas Open Meeting Act did not confer constitutional 
rights.  In fact, the Act provides its own enforcement mechanism, K.S.A. 75-4320(a) 
which stipulates the payment of a penalty if a violation of the Act occurs.  Because 
the Kansas Open Meeting Act confers no constitutional right, the federal district court 
determined it had no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the school district had 
complied with the Act.  The defendants were granted summary judgment on all 
claims against them. 
The court in its summary emphasized their view that this case should never 
have been brought before them.  The students had done wrong and admitted so.  
Public schools have the right to impose discipline upon students without first seeking 
permission from parents as long as the due process rights of the student are upheld.   
 
Griffith v. Teran 
794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992) 
 
Sally Griffith was a senior at Wichita North High School and attended the 
1991 graduation ceremony where an invocation and benediction were given by 
another student.  The invocation made references to "Heavenly Father," "Great 
Spirit," and "Lord."  The benediction that year made similar references and ended 
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with "Amen."  Griffith found the invocation and benediction to be offensive and 
inappropriate and filed in court for a temporary restraining order and preliminary 
injunction on the grounds that the high school invocation and benediction violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  The action was filed on May 27, 1992 
and was an attempt at preventing the invocation and benediction at the May 29, 1992 
graduation ceremony.  The defendant was the principal of the high school, Ralph 
Teran.  Teran testified that an invocation and benediction took place every year and 
they were delivered by students.  Students were selected without regard to religious 
preferences or beliefs.  Teran further explained that the purpose of the invocation and 
benediction is to give a "solemn sense" to the graduation ceremony and to promote 
understanding between people with different backgrounds.  Attendance at the 
graduation exercise was not mandatory and was not a condition to receiving a 
diploma. 
Since 1971, challenges to the Establishment Clause have been subjected to the 
three-part test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 
(1971).  The three prongs of the Lemon test impose three restrictions on governmental 
action: "(1) it must have a secular purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be 
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it must not foster an excessive 
entanglement with religion."  Id. at 612-613.  In most instances of cases brought to 
court regarding the Establishment Clause the issues occurred in the classroom.  The 
court here found it significant that this case dealt with a graduation ceremony.  The 
court noted that, "a graduation ceremony-unlike the classroom-does not attempt to 
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educate" (p. 1057).  However, since the alleged violation occurred at a school-
sponsored activity the court put the situation to the three-part Lemon test.  The first 
prong of the test requires that the action have a secular purpose.  The court here found 
that the benediction and invocation for the graduation exercises at North High School 
were both nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in content.  They served the purpose of 
"solemnizing the occasion" (p.1059).  In addressing the second prong of the Lemon 
test, the court found that the invocation and benediction would not have the effect of 
promoting or advancing religion.  In the context of a graduation ceremony, the court 
found that "the nonsectarian references to the deity serve to endorse neither a 
particular religion nor religion in general" (p. 1059).  Finally, the court turned to the 
third-prong of excessive entanglement.  The court could find no evidence of any 
excessive entanglement.  The policy of the school principal simply allowed students 
to compose and present the benediction and invocation.  The contents of each were 
subject only to a review by the principal for sectarianism or proselytizing.  
Accordingly, the court found that the invocation and benediction did not violate the 
Establishment Clause and Griffith's motion was denied.    
 
James By and Through James v. Unified School District No. 512, Johnson 
County 
899 F. Supp. 530 (D. Kan. 1995) 
 
James was a sophomore at Shawnee Mission Northwest High School in the 
spring of 1995.  On April 28, 1995, Mark Hotzel, a police officer and school resource 
officer, and Harlan Hess, the associate vice principal, confronted James about a rumor 
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that he had a gun on school property and requested to search his car.  James was 
allowed to call his father, but not an attorney.  Prior to the arrival of James' father, 
Hotzel and Hess searched his car and found a gun.  Hotzel arrested James and then 
informed him of his Miranda rights.  Hess informed James and his father that James 
would be suspended for five days.  School district policy prohibited possession of a 
gun on school property and required school administration to suspend and to 
recommend expulsion of any student in possession of a gun.  USD 512 notified James 
and his parents by letter dated April 28, 1995, that a hearing would be conducted on 
May 1, 1995, to determine if James' suspension should be modified to a long-term 
suspension or expulsion.  The letter was postmarked May 1, 1995, and James 
received it on May 2, 1995.  James and his father were both present at the May 1 
hearing.  At that hearing, it was recommended that James be expelled from school for 
the remainder of the 1994-95 school year and the first semester of the 1995-96 school 
year.  James appealed to the Board of Education which conduced a hearing on May 
19, 1995.  At the hearing, the school board affirmed the expulsion decision.  On 
August 29, 1995, James filed suit in federal court requesting injunctive relief and 
monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  James asked that he be allowed to take his 
spring semester exams and that he be permitted to return to school in the fall of the 
1995-96 school year.   
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In order to prevail on a motion for a temporary restraining order the plaintiff 
must show that he will suffer irreparable harm unless injunction issues, that 
threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction 
may cause the defendant, that injunction would not be adverse to the public interest, 
and that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of 
the case.  The court chose to first examine whether there was a substantial likelihood 
that James would prevail on the merits.  James contended that his substantive due 
process rights were violated because the expulsion hearing was the result of an 
improper search and seizure by police officers of his vehicle.  At issue was whether 
the findings of an illegal search and seizure were required to be excluded from an 
expulsion hearing.  The court noted that even if James' Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights had been violated by the search, case law "does not prohibit using the fruits of 
that violation in school disciplinary hearings" (p. 533).  The Supreme Court in United 
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) found that "the 
exclusionary rule does not prohibit the use of illegal evidence in a civil proceeding by 
a sovereign which was not involved in violating the Constitution in obtaining the 
evidence" Id. at 447.  In this case, school officials had no part in the search and 
seizure of the gun found in James' car.  Courts will only review and revise school 
suspensions on substantive due process claims if there was "no rational relationship 
between the punishment and the offense."  Brewer v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 799 
F.2d 260,264 (5th Cir.1985).  In this case, school officials had a rational reason for 
suspending James: to keep weapons out of the school.  The court held that James had 
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"failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would succeed on the merits of his 
substantive due process claim" (p. 535).  In deciding James procedural due process 
claim, the court turned to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 
(1975).  Although Goss did not specifically address due process rights in the case of 
an expulsion, it did address rights for suspensions of ten days or less.  In cases such as 
that, a student must be given oral or written notice of the charges and evidence 
against him and a chance to present his side of the story.  Goss noted that longer 
suspensions or expulsions "may require more formal procedures."  Id. at 584.  Other 
court cases dealing with longer-term suspensions or expulsions required advance 
notice of the charges and a fair opportunity to be heard by an impartial decision-
maker.  While James may not have received advanced written notice of the May 1, 
1995 trial, he received some sort of notice because he and his father attended the 
hearing.  Both James and his father were given the opportunity to speak and James 
did not allege that the decision-maker was biased.  At the May 19, 1995 hearing 
before the Board, James was represented by a lawyer and allowed to present evidence 
on his behalf.  The court found that the defendant school district had afforded James 
"all the process he is due under the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 536).  James failed to 
show a substantial likelihood he would succeed on the merits of his procedural due 
process claim.  Because James failed to establish an essential element in his request 
for injunctive relief, his motion for a temporary restraining order was denied.   
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Singleton v. Board of Education USD 500 
894 F. Supp. 386 (D. Kan. 1995) 
 
Darrell Singleton was a student at Central Middle School.  On October 2, 
1992, he was called out of gym class to meet with assistant principal Bernice Cottrell.  
An adult woman, Vivian Williams, met Singleton outside of the office area and 
accused him of stealing $150 from the front seat of her car.  Jim Antos, another 
assistant principal, noticed the argument and took Singleton into his office to speak to 
the principal, Thomas Barry.  Cottrell escorted Williams into her office and discussed 
the situation.  Cottrell then informed Antos that Williams was upset and accused 
Singleton of stealing money from her car.  She also reported that Singleton's mother 
sold drugs.  Antos returned to Barry's office where he and Barry questioned Singleton 
about the money.  They also searched Singleton while in the office.  The versions of 
the search conflicted, however all agree that Singleton was not strip-searched.  After 
he was searched, Antos and Barry took Singleton to his locker and searched his coat, 
books, and papers.  They found no money or drugs in either search.  Before this 
incident, Barry had discouraged students and staff from bringing large sums of money 
to school.  Board policies were in place at the time of the incident regarding the 
search and seizure of students or their property.  Singleton filed action under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging his constitutional rights had been violated when he was 
subjected to an illegal search.  Claims were brought against Barry, Antos, Cottrell, 
and the school board.   
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New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), 
clearly established the law regarding constitutionality of searches at school.  In T.L.O., 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches made in 
public schools.  Nevertheless, a student's expectation of privacy must be balanced 
against the school's need to maintain order.  The test to determine the validity of a 
search is the "reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search" T.L.O. 105 S.Ct. 
at 742.  A two-fold test is used to determine the "reasonable under all circumstances" 
requirement.  In order to be constitutionally valid, a search must be justified at the 
beginning, and the scope of the search must be reasonably related to the 
circumstances that necessitated a search.  Based on the facts of this case, the court 
found that the search of Singleton was justified at its inception.  The potential 
infractions included the possession of a large sum of money and the possibility that 
the money had been stolen.  The court also found that the search was reasonable in its 
scope considering Singleton's age, gender, and the nature of the suspected infraction.  
He was searched in the privacy of Barry's office with only two male administrators 
present.  Singleton was never required to remove his underwear, and he was not 
touched inappropriately.  Previous court decisions from other states found similar 
student searches to be reasonable.  Singleton also argued that the search of his locker 
was unreasonable.  The defendants presented a copy of the school policy that clearly 
stated a student was not in possession of his locker; it was the property of the school.  
When the chance arose that Singleton could have had something stolen in his 
possession, the school had legally sufficient grounds to search his locker.  
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Accordingly, the court found that Singleton's constitutional rights had not been 
violated when school administrators searched him and his locker.  The defendant's 
motion for summary judgment was granted and the case was closed.  
 
Spencer v. Unified School District No. 501 
935 P.2d 242 (Kan. App. 1977) 
 
Jason Spencer, a student at Topeka High School, was suspended from school 
for possession of a pellet gun in the school parking lot.  In February 1995, Jason was 
eating lunch with two other students in his car when one of the other students 
removed a pellet pistol that looked like a real handgun from under Jason's front seat.  
During the lunch break and again after school the other student pointed the gun at 
friends who laughed, knowing the gun was a joke.  A parent saw the gun and reported 
Jason's license plate number to school security.  An investigation ensued and Jason 
was suspended for the remainder of the school year.  His suspension listed two 
causes:  a code 40 violation of "unruly conduct that disrupts school" and a code 60 
violation of "other matters covered by K.S.A. 72-8901 et seq."  (p. 244).  Jason 
appealed his extended suspension to the board of education.  After a hearing, the 
Board affirmed the suspension.  Jason appealed to the district court, which upheld the 
Board's decision.  Jason appealed.   
The first argument addressed by the court was whether the Board had acted 
beyond the scope of its authority.  Jason claimed the principal had "acquitted" him of 
the code 40 violation, which meant the issue should have been beyond the scope of 
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the Board's review.  Jason interpreted the principal's finding that Jason possessed a 
look-alike handgun to mean he had only committed a code 60 violation because the 
principal did not specifically state that he had engaged in unruly conduct that 
disrupted school.  The court did not agree with Jason's logic.  It held that a code 60 
violation, which was based on K.S.A. 72-8901, included "conduct which substantially 
disrupts…the operation of any public school…"  And so, although the principal did 
not specifically state which code Jason had violated, because a code 40 violation fell 
within a code 60 violation, he did not acquit Jason of any offense.  Therefore, the 
court found that the Board had not acted beyond its authority of the scope of its 
review.  Jason next argued that K.S.A. 72-8901(b) was unconstitutionally vague 
because the language of the statute did not specify what kind of conduct was 
prohibited.  The court first noted that a statute must be presumed constitutional and in 
order to be struck down it had to "clearly violate" the constitution.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of vague school regulations in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986).  In Bethel, a student 
challenged a school regulation prohibiting conduct which materially and substantially 
interferes with the educational process.  The Bethel court held that "Given the 
school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of 
unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary 
rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions."  
Id. 478 U.S. at 686.  Based on the broad standards set out in Bethel, the school in the 
present case did not need a regulation specifically prohibiting the possession of a 
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look-alike handgun.  Accordingly, the court found that K.S.A. 72-890 was not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Jason's final argument on appeal was that the Board's 
findings were not supported by the evidence.  Jason argued that there was no 
substantial evidence showing his conduct caused an actual disruption in the operation 
of the school.  The court found that this argument presented the closest issue of the 
case.  The evidence of an actual disruption to the school was minimal.  One parent 
saw the gun and contacted school security.  There was no evidence that any student 
ever thought the gun was a real threat.  Jason further argued that the school's 
investigative efforts could not be considered as a disruption to the operation of the 
school.  The court believed this point to be "well taken."  Students do not have control 
over whether school officials decide to conduct an investigation.  The school, 
according to the court, should not be "able to deem a student's actions disruptive 
simply because the school chose to investigate" (p. 245).  If they did so, a student's 
actions could be deemed disruptive even if the student had done no wrong, simply 
based upon the time and energy it took to investigate allegations against him.  
However, the court found a flaw in Jason's final argument in regards to the 
sufficiency of the evidence against him.  The Board had not simply found that Jason 
had engaged in conduct that disrupted school; it also found that Jason's conduct had 
impinged upon or invaded the rights of others.  The school principal testified 
regarding the importance of a safe school environment and pointed out that Jason's 
misconduct had "chipped away at that safe environment by creating a sense of fear 
that guns might be present on school grounds" (p.245).  The principal further testified 
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that parents and students had the right to feel safe at school and Jason's behavior had 
impinged on those rights.  Based on the principal's testimony, the court found the 
substantial competent evidence needed to support the school board's finding.  The 
judgment of the district court was affirmed.   
 
West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260 
206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) 
 
In 1995, in response to several incidents of racial tension between black and 
white students at Derby High School, the school district adopted a racial harassment 
and intimidation policy.  Several verbal confrontations had occurred between students 
wearing shirts with an image of the Confederate flag and those wearing an "X" in 
support of Malcolm X.  Racial graffiti appeared on campus bathrooms, walls, and 
sidewalks.  At least one physical fight occurred and there were reports of racial 
incidents on school buses and at football games.  In response to the tension, the 
school district organized a 350-member task force made up of parents, teachers and 
other community members to make a proposal on how the district should deal with 
the issues.  This task force recommended the adoption of a policy on racial 
harassment.  As a result, the school district adopted a "Racial Harassment and 
Intimidation" policy which stated in part that employees and students would not 
"wear or have in their possession any written material, either printed or in their own 
handwriting, that is racially divisive or creates ill will or hatred" (p. 1361).  The 
policy gave specific examples of items such as the Confederate flag and symbols 
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denoting the Ku Klux Klan, Black Power and Neo-Nazi groups.  Any violation of the 
policy would result in disciplinary action.  For students, the first offense would result 
in a three-day out-of-school suspension.  At the beginning of each school year, 
students were required to review a handbook covering all of the district's policies, 
including the racial harassment policy.  After reviewing the handbook, students 
signed an acknowledgement form stating they had reviewed and understood the 
policy handbook.   
During the 1997-98 school year, a seventh grade student, T.W., became 
involved in several disciplinary incidents.  At one point, he received a three-day 
suspension for calling another student "blackie."  When he returned from his 
suspension, T.W. had a conference with the assistant principal, Brad Keirns, who 
reviewed the harassment and intimidation policy with T.W.  On April 14, 1998, 
during math class, T.W. drew a Confederate flag on a piece of paper.  A student 
showed the drawing to the teacher who turned it over to Keirns.  When questioned, 
T.W. admitted drawing the flag and provided a written statement about what 
happened.  The assistant principal, following district policy, suspended T.W. for three 
days.  T.W.'s father filed suit for injunctive relief against the school district under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983.  In the suit, T.W.'s father alleged that the school district's policy 
(1) violated his son's First Amendment free speech right, (2) was unconstitutionally 
vague, (3) violated his son's Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, 
and (4) violated his son's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.  The 
district court held that T.W. had received appropriate due process because the 
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assistant principal had informed T.W. of the charge against him and gave T.W. a 
chance to present his side of the story.  The district court also found that the school 
district' policy did not violate equal protection because there was a legitimate 
educational purpose for not allowing students to possess a Confederate flag.  The 
district court further held that the policy did not violate the First Amendment because 
school officials had sufficient evidence from which they could reasonably conclude 
that possession of a Confederate flag would likely lead to a material and substantial 
disruption of the school.  T.W. appealed this decision. 
On appeal, T.W. did not seriously argue that he failed to receive due process; 
rather he argued that he did not receive a "meaningful" hearing because the assistant 
principal never found out whether T.W. intended to harass or intimidate anyone by 
drawing the Confederate flag.  The appellate court rejected any notion that the 
Constitution requires a finding of an intent to harass before the school district could 
enforce its harassment policy.  The assistant principal suspended T.W. for 
"knowingly and intentionally" violating the district's policy.  The appellate court 
found this decision to be supported by the evidence presented and held that T.W. had 
received all of the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Next, the 
court addressed T.W.'s claim that the school had violated his rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause in that the school district selectively excluded his possession of the 
Confederate flag while other allowing other students to possess the flag in history or 
library books.  The court first noted that public school students are not considered a 
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.  Accordingly, the school district 
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could prohibit students from possessing the Confederate flag on school grounds, 
outside of school-approved materials, as long as the policy was rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.  In this case, the school district had a legitimate 
interest in preventing potentially disruptive student conduct from interfering with the 
educational process.  Thus, the appellate court concluded that the harassment and 
intimidation policy did not violate T.W.'s right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The court next held that the school district did not violate 
T.W.'s First Amendment right to free speech when it suspended him from school after 
he drew the Confederate flag.  The display of the flag could be considered a form of 
political speech, and school officials cannot ban such speech simply because they fear 
there might be a disturbance.  However, the weight of evidence in this case showed 
that, based on recent past events, the school district had good reason to believe that a 
student's display of a Confederate flag could cause a disruption.  The history of racial 
tension in the school district made administrators' and parents' concerns about future 
disruptions from the possession of a Confederate flag at school reasonable.  T.W.'s 
First Amendment free speech challenge failed with the appellate court.  Finally, the 
court addressed T.W.'s challenge that the harassment policy was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad.  In order for a court to address a challenge that a law is 
overbroad, it must be shown that the law could have "a chilling effect on the free 
speech rights of parties not before the court" (p.1367).  The court held that T.W.'s 
challenge failed because there was no realistic danger that the district's policy would 
significantly compromise First Amendment protections of other students.  The court 
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further held that the policy was not unconstitutionally vague.  The policy might have 
been void for vagueness if a reasonable student of ordinary intelligence who read the 
policy might not understand its meaning.  That was not the case here.  The policy 
clearly prohibited any student from possessing a Confederate flag and outlined the 
consequence for such action.  T.W. had reviewed the policy on more than one 
occasion and was well aware that drawing a Confederate flag was against school 
policy.  The decision of the district court was affirmed.                     
 
C.R.K. v. U.S.D. 260 
176 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Kan. 2001) 
 
 In December 1995, the plaintiff, C.R.K., a student at Derby High School 
alleged that her boyfriend, Adrian Martin, raped her in August 1995 prior to the start 
of the school year.  Adrian was also a student at Derby High.  The alleged rape 
occurred during the summer but the plaintiff did not report the incident.  Plaintiff and 
Martin broke up some time in October.  In early December the plaintiff told a friend 
about the alleged rape who then insisted that the plaintiff tell her mother, which she 
did.  Plaintiff and her mother contacted the Derby police and reported the incident.  
Plaintiff’s parents met with Dr. Jim Sowers, the high school principal, in January 
1996, and informed him of the alleged rape.  They wanted an assurance from the 
school that Martin would not have any contact with their daughter and that 
supervision would be present at all cheerleading practices, as both Martin and the 
plaintiff were on the squad.  Dr. Sowers informed the cheerleading sponsor who made 
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sure that because the plaintiff was on the junior varsity team and Martin was on the 
varsity,  no practices were scheduled that included both of them.  Because the 
incident had been reported to the police and had occurred outside the school’s 
jurisdiction, Dr. Sowers did not impose any disciplinary action upon Adrian Martin.  
The plaintiff alleged that after she reported the incident, the defendants allowed 
Martin and his friends to harass her during school hours and at extra-curricular 
activities.  The plaintiff gave examples of the harassment that occurred between 
January and the spring of 1996.  Some of the incidents included: a group of girls who 
would follow her around and talk about her, one girl who pretended to kick her, and 
another girl who threatened to harm her.  When these incidents occurred, the plaintiff 
would tell her mother who would call either Dr. Sowers or another staff member to 
report the situations.  In each case, the school investigated the allegations made by the 
plaintiff, conferenced with the students involved if necessary, and in one case 
assigned a girl who had threatened the plaintiff to an in-school suspension.  At the 
end of the school year, the plaintiff’s mother wrote a letter to Dr. Sowers in which she 
expressed her frustration with the harassing behavior of other students, the police 
department who she referred to as “jerks,” and the fact that she believed Adrian 
Martin should be kicked out of school.  She also asserted that Martin should not be 
allowed to participate in extracurricular activities because of a clause in the school 
district’s Standard Code of Conduct for Athletic/Activity Participation, which said 
that any student who “admits to, or is found guilty of any violation local, state, or 
federal law would be ineligible.”  In June 1996, a hearing concerning the complaint 
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against Adrian Martin was held.  Adrian admitted to, and was found guilty of, the 
commission of a battery under K.S.A. 21-3412(b), a class B person misdemeanor.  
The judge placed Martin on one year of probation, a condition of which was a No 
Contact Order between him and the plaintiff.  The court did not restrict any of 
Martin’s extracurricular activities, leaving that to school rules and regulations.  
Sometime that summer, Alana Pharis, the Derby High School Athletic Director, 
determined that Adrian Martin was not eligible to participate in extracurricular 
activities because of his involvement in the juvenile court proceedings.  In July 1996, 
Martin’s parents wrote a letter to Dr. Sowers in which they asked for a clarification of 
the policy as it applied to Martin’s circumstances.  They asked Sowers to consider the 
fact that Martin was an honor student who had been involved in many school 
activities and had no prior disciplinary problems.  Before making his decision, Dr. 
Sowers contacted one of the prosecutors in Martin’s juvenile court case and asked if 
the No Contact provision would prevent him from participating in school activities.  
The attorney stated that he thought it “was best to keep juveniles in extracurricular 
activities” and he did not believe it would violate the No Contact order if Martin were 
allowed to play football.  Sowers also received a letter from Martin’s probation 
officer indicating that he had been doing well and expressing the opinion that it would 
have a “negative effect” if Martin were excluded from extracurricular activities.  As 
he was inclined to reverse the athletic director’s ruling, Sowers met with the Board to 
get some direction.  They discussed the fact that Martin had been convicted of 
misdemeanor battery, not rape.  There was also discussion about the new Standards of 
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Conduct for Athletics/Activity Participation, which had been approved the previous 
spring and stated that students were ineligible when “found guilty of any felonious 
law” (p. 1152).  (This rule change had been suggested in 1994 and was put into place 
in 1996)  As a result of these meetings, Sowers sent a letter to the parents of Adrian 
Martin notifying them that Adrian would be placed on extended probation and 
allowed to participate in extracurricular activities.  Martin would not be eligible for 
yell leading, as that would place him in contact with the plaintiff who was on the 
cheerleading squad.  Starting in the fall of 1996, plaintiff reported various forms of 
alleged harassment.  Plaintiff’s mother also complained that students were harassing 
her as well as the plaintiff.  In each case, a school official would investigate the 
allegations and if they were verified, disciplinary action would occur.  The school 
accommodated the No Contact order by ensuring that the cheerleaders had their own 
transportation to the games, rather than riding with the football team, of which Martin 
was a member.  The cheerleading sponsor changed the plaintiff’s location in the cheer 
formation when the plaintiff made that request.  In October 1996, the plaintiff’s 
mother called to report that a student had called the plaintiff “fat” during class.  She 
said this violated Adrian Martin’s No Contact order because the student was one of 
his friends.  The situation was investigated but the accused student denied saying 
anything derogatory and the classroom teacher had seen no evidence of the incident.  
In January 1997, plaintiff’s attorney served a notice and letter upon the defendant 
school district and Dr. Sowers alleging they had “intentionally discriminated against 
plaintiff on account of sex in violation of Title IX” (p. 1160).  Plaintiff alleged that 
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the harassment continued through spring 1997.  She pointed to incidents in which 
Martin would sit behind her at basketball games when she was cheering and times 
when his mother would follow her into the restroom.  The plaintiff did not report 
these incidents to school officials; instead, she would tell her mother who would then 
call the school.  Plaintiff also complained that she had wanted to join some school 
clubs but did not do so because Martin was in those clubs.  She did not inform school 
officials of her desire to participate in these clubs.  The plaintiff claimed that this 
harassment violated her rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq.  The matter went before the court on both parties’ 
cross-motions for summary judgment.   
Title IX provides in part that “no person in the United Stated shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”  20 U.S.C. Section 1681(a).  In Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of 
Education, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S. Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999), the Supreme 
Court held that a school district that receives Title IX funds can be held liable for 
damages if the school is “deliberately indifferent” to acts of student-to-student sexual 
harassment.  Davis did not imply the a school must expel students who engage in 
sexual harassment, nor did in state that liability hinged upon whether the school was 
successful in its attempts to stop peer harassment.  Rather, school officials would be 
considered “deliberately indifferent” only when the response to reported harassment 
is “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.”  Unlike Davis, the 
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school district in this case took numerous steps in an effort to address the complaints 
made by the plaintiff and her mother.  They did not ignore the reports but made 
attempts to investigate and address the problems.  The plaintiff argued that allowing 
Martin to participate in extracurricular activities was evidence of deliberate 
indifference because it forced the plaintiff to have contact with Martin and “sent a 
message” to other students that sexual harassment was tolerated at the school.  The 
court found several reasons why the defendants’ actions did not rise to the Davis 
standard of deliberate indifference.  First, in regards to the change in the eligibility 
rule, it was clear that by 1994 – before any incident involving Martin – the school had 
received recommendations from the athletic director that the policy be interpreted to 
allow school officials some discretion in determining whether a particular conviction 
should make a student ineligible.  Second, the offense to which Martin pleaded guilty 
was battery and this offense contained no element of sexual contact.  It was not 
unreasonable of the school to accept the findings of the court and treat the offense as 
consisting only of battery.  Third, although the plaintiff points out that some students 
had been suspended or expelled in the past for committing battery, none of these 
cases occurred outside the jurisdiction of the school at a time when school was not in 
session.  Fourth, Dr. Sowers relied on the recommendation of the district attorney and 
the probation officer who were involved in Adrian Martin’s case.  Both of these 
officials recommended that Martin be allowed to participate in school activities.  It 
was clearly not unreasonable for Dr. Sowers to rely on their judgment as they were 
informed about the facts of Martin’s case and they were charged with seeing that the 
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court’s no-contact order was enforced.  Finally, the fact that Dr. Sowers did not allow 
Martin to participate in yell leading was further evidence that he did not ignore the 
potential for contact between Martin and the plaintiff.  While the court conceded that 
the school’s response was not ideal in all instances, this was not a case, as was Davis, 
of a school making “no effort whatsoever either to investigate or put an end to 
harassment” (p. 1167).  The court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish that 
the school responded in a manner that was clearly unreasonable.  The defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment was granted.  The plaintiff’s motion for partial 
summary judgment was denied.  The clerk was directed to enter a judgment of 
dismissal on the merits in the favor of the defendants. 
 
Nicol v. Auburn-Washburn USD 437 
231 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. Kan. 2002) 
 
Andrea Nicol was a student at Washburn-Rural High School who filed suit 
against a school security officer after an altercation took place at school.  On the 
morning of September 30, 1998, Jerald Targett, the school security officer, was called 
to the office to assist with two students who were having behavioral issues.  When he 
arrived, Targett encountered two female students, one of whom was the plaintiff 
Nicol.  The girls had been suspended from school and had left the office to go to their 
classes to pick up homework assignments.  Targett followed the girls. They became 
belligerent, used obscene language and told Targett to stop following them.  Targett 
told the girls to leave the school grounds but they continued entering classrooms and 
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causing a disturbance.  Targett followed them into a classroom and put his hands on 
Nicol in an attempt to get her to leave.  According to Nicol, Targett grabbed her arm 
and placed his forearm across her throat cutting off her airway.  Targett then swung 
her off the floor and dragged her into the hallway.  He pushed her face and head into 
a wall, which resulted in bruises.  According to Nicol, Targett then slammed her into 
a water fountain.  She clung to the fountain to keep Targett from dragging her away.  
When Targett pulled her away from the fountain, he did so with enough force to pull 
the fountain off the wall.  The police arrived, handcuffed Nicol and took her to 
Shawnee County juvenile where she was released to her parents.  Nicol's parents took 
her to the hospital for treatment of her injuries.  On October 5, 1998, the school board 
held an administrative suspension hearing and suspended Nicol for the remainder of 
the semester.  On August 2, 1999, Nicol's parents appeared in front of the school 
board and requested an investigation into the actions of Targett against Nicol.  In a 
letter dated September 13, 1999, Howard Schuler, superintendent, and Steven Angel, 
school board president, indicated that the school board would not take any action 
against any employee of the District for doing their job.  Nicol filed suit against the 
school district, several employees of Washburn Rural, and one member of the school 
board.  The defendants were named in both their individual and official capacities as 
agents of USD 437.  Plaintiff Nicol filed her suit under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681 et seq., claiming the defendants 
created a "hostile environment" that included harassment and physical abuse and 
discriminated against Nicol on the basis of her gender.  She also filed suit under 42 
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U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming the defendants violated her rights under the Fourth 
Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure and violated her rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to receive both procedural and substantial due process.  Nicol 
filed under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), in which she alleged the defendants engaged 
in a conspiracy to deprive her of her "class-based civil rights."  In addition, she filed 
several related state law statutory and common law claims against the defendants, 
these included claims under Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 60-513 "against the use of 
excessive force by officers," claims under Kan. Stat. Ann. Section 21-3608 for child 
endangerment, and common law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
assault, and battery.  The defendants made a motion to dismiss.   
Courts will only dismiss a case for failure to state a claim when it appears 
beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of their theory 
that would entitle them to relief.  All facts are accepted as true and all reasonable 
inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff.  The defendants first 
argued that they were immune from liability for the civil rights violations claimed by 
Nicol by reason of qualified immunity.  They asserted that the individually named 
defendants were government officials who performed acts "within the course of their 
duties" and that they acted in good faith and "not in ignorance or disregard of settled 
indisputable principles of law" (p. 1097).  Qualified immunity protects state officials 
from liability when they act within the scope of their employment and their conduct 
has not violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.  When a defendant raises the defense of 
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qualified immunity in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court conducts a two-
part test.  First, the court must determine if the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a 
constitutional or federal statutory right.  Next, the court must examine whether the 
right that was violated was "sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right" (p. 1098).  The court used this 
two-step test to analyze the qualified immunity defense in all of the plaintiff's claims.   
In addressing the Fourth Amendment claim, the court sought to determine 
whether seizure was reasonable under all the circumstances.  In a public school 
context, the court must take into account what is appropriate treatment for children in 
public schools as well as consider the school's "custodial and tutelary responsibility 
for children" (p. 1099).  The defendants claimed that Targett's actions did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment because they were directed at getting Nicol to leave the 
school, to prevent her from continuing her disruption of classrooms and running 
through the school to evade Targett.  While the court agreed the school had an interest 
in ensuring that students cooperate in non-disruptive manner, it found that Targett's 
actions went beyond what would be considered reasonable under the circumstances.  
In considering the facts alleged by Nicol, the court found that she had stated a 
violation of her Section 1983 Fourth Amendment rights which met the first prong of 
the test.  Having found she stated a Fourth Amendment claim, the court next 
determined that a reasonable officer in Targett's position should have known that the 
use of excessive force in response to a student's non-compliant actions would violate 
well-known constitutional principles.  As the plaintiff was able to meet both prongs, 
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the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss the Fourth Amendment claim.  
Nicol had two Fourteenth Amendment claims for the court to address, those being 
procedural and substantial due process.  In her procedural due process claim, Nicol 
alleged that the due process that had been provided was biased in favor of the school.  
As she could not substantiate this claim with facts, the court dismissed it and granted 
the defendants' motion on this basis.  In her substantive due process claim, Nicol 
alleged that the "attack" by Targett was "punishment" for her behavior the day of the 
incident.  The Tenth Circuit set out that in school discipline cases, the substantive due 
process inquiry is "whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so 
disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather 
than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and 
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience" (p. 1102).  
When the court considered the facts presented in this case, it determined that the 
altercation, which was of such force that the plaintiff suffered injuries and school 
property was damaged, might rise to the "shock the conscience" standard.  Thus, the 
court found Nicol had stated a substantial due process claim.  The court also found 
that the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protections had long been 
established in public schools and Targett should have known that the amount of force 
he used would violate these well-known constitutional principles.  The defendants' 
motion on the substantive due process claim was denied.   
The court next turned to the Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Section 1681(a) claims that 
the defendants created a "hostile environment" that included harassment and physical 
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abuse and discriminated against Nicol because of her gender.  To state a claim under 
Title IX, a plaintiff must show that the school district (1) had knowledge of, and (2) 
was deliberately indifferent to (3) harassment that was so severe, pervasive and 
objectively offensive that it (4) deprived the victim of access to the educational 
benefits of opportunities provided by the school.  In considering Nicol's complaint, 
the court found that she had made a generalized accusation that the school district 
"fostered a hostile educational environment that discriminated against the 
Plaintiff...on the basis of her gender" (p. 1104).  However, there were no factual 
allegations to support this statement.  There was nothing to tie Targett's actions to 
Nicol's gender, nor were there allegations that the districts' decision not to discipline 
Targett had anything to do with her gender.  Accordingly, the court found that Nicol 
had failed to establish a case for this claim and granted the defendants motion for 
dismissal on the accusation of a hostile environment on the basis of sex under Title 
IX.  The court also dismissed Nicol's conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 
1985(3) because she failed to claim that the actions taken by the defendants stemmed 
from some class-based, discriminatory motive.  Because Nicol failed to respond to the 
defendants' arguments on the alleged state statutory violations of excessive force by 
officers under K.S.A. 60-513 and child endangerment under K.S.A. 21-3608, the 
court dismissed these two claims.  Finally, the court addressed the defendants' 
assertion that they were entitled to qualified immunity from the state law claims 
pursuant to the discretionary function of the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).  K.S.A. 
75-6104(e) protects governmental entities and employees acting within the scope of 
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their duties for damages that result from "any claim based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 
the governmental entity or employee, whether or not the discretion is abused and 
regardless of the level of discretion involved."  The court pointed out that this 
exception only provides a defense against ordinary negligence.  It does not apply to 
allegations of willful or wanton acts by governmental employees.  The court found 
that in this case, the defendants were not entitled to immunity under the exception 
found in the KTCA.  The claims made by Nicol involved intentional torts and alleged 
willful and malicious conduct by the defendants.  Accordingly, the defendants' 
motion was granted in part and denied in part.     
 
Smith v. Barber 
316 F. Supp. 2d 992 (D. Kan. 2004) 
 
This lengthy case involved five student plaintiffs who were arrested for 
plotting an armed attack on their high school.  Much of the case dealt with the claims 
brought against law enforcement officers and the county attorney.  This brief will 
only discuss those claims brought against school district officials.   
On Friday, December 17, 1999, Labette County High School (LCHS) officials 
learned of an alleged plot to stage an armed attack on the school by students Smith, 
Traxson, Spencer, McReynolds, Vail (plaintiffs) and non-parties Heiskell and Van 
Buren.  The plan had allegedly been planned the evening of December 16 at Smith's 
home and was to take place on December 20, 1999.  At school on December 17, 
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Heiskell and McReynolds talked about the plan in front of Van Buren.  Van Buren 
was allegedly recruited to participate in the attack by sitting on a building outside 
LCHS and shooting people as they came out of the school.  Over their lunch hour that 
day, Heiskell and Van Buren informed Stacy Smith, a teacher at LCHS, about the 
plan to attack the school.  When Smith further questioned the students, Heiskell 
described the plans and warned her that she was a target along with other teachers and 
a student.  Van Buren told Smith that McReynolds had asked him to sit on the roof 
and shoot people as they came outside.  Van Buren became visibly upset and began 
crying.  Stacy Smith immediately reported the conversation to Greg Cartwright, 
school principal.  Cartwright interviewed Heiskell in the presence of Smith and Van 
Buren.  Heiskell repeated the story he had told Smith and added that he and the other 
plaintiffs had been drinking and doing drugs during while making their plans.  
Heiskell told Cartwright that they had drawn a map of the school and planned to start 
their attack at the end of the school where the art room was located.  McReynolds had 
said he could get police uniforms for them to wear because his father was a reserve 
deputy for the sheriff's office.  Heiskell also reported that they had discussed a hit list 
of specific individuals they would shoot.  Heiskell had not believed the five students 
were serious until Van Buren was approached about sitting on top of a building to 
shoot people as they came out.  After the interview, Cartwright called the Safe School 
Hotline to report the alleged threat.  Ken Swender, an assistant principal, called 
Undersheriff C.W. Davis at the sheriff's office to report the alleged plot.  Sheriff 
William Blundell, detective Scott Higgins, and Davis all drove to LCHS to 
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investigate.  When he arrived, Blundell informed police chief James Barber that the 
sheriff's office would handle the investigation.  Cartwright informed Blundell, 
Higgins, and Davis of the plan as told to him by Heiskell.  Cartwright then called 
Superintendent Dennis Wilson to tell him about the situation at LCHS.  Once Wilson 
arrived at the school, Blundell and Higgins interviewed Heiskell in the presence of his 
parents and Wilson.  Throughout the interview, Heiskell was upset and crying.  After 
the interview, Blundell and Higgins met with county attorney Robert Forer in his 
office and informed him of their conversation with Heiskell.  The discussed the need 
to interview Van Buren and to contact the Kansas Bureau of Investigations (KBI) to 
help with the investigation.  Cartwright was called to the sheriff's office to provide 
details about his conversation with Heiskell and information regarding where the 
boys lived.  Cartwright informed Higgins at that time that he had received a report 
from a teacher's aide stating that Van Buren had warned her not to come to school on 
Monday.  Later that evening, Higgins called Heiskell to conduct a second interview 
by telephone and the KBI interviewed Van Buren.  Based on information from the 
interviews, Higgins completed an application for search warrants.  The search 
warrants were executed early in the morning hours of December 18, 1999.  
McReynolds, Smith, Traxson, Spencer, and Vail were all arrested at their homes.  
Multiple guns, ammunition and reserve sheriff's deputy uniforms were confiscated in 
the searches.  The boys were all interrogated on December 18, 1999.  Each discussed 
the plans for attacking the school and Traxson and Smith acknowledged having 
access to weapons.  All five said that the conversation was meant to be a joke.  On 
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December 19, Forer filed juvenile complaints in Labette County District Court 
charging each of the boys with eight counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree 
murder.  That same day, Higgins interviewed Heiskell for a third time at LCHS.  
Heiskell reiterated his story and said he believed the plot to be serious.  On December 
21, 1999, a detention hearing was held and the court ordered that the five students 
remain in custody.  On January 29, 2000, the five were transferred from the Juvenile 
Detention Center to the Labette County Jail.  Between February 8 and February 14, 
2000, the five boys were released on $25,000 bond and house arrest.  As a condition 
of their release, none could have any contact with LCHS.  On February 6, 2000, 
Heiskell told Forer that parts of his previous statements to law enforcement were not 
true.  Specifically, no map had been drawn, there were no guns or uniforms present 
during the discussions, and the guns were in the gun cabinet.  Forer was not sure 
whether Heiskell's initial statements or his revised statements were true.  Forer 
concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to prosecute the five boys, so he 
dismissed the charges of conspiracy to commit murder on April 14, 2000.  After Forer 
dropped the charges, the prohibition against the boys contacting the school was also 
released.  Cartwright concluded it was in the best interest of the students and LCHS to 
suspend the five for the remainder of the school year.  On April 17, 2000, Cartwright 
sent a notice to the students advising them that they would be placed on short-term 
suspension through April 28.  He also sent notice of his intention to suspend them for 
the rest of the school year and advising them of their right to contest that 
recommendation during hearings scheduled for April 27 and 28.  The notifications 
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included copies of the Student Suspension and Expulsion law, K.S.A. 72-8901 et seq. 
and U.S.D. 506 Board regulations relating to due process hearings for students.  
Superintendent Wilson presided over the hearings for all of the students.  All of the 
boys denied any wrongdoing, however, all except Vail agreed to the proposed 
suspension.  Vail did not agree to the suspension and Wilson advised him of his right 
to appeal the decision of the hearing officer to the school board.  Wilson accepted the 
suspension recommendation for each of the boys and mailed copies of his 
determination to each of them the following week.  None of the students filed an 
intent to appeal with the school district.  The five students sued the city and its police 
chief, county attorney, sheriff, detective, and undersheriff, school district, district 
superintendent, and the high school principal under Section 1983 alleging violations 
of Fourth Amendment relating to searches and arrests, malicious prosecution, and 
violations of the Eighth Amendment.  Their specific claims against the school district 
and officials were for deprivation of procedural and substantive due process rights.  
The defendants made a motion for summary judgment.  
In addressing the claims against Wilson and Cartwright, the court cited several 
previous court decisions dealing with suspension and the rights of students.  Wood v. 
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) held that "it is not the 
role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the 
court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion."  Id. 420 U.S. at 308.  
The Wood court also went on to point out that public school students retain 
substantive and procedural due process rights while at school.  In Goss v. Lopez, 419 
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U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975), the Supreme Court established the 
basic procedural due process rights for students.  At the minimum, students facing a 
suspension must be given some sort of hearing.  In the case of suspensions of 10 days 
or less, a student must be given oral or written notice of the charges against, an 
explanation of the evidence, and a chance to present his side of the story.  If the 
suspension is for a longer period of time, or in the case of an expulsion, "more formal 
procedures" may be required.  The five students in the present case first asserted that 
they were deprived of their due process rights when the school district failed to 
provide them with an education while they were confined in jail.  Basically, they 
alleged that this failure amounted to a "de facto" suspension without notice or a 
hearing.  The court determined that the students failed to support their assertion with 
any controlling authority.  Although they quoted several sections of Kansas statutes 
and cited case law dealing with public school discipline and suspension, they could 
offer no explanation for how this supported their claim.  The court dismissed the 
claim for lack of evidence of any requirement that school officials must provide a 
confined student with educational materials or else risk violating the student's due 
process rights.  Next, the students claimed there were several errors in their 
suspension from school that resulted in due process violations.  They contended they 
should have been informed that Heiskell had been a witness against them and been 
allowed to cross-examine him.  In Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237 
(10th Cir.2001), it was made clear that there was "no constitutional guarantee to 
cross-examine witnesses during a school suspension hearing" (p. 1033).  The 
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suspensions in this case were based on the conversation about attacking the high 
school, which resulted in a substantial disruption of the school, not Heiskell's 
testimony.  The court also found that the notices sent to the students from the school 
district sufficiently notified them of the charges against them and satisfied the 
requirements set out in Goss.  The student plaintiffs also argued that their suspensions 
were not proper because they were based on the belief that the boys were guilty, even 
after Heiskell admitted he had not been truthful in all of his statements and the 
charges had been dismissed.  The court believed this argument missed the mark.  The 
boys had been suspended because of the impact their admitted conversation about 
attacking LCHS had on the school, not because of the criminal charges filed or 
Heiskell's statements.  Finally, the court addressed the substantive due process claims 
of the five students.  To prevail on this claim, a student must show that he suffered 
substantial prejudice as a result of inadequate procedures.  Because four of the 
students had been present at the hearing, with an attorney and their parents present, 
and agreed to the suspensions, they could not now claim that their suspension was the 
result of inadequate procedures.  Vail, who did not have an attorney present and did 
not agree with the suspension, was allowed to present his case and was provided with 
proper notice of the appeal process, thus preserving his due process rights.  
Accordingly, the court granted Wilson and Cartwright's motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the students' claims for deprivation of their procedural and 
substantive due process rights.  Finally, the court addressed the claims against U.S.D. 
506.  The district could only have been held liable for unconstitutional acts that were 
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the result of a policy or custom of the school district or from the acts of officials with 
policy-making authority.  Since the court had determined that Cartwright and Wilson 
had not deprived the students of any rights, the claims against the school district were 
also dismissed.  Summary judgment was granted with respect to the school district 
and its employees and the case as a whole was dismissed. 
 
Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School District No. 464 
377 F. Supp. 2d 952 (D. Kan. 2005) 
 
This case was brought by Dylan Theno as the result of student-on-student 
harassment that took place when he attended junior and senior high school in 
Tonganoxie.  The harassment of Theno began when he was in the seventh grade 
during the 1999-2000 school year.  In October of 1999, K.L. and C.C. called Theno a 
faggot and K.L. tried to trip him.  Theno pushed K.L. and the teacher took the 
students to the office.  The vice principal talked to all of them and warned that they 
would get an in-school suspension if the behavior continued.  In November of 1999, 
at a school basketball game S.S. threw rocks at Theno, called him a fag and made 
other rude comments about him.  Theno punched S.S. and received a three-day 
suspension.  S.S. received an in-school suspension for the name-calling.  Theno 
talked to Steve Woolf, the building principal, about the incident.  On several 
occasions after Christmas, Theno was harassed by students in the lunchroom who 
called him fag and accused him of masturbating.  One student, G.P., made rude 
gestures of a sexual nature towards Theno.  Two other boys, M.M. and D.C. made fun 
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of Theno regarding a rumor that he had been caught masturbating in the bathroom.  
They told him that G.P. had started the rumor.  Other students began teasing Theno 
and asking if he was going to "make a trip to the bathroom" (p. 955).  Theno left the 
lunchroom and went to see the vice principal.  He told her what happened and she 
went to talk with the other kids.  Woolf brought Theno into his office and asked about 
what happened.  The vice principal returned and told them that she had warned the 
students that if they used the terms fag or gay again they would be suspended.  
Theno's mother learned of the incident in the lunchroom and came to the school to 
meet with the administrators.  She disagreed with the boys only receiving a warning.  
Later, Mrs. Theno spoke with the superintendent, Richard Erikson, and asked that he 
review the manner in which the principal (Woolf) and vice principal (Strong) had 
handed the situation.  Erikson reported back to Mrs. Theno in a few days and said that 
he believed the school's administrators had handled the situation in accordance with 
the student handbook.  Theno's father met with G.P. and his father at which time G.P. 
apologized.  G.P.  later told students that he had made up the rumor about Theno's 
masturbating.  Theno had no further problems with G.P., C.C., or K.L.  Shortly after 
this situation, an eighth grader, D.W., called Theno the jack-off kid.  Later that school 
year, Theno had problems with A.E. in the lunchroom calling him the jack-off.  
Theno did not report this to staff members.  On February 17, 2000, Theno was 
counseled and moved to a different lunch table for calling other students faggots after 
they made fun of his hair.  On February 24, 2000, A.E. was disciplined and given a 
three-day lunch detention and a warning that the next incident of harassment would 
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result in more severe consequences.  Numerous other incidents of harassment 
occurred throughout the remainder of Theno's seventh grade year involving different 
students.  During Theno's eighth grade year, the 2000-01 school year, Theno had 
problems with D.W. again.  D.W. would call him names, such as faggot and queer 
and once drew rude pictures that represented Theno in the condensation on the school 
bus window after basketball practice.  Theno reported this to Woolf who told D.W. 
that if he continued making fun of Theno he would be kicked off the basketball team.  
D.W. stopped the harassment until after basketball season was over, then he 
continued making random rude comments.  Mr. Theno went to the school in January 
of 2001 to speak to Woolf about D.W.  He also went the school several other times 
that year to discuss the continuing harassment.  The next major problem occurred 
during Theno's ninth grade year in gym class.  Someone (Theno suspected D.W.) had 
written on the locker room chalkboard that Theno was a fag and that he masturbated.  
Theno erased it the first time, but when it was written a second time he reported it to 
Woolf.  Woolf said he would handle it.  Nothing was written the next day, but 
someone wrote something the following day.  When Theno returned to Woolf, he 
apologized, said he had been busy and had forgotten to check.  Woolf talked to D.W. 
and to Matt Bond, the gym teacher.  Nothing further was written on the board and 
Theno had no further problems with D.W.  Woolf also interviewed A.E. and asked if 
he had called Theno names or heard others calling him names.  A.E. denied any 
knowledge of anything.  Mr. Theno again spoke with Woolf.  He also met with 
Erickson in early February of 2002 to discuss the numerous incidents of name-calling.  
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After meeting with Mr. Theno, Erickson talked to Woolf and reviewed all of the 
incidents based on the information Mr. Theno had given him and discussed Woolf's 
handling of the harassment.  Theno did not report any further incidents during the 
remainder of his ninth grade year.  Theno moved up to the high school for the 2002-
03 school year.  Woolf did not talk to anyone at the high school before Theno arrived 
to alert them of the harassment that Theno had experienced or the complaints raised 
by his parents.  Theno first experienced harassment at the high school in February of 
2003 in a strength training class.  T.H. started making fun of Theno by saying that he 
had been caught masturbating in the bathroom.  This happened on several occasions.  
Theno had similar problems with N.S. and M.W. in strength training class.  Theno did 
not report any of this to his teacher, Matt Bond, and he let it go on for about a week 
before telling his father.  Mr. Theno went to the school and met with the high school 
assistant principal, Brent Smith, to notify him of the problems in strength training 
class as well as in another class with A.E.  Mr. Theno told Smith that his son had had 
similar problems in the seventh grade.  Smith investigated the complaints by first 
talking to Theno and then with the boys accused of making comments.  Smith talked 
to the boys about the seriousness of sexual harassment and the consequences that 
would ensue if the harassment continued.  Smith also informed Bond of the 
comments so that he would be more aware of the situation.  Theno had no further 
problems with M.W., N.S., or T.H.  In March of 2003, Mr. Theno called school board 
member, Richard Dean, and outlined the problems that his son had been having.  On 
March 12, Theno and his parents met with Dean at which time Mr. Theno gave Dean 
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a copy of sixteen pages of notes from Mrs. Theno regarding all of the harassment 
their son had been dealing with.  Dean later shared the concerns with the other board 
of education members and notified school administrators.  After Smith received the 
log of incidents, he and the principal, Michael Bogart, decided to take a more 
proactive stand and talk to the boys mentioned in the incident log.  Smith brought in 
all of the boys mentioned in the log and spoke with them about the seriousness of 
their past actions.  Most of the students Smith talked to were aware of prior problems, 
but nothing recent.  All assured Smith that they would not be a part of any further 
issues.  There were no further problems during Theno's tenth grade year.  During the 
summer before Theno's eleventh grade year, Mr. Theno provided Smith with 
information that included the names of student who had harassed his son in the past.  
Mr. Theno also contacted the school counselor and told her about the harassment.  
Bogart and Smith met with some of Theno's teachers for the 2003-04 school year, 
informed them of the previous harassment and advised that they be alert to any 
inappropriate comments.  Only a few days after school started, D.O. made fun of 
Theno at the lunch table, calling him fag and referring to the rumor about 
masturbating in the bathroom.  Theno ignored D.O. and did not report anything.  On 
September 8, 2003, as Theno was entering the school building, D.O. stepped forward 
into Theno's face and said, "Faggot, faggot, faggot" (p. 960).  Theno punched D.O. in 
the face and a fight ensued.  Both boys were suspended for three days.  Theno had no 
further problems with D.O. in school.  On October 13, 2003, Mr. Theno met in 
executive session with the school board to complain about the harassment and request 
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that the administrators be terminated.  On November 16, 2008, while in strength 
training class doing lunges with weights, C.L. called Theno a queer.  The teacher 
overheard the comment and made C.L. do pushups.  Bogart learned of the incident 
during a conference the next day with Mrs. Theno.  He met with C.L. and C.L.'s 
mother, gave C.L. a detention and required him to write a letter of apology to Theno.  
On November 18, 2003, Bogart made an all school announcement that banned the use 
of the terms "gay" or "fag."  That night Theno begged his mother not to send him 
back to school.  On November 19, 2003, Mrs. Theno called Bogart and took her son 
out of school.  Theno subsequently earned his GED.  Theno brought this court action 
alleging that the school district and various school officials violated Title IX and state 
law by being deliberately indifferent to the harassment and for negligent failure to 
supervise students under their control.  The defendants sought summary judgment 
claiming because the sexual harassment was not gender related, was not sufficiently 
severe and pervasive, and the school district responded reasonably and without 
deliberate indifference, it did not merit a Title IX claim.   
  In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 
143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999), the Supreme Court held that public schools, as recipients of 
federal funds, can be liable under Title IX for student-on-student harassment when it 
can be shown that "the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known 
acts of harassment" and "only for harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an educational 
opportunity or benefit" Id. At 633, 119 S.Ct. 1661.  The Davis court dealt with a case 
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of male-on-female harassment.  In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998), the Supreme Court held that same-
sex harassment arising from a hostile work environment fell under Title VII.  Based 
on these Supreme Court decisions, the court here held that "same-sex student-on-
student harassment is actionable under Title IX to the same extent that same-sex 
harassment is actionable under Title VII" (p. 962).  Oncale provided three evidentiary 
methods by which a same-sex plaintiff can show the harassment was based on sex.  
Theno was not able to meet any of the three methods, but the court determined that 
the three methods were meant to be "instructive, not exhaustive" (p. 963).  Gender 
stereotyping is another method of proving same-sex harassment under Title VII.  The 
court here determined that a "rational trier of fact" could infer that Theno had been 
harassed because he failed to meet his peers' stereotyped expectations for his gender 
because the primary objective of the harassers appeared to be an attack on Theno's 
masculinity.  The name-calling alone "probably would not be sufficient to withstand 
summary judgment" (p. 965).  The bulk of the harassment could be traced back to the 
rumor started when Theno was in the seventh grade that he had been caught 
masturbating in the bathroom.  In the court's opinion, all of the harassment relating to 
the masturbation rumor reflected the harasser's beliefs that Theno did not conform to 
male stereotypes by not engaging in that kind of behavior at school, i.e., that he did 
not act as a man should act.  Therefore, Theno could raise a genuine issue of material 
fact that he had been harassed based on his gender.  
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 Under Title IX, a plaintiff can show that the school district was deliberately 
indifferent to discrimination "only where the district's response to the harassment…is 
clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances" Davis 526 U.S. at 648, 119 
S.Ct. 1661.  Courts have held that this does not mean administrators must take any 
particular type of disciplinary action.  Davis held that victims do not have a right to 
seek a particular punishment and courts should not "second guess school 
administrators' disciplinary decisions" Id. at 648, 119 S.Ct. 1661.  In the case at hand 
the discipline handed out by the school district, which was mostly warnings, was 
largely effective in stopping the harassment with respect to each individual harasser.  
Each time the school warned a harasser, that particular harasser stopped bothering 
Theno.  However, when looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, as the court must do in determining summary judgment, the school's 
response to the harassment might be considered ineffective by a rational trier of fact.  
Theno had been subjected to years of harassment.  The school rarely took any 
disciplinary measures above warning the harassers.  The court recognized the fact that 
the school "was not legally obligated" to stop the harassment, but found that a jury 
could conclude that at some point in the four years Theno was harassed the school 
district's standard disciplinary response to the known harassment became 
unreasonable.  In Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, 231 F.3d 253 (6th 
Cir. 2000), the plaintiff suffered harassment by her peers for a number of years.  The 
school district in Vance largely "talked to" the harassers, much like the Tonganoxie 
administrators did with Theno's harassers.  The Sixth Circuit recognized that a school 
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was not required to expel or suspend every student accused of misconduct, but found 
that "where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are 
ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has 
failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances" Id. at 261.  Although in 
Theno's case, the school did eventually become more proactive in speaking with 
teachers and students and increased its efforts to prevent the harassment, the court 
held that it was a question for the jury to decide if these efforts were "too little, too 
late."  Next, the court addressed whether the harassment was severe and pervasive 
enough to deprive Theno of access to educational opportunities.  Previous courts have 
held that damages are not available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling, even 
where comments target differences in gender.  As described previously, Theno was 
teased by his peers for four years.  He was routinely called names based on a rumor 
started in the seventh grade.  As a result of the harassment, Theno suffered from 
stomach problems and depression so severe that medication was required.  He sought 
counseling and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety disorder, 
and avoidant personality.  Theno eventually withdrew from school.  Although some 
of the isolated incidents could be characterized as mere insults, teasing, and name-
calling, collectively they reflected a pattern of harassment that the court found to be 
severe and pervasive.  Therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was 
denied on Theno's Title IX claim.   
With respect to Theno's claim of negligent supervision, the court determined 
that Kansas courts would not recognize a negligent supervision claim under the facts 
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of this case.  Under Kansas law, public schools have no duty to supervise students in 
such a manner as to prevent emotional harm to other students.  All of the cases 
brought to Kansas courts dealing with negligent supervision have involved physical, 
bodily harm to a student.  Accordingly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment 
was granted on the negligent supervision claim.   
On July 27, 2005, the defendants' brought a motion to reconsider or alter this 
judgment.  The court held that the adequacy of the school's response to known acts of 
harassment was an issue that had to be resolved by a jury.  Thus, the motion was 
denied.   
 
Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified School District No. 464 
394 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (D. Kan. 2005) 
 
In the previous Theno case, Dylan Theno sued the Tonganoxie School District 
on allegations that his Title IX rights had been violated in connection with the 
district's alleged deliberate indifference to four years of harassment by other students.  
The case went to a jury and a $250,000 verdict against the district was returned.  
Following this verdict, the school district filed a renewed motion for judgment as a 
matter of law.  The school district argued that the evidence presented at the trial was 
insufficient to prove (1) that Theno was harassed based on his gender, (2) that Theno 
suffered harassment of which the school district had knowledge that was so severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived him of educational opportunities, 
and (3) that the school district acted with deliberate indifference.   
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In order to win judgment as a matter of law, the court must find "no legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to claim or defense under the controlling 
law" (p. 1301).  Courts must affirm the jury verdict if the record, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, contains evidence upon which a jury could 
have properly returned a verdict for the nonmoving party.  The court reviewed the 
transcript from the Theno trial and the record.  After review, the court first found that 
whether Theno was harassed by pupils based on his failure to conform to 
stereotypical gender expectations was a question for the jury.  In spite of the district's 
claim that there was no evidence that the harassment was based on the harassers 
perceptions that Theno was effeminate or homosexual, the court found there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision.  The student harassers did not pick 
on Theno using terms such as "geek" or "weirdo," they resorted to crude gestures, 
teasing, and name calling that all had sexual innuendos and undertones meant to 
"debase" his masculinity.  The court also held that the determination of whether the 
harassment was so severe that it deprived Theno of educational benefits or 
opportunities was a question for the jury.  The harassment had occurred over several 
years, with the same sexually derogatory themes.  Theno suffered from physical side 
effects and eventually left school.  This was sufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict.  Finally, the court determined that whether the school district acted with 
deliberate indifference was also a question for a jury.  Enough evidence was 
presented showing that the district's response to the harassment was not reasonable in 
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light of the severity and ongoing nature of the harassment to support the jury's 
decision.  Because the evidence presented was sufficient for the jury to return a 
verdict in Theno's favor, the court denied the school district's motion for judgment as 
a matter of law.  
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Chapter 3 
School Program 
 
The four cases in this chapter deal with the administration of programs of 
study or other school activities.  In Kansas, these have been limited to challenges 
brought by students to participation in extracurricular activities and one case dealing 
with the removal of objectionable books from a school library.   
In Kansas, the courts do not find a constitutionally protected property interest 
in participating in extracurricular activities.  However, students may not be banned 
from participation based on their membership in a protected class. 
Regarding the decision to ban books, schools should follow the guidelines 
established by Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 
435 (1982).  Books may not be banned simply because school officials disagree with 
the topics or ideas presented by the author.  School districts should establish 
procedures for the steps to take when making a decision to ban a book and then 
follow those procedures.   
 
Haverkamp v. Unified School District No. 380 
689 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Kan. 1986) 
 
Deandra Haverkamp had been the Head Cheerleader at Centralia High School.  
In October 1985, she asked for permission to go to Nashville, Tennessee to record an 
album.  The principal, Mr. Zumbahlen, and Superintendent, Mr. Kraushaar, granted 
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her request.  The pep club sponsors, Ms. Dibble and Ms. Sleeper, removed 
Haverkamp from the cheerleading squad.  Kraushaar and Zumbahlen were told of her 
removal from the squad but did not take any action on her behalf.  Haverkamp alleged 
that in January 1986, Dibble subjected her to corporal punishment without just cause 
that resulted in Haverkamp ending her public education early.  Haverkamp claimed 
that her removal from the cheerleading squad violated her right to procedural due 
process because she was not given any notice or hearing.  She claimed that she had a 
property interest in her position as Head Cheerleader and that her trip to Nashville 
was a protected activity under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and the defendant's actions against her violated her first amendment rights.  
Haverkamp also claimed liberty and property interests in the right to continue her 
high school education without interruption until May 1986 and a liberty interest that 
was violated by Dibble's conduct in corporal punishment against her.  The matter 
went before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss.   
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must take the factual allegations 
of the complaint as true and all reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the 
plaintiff.  The complaint may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim.  The court first 
considered the property interest in Haverkamp's position as Head Cheerleader.  The 
defendants argued that no protected property interest existed in the right to participate 
in extracurricular activities.  Although Kansas courts had not addressed this issue, 
many other states had.  The majority of cases examined by the court rejected the 
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existence of a federally protected right in participation in interscholastic 
extracurricular activities.  While a few cases held otherwise, the court here found that 
Haverkamp's position as Head Cheerleader did not rise to the level of a 
constitutionally protected property interest.  Next, the court considered the equal 
protection and first amendment claims.  There did not need to be a property or liberty 
interest in her position as Head Cheerleader for Haverkamp to claim a first 
amendment retaliation claim.  However, the court found that the facts presented by 
the plaintiff did not "rise to the level of a constitutional violation" (p. 1058).  There 
was no indication that Haverkamp's speech or associations led to her being removed 
from the cheerleading squad.  There was also no evidence of retaliation by school 
officials because she went to Nashville to record an album.  Everything the 
defendants had done fell within the discretionary authority available to school 
officials.  Thus, the court could not find that the defendant's actions had violated the 
first amendment rights of the plaintiff.  The court next turned towards Haverkamp's 
claim that she had been deprived of property interest by the defendants' actions 
preventing her from continuing her high school education until May 1986 and that her 
liberty interests had been violated because the discipline imposed upon her had 
caused damage to her reputation.  The court cited Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 
S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975) and noted that a student's "legitimate entitlement to 
public education may not be taken away without adherence to minimal due process 
procedures" (p. 1059).  Goss dealt with students who had been suspended from school 
for misconduct.  In this case, there was no allegation that Haverkamp had been 
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suspended or expelled because she traveled to Nashville while school was in session.  
Haverkamp alleged that because of the defendant's actions she "was forced to 
graduate early" because of an "oppressive environment."  She was in no way deprived 
of her right to a public education by her decision to graduate early.  The court also 
found no support for the claims of a liberty interest, as there were no allegations of 
the defendants publicizing Haverkamp's removal from the cheerleading squad, nor 
was there any indication of damage to her reputation.  The last claim for the court to 
address was whether Haverkamp had been deprived of a liberty interest by being 
subjected to corporal punishment from Dibble.  Corporal punishment only violates a 
child's substantive due process rights when it is arbitrary, capricious, or wholly 
unrelated to the legitimate state goal of maintaining an atmosphere conducive to 
learning.  Woodward v. Los Fresnos Independent School Dist., 732 F.2d 1243 (5th 
Cir. 1984).  When the court reviewed Haverkamp's complaint, they found it to be 
"devoid of any facts pertaining to this claim" (p. 1060).  The complaint simply stated 
that Dibble's conduct against the plaintiff had deprived her of her liberty interests 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  While the court acknowledged that in ruling on a 
motion to dismiss it had to take factual allegations as true in the plaintiff's favor, the 
plaintiff had pled no facts in support of a claim.  The court held that it was "not 
required to speculate on what facts may exist which could entitle plaintiff to relief" (p. 
1060).  The defendants' motion to dismiss was granted. 
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Stone By and Through Stone v. Kansas State High School Activities 
Association, Inc. 
761 P.2d 1255 (Kan. App. 1988) 
 
During the 1986-87 school year, Lance Stone was a junior at Tonganoxie 
High School (THS).  In the spring semester of 1987, Stone only passed four of his 
classes.  The Kansas State High School Activities Association (KSHSAA) Rule 13 
requires that a student pass at least five subjects in a current semester in order to be 
eligible in the next semester.  Rule 14 prevents a student from making up the work 
after the semester has ended in order to regain eligibility.  On June 8, 1987, Lee 
Smith, the principal of THS certified to KSHSAA that Stone was ineligible for the 
fall semester of 1987.  While Smith was on vacation in July, Stone's parents made 
arrangements with the superintendent of the school district, Stephen McClure, for 
Stone to receive 45 hours of tutoring from his English teacher so that he could raise 
his failing grade.  McClure did not know about Rule 14 when he approved the 
arrangement.  When Smith returned from vacation, McClure learned that Rule 14 
would prevent Stone from regaining his eligibility.  McClure also discovered that 
under standards set by the Kansas Board of Education, 60 hours of tutoring would be 
required for one unit of credit.  Stone completed the remaining 15 hours of tutoring 
during the fall semester.  The school duly noted on his transcript that he had 
completed English III by arrangement on 10/7/87.  On September 22, 1987, Stone, his 
parents and their attorney appeared before the KSHSAA's executive board and 
requested that Stone's eligibility be restored.  Their request was denied.  The 
following day, Stone, his parents, their attorney and Superintendent McClure 
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appeared before the KSHSAA board of directors.  McClure asked the board to amend 
Rule 14 so that students who made up work could regain their eligibility.  The board 
did not act on the request.  On October 8, 1987, Stone and his parents filed action in 
district court seeking a declaratory judgment that Rule 14 violated Stone's 
constitutional rights.  They also sought a permanent injunction to enjoin KSHSAA 
from declaring Stone ineligible for the fall semester.  The following day Stone 
requested and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting KSHSAA and the 
school district from "preventing in any way, Lance Stone from participating in any 
interscholastic or interschool activity during Fall Semester of 1987" (p. 1257).  At a 
hearing on October 22, 1987, the trial court found that although Rule 13 was desirable, 
not allowing a student to make up the work and regain eligibility was "unreasonable 
and arbitrary" and prevented a student the right to participate.  Stone alleged at the 
trial that a Eudora High School student who had moved in from Iowa was allowed to 
participate after making up some failed courses before transferring from Iowa to 
Kansas.  Iowa, unlike Kansas, permits make-up work and this student would have 
been eligible if he had remained in Iowa.  He became eligible in Kansas under a rule 
that allows a transfer student from another state to be eligible in Kansas if they would 
have been eligible had they remained in the state from which they transferred.  The 
trial court found this to be unequal treatment of students.  The court granted the 
preliminary injunction holding that the "no make-up" rule was unreasonable and 
denied Stone the due process and equal protection guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.  KSHSAA appealed the decision.  Stone claimed that the appeal should 
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be dismissed as moot because the fall 1987 semester had ended by the time the case 
came before the Court of Appeals.  The court declined to dismiss the case because of 
its importance to students and school systems around the state and because similar 
actions could be filed in the future.   
KSHSAA is a voluntary association of Kansas high schools that oversees 
interscholastic activities.  Its existence is authorized by K.S.A. 72-130 et seq.  
KSHSAA has enacted a set of fifty-one rules and regulations that are binding on 
member schools and on students of member schools who participate in interscholastic 
activities.  Although not a true government body, when KSHSAA acts, it acts as a 
government body because of the substantial control it has over Kansas public schools.  
For that reason, the appellate court held that KSHSAA's rules were subject to the 
same constitutional scrutiny applied to rules adopted by the legislature or school 
districts.  KSHSAA provided several reasons for its no make-up rule.  First, the rule 
encourages students to do well academically.  Second, it treats all students the same 
because many schools do not offer summer school and not every parent can afford 
tutoring.  A different rule, according to KSHSAA, would be unfair to those students 
who would not have the opportunity to make up their work.  It would also be unfair to 
those students participating in spring sports because they would not have as long a 
period of time between semesters to get their work made up.  KSHSAA did not 
believe the rule was overly harsh because most high school students can enroll in six 
or seven classes and only have to pass five to be eligible for the following semester.  
While the trial court had disagreed with KSHSAA's reasoning, the appellate court 
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held that it was "not the role of the trial court to substitute its own judgment for that 
of KSHSAA" (p. 1259).  The appellate court further held that if "reasonable people" 
could differ on the rationale behind the no make-up rule, a court could not hold the 
rule to be invalid under a rational basis standard.  Therefore, the appellate court found 
that the no make-up rule had a rational basis and its application to Stone did not 
violate any due process rights.  The court next addressed whether the no make-up rule 
denied Stone the equal protection of the laws because the Iowa transfer student had 
been deemed eligible under the out-of-state transfer rule even though he had made up 
the work from classes he had failed.  The court pointed out "different classes of 
people may be treated differently under the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution" (p. 1260).  If the unequal treatment is directed towards a person 
falling within a suspect category, such as race or gender, the government must show a 
compelling state interest for the differential treatment.  However, if the classification 
is on any other basis, equal protection only requires that the classification have a 
reasonable or rational basis.  KSHSAA determined that it would be unfair to deny 
eligibility to students moving into Kansas if they would have been eligible had they 
stayed in their former state.  Students from other states have different eligibility rules 
and plan their course of study according to those rules.  When students move in to 
Kansas they have no knowledge of KSHSAA's rules, and to hold them to Kansas 
requirements would not be fair.  The appellate court found this distinction between 
Kansas students and students from out of state to have a rational basis.  Because of 
this, and the fact that the distinction was not based on any suspect category, the 
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appellate court found that Stone had not been denied the equal protection of the law.  
The court further held that the district court had abused its discretion by issuing a 
temporary injunction to which Stone, as a matter of law, was not entitled.  
Enforcement of the no make-up rule had not denied Stone of due process or equal 
protection rights.  The decision of the trial court was reversed.   
 
Case v. Unified School District No. 233, Johnson County 
908 F. Supp. 864 (Kan. 1995) 
 
This case involves former and current students and their parents who 
challenged the decision of the Board of Education and its superintendent to remove a 
book titled Annie on My Mind from the school libraries.  The plaintiffs’ claim was 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and alleged that the defendants had 
violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Section 11 of the Bill of Rights to the Kansas Constitution.  In early 
August of 1993, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation/Kansas City 
(GLAAD/KC) and Project 21 offered to donate two books with gay or lesbian story 
lines to the District as part of their promotion of gay and lesbian issues in the Kansas 
City metropolitan area.  The books were Annie on My Mind and All American Boys.  
This project received media coverage and school district representatives received a 
number of phone calls from the public regarding the book donations.  In October, a 
representative from Project 21 delivered copies of these books to each of the three 
Olathe High Schools.  It was discovered by one of the high school media specialists 
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that prior to the donation there were copies of Annie on My Mind on the shelves of 
four Olathe junior high and high schools.  Dr. Banikowski, the school district’s 
Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Instruction, requested that the media 
specialists review both donated books and then advise her of their opinions regarding 
the suitability of each book for inclusion in the District’s library collections.  All of 
the media specialists agreed that because Annie on My Mind had literary merit and 
had received very favorable reviews, it was appropriate for the high school libraries.  
They did not believe All American Boys was appropriate for inclusion in the school 
libraries.  In early November, Dr. Wimmer, the superintendent, informed the Board 
that the literary review committee, in keeping with the District’s book review 
procedures, had recommended acceptance of Annie on My Mind.  He stated that he 
had not received any formal complaints from parents and gave a copy of the book to 
two board members so they could read it.  Dr. Wimmer determined that the district 
needed to clarify procedures for book donations and told the board he had scheduled a 
meeting with media specialists to create guidelines for this process.  In December, Dr. 
Wimmer met with media specialists and gave them a copy of the new book donation 
guidelines that he had created on his own.  He had decided prior to this meeting that 
the District would refuse to accept the donated books and would remove existing 
copies of Annie on My Mind from all libraries.  Dr. Wimmer had not had any 
meetings with media specialists before making this decision.  He told them that the 
district needed to take this action because of community concerns and because he did 
not believe the Board would support acceptance of the book.  The literary merit and 
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educational suitability of the book were not discussed, nor was there discussion about 
possible alternatives to removing the book, such as placement on a restricted shelf.  In 
early January, a group of students asked to speak at a school board meeting to express 
their views regarding the removal of Annie on My Mind from the District’s libraries.  
Presentations were made at the next board meeting both for and against the removal 
of the book.  Following these presentations, the Board met in executive session to 
consult with counsel and hear Dr. Wimmer’s position regarding the issue.  The Board 
then returned to open session and voted 4-2 in favor of a motion to support Dr. 
Wimmer’s decision to remove Annie on My Mind from the school district’s libraries.  
A group of students and parents then took their complaints to the district court and a 
trial was held in September of 1995.   
The court first addressed the school district’s policies and procedures for 
library materials.  The Olathe School District had an adopted “Media Selection 
Policy” which set forth the District’s selection criteria for library resources.  The 
policy incorporated the American Library Association’s School Bill of Rights which 
states in part that it is the “responsibility of the school library media center to provide 
materials that support the curriculum; encourage students’ growth in knowledge and 
development of literary, cultural, and aesthetic appreciation and ethical 
standards…thereby enabling students to develop an intellectual integrity in forming 
judgment.”  The media policy also set out a 13-step procedure to address concerns 
about library materials.  The court found that the “District failed to follow its adopted 
procedures for the reconsideration of library materials” (p. 872).  The court also held 
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that the school district had ignored the American Library Association’s School Bill of 
Rights which places importance on having diverse ideas available in the library for 
students.  After the media specialists had determined that Annie on My Mind was 
suitable, Dr. Wimmer overrode their decision and created his own “book donation 
guidelines.”  In doing this, he ignored both the media specialist’s recommendations 
and the school district’s established criteria for reevaluation of library materials.  
When they voted to support Dr. Wimmer’s decision, the Board did not follow policy 
requiring that challenged materials be evaluated according to the District’s 
established criteria.  The Board also had no discussion regarding the literary or 
educational merit of the book.  Thus, the Board ignored its own guidelines for the 
reconsideration of library materials.  The next issue the court addressed was that of 
standing.  The defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
removal of Annie on My Mind.  The court pointed out the three elements involved in 
constitutional standing requirements: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury 
in fact – an invasion of a legally protected interest.  Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct.  Third, it must be likely that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.  In using these criteria, the court determined 
that the former students and their parents lacked standing because they could not 
check out materials from Olathe school libraries and therefore their injuries would not 
be redressed if the books were returned to those libraries.  Parents of current students 
were also found to lack standing because “the constitutional right to challenge the 
removal of a book from a school library appears to be held by the student who is 
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denied access to the book” (p. 873).  The only remaining plaintiffs with standing were 
current Olathe School District students and one parent who was also a teacher in the 
district.  Having resolved the issue of standing, the court turned to the claim that the 
plaintiffs’ rights had been violated under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  In 
Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982), 
the Supreme Court concluded that there were limits on the discretion of school 
officials to remove library books from junior high and high school libraries.  In a 
plurality opinion, the Pico court held that local school boards could not “remove 
books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in 
those books.”  Id. at 872.  The plurality indicated that removal might be permissible if 
the book contained “pervasive vulgarity” or if it was “educational unsuitable.”  The 
court here concluded that it should follow the Pico decision because it was the only 
Supreme Court decision dealing with the removal of books from a public school 
library.  In determining the motivation of the school board members for their removal 
decision, the court found that the trial testimony showed that they disagreed with the 
ideas presented in the book.  By removing the book, the board members intended to 
deny access to those ideas.  There was no evidence that suggested a lack of 
educational suitability was behind the Board’s decision.  The fact that the Board and 
superintendent disregarded established policies and did not consider less restrictive 
alternatives to completely removing the book were cited as evidence of improper 
motivation for the removal of Annie on My Mind from the Olathe public school 
libraries.  The court concluded that this was a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
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rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the 
Constitution of the State of Kansas, Bill of Rights, Section 11.  Finally, the court 
turned to the plaintiffs’ due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
court found that although the district did not follow its own procedures for removal of 
a book from the library, this failure did not constitute a due process violation.  By 
providing the plaintiffs an opportunity to express their views at a school board 
meeting, the Board had satisfied the minimum federal constitutional requirements.  
The plaintiffs’ request for injunctive and declaratory relief was granted and the court 
ordered the defendants to return the copies of Annie on My Mind to the libraries in the 
Olathe School District. 
The court will look to the rationale used when a school district decides to 
remove a book from its library.  The district must be able to show that the removal 
was due to the educational suitability of the book and not to their disapproval of the 
ideas and opinions presented.  It would be wise for a school district to have a policy 
in place that outlines the steps that must be followed to address concerns about library 
materials.  It would be wiser still to follow that procedure once it has been established.          
 
Adams By and Through Adams v. Baker 
919 F. Supp. 1496 (D. Kan. 1996) 
 
     The plaintiff, Tiffany Adams, a fifteen-year-old female student, filed for a 
preliminary injunction against the defendant school district alleging that her right to 
equal protection had been violated when the school district refused to allow her to try 
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out for the high school wrestling team because of her gender.  Plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief and monetary damages against the school district alleging Title IX 
and equal protection rights had been violated.  Defendant school district’s 
superintendent, Bob Neel, testified that he made the determination to prohibit the 
Plaintiff from trying out for the wrestling team due to several factors: parents’ moral 
objections, the possibility of sexual harassment lawsuits; the plaintiff’s safety; that 
state law and Title IX do not require coed wrestling; and disruption of the school 
setting. 
Parties seeking preliminary injunction must establish substantial likelihood 
that it will prevail on merits; that it will suffer irreparable injury unless injunction 
issues; that threatened injury to moving party outweighs whatever damage proposed 
injunction will cause opposing party; and that injunction would not be adverse to 
public interest.  Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) is a federal 
law prohibiting discrimination based on sex in all programs and activities receiving 
federal funds.  34 C.F.R. Section 106.41 deals specifically with athletics.  Under 
section 106.41(b), “where a recipient operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport 
for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the 
other sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously been 
limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try out for the team offered 
unless the sport involved is a contact sport.  In this case, the plaintiff was unlikely to 
succeed on her Title IX claim as Title IX did not require school districts to allow 
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female students to participate in contact sports, and wrestling is defined as a contact 
sport.   
The plaintiff’s claim of deprivation of equal protection brought under 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 was based on the fact that the defendants sought to deny her the 
opportunity to participate in wrestling on the basis of gender.  Gender based 
discrimination is permissible only where the discrimination is “substantially related” 
to the achievement of “important governmental objectives.”  Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982).  
The defendants’ reasons for their decision were safety, fear of sexual harassment 
litigation, potential disruption of the school setting, student and parent objections 
based on moral beliefs, and a variety of inconveniences, such as availability of locker 
room facilities.  The court concluded that the rationales of parent objections and 
inconveniences did not constitute “important governmental objectives” in this case.  
School districts are not subject to every parental complaint, nor is it the duty of 
schools to shield students from every situation they may find objectionable or 
embarrassing due to their own prejudices.  While the court agrees that student safety 
is an important governmental objective, there is no evidence to support the claim that 
the plaintiff’s safety is at a greater risk simply because of her gender.  Preventing 
sexual harassment is also a government objective; however, there is no reason to 
suspect that girls would be likely to mistake the contact that is inherent in the sport of 
wrestling for sexual harassment.  The court also found that the defendants’ actions 
were not substantially related to the goal of avoiding school disruptions.  The plaintiff 
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wrestled at her junior high the year previous and there were no such disruptions.  
These findings show that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of her Section 
1983 claim based on equal protection.  A deprivation of a constitutional right is in and 
of itself irreparable harm, so the plaintiff would succeed in that portion of her 
injunctive relief motion.  The only hardship the defendants alleged relate to 
accommodating a female wrestler’s need for a place to change and possible 
differences in coaching techniques.  These problems had been overcome the previous 
year and could likely be solved again.  Therefore, it was found that a preliminary 
injunction imposing minimal hardships to the defendants would be outweighed by the 
irreparable injury that the plaintiff would suffer if not allowed to participate.  Finally, 
the court found that the public interest would best be served by enjoining the 
defendants from infringing on the plaintiff’s right to equal protection.  The court 
granted the motion for preliminary injunctive relief and the defendants were enjoined 
from denying the plaintiff the opportunity to participate in wrestling based on gender. 
Courts must consider all factors when determining whether preliminary 
injunction should be issued.  In this case, Adams was able to establish that she would 
prevail on merits, as prohibiting her from wrestling based solely on gender does not 
impose upon important governmental objectives.  To deny preliminary injunction 
would have caused irreparable injury in the denial of constitutional rights as well as 
causing a loss of practice time and competitive opportunities.  It was highly unlikely 
that the defendant would suffer any damage because of the injunction and the public 
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interest favors granting an injunction as the public as a whole has an interest in 
protecting constitutional rights.   
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Chapter 4 
Equal Opportunity Issues   
Ten of the thirteen published cases in this chapter deal with the rights of 
students with disabilities.  The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
along with related state laws and other federal and state regulations provide the legal 
framework for educating students with disabilities.  A "basic mandate of IDEA is that 
all children with disabilities must receive a free, appropriate public education 
(FAPE)" (Imber & Van Geel, 2004, p. 262).  Courts will often rely on the decision in 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 189-90, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) to determine if a school 
district has met its requirement to provide a FAPE to a student.   
 The bulk of special education cases in Kansas are made up of challenges to 
the Individualized Education Program (IEP) of a student.  According to Rowley, an 
IEP must provide some educational benefit in order to be supported by the courts.  
School districts must make placement decisions based on the input of the IEP team 
with parental involvement.  At an IEP meeting, parents must be provided with their 
rights, which include the procedures to follow in order to challenge an IEP.   
When challenging an IEP, The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 
Section 1415 mandates that parents are first provided with an impartial hearing to air 
their grievances.  If the results of the hearing are not to the satisfaction of the parent 
or school district, then an appeal can be made to the state department of education.  If 
either party does not agree with the decision of the state department, then an appeal 
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may be taken to either state or federal courts.  So long as administrative relief is 
available and pursuit of such relief is not futile, these administrative remedies must be 
taken before a case will be heard by the courts. 
  Kansas courts, in keeping with Rowley, have held that FAPE does not require 
the school maximize the potential of handicapped children by giving them the exact 
same opportunities provided to other children.  So long as it can be shown that a child 
is receiving some educational benefit, the courts will support the IEP.  In challenging 
an IEP, the burden of proof rests with the party opposing the IEP.  The opposing party 
must show why the educational setting established by the IEP team is not appropriate.  
Parents do not have the right to compel a school district to provide a specific program 
or methodology and courts have consistently left those decisions up to schools.  
School districts need only show they are providing an appropriate education for a 
child, it need not be the one preferred by parents. 
 
Bailey v. Unified School District No. 345 
 664 P. 2d. 1379 (Kan. 1983) 
 
Kenneth and Barbara Bailey, parents of a visually handicapped child disputed 
the decision by U.S.D. 345 to place their child at the Kansas State School for the 
Visually Handicapped (KSSVH).  The school district believed this to be the child’s 
appropriate placement.  The parents wanted their son to continue his education in the 
local public school system.  The Baileys were provided a due process hearing in 
which both parties presented their evidence.  The hearing examiner upheld the school 
 
152 
 
district’s decision to place the child at KSSVH.  This decision was appealed to the 
State Board of Education, who, upon reviewing the 700-page transcript, upheld the 
decision of the hearing examiner.  The Baileys appealed the State Board’s decision to 
the district court.  No additional evidence was presented to the district court and the 
district court upheld the decision of the State Board of Education finding the decision 
to be “supported adequately and fully” by the record.  The Baileys appealed to the 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Two issues were presented to the Court.  The first dealt with the accusation 
that the district court erred in excluding additional evidence and the second related to 
whether the district court was incorrect in finding there was substantial evidence to 
support the Board’s decision.  The exclusion issue dealt with a situation in which the 
attorney for the Baileys filed a motion four days after oral arguments had been heard 
requesting they be allowed to submit additional evidence.  They cited 20 U.S.C. 
Section 1415(e)(2) of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 which 
provides “…the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, 
shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party…”  The district court denied 
this motion because “…no additional evidence was presented in the appeal before the 
State Board and no additional evidence was presented to this Court prior to the 
submission of this cause for decision.  This Court’s review is on the record, and 
further, the motion comes too late…”  (p. 1381).  The Supreme Court agreed with the 
district court’s decision pointing out that “even on appeal we have no information as 
to the nature of such ‘additional evidence’ ” (p. 1382).  The Court interpreted the 
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“additional evidence” provision as applying to evidence offered at the time of the 
district court hearing.  In deciding the issue of whether or not there was substantial 
evidence to support the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court turned to the 
educational records that led to the determination by the school district that residential 
placement in the KSSVH was an appropriate educational program for the child.  The 
records showed that the defendant school district had worked with the Bailey’s for 
over ten years.  During that time, the district had provided counseling services for the 
family, as well as special education services.  The child was mainstreamed during 
junior high and provided with a one-on-one teacher to provide assistance during 
classes.  The district worked closely with KSSVH, as well as the State Rehabilitation 
Center for the Blind, to provide the best program for his needs, which included 
emotional as well as visual disabilities.  The school district consulted with various 
outside experts, considered numerous options, and finally determined that enrollment 
in a regular high school would not be an appropriate education for the child.  After 
looking at these records, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court was 
correct in its decision of the State Board of Education was supported by substantial 
competent evidence.  Judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
The provision of 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(e)(2) which permits the presentation 
of additional evidence does not require the court to admit evidence which is offered 
following the actual court hearing.   
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Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Topeka Unified School District No. 
501 
755 P.2d 539 (Kan. 1988) 
 
Prior to September 1985, five black students filed requests to transfer their 
elementary school enrollment from Linn Elementary to Avondale East Elementary.  
The school district denied their requests because they were requesting to transfer to a 
school having a higher minority race percentage than their home attendance area 
school.  U.S.D. 501 based this decision on Board Policy No. 8025, Section V.C., 
which stated in relevant part that applications for transfer would only be approved for 
a minority race student requesting a transfer to a school which had a "lower minority 
race percentage than his/her home attendance area school."  On September 5, 1985, 
five complaints were filed with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights (KCCR) 
which alleged that U.S.D. 501 had denied the complainants their request for transfer 
on the basis of their race and in violation of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, 
K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(3), which prohibited discrimination "in places of public 
accommodation."  The KCCR served five subpoenas upon the school district and Mr. 
Gerry Miller, the Custodian of Student Records.  U.S.D. 501 notified the KCCR that 
it would not comply with the subpoenas because the KCCR did not have jurisdiction 
under the Act to investigate the complaints.  The KCCR filed an order to enforce the 
subpoenas with the district court.  After a briefing and oral arguments by both parties, 
the district court denied enforcement of the subpoenas.  The district court had based 
its decision on Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, 544 
P.2d 791 (1975) which was the KCCR's first attempt to expand its authority since a 
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1972 amendment to the Act.  The Howard majority determined that the KCCR's 
jurisdiction was "clearly confined to the areas of public accommodation, housing, and 
employment" (p. 542).  The district court further held that public schools and public 
school policies were not matters of "public accommodation" and were not within the 
scope of the KCCR's authority.  The KCCR appealed this decision. 
K.S.A. 44-1004 of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination bestowed specific 
powers on the KCCR.  The Act provided in part that the commission would have the 
"functions, powers, and duties to receive, initiate, investigate, and pass upon 
complaints alleging discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and 
housing because of race, religion, color..."  The Act was amended in 1972 but the 
specific powers granted to the KCCR were not changed.  The KCCR requested that 
the court expand the powers and duties of the KCCR by determining that the 
definition of "unlawful discriminatory practice" found in K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(3) was "a 
legislative grant of additional jurisdiction"  (p. 542).  The court did not expand the 
KCCR's powers.  Rather, it found that the Act was clear in defining the role of the 
KCCR.  The court determined that its role was to decide if a public school was 
considered a place of "public accommodation."  Section (h) of K.S.A. 44-1002 
defines public accommodations and provides a list of 21 facilities given as examples 
of a public accommodation.  All 21 were places of business offering "goods, services, 
facilities, and accommodations to the public" (p. 543).  Public schools were not listed.  
The court determined that public schools were not places of public accommodation as 
provided by the Act.  The court further added that "if the legislature had intended the 
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public schools to be included within the concept of 'public accommodations,' they 
would have specifically so stated" (p. 543).  Schools could be considered a place of 
public accommodation when sponsoring an activity open to the general public, such 
as a basketball game.  If the school then denied entrance to the game on the basis of 
race it would be within the authority of the KCCR to investigate allegations of 
wrongful discrimination.  In this case, the alleged discrimination centered on a board 
policy which determined access to a specific school; a situation not within the scope 
of public accommodation.  The decision of the district court was affirmed with the 
Kansas Supreme Court noting that "whether the scope of the Act should be broadened 
to cover the complaints of public school students who were denied the right to 
transfer to a school outside their attendance area is a matter for the legislature, not the 
courts" (p. 544). 
 
Hayes Through Hayes v. Unified School District No. 377 
877 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1989) 
 
Before the beginning of the 1980-81 school year, Dennis and Sally Hayes 
were evaluated to determine if they were to be placed in the Personal/Social 
Adjustment Program (PSA Program) through the Educational Cooperative in USD 
377.  When it was found that they qualified for the program, their mother, Lucy 
Hayes, met with school personnel and signed a form agreeing to the placement.  
While in the PSA program that year, both Hayes children behaved in a disruptive 
manner and violated school rules.  As a result of their behavior, the children were 
sometimes required to stay in a three-by-five foot time-out room.  At no time did the 
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parents of the Hayes children request a hearing to institute a change in placement or 
to object to the use of the time-out room.  Instead, the Hayes parents filed suit in 
district court alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Kansas state law.  
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and held that 
the remedies provided for by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA) 
were not an exclusive means by which students could bring action.  The plaintiffs 
appealed and the defendants cross-appealed, contending that the action should be 
dismissed because the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under 
the EHA.   
The first task of the appellate court was to determine if the claims were 
properly before the court or if the plaintiffs were required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies under the EHA.  The EHA in 20 U.S.C. Sections 1415(b)(2) 
and (c) provides procedures for parents or guardians to follow if they have a 
complaint regarding the educational placement of their children.  Complaints are first 
brought to an impartial due process hearing.  If the issue is not resolved at this 
hearing, an appeal may be taken to a state agency.  If the matter is not resolved at the 
state hearing, the parents have the right to bring action in court.  While the EHA is 
not the exclusive remedy available, if relief can be sought under the EHA, exhaustion 
of the Act's administrative remedies is necessary before action can be brought in court.  
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs in this case were required to exhaust their 
administrative remedies, the court had to determine if the disciplinary measures at 
issue were encompassed in the provision of a "free appropriate public education" 
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guaranteed by the Act.  The plaintiffs argued that the disciplinary measures were not 
within the scope of the EHA and their claims constituted an independent due process 
challenge.  The district court agreed, finding that because the disciplinary measures 
did not constitute a "change in placement" they were not the type of action protected 
by the EHA.  The appellate court did not agree.  While the time-out room did not 
constitute a change in placement, the appellate court did not believe that removed 
"the action from the purview of the Act" (p. 813).  The EHA requires that parents and 
children be given "an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter 
relating to…the provision of a free appropriate public education."  20 U.S.C. Section 
1415(b)(2).  The appellate court found that the school's use of a time-out room was 
related to providing an appropriate public education for the Hayes children.  The 
time-out room was used as a method of punishment and for short "cool-down" 
periods to ensure the safety of other students from disruptive behavior.  The appellate 
court held that "the discipline of a child in the classroom, including short-term 
suspensions and time-out periods, is a matter that relates to the public education of a 
handicapped child and falls within the scope of the EHA" (p. 813).  Because the 
disciplinary measures were found to be within the scope of the EHA, the plaintiffs 
were required to present their complaints concerning this disciplinary action 
according to the procedures set forth by the Act.  Administrative remedies under the 
EHA must be exhausted before any judicial review is sought, unless adequate relief is 
not available or if "the pursuit of such relief would be futile" (p. 814).  The court 
could find nothing in the record to indicate that administrative relief would be 
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inappropriate.  The appellate court reversed and remanded to the district court with 
instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   
 
Hall v. Shawnee Mission School District (USD No. 512)  
856 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Kan. 1994) 
 
Michael Hall attended kindergarten in North Carolina where he received a 
special education assessment, and special education and related services.  At that time, 
he had physical and behavioral problems, which included self-destructive behaviors.  
In 1988, the Halls moved into the Shawnee Mission School District and Michael was 
placed in the second grade.  When enrolling his son, Mr. Hall requested special 
education services for Michael and provided the evaluations from North Carolina.  
Michael was evaluated by the district in September of 1988 and an IEP was prepared 
for him.  During his second grade year, Michael was placed in a mainstream 
classroom and received two one-hour sessions each week of occupational therapy.  
He had ongoing behavioral problems at home and school, so his parents took him for 
an evaluation at the Children's Rehabilitation Unit at the University of Kansas 
Medical Center at their expense.  The evaluation report stated that Michael could not 
work at an independent level in a mainstream classroom for longer than five minutes 
without certain behavioral components addressed.  The Halls informed the District of 
the results of this independent evaluation, but Michael's placement was not changed 
at that time.  During his third grade year, Michael continued to have problems in the 
mainstream classroom.  In January of 1990, Michael's parents placed him in the 
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Crittenton Center for a 30-day residential evaluation.  A psychiatrist, Judith Pfeffer, 
determined that Michael was a candidate for "continued residential treatment due to 
his need for a fully structured educational and home environment" (p. 1525).  She 
also concluded that he would not be able to function if he was mainstreamed.  After 
his release from Crittenton, Michael was placed back into the mainstream third grade 
classroom with some special services provided outside the classroom.  After about 
four weeks, Michael was placed in the Crisis Intervention Diagnostic Classroom at 
the Corinth School in the Shawnee Mission School District for a six-week trial period.  
This change in placement came about as the result of an IEP meeting on March 1, 
1990 and it was agreed to by the Halls.  Michael remained at Corinth for the rest of 
the year.  In April 1990, a team of doctors from KU Medical Center evaluated 
Michael's records at the request of the District in order to determine if the school 
district could meet his educational needs.  The team concluded that the District was 
serving Michael's academic needs.  Michael had made good academic progress and 
had few behavior problems at Corinth.  Another IEP meeting was held on April 18, 
1990, to discuss Michael's placement.  Mr. Hall left the meeting because he believed 
Michael needed to be hospitalized and subsequently requested a due process hearing.  
The hearing was not held because another IEP meeting was held in May 1990, and 
the new IEP was acceptable to the Halls.  Michael was placed at Corinth in a 
behavioral disorders classroom to begin the 1990-91 school year.  The long-term goal 
being that he would gradually work his way back into the mainstream classroom.  Mr. 
Hall again requested residential placement, but the District did not give his 
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recommendation serious consideration.  During the fall of 1990, Michael's teachers 
reported that he was doing very well and by December, he was attending mainstream 
classes for the majority of the day.  Michael's problems at home continued.  The Halls 
sought assistance from the Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services 
(SRS) and a "child in need of care" petition was filed.  The petition was granted and 
preparations were made to place Michael in a residential facility.  On December 17, 
1990, the Halls removed Michael from Corinth and placed him in the Gillis Center.  
Gillis was a full-time residential program where the student lives on campus full-time 
and attends school.  In the fall of 1991, the Halls requested a due process hearing 
concerning the appropriate placement of Michael and sought reimbursement from the 
District for Michael's Gillis Center expenses.  In March 1992, the hearing officer 
concluded that the evidence presented supported the school district's position that 
Michael had been provided with an education from which he benefitted.  In August 
1992, a review officer affirmed the decision of the hearing officer.  The Halls next 
filed this lawsuit with the district court claiming that the school district had failed to 
provide Michael with an adequate educational benefit which caused them to place 
Michael in a residential facility at their own expense.   
The court was required to make the following inquiries in making a 
determination of whether the school district was required to pay for residential 
placement:  First, the court had to determine whether the district's IEP was reasonably 
calculated to provide an educational benefit for Michael.  If the court determined that 
it was not so calculated, then the court must decide whether the Halls choice to place 
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Michael in the Gillis Center was the appropriate educational choice for Michael.  If 
the answer to that question was "yes," then the Halls would be entitled to 
reimbursement.  The court only considered the August 1990, IEP which placed 
Michael at Corinth as there were no unresolved objections to any previous IEP's.  An 
IEP that is reasonably calculated to provide some educational benefit had to be likely 
to produce progress, not regression.  However, a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) does not require the state to "maximize the potential of handicapped children 
'commiserate with the opportunity provided to other children.'  "  (The court here 
quoted Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 189-90, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).  Another goal of IDEA 
is the education of handicapped children in classrooms with non-handicapped 
children "to the maximum extent appropriate."  20 U.S.C. Section 1412(5).  The 
school district, therefore, had an obligation to balance the goal of providing Michael 
with some educational benefit with the goal of providing an education in the least 
restrict environment.  The record showed that Michael had been making very good 
progress at Corinth.  His teachers reported that he was performing approximately on 
grade level in all subjects and had very minor behavior problems.  His parents 
reported that his problems at home were severe.  Dr. Pfeffer believed that things had 
gotten so bad at home that residential placement was necessary.  Based on the record 
before them, the court concluded that Michael was receiving an educational benefit 
from his placement in the school district.  The court further held that Michael's 
parents had presented no evidence from which the court could conclude that a 
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residential placement was necessary from an academic standpoint.  The Halls had not 
met their burden of proof to show that the district failed to offer Michael FAPE or 
that his August 1990, IEP was not reasonably calculated to provide him some 
educational benefit.  The court further noted that, although the Halls may have had 
the opinion that a residential placement was best for Michael, such a placement was 
not mandated by IDEA and in fact may have been more restrictive than the district 
could legally choose.  Placing a student who was performing well at school in a 
residential facility could have caused the school district to "run afoul" of the IDEA's 
least restrictive environment requirement.  Judgment was made in favor of the school 
district and all of the Hall's claims were dismissed.     
 
Fowler v. Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kansas 
128 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir. 1997) 
 
Michael Fowler was a deaf twelve-year-old boy who qualified as a child with 
a disability under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. Section 
1400-1420 (IDEA).  While in public school, he was provided with interpretive 
services.  After four years in the public school system, Michael's parents voluntarily 
placed him in a private school.  They requested that the District provide interpretive 
services for Michael, but the District denied their request.  The Fowler's appealed to 
the district court which held that the District must pay for the entire cost of Michael's 
services.  On appeal from that decision, the Court of Appeals, 107 F.3d 797 (1997), 
reversed and found that the District was required to at least pay for part of the sign 
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language services, and remanded for factual findings.  On grant of certiorari, the 
Supreme Court, 521 U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 2503, 138 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1997), vacated 
the appellate court's decision and remanded for consideration in light of amendments 
to IDEA. 
IDEA provides federal funds to states that are then given to local educational 
agencies to assist in educating students with disabilities.  One area of contention has 
been the extent to which children whose parents choose to place them in a private 
school may participate in special education programs and receive services pursuant to 
the Act, and what obligation the public school district has to pay for those services.  
The IDEA was amended in 1997 and addressed the issue of children enrolled in 
private schools in stating that the "amounts expended for the provision of services by 
a local educational agency shall be equal to a proportionate amount of Federal funds 
available."  The Act also provided that, in general, a local educational agency would 
not be required to pay for the cost of special education and/or related services for a 
child with a disability at a private school if the local agency had made a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE) available to the child and the parents chose to 
place the child in the private school or facility.  These changes were to take effect on 
June 4, 1997.  The Court of Appeals held that their prior interpretation of the pre-
Amendment IDEA applied to the parties with respect to conduct prior to June 4, 1997.  
The school district was obligated to pay for Michael's interpreter services at an 
amount up to, but not more than, the average cost to provide that same service in the 
public school setting.  From June 4 onward, the Amendments applied.  The court 
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interpreted this as meaning that the local educational agency's only obligation was to 
spend a proportionate amount of the Federal funds that they received to provide 
services for students attending private schools, as long as the local agency had offered 
FAPE to a child whose parents then voluntarily placed him in a private school.  The 
court went on to state that the Act did not make it clear whether an equal share of 
Federal funds had to be allocated for each disabled child enrolled in a private school 
or whether the proportionate amount was to be allocated for disabled private students 
collectively.  It was also not clear whether the local educational agency had discretion 
as to whether it had to spend a proportionate share on all disabled students in a private 
school or if it could choose which services to provide to which students.  The court 
hoped that the "Department of Education's final regulations will provide some 
guidance" (p. 1437).  In the mean time, the issue was remanded to the district court to 
determine the school district's financial obligation to Michael after June 4, 1997.  The 
court held that "further fact finding" was required to determine Michael's share of the 
"proportionate amount."    
The court next considered whether the IDEA Amendments affected their 
previous analysis of Kansas law.  Kansas Stat. Ann. Section 72-5393 provides that 
"any school district which provides auxiliary school services to pupils attending its 
schools shall provide on an equal basis the same auxiliary school services to every 
pupil, whose parent or guardian makes a request therefore, residing in the school 
district and attending a private, nonprofit elementary or secondary school whether 
such school is located within or outside the school district..."  The Amendments to 
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IDEA made it clear that states did not need to spend their own money to provide 
special education services to voluntarily placed private school students.  Again, their 
only obligation was to make available to such students a proportionate amount of 
their Federal funds.  However, nothing prevents a state from providing more from 
their funds.  The court rejected the argument that it was inconsistent with the 1997 
Amendments for Kansas law to provide more for disabled private students that was 
its obligation under IDEA.  The Court of Appeals held that, "under Kansas law" 
Michael was entitled to an interpreter on site at his private school at a cost "no greater 
than the average cost of providing hearing-impaired students with interpretive 
services at public schools" (p. 1439).  The case was reversed and remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings.  The court also held that the Fowler's were 
entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as they were deemed the prevailing party in the 
case.  
 
Logue v. Shawnee Mission Public School District No. 512 
959 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Kan. 1997) 
 
Noah Logue was diagnosed with severe hearing loss as a very young child.  In 
1991, he was placed in a "total communication" preschool at Children's Mercy 
Hospital in Kansas City, Missouri.  At the time of this case, there were two major 
competing methodologies for teaching hearing impaired students.  The goal of the 
"total communication" method was to help students reach required academic levels by 
utilizing both speech and sign language.  The goal of the second method, "oral 
communication," was to help students acquire intelligible speech.  This method 
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forbade any use of sign language and insisted that the child use all verbal 
communication.  The Logues moved to the Shawnee Mission School District in 
September of 1991 and Noah was referred to the District's hearing-impaired 
preschool.  On September 16, 1991, the District held a meeting to develop Noah's IEP.  
Noah's parents participated in the meeting and consented to place Noah in a self-
contained hearing-impaired preschool that utilized the total communication method.  
Annual IEP's were held in October of 1991, 1992, and 1993, which produced similar 
IEP's for Noah all using the total communications approach, which his parents did not 
challenge.  During this time, Noah's vocabulary increased and his speech and 
articulation improved.  In June of 1994, the Logues took Noah for testing at the 
Central Institute for the Deaf (CID) in St. Louis, Missouri.  The CID was a private 
facility that utilized the oral communications method.  After completing their testing, 
the CID recommended that Noah be placed in full-time special education as a 
hearing-impaired child with other children of his age and ability.  The CID also 
determined that Noah would require "intensive instruction in an oral program 
focusing on the development of auditory skills, lip reading, and speech" (p. 1345).  
The Logues met with Mary Conlan, the District Director of Special Education, and 
gave her a copy of the CID's report.  They informed her that they wanted a program 
for Noah that focused on the development of oral language rather than total 
communication.  The District did not have an oral communications program and 
Conlan advised the Logues that their request would need to be discussed at an IEP 
meeting.  On August 16, 1994, an IEP meeting was held with the Logues, Conlan, the 
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school psychologist, Noah's hearing-impaired kindergarten teacher, the speech and 
language pathologist, and the school principal.  The group discussed numerous 
options.  In the end, the district proposed education in a self-contained hearing-
impaired classroom; mainstream time in a regular classroom for some subjects; and 
extensive time for speech, language, and auditory training.  The Logues rejected the 
IEP team's proposal and notified the District that Noah would be enrolling in the CID 
for the 1994-95 school year.  They requested another IEP meeting to come up with "a 
decision we can live with" and told the school that they would place Noah at the CID 
until the District developed an "appropriate oral program."  On September 28, 1994, 
the District held another IEP meeting.  In attendance were the same people as at the 
August meeting along with outside resource people, such as a social worker and Dr. 
Lynn Hayes of the University of Kansas Medical Center's Deaf Education program, 
who was familiar with both the oral and total communication methods.  At that 
meeting, the District rejected the Logue's request for placement at the CID as being 
too restrictive for Noah.  It did respond to their request for more training in oral 
speech by increasing Noah's time with the speech and language pathologist.  The 
Logues did not agree to this program and began the due process procedure before a 
hearing officer.  After an extensive hearing, the Kansas Special Education Due 
Process Hearing Officer found in favor of the school district.  She found that the IEP's 
from August and September "clearly fulfilled all requirements of 34 CFR 300.346(a) 
and K.A.R. 91-12-14(f), and would give Noah an educational benefit that was likely 
to produce progress" (p. 1347).  The Logues appealed this decision to the State Level 
 
169 
 
Review Officer who upheld the hearing officer's decision.  The Logues next appealed 
to the district court alleging that:  (1) the District failed to create an IEP that would 
afford Noah a free appropriate public education (FAPE); (2) the September IEP 
lacked the content required by 91 K.A.R. 91-12-41(f) and 34 C.F.R. 300.346 in that 
its statement of goals was too general and its statement of present levels of 
functioning were too broad; and (3) the IEP did not afford Noah the "educational 
benefits in accord with his abilities and capacities" as was required by K.S.A. 72-962.   
In reviewing this case, the court pointed out that the burden of proof rests with 
the party opposing the IEP.  It further noted that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
had stated that there was a "presumption in favor of the education placement 
established by an IEP and the party attacking should bear the burden of showing why 
the educational setting established by the IEP is not appropriate" citing Alamo 
Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th Cir.1986).  
With that in mind, the court first addressed the issue of the IEP's compliance with 
K.A.R. 91-12-41(f)(1)-(4), which requires that certain items be included in an IEP.  
K.A.R.91-12-41(f)(1) dealt with present levels of performance and required that an 
IEP contain a statement of the child's present level of educational performance.  
Noah's IEP included appropriate information regarding his educational performance.  
The court did not find these descriptions to be "too broad," as the Logues claimed, 
and held that the law did not require any more specific statement of his present levels 
of performance.  Noah had been evaluated and assessed on numerous areas related to 
his disability, intelligence, and development.  The court could find no evidence that 
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the District failed to meet any requirements regarding assessments or present levels of 
functioning as required by K.A.R. 91-12-41(f)(1) or 34 C.F.R. 300-324(a)(1).  Noah's 
IEP had six annual goals which described the educational performance expected for 
Noah within a year's time.  The Logues argued that the goals were too general, but the 
court disagreed finding that the IEP met the requirements of K.A.R. 91-12-41(f)(2).  
Information dealing with short term objectives as required by K.A.R. 91-12-41(f)(3)-
(4) was also included in Noah's IEP.  The objective criteria were stated and the 
evaluation procedure was duly noted.  Again, the court found that the IEP met the 
required regulations.  Next, the court addressed the Logue's claim that the September 
IEP denied Noah educational benefits in accordance with his abilities and capacities.  
The court in reviewing the record, found that Noah had been progressing in his 
Shawnee Mission program and that further progress could have been expected under 
the proposed plan.  Two of the Logue's own witnesses had testified that the proposed 
IEP would have afforded Noah some educational benefit.  This meant that the IEP 
met the substance requirement of the IDEA.  The Logues argued that the State of 
Kansas had set higher standards than were required by federal law in K.S.A. 72-
962(f)(2).  The court found that this statute did not bind the State of Kansas "to 
anything at all" (p. 1350).  K.S.A. 72-962(f)(2) simply defines "exceptional children" 
and the definition does not require public schools to provide any specific level of 
educational services.  It is K.S.A. 72-966(a) which requires each school district to 
provide "special education services for all exceptional children" who reside in the 
state.  K.S.A. 72-963(h) defines special education services as "programs for which 
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specialized training, instruction, programming techniques, facilities, and equipment 
may be needed for the education of exceptional children."  The Logues could not 
provide any "hard evidence" to show that the legislature intended to impose a higher 
standard than required by IDEA.  They also could not establish that the education 
offered to Noah by the school district in 1994 violated the Special Education For 
Exceptional Children Act, K.S.A. 72-961 et seq. in any way.  The court concluded by 
holding that the IEP proposed by the school district in September was "reasonably 
calculated to provide Noah an educational benefit..."  (p. 1350).  The court also noted 
that the record showed the Logues to be responsible parents who advocated for Noah.  
The sticking point, in the court's opinion, was that the Logues and the District were 
opposed on the appropriate method of providing the best education to Noah.  The 
Logues favored the "oral communications" method while the District utilized the 
"total communications" method.  In citing Lachman v. Illinois Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 
290 (7th Cir.1988), the court stated that "parents -  no matter how well motivated - do 
not have a right under IDEA to compel the school district to provide a specific 
program or employ a specific methodology for the education of their disabled child."  
Id. At 297.  The issue was not whether the CID offered a better program, but whether 
the District offered an appropriate one - which the court found it had.  Judgment was 
granted in favor of the school district.          
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Joshua W. v. Board of Education of Wichita Public Schools U.S.D. No. 259 
13 F. Supp. 2d 1199 (D. Kan. 1998) 
 
Joshua W. and his parents lived in Wichita where he attended public schools 
until approximately January 27, 1995.  Joshua was identified as behaviorally 
disordered and was provided special education services under IDEA during the time 
he attended Wichita public schools.  In November of 1994, the school district revised 
Joshua's IEP and called for his placement in a special day school.  He was transferred 
to Sowers Alternative School, which offered services to behaviorally-disordered 
students.  While at Sowers, Joshua was confined as a juvenile offender at the 
Sedgwick County Youth Residence Hall (YRH) on separate occasions.  During his 
confinement, he received services from the school district.  On January 27, 1995, 
Joshua left YRH, did not return to Sowers, and quit attending classes in the District.  
After this date, Joshua lived in a number of locations and spent time at juvenile and 
substance abuse facilities.  On March 1, 1995, Joshua's mother, Anita O., changed her 
address to a home outside the U.S.D. 259 boundaries.  In September of 1995, Joshua 
was authorized to attend Kemper Military Academy in Boonville, Missouri while he 
awaited sentencing on an aggravated criminal assault charge.  He was expelled from 
Kemper in October 1995 for violating the school's code of conduct.  On November 4, 
1995, Anita O. completed an enrollment form for Joshua to attend Three Springs 
Outdoor Therapeutic Program in Centerville, Tennessee.  On November 17, 1995, she 
contacted the District Office of Special Education for U.S.D. 259 to discuss Joshua's 
re-entry into the District.  Robert Coleman, the principal of Sowers, told Anita O. that 
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she should enroll Joshua at Sowers since that was his last placement under the IEP.  
Joshua was then enrolled at Sowers although he was still attending Kemper.  On 
November 20, 1995, Anita O. met with Coleman, the school psychologist, social 
worker, and guidance counselor.  She signed release forms so the staff could obtain 
information about Joshua since he last attended Sowers.  Coleman told Anita O. that, 
pursuant to the IEP, Joshua would attend Sowers until the school received additional 
information on Joshua and developed a revised IEP.  Anita O. did not inform the 
District that she had moved into a different attendance area, nor did she tell them that 
she had been trying to enroll Joshua at Three Springs in Tennessee.  That same day, 
Joshua was sentenced in Saline County Court to an 18-month prison term.  Instead of 
prison, the court put Joshua on probation for 24 months and required that he enter and 
complete the program at Three Springs.  On November 21, 1995, Anita O. and Joshua 
flew to Tennessee and Joshua was placed at Three Springs.  The District staff tried to 
contact Anita O. to discover Joshua's whereabouts but she did not return their phone 
calls.  On December 4, 1995, her attorney wrote to notify the District that she was 
beginning an administrative claim.  An administrative hearing officer found that since 
Joshua was not a residence of the District on November 20, 1995 the District was not 
financially responsible for his placement.  Anita O. appealed the decision, which was 
affirmed by a state review officer appointed by the Kansas State Board of Education 
on December 31, 1996.  Action was then brought to the district court under the IDEA, 
20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq. against the Wichita School District as well as the 
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Kansas Board of Education and the Commissioner of Education, Dr. Andy Tompkins.  
The defendants moved for summary judgment.   
The main issue addressed by the court was the IDEA claim by the plaintiffs 
against the District.  A school district's obligation to enroll a student turns upon 
residency.  K.S.A. 72-1046(a) provides a right to attend school in a district based on 
residence.  A child may attend school in a specific district if the child lives with a 
"resident of the district and that resident is a parent, or a person acting as parent of the 
child."  In this case, Joshua was not entitled to services from the District because he 
was not living in the District in November 1995, and he was not living with a parent 
or person acting as a parent in the District.  Both of Joshua's parents had moved out of 
the Wichita School District.  Anita O.'s action of moving to Tennessee prevented the 
District from reviewing Joshua's status and writing a new IEP.  Fagan v. District of 
Columbia, 817 F.Supp. 161, 164 (D.D.C.1993), found that if a "parent's acts frustrate 
the decision making process, the parent may be estopped from relief under the 
IDEA."  Id. at 164.  When Anita O. contacted the District in November of 1995, she 
had already worked to have Joshua placed at Three Springs in Tennessee and 
mentioned none of this to District staff.  She acknowledged that the District staff had 
told her they would need to further evaluate Joshua before they made a final 
placement decision.  When staff asked where Joshua was living, she gave them an 
address on South Sheridan, even though she knew he was at a military school in 
Missouri and would be going to Tennessee immediately after her meeting with them.  
The court found that Anita O.'s actions had not been prompted by a sincere effort to 
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get a final placement decision from the District, rather she was attempting to 
"manipulate the District into funding a placement upon which she had already 
resolved" (p. 1204).  The court found the defendants were qualifiedly immune with 
respect to the section 504 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims.  Accordingly, the 
motions for summary judgment were granted.  
 
O'Toole By and Through O'Toole v. Olathe District Schools Unified School 
District No. 233 
144 F.3d 692 (10th Cir. 1998) 
 
Molly O'Toole entered the Olathe school district's hearing-impaired program 
located at Scarborough Elementary School (SEC) in the fall of 1988.  While in 
attendance at SEC, an individualized educational program (IEP) was developed for 
Molly.  During the 1991-92 school year, Molly was in both a regular and a resource 
classroom.  This case involves the adequacy of the IEP that was developed in 
February of 1993 and then amended in August of 1993.  The IEP team, which 
developed the February IEP, consisted of Kevin O'Toole, Molly's father, Kathy 
Fulgham, Molly's stepmother, and a multi-disciplinary group of SEC personnel.  
During the months following the February IEP meeting, Molly's parents received 
regular reports on her progress.  Mr. O'Toole also kept in close contact with Molly's 
teachers.  In June of 1993, Mr. O'Toole had Molly evaluated at the Central Institute 
for the Deaf (CID), located in St. Louis, Missouri.  The CID report recommended that 
Molly be provided full-time special education as a hearing-impaired child with 
children of similar age and ability.  They believed that placement in a regular 
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classroom was not appropriate.  The report also required that Molly receive intensive, 
individualized instruction by teachers experienced with hearing-impaired students.  In 
July 1993, Molly was accepted as a full-time residential student at the CID.  Mr. 
O'Toole inquired about reimbursement from the Olathe district for tuition and/or 
other expenses incurred at the CID and was told that while tuition reimbursement was 
not available, the district would check on reimbursement for expenses.  O'Toole then 
requested an IEP meeting in late August.  Most of the same IEP team members were 
in attendance at the August 1993 meeting.  Various changes were made to Molly's 
IEP based on the CID's recommendations, and at the end of the meeting, all members 
of the IEP team, except the O'Toole's, agreed that Molly should remain at SEC.  Mr. 
O'Toole disagreed and signed a form terminating the District's services to Molly.  
Molly was subsequently enrolled at the CID school.  Sometime after the August 
meeting, Mr. O'Toole was notified by the District that his request for reimbursement 
for CID expenses was denied.  O'Toole then requested a due process hearing 
regarding Molly's placement at the CID.  A thirteen-day hearing took place, at the end 
of which the hearing officer found in favor of the school district.  The O'Toole's 
appealed the hearing officer's decision to a reviewing officer appointed by the state 
board of education.  The O'Toole's requested the opportunity to present more 
evidence, but their request was denied by the reviewing officer who determined that 
additional evidence was not necessary.  The reviewing officer affirmed the hearing 
officer's decision on all but three issues.  On those issues, the reviewing officer found 
that the annual goals and objectives, description of related services, and statement of 
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present levels of functioning found in the February and August IEP's failed to meet 
the procedural requirements of Kansas law and the IDEA.  The reviewing officer 
remanded the matter for a determination of whether the O'Toole's were due the relief 
of requiring that the District comply with all procedural requirements when 
developing any future IEP's.  The O'Toole's next requested a review in district court 
and the school district cross-appealed challenging the reviewing officer's decision 
concerning the IEP's compliance with state law.  In O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Schs. 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233, 963 F.Supp. 1000 (D.Kan. 1997), the district court granted 
the school district's motion for summary judgment, holding that:  (1) Kan. Stat. Ann. 
Section 72-962(f) did not establish a higher educational standard than the IDEA; (2) 
Molly's IEP provided an adequate statement of her performance levels; (3) the IEP set 
adequate annual goals; (4) the IEP set adequate short-term instructional objectives 
and progress monitoring procedures; (5) the IEP contained an adequate statement of 
related services; (6) the school district had complied with IDEA procedures.  The 
district court also denied the O'Toole's motion for an enlargement of time to file a 
formal written request to present additional evidence because their counsel had not 
filed the motion prior to the expiration of the time for discovery and had failed to 
provide justification for his late filing.  The O'Toole's appealed this decision arguing 
that:  (1) Kansas had adopted a higher educational standard than the IDEA; (2) 
Molly's IEP was not adequate; (3) the district court erred in not allowing them to 
show additional evidence; (4) the exclusion of evidence which related to the impact 
teaching sign language in a hearing impaired program denied a free appropriate 
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public education (FAPE) and violated the IDEA's due process requirements; and (5) 
the exclusion of additional evidence violated IDEA.   
The first issue addressed by the appellate court was whether Kansas had a 
higher educational standard than the IDEA.  In 1993, when Molly's IEP's were written, 
K.S.A. 72-962(f)(2) defined exceptional children and provided that special education 
services were necessary "to enable them to progress toward the maximum of their 
abilities or capacities."  The O'Toole's argued that this meant Kansas obligated 
schools to provide special education services that would maximize each child's 
potential.  The court disagreed with this pointing to Logue v. Shawnee Mission Pub. 
Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 959 F.Supp. 1338 (D.Kan. 1997) in which the court 
stated, in rejecting a similar argument, that K.S.A. 72-962(f)(2) "does not -by its 
terms-bind the State of Kansas to anything at all," it simply defines "exceptional 
children" Id. at 1350.  K.S.A. 72-966(a) is the statute that obligates school districts to 
provide special education services for all exceptional children who are residents of 
the school district.  The court found no clear indication from any of the "relevant 
statutes" that a standard had been adopted which required Kansas schools to provide 
educational services to exceptional children at a higher level than required by IDEA.  
The second issue addressed was the adequacy of Molly's IEP.  The court sought to 
discover if the school district complied with IDEA procedures, including whether the 
IEP conformed with the requirements of the Act.  The court here agreed with the 
Third Circuit that stated the "measure and adequacy of an IEP can only be determined 
as of the time it is offered to the student, and not at some later date..."  (p. 701).  
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However, a school district cannot ignore the fact that an IEP is failing, nor can it 
continue to implement the same IEP year after year, if it fails to provide educational 
benefits to a student.  Kansas regulations, found in Kan. Admin. Regs. 91-12-41(f), 
specify in detail what an IEP must contain.  Federal regulations echo the statutory 
requirements for an IEP, 20 U.S.C. Section 1401(a)(20); 34 C.F.R. Section 
300.346(a), but Appendix C to part 300 of these regulations provides more detailed 
requirements.  After reviewing these requirements, the appellate court stated that 
while it agreed with the reviewing officer that the IEP did not clearly convey Molly's 
present levels of performance, it did refer to a specialist's report which provided more 
detail.  The court also opined that there was "no doubt" that Molly's parents and 
teachers were well aware of her levels of educational performance and discussed 
them in order to formulate her IEPs.  Therefore, the court concluded that the 
statement of present levels of performance in the IEP's did not violate the procedural 
requirements of the IDEA and Kansas law.  After looking at the annual goals and 
short-term objectives found in Molly's IEP's, the appellate court agreed with the 
district court's ruling that they complied with the procedural requirements of the 
IDEA and Kansas law.  As had been noted by the district court, "there is no legal 
authority requiring a particular level of specificity in the statement of annual goals" (p. 
706).  Although some of the goals were general, other clearly conveyed specific goals.  
A FAPE under the IDEA also includes related services, if necessary.  As the 
O'Toole's questioned the IEP's adequacy in this area and the reviewing officer had 
found it lacking, it was next addressed by the court.  Molly's IEP had stated that she 
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would receive speech/language services, transportation services, a screening by an 
occupational therapist, school social work services, school counseling, an inclusion 
facilitator, an annual audiology report, and consult with a behavior specialist "as 
appropriate."  The appellate court agreed with the reviewing officer that the term "as 
appropriate" failed to adequately specify the level of related services the school was 
committed to provide.  However, the court also found that the record supported the 
hearing officer and the district court's findings that Molly had never been denied any 
related service requested by her parents.  While the court believed the school district 
should have specified the level at which related services would be provided, it did not 
find that these "technical irregularities" violated Kansas law or the IDEA.  Next, the 
court addressed whether the IEP was reasonably calculated to provide a FAPE and 
whether Molly received any educational benefits.  While her progress was not steady 
in all areas, it was shown that she had made some progress during the 1993 school 
year.  The court found that the record supported the finding, made by the hearing 
officer, reviewing officer and the district court, that Molly's parents had been in 
constant contact with her teachers and were aware at all times of her progress at 
school.  In addition, the court believed that the August IEP was a "real attempt" by 
the school district to respond to the O'Toole's concerns.  Since the O'Toole's pulled 
Molly out of the District in August, there was no way to assess whether the 
modifications to the IEP had an impact on her learning.  The fact that she made 
progress at the CID did not mean that the CID was the only appropriate placement for 
Molly.  An "appropriate education required by the Act is not one which is guaranteed 
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to maximize the child's potential" (quoting Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 4, 
921 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir.1990)).  Therefore, the court held that the record 
supported the conclusion that Molly's IEPs were "reasonably calculated to confer 
educational benefit on her and she made sufficient progress toward achieving her IEP 
goals in the 1993 school year" (p. 708).  Finally, the court turned toward the issue of 
the exclusion of evidence by the hearing officer and the district court.  U.S.C. Section 
1415(e)(2) provides that the district court in an IDEA case "shall receive the records 
of the administrative proceedings and shall hear additional evidence at the request of 
a party."  However, the district court has discretion to determine if additional 
evidence is necessary.  The district court had denied the motion for extra time to 
present additional evidence because it was not timely filed by counsel and no 
explanation was given as to why the evidence was not produced during the discovery 
period that had closed three months before the motion was filed.  The appellate court 
found no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court.  The court also found no 
error in the hearing officer's decision not to permit the introduction of evidence as to 
whether the methodology of teaching sign language to a hearing-impaired child was 
better than that of spoken language.  Finding that methodology was "precisely the 
kind of issue which is properly resolved by local educators and experts," the court 
held that as the IDEA had not been violated, it would not find error in the refusal of 
the hearing officer to "engage in a dispute about methodology" (p. 709).  The 
judgment of the district court was affirmed.  
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Eads ex rel. Eads vs. Unified School District No. 289, Franklin County  
184 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (D. Kan. 2002) 
 
This action was brought on behalf of Rachel Eads, a seventh grader with 
juvenile diabetes.  The plaintiffs alleged that the school district defendants failed to 
recognize that Rachel was a handicapped student and accommodate her accordingly.  
In September of 1997, Rachel was diagnosed with diabetes.  In October of 1997, the 
school nurse prepared an "Individual Health Care Plan" for Rachel Eads that 
addressed the health care needs necessary for managing Rachel's illness.  When she 
was at school, Rachel would go to the nurse's office to check her blood sugar levels 
and administer her own insulin shots.  This required her to leave some classes early 
and arrive late to others.  Rachel only attended fourteen school days in the first 
quarter of school that year.  In December of 1997, Rachel's parents requested a 
Section 504 Plan of Accommodation for her.  In it, they requested the modification of 
assignments and tests so that Rachel's grades for the first and second quarters would 
be based on the work she had completed up to that point as she was still working on 
missing work due to her frequent absences.  Her parents also requested a modification 
to her physical education classes in that she would not have to write reports for 
missed activities.  The proposal letter also requested medical accommodations that 
complied with those already written by the school nurse.  The 504 committee met and 
decided on a plan, which they discussed with Rachel's parents in January of 1998, and 
all parties signed.  On February 16, 1998, the Eads withdrew Rachel from Wellsville 
Junior/Senior High School for home schooling.  They also contacted the 
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superintendent and requested a Due Process Hearing.  The hearing was held in March 
and the Hearing Officer issued a decision that denied the Eads' request to pay for 
tuition and transportation for Rachel to attend a different school district.  The Hearing 
officer concluded that the District failed to properly implement the provisions of 
Section 504 by not promptly convening the 504 committee to evaluate Rachel's 
diabetic absences whether her parents had requested a plan or not.  The Officer also 
concluded that the 504 committee should have provided individualized 
accommodations regarding the school attendance policy for Rachel and not have 
allowed individual teachers to develop and interpret the necessary accommodations.  
The Officer found "no evidence that R.E. or her parents were discriminated against 
because of R.E.'s diabetes" (p. 1129).  During the Due Process Hearing, Rachel's 
parents and the 504 committee developed an appropriate 504 accommodation plan 
that everyone agreed would meet Rachel's educational needs.  The Hearing Officer 
found no evidence that the district would be unable to make the needed 
accommodations.  In spite of this agreement, the Eads appealed the Hearing Officer's 
decision to the Board of Education which denied their appeal.  The plaintiffs did not 
pursue any further administrative remedies and waited over nineteen months to file 
judicial action with the court.  The case came before the court on the motion for 
summary judgment or dismissal filed by the defendants.  The plaintiffs filed a motion 
to amend the pretrial order to include a claim for violation of the Family Educational 
Right to Privacy Act (FERPA) 20 U.S.C. Section 1232(g). 
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The amended final pretrial order described the plaintiffs' claims as being 
brought under the federal laws of IDEA and ADA.  There was no mention of Section 
504, FERPA, or the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in the pretrial 
order.  The burden to assure that the pretrial order accurately reflects the position of a 
party rests with that party and not the court.  The amendment of a pretrial order will 
only be permitted if it would "prevent manifest injustice."  Fed R. Civ. P. 16(e).  The 
plaintiffs never included allegations of FERPA violations in their complaint or the 
pretrial order.  To allow them to add a FERPA claim would create prejudice to the 
defendants that would be "real and substantial."  The court found no reason to believe 
that the defendants had conducted any discovery relevant to the FERPA claim and it 
stated, "the time for discovery has expired long ago" (p. 1130).  Thus, the court found 
that the plaintiffs had not carried their burden of proving manifest injustice without 
the amendment to the pretrial order; their motion was denied.  
IDEA is an education statute that provides for children with disabilities to 
have access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) that emphasizes the 
services needed to meet their unique needs.  Through IDEA, federal funds are 
distributed to states for the education of children with disabilities.  To receive these 
funds, states "must establish and maintain procedures...to ensure that children with 
disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the 
provision of" FAPE.  20 U.S.C. Section 1415(a).  IDEA specifies what procedures 
must be established and these include the steps to be followed if a complaint is to be 
filed regarding any matter relating to providing services to an identified child.  20 
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U.S.C. Section 1415(f)(1) provides that "upon filing a complaint, the parents are 
entitled to an impartial due process hearing to be conducted by the state or local 
educational agency.  Then, if the local agency holds the hearing, the parent may 
appeal to the state educational agency "which must "conduct an impartial review."  20 
U.S.C. Section 1415(g).  Judicial review can then be sought if the party finds the 
decision of the state educational agency to be unjust.  In Kansas, K.S.A. Section 72-
961 et seq., the due process is conducted at the local level by a hearing officer, with 
the right to appeal to the state board of education.  The appeal to the state is made by 
an appointed review officer.  The decision of the state board's review officer is then 
subject to judicial review.  In the case at hand, the court found that, as the plaintiffs 
had not appealed any local agency decision to the state educational agency, they had 
failed to exhaust all of their administrative remedies.  Unless the plaintiffs could 
establish an exception to the exhaustion requirement, the court had no jurisdiction to 
review the case.  Plaintiffs argued that exhaustion was not necessary because the 
monetary relief they sought could not be awarded administratively.  The court 
disagreed finding that the plaintiffs not only sought monetary damages "but are also 
pursuing claims for injunctive or non-monetary relief based on the defendants' alleged 
failure to provide Rachel Eads with a free appropriate public education and other 
accommodations required by law."  The court also pointed out that a review of other 
court decisions showed that even if the plaintiffs were only seeking monetary 
damages, they still must exhaust administrative remedies.  The court went on to state 
that "the plaintiffs' allegations almost exclusively deal with Rachel's educational 
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needs and the defendants' failure to meet them" (p. 1137).  As the alleged injuries 
were almost exclusively educational in nature, they would be addressed through 
IDEA's administrative procedures.  Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack 
of jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(l). 
 
Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Olathe District Schools Unified School District No. 
233 
316 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Kan. 2003) 
 
This case involves the parents of an autistic child, Ben Johnson, who sued the 
school district claiming violations of the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA).  
Their son, Ben, had attended school in the Olathe School district since preschool.  Up 
until the 5th grade, Ben was placed in the regular classroom.  Beginning in the 5th 
grade, Ben spent most of his school day in a one-on-one placement.  At the end of 
Ben's 6th grade year, the Johnsons met with school district staff for Ben's annual IEP 
team meeting.  The Johnsons did not agree with the placement options discussed, 
which included extended school year services.  They wanted Ben placed in a home 
program.  On May 30, 2000, the Johnsons withdrew Ben from the Olathe Schools.  
The IEP team met again with Ben's parents in July 2000 to develop a plan for summer 
and fall placement.  The IEP team considered home placement but concluded that the 
most appropriate placement for Ben would be at Pioneer Trail Junior High's (PTJH) 
Lifeskills classroom.  After that meeting, the Johnsons requested a due process 
hearing to present their complaints against the school district.  In early September 
2000, Dr. Barone, the school district's applied behavioral analysis consultant, and 
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Katie Cook, the autism consultant, visited the Johnson's home.  They concluded that 
the home program was not the most appropriate placement for Ben.  The due process 
complaint was settled in December 2000.  Ben's parents agreed to enroll him at PTJH 
and have him placed in the Lifeskills classroom per his November 2000 IEP.  The 
November IEP also included a plan to help Ben transition from home school to 
attendance at PTJH as he would only attend school for two hours in the afternoon.  
Time at school would gradually be increased over subsequent weeks.  This transition 
plan would be adjusted as needed based on Ben's success at PTJH.  Ben was educated 
at home almost exclusively until December 28.  To address Ben's behavior, his 
parents used a technique called "redirection."  They decided to use "planned ignoring" 
beginning in December 2000.  Ben started at PTJH on January 2, 2001.  The school 
used both redirection and planned ignoring in dealing with Ben's behaviors.  The 
Johnsons and the IEP team met on January 12, 2001, and agreed to increase Ben's 
school day by 30 minutes each day.  The parties met again on January 22 for another 
IEP meeting.  The IEP team wanted to start Ben on some new academic programs and 
increase his academic day, but his parents rejected the proposal.  Dr. Barone 
recommended exclusive use of redirection as a means to address Ben's behaviors 
based on data the school had been collecting.  The Johnsons began to consult with Dr. 
Baer about possible recommendations to Ben's transition plan.  The IEP team met 
again on January 31, 2001, to talk about Ben's progress at PTJH and revise his IEP.  
Ben's parents discussed Dr. Baer's recommendations and requested that the school 
provide services in their home in the morning, with his afternoon education occurring 
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at PTJH.  The rest of the IEP team did not agree with this proposal.  They wanted to 
increase Ben's time at PTJH.  The Johnsons rejected the IEP team's recommendations.  
Four other IEP meetings took place in February and March.  At these meetings, the 
Johnsons discussed their desire for the school to follow Dr. Baer's recommendations 
regarding the use of planned ignoring rather than redirection to deal with Ben's 
behavior at school and for Ben to receive his services at home before transitioning 
back to PTJH.  On March 7, 2001, after both sides failed to reach an agreement on 
Ben's services, the Johnsons decided that they would not return Ben to PTJH.  A due 
process hearing was held in March 2001.  The due process hearing officer ruled in 
favor of the school district finding that: (1) the district had complied with the 
procedural requirements of IDEA in developing Ben's IEP; (2) the November and 
February IEPs placed Ben in the Least Restrictive Environment (LRE); and (3) the 
November and February IEPs were reasonably calculated to provide Ben with a free 
appropriate public education (FAPE).  The plaintiffs appealed the ruling, but the state 
hearing officer affirmed the due process hearing officer's decision on March 12, 2002.  
The Johnsons next appealed to district court asserting a number of violations of IDEA. 
In order to reach the conclusion that an IEP is invalid, it must be shown that 
there was some rational basis to believe the "procedural inadequacies compromised 
the student's right to an appropriate education, seriously hampered the parents' 
opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of 
educational benefits" (p. 964 citing O'Toole v. Olathe Dist. Schs. Unified Sch. Dist. 
No. 233, 144 F.3d 692, 698 (10th Cir. 1998)).  It is up to the party attacking the IEP 
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to show why it is inadequate or did not provide educational benefits.  The Johnsons 
alleged several violations of IEP all of which were addressed by the court.  The first 
allegation by the plaintiffs was that the IEP team did not have the necessary team 
members because there was no special education or general education teacher present 
at the meetings.  However, Katie Cook, who served as Ben's case manager and was 
responsible for implementing his IEP, was on the team.  The Johnsons argued that 
because she had the title of case manager, and not special education teacher, she 
could not fill that role on the IEP team.  The court disagreed, finding that as Cook 
filled the role of a special education teacher her title did not matter.  The court also 
held that there was no need of a general education teacher on the IEP team.  Although 
Ben was provided with a specially designed physical education program, a physical 
education teacher did not need to serve on the IEP team because Ben only attended 
school for two and one-half hours per day and did not attend general physical 
education classes.  Another of the Johnsons allegations was that because the school 
district would not consider home placement, they failed to consider the full 
continuum of placements for Ben.  The court again disagreed.  The record showed 
that the IEP team considered, but rejected placing Ben in a general education 
classroom based on his needs.  The team did consider home placement in other IEP 
meetings but did not believe it was a viable option for Ben.  Their rejection of the 
Johnson's proposal for home placement did not mean the district had failed to 
consider all placement options.  The court addressed numerous other procedural 
complaints by the plaintiffs and found in favor of the school district on each of them 
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because the evidence did not support their allegations.  The big issue for the court to 
decide was whether the school district provided Ben with a FAPE.  None of the 
claims of procedural defects in Ben's IEP were substantial enough to rise to the level 
of a deprivation of FAPE.  The court determined that the "real basis of the plaintiffs' 
complaints centered on two issues:  (1) plaintiffs wanted Ben placed at home; and, (2) 
plaintiffs believed that defendant should have utilized planned ignoring rather than 
redirection…"  (p. 975).  The court concluded that Ben's placement at PTJH did not 
deny him a FAPE.  Previous court cases have held that parents do not have the right 
to compel a school district to provide a certain program or methodology for their 
children.  Courts "will not second guess the decisions of authorities on educational 
methodology" (p. 975 citing Board of Educ. of Hendrick Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester 
County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982).  
Accordingly, the district court found in favor of the defendant school district.        
 
D.L. v. Unified School District No. 497 
392 F. 3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004) 
 
D.L, the mother of R.L. and J.L. enrolled her children in USD 497 in August 
1997.  R.L had autism and J.L. suffered from a milder learning disability.  An 
anonymous informant told the district that the children were nonresidents in 1997 and 
again in November 1999.  The district hired an investigator who found that the 
children were being driven from Kansas City, Kansas, outside the district, to 
Lawrence to attend school.  The district wrote D.L. to notify her that the children 
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would not be permitted to return to school after January 13, 2000.  Plaintiffs 
requested a due-process hearing under IDEA which the district denied.  On January 
23, 2000, the mother provided an affidavit of residency stating that R.L. was living 
with her in the district.  The children were readmitted to school that day.  However, in 
March 2000 the district again found out through an investigator that the children were 
commuting to school from Kansas City.  The district had a nonresident admission 
policy under which nonresident students would be admitted upon completion of an 
application for nonresident admission if there was space available in the District’s 
schools and if admission of the student would not require the District to hire 
additional staff.  Autistic students were not able to obtain nonresident status because 
each autistic student was assigned his own paraprofessional.  On April 18, 2000, the 
District sued D.L. and P.P., her cohabiting boyfriend, in Kansas state court, seeking 
damages as compensation for the cost of educating the children while they were 
nonresidents and an injunction prohibiting the children from attending District 
schools in the future.  On September 5, 2000, D.L., P.P. and the children countered by 
filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas against the 
District, Dr. Eicher, the former director of special education, and members of the 
school board.  They alleged that (1) the District had violated the IDEA by denying 
them the requested due process hearing and by expelling the children from January 
13-January 24, 2000; (2) the District violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against Plaintiffs because of their 
residence and disabilities; (3) the District violated FERPA by disclosing the 
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disabilities of the children in the state-court suit; and (4) the District violated 
Plaintiffs’ common-law right to privacy by placing them under surveillance and 
making public statements about their residency.  The plaintiffs sought a variety of 
forms of relief.  The district court dismissed all of P.P.’s claims for lack of standing, 
dismissed claims against the school board members as being redundant, held that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under FERPA, and granted summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants on the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Fourteenth Amendment, and 
invasion-of-privacy claims.  The district court further held that Dr. Eicher enjoyed 
qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in his favor on all claims.  Finally, 
the district court held that the plaintiffs had no right to recovery under IDEA claims, 
as there had been no substantial loss of educational benefits.  The plaintiffs appealed 
the district court’s judgment.   
The first issue the court discussed was the conflict between the ongoing state 
court case and the district court decision.  The Court of Appeals held that the district 
court should have stayed proceedings on the claims for damages and lacked 
jurisdiction to resolve many of the claims because of the pending state action.  They 
based this holding on what is known as the Younger doctrine.  See Younger v. Harris, 
401 U.S. 37, 54, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).  Even when a federal court 
would otherwise have jurisdiction to hear a claim, the court may be obliged to abstain 
when a federal-court judgment would interfere with an ongoing state proceeding.  
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs’ contention that the school district’s policy of 
nonresident-admission violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and their Fourteenth 
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Amendment right to travel.  The court found that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over these claims because each claim made an assertion that the children were 
entitled to receive an education from the District.  If the federal court granted any 
type of relief to the plaintiffs, then it would have made the conclusion that the 
children were so entitled.  If that were to occur, then there would be no merit to the 
state court suit in which the District sought reimbursement from D.L. and P.P. for the 
educational expenses of the children to which they, as nonresidents, were not entitled.  
Another complication in this case was that the parties listed on the state and federal 
lawsuits were not identical.  Therefore, the court had to determine whether Younger 
barred the claims of J.L. and the Estate of R.L. who were not parties on the state case, 
as well as the claims against Dr. Eicher who was also not a party in the state case.  
The court relied on Supreme Court opinions in previous cases to guide them in their 
decision.  As a result of this review of case precedent, the court determined that it was 
improper under Younger to “exercise federal jurisdiction over the claims of J.L. and 
the Estate of R.L.,” (p. 1231), as well as those against Dr. Eicher, because of their 
close connection to the parties that had been named in the state-court suit.   
The court did address the plaintiffs’ claim that the District had violated IDEA 
when it refused the request for a due process hearing.  This claim did not violate 
Younger because there was no assertion that the children had a right to the education 
received by the District, so the court‘s decision would not interfere with the state 
litigation.  The court turned to T.S. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 54, 265 F. 3d 1090 (10th Cir. 
2001) in which it held that “for a claim based on the deprivation of [an IDEA] due 
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process hearing…to be cognizable, it must be linked with a consequent loss of 
substantive benefits.”  Id. At 1093.  The plaintiffs in this case failed to allege any 
connection between the denial of the due-process hearing and any educational harm.  
As a result, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision.  The court also 
affirmed the district court’s decision that P.P lacked standing to raise the only claim 
not barred by Younger.  U.S. Const. art. III Section 2 requires that, in order for a 
federal court to hear a Case, the plaintiff is required to “show [that] (1) it has suffered 
an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 
injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  P.P. failed to show a “redressable 
injury” with respect to the nonbarred IDEA claim.   
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment with respect to the IDEA claim 
based on the alleged denial of a due process hearing, vacated the judgment as to all 
other claims raised in this appeal, and remanded for the district court to stay 
proceedings on claims for damages and dismiss the remaining vacated claims.   
(On May 23, 2005, a petition for writ of certiori to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit was denied.  D.L. v. Unified School District No. 497, 544 U.S. 
1050, 161 L.Ed. 2d. 1090.) 
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D.L., et al., v. Unified School District No. 497, Douglas County  
Not reported in F. Supp. 2d, 2008 WL 4148593 (D. Kan.) 
 
This is a continuation of the previous D.L. case from 2004.  The plaintiffs had 
brought suit against the school district in regards to the education of their children, 
J.L. and R.L. who received special education services.  On April 18, 2000, the 
defendants sued the mother of J.L. and R.L. for fraud related to the autistic children 
attending school in the district despite not living within the district boundaries (the 
“state case).  On September 29, 2000, the plaintiffs filed the present action asserting 
claims under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Section 1983 for violation 
of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and invasion 
of privacy under Kansas law.  The district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and the plaintiffs appealed.  In the Court of Appeals decision, the court 
affirmed in part and remanded in part for a lack of jurisdiction due to pending state 
court litigation and conflicts with the Younger doctrine.  On March 7, 2006, the state 
case was dismissed on a motion by the defendants.  As a result of that action, the 
district court lifted the stay on March 22, 2007.  On October 3, 2007, the parties filed 
a Stipulation Regarding Status of Claims in which they agreed that the plaintiffs’ 
claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendments remained for resolution by the 
district court.   
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The court first dismissed the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims because the 
plaintiffs could not show an “injury in fact” of a legally protected interest.  The court 
next addressed the claims under Section 1983 for violation of plaintiffs’ Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to equal protection and substantive due process.  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the defendants’ actions interfered with their right to travel, maintain a 
residence of choice and education, and treated them differently based on their 
disabilities.  First, the plaintiffs’ argument that they had a federally protected right to 
travel failed because they had not alleged any limitation to their interstate travel.  
Second, the plaintiffs did not provide any support for their assertion that “based on 
Kansas law, there is no question that plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected 
interest in …maintaining a residence of their choice.”  Even if they could support it, 
the court noted that a “protected interest ‘based on state law’ does not create an 
actionable Section 1983 claim.”  As to the third claim, the plaintiffs’ supplemental 
filings were not clear as to what action the defendants took to violate their rights.  As 
it is not the duty of the court to “scour the evidence to create and complete plaintiffs’ 
arguments,” the court granted the defendants’ request for summary judgment on the 
plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims.  As a result of the above action, the plaintiffs had no 
remaining viable claims in the case.  
(The district court decision was affirmed by the United States Court of 
Appeals on February 23, 2010, 596 F.3d 768, 254 Ed. Law Rep. 49 (10th Cir.(Kan.))  
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Doe v. Unified School District No. 259 
240 F.R.D. 673 (D. Kan. 2007) 
 
Pam Doe, mother of Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, filed this action requesting 
class certification.  Plaintiffs claimed that USD 259 violated Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 and sought to certify "all females, formerly, currently or who in the 
future may be a student at any school within USD 259 since January 1, 1997" (p. 675).  
Jane Doe 1 and 2 both alleged that Jane Doe 1 was sexually harassed, both physically 
and verbally, by a student named S.S during the 2002-2003 school year.  Jane Doe 2 
reported that S.S. would sexually harass her and other female students during 
chemistry class.  She claimed to have reported one event to the teacher.  The teacher 
denied that this occurred.  On August 28, 2004, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and their 
mother completed a police report that contained allegations about S.S. from a private, 
back-to-school party off school grounds.  Mother Doe later signed a Protection from 
Stalking (PFS) affidavit with the District Court of Sedgwick County.  Mother Doe 
then requested a meeting with administration at South High School and reported what 
had occurred.  At the meeting, the Does were told to document and report any 
incidents of sexual harassment occurring at school.  They were also told to notify the 
police if anything happened off school grounds.  When S.S. was served with the PFS 
order, school security and administration warned S.S. to stay away from the Does, not 
to contact them by phone, and to tell his friends to leave them alone.  Jane Doe 1 and 
Jane Doe 2 withdrew from South High School on September 3, 2004.  To support 
their class certification claim, the plaintiffs submitted several examples of the 
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defendant's failures that alleged caused sexual harassment to "permeate throughout 
the district" (p. 678).  They presented allegations ranging from the investigation of a 
teacher who had allegedly impregnated a former student to various claims of 
inappropriate sexual incidents across the district's schools.  The plaintiffs claimed that 
a pattern and practice of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment existed within 
the school district.   
For the plaintiffs to succeed on a motion for class certification, they must 
show "under strict burden of proof, that all the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) are 
clearly met" (p. 678).  These requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
and adequacy of representation.  The plaintiffs met the first requirement of 
numerosity because there were over 20,000 female students in the district.  To 
determine commonality, the court turned to General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) which held that 
members of a class must "possess the same interest and suffer the same injury, while 
at the same time, present specific questions of common law or fact."  Id. at 156.  In 
the case at hand, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 had claims that were factually different.  
The plaintiffs' presentation of other harassment allegations that occurred across the 
district took place in different settings, with different students and involved different 
relationships.  Taken together, these allegations did not represent common issues of 
fact or law needed for class certification.  In addition, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that any of the defendants' policies led to the alleged 
harassment.  Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to meet the commonality requirement of 
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Rule 23(a)(2).  The plaintiffs also failed to meet the typicality prong of Rule 23(a)(3) 
because of the fact that the claim of each proposed class member would differ from 
the plaintiffs' claims of harassment with respect to both liability and damages.  
Finally, the court addressed the adequacy of representation requirement.  Plaintiffs 
had to demonstrate that "the proposed representatives' interests are sufficient to 
induce vigorous advocacy on their part; that their interests are not antagonistic to 
those of class members; and that they have means, including competent counsel, to 
pursue their case"  citing Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 206 F.R.D. 509, 512 
(D.Kan.2002).  The court held that it need not address the issue further because the 
plaintiffs' had failed to meet the commonality and typicality requirements.  The 
plaintiffs also argued that they satisfied the requirements under Rule 23(b).  In 
addition to satisfying the requirements of (a), the plaintiffs had to show that the 
defendants had acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class 
which would make injunctive relief appropriate for the class as a whole; or that the 
questions of law common to the members of the class as a whole predominated over 
any questions affecting only individual members.  The plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief under Rule 23(b)(2) against the defendants which would require them to do 
such things as conduct yearly mandatory training, have an independent liaison handle 
sexual harassment complaints, and enforce all policies regarding harassment.  The 
court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements for Rule 23(b)(2) because 
their requested injunctive relief was too "vague and generalized."  It found that a 
request to "enforce all policies" was a statement of policy that did not address the 
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problem and "could not be fashioned in a manner that would satisfy the requirements 
of the federal rules" (p. 682).  Lastly, the court held that because the plaintiffs had not 
established common issues of fact, they did not meet the requirements for class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).  Although the plaintiffs asserted that Title IX and 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 were the common issues of law, the alleged violations varied 
too widely among each of the class members.  The plaintiffs were not able to meet the 
burden of showing that there were questions of law common to the members of the 
class as a whole that would predominate over questions that only affected individual 
members.  The court denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification because they 
were not able to meet the requirements of Rules 23(a) or Rule 23(b).  
 
Rubio v. Turner Unified School District No. 202 
523 F. Supp. 2d (D. Kan. 2007) 
 
Zachariah Rubio attended high school at Endeavor Alternative School in the 
Turner school district.  Rubio's first language was English, but he also spoke Spanish.  
The principal at Endeavor, Jennifer Watts, had a policy that prohibited students from 
speaking Spanish at school.  This was not a District policy and Bobby Allen, the 
superintendant, was not aware of Watts' rule.  In the spring of 2005, Rubio spoke 
Spanish to other students and was sent to the office.  On November 28, 2005, Rubio 
was told by two staff members to stop speaking Spanish.  He was sent to the office 
and was suspended for speaking Spanish after being told not to do so.  Watts met with 
Rubio's father and told him the suspension would last for the remainder of the day 
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and the next day.  Rubio's father called Allen that afternoon regarding the suspension.  
Allen called Watts and told her he was overturning the suspension because there was 
no district policy prohibiting students from speaking Spanish.  Allen also verbally 
reprimanded Watts.  Allen then called Rubio's father and told him that his son would 
not be suspended and could return to school the next day.  Because he had been sent 
home, Rubio missed one and a half hours of class that afternoon.   From December 5 
through 12, 2005, the incident was reported in the local news.  On December 12, 
Rubio filed suit against the school district and other individuals.  After receiving 
notice of the lawsuit, Allen told those involved to treat Rubio the same as other 
students.  From January 18 through May 17, 2006, Rubio received several discipline 
referrals for various reasons.  Rubio earned credits towards graduation while at 
Endeavor and returned to Turner High School for the 2006-07 school year.  In 
September 2006, the district court dismissed Rubio's claims against the 
superintendent, the board of education, the principal and several teachers at Endeavor.  
The court further granted Rubio leave to file an amended complaint to assert 
discrimination and retaliation only against the school district.  On October 2, 2007, 
Rubio filed suit claiming the district had violated his rights under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 200d et seq. by discriminating against him 
based on his national origin and race and retaliating against him for complaining of 
such discrimination.  He claimed race discrimination in violation of Title VI when a 
teacher sent him to the office for speaking Spanish on November 28, 2005.  This 
incident, according to Rubio, created a hostile school environment.  The retaliation 
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claims were based on what Rubio claimed was a verbal attack upon him by four 
teachers when he was in the office for refusing to go to class and failure to comply 
with staff instructions during an incident on February 10, 2006.  The school district 
sought summary judgment on both claims.  
Title VI prohibits discrimination by federally funded programs.  It further 
states that "no action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has 
advised the 'appropriate person' of the failure to comply with the requirement and has 
determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means."  42 U.S.C. 
Section 200d-1.  The school district in this case could be held liable for the acts of the 
teachers at Endeavor if Watts had notice of the conduct and failed to take action to 
end the alleged discrimination.  To establish a prima facie case of hostile environment 
under Title VI, Rubio had to show that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) 
the harassment was based on his race, color, or national origin; (3) the defendant had 
knowledge of and was deliberately indifferent to the harassment; and (3) the 
harassment was so severe and offensive that it deprived him of access to educational 
benefits.  The court believed Rubio met the first three elements of a prima facie case.  
At issue was whether the single incident complained about was sufficient enough to 
support a hostile environment claim.  The court believed that the incident was not 
severe or offensive enough that it deprived Rubio of educational benefits.  However, 
the school district first raised this argument in its reply brief and the court would not 
consider the new argument.  The court overruled the school district's motion for 
summary judgment on Rubio's national origin and discrimination claim, but it 
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directed Rubio to "show cause in writing on or before November 9, 2007," as to why 
the court should not grant summary judgment in favor of the school district on these 
claims because "the alleged harassment was not so severe that it deprived Rubio of 
educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school" (p 1252).  The court 
next addressed Rubio's allegation that because he filed a lawsuit, the school district 
retaliated against him by giving him excessive office referrals resulting in two 
suspensions.  To establish a case of retaliation under Title VI Rubio had to show (1) 
he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered adverse action due to such activity; 
(3) a causal nexus between the protected activity and the adverse action; and (4) the 
school district knew of the retaliation and did not respond adequately.  By filing his 
discrimination lawsuit, Rubio had engaged in a protected activity.  He claimed the 
adverse action occurred when four members of the Endeavor staff detained him in the 
office, harassed him, and wrote multiple discipline referrals on the same incident.  
Rubio also claimed that teachers gave him an increased number of referrals after he 
filed the suit.  The court, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Rubio, 
found such actions could constitute an adverse action sufficient for a prima facie case.  
The court also found a causal connection between the filing of the lawsuit and the 
adverse action.  The lawsuit was filed on December 12, 2005, and on February 10, 
2006, one of the teachers named in the first suit was involved in the incident in which 
Rubio was detained in the office.  The court believed two-months was a sufficient 
amount of time to establish causation.  On the fourth element, Rubio could offer no 
evidence showing that Watts was aware of any retaliation by the teachers at Endeavor.  
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Rubio never reported that staff members were retaliating against him and there was 
no reason for Watts to suspect that any such thing was occurring.  The court therefore 
held that "no reasonable jury could find that the District had notice that Endeavor 
staff members retained plaintiff in the office on February 10, 2006, in retaliation for 
the filing of this lawsuit and failed to take adequate steps to address the retaliation" (p. 
1255).  The school district's motion for summary judgment was granted on Rubio's 
retaliation claim.  The motion was overruled on Rubio's discrimination claim, but 
Rubio had to show cause by November 9, 2007, as to why the court should not grant 
summary judgment in favor of the school district because the harassment was not 
severe or offensive enough to deprive him of educational benefit.   
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Part II 
Suits by Employees 
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Chapter 5 
Discrimination in Hiring or Promotion 
 
All three of the cases within this chapter deal with claims of discrimination 
due to a disability.  Employees with disabilities are protected by the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).  The ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions and privileges of employment."  42 U.S.C. Section 12101.  This law 
applies to people who have a physical or mental condition that "substantially limits 
one or more major life activities."  In the state of Kansas, the Kansas Act Against 
Discrimination (KAAD), K.S.A. 44-1001 et seq. provides definitions and procedures 
for governmental entities in the state.  
Employees are protected from discrimination by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.  Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, color, religion 
or national origin.  All employment discrimination complaints must first be filed with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  In Kansas, complaints 
may also be filed with the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights (KCCR).  If the 
EEOC or other state fair-employment agency chooses not to take legal action or fails 
to act on the employee's behalf, then the employee may take his complaint to court.  
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Employers must ensure that they follow the requirements of all federal and 
state laws regarding discrimination.  In cases of disabilities, it is important to point 
out that the fact a person has a disability does not mean the person must be employed 
or cannot be terminated.  The law "only prohibits discrimination against people with 
disabilities who are 'otherwise qualified'; that is who despite their disability have the 
training, experience, abilities, and skills to perform the essential requirements of their 
job" (Imber & Van Geel, 2004, p. 393).  Employers must make an effort to provide a 
reasonable accommodation to employees with a disability when it is feasible to do so.  
 
Unified School District No. 259 v. Kansas Commission on Civil Rights 
640 P.2d 1291 (Kan. App. 1982) 
 
Patrick Palmer applied for a job as a custodian with the school district.  He 
was hired subject to his successfully passing a physical examination.  Palmer was 
examined by Dr. Low who learned that Palmer had been treated by a Dr. Weber for 
hematuria (blood in the urine).  Low contacted Weber to request information about 
Palmer's medical history and work restrictions.  Weber responded with a written 
report stating that Palmer should not engage in heavy lifting, stooping or straining.  
As a result of this report, Low recommended that the school district not hire Palmer.  
When Palmer learned he had not been recommended for employment, he contacted 
Weber.  Subsequently, Weber wrote a letter to the school district stating he believed 
Weber was capable of performing the tasks involved in the custodial position.  The 
school district did not change its position.  Palmer filed a complaint with the Kansas 
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Commission on Civil Rights (KCCR) alleging he was discriminatorily denied 
employment because of a physical handicap.  The KCCR ruled that Palmer was a 
physically handicapped individual whose handicap was unrelated to the position he 
sought and awarded damages.  The school district appealed to the district court.  The 
district court reversed the KCCR's decision finding that Palmer was not a 
handicapped person within the meaning of K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(3) in that he had no 
substantial disability and the school district had a "reasonable basis" to believe that 
his condition was sufficiently job related to disqualify  him for the position for which 
he applied.  Palmer and the KCCR appealed. 
At the time of this case, K.S.A. 44-1009(c)(3) made it an unlawful practice to 
discriminate against anyone because of a physical handicap.  K.S.A. 44-1002(j) 
defined a physical handicap as meaning the physical condition of a person "which 
constitutes a substantial disability but is unrelated to a person's ability to engage in a 
particular job or occupation."  In this case, there was disagreement on the definition 
of a physical handicap on the part of the authorities who provided testimony to the 
court.  In fact, Palmer, Low, and Weber all testified that they did not believe Palmer 
had a physically handicapping condition.  However, the appellate court decided that 
even if they gave the broad interpretation to a "substantial disability" requested by the 
KCCR, the KCCR would not prevail.  The appellate court agreed with the district 
court's finding that the school district had met its burden of proving it had a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for not hiring Palmer.  The school district had hired an 
independent contractor to determine Palmer's physical ability to perform the job he 
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sought.  Based on the medical information it received, the school district decided not 
to hire Palmer because of an existing medical problem that would prevent him from 
performing the duties of the job.  In order to meet the statutory definition of a 
physical handicap, a disability must not be related to work and in this case, the 
medical problem was job related.  The judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
     
Jewell v. Blue Valley Unified School District No. 229 
210 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Kan. 2002) 
 
Christy Jewell began teaching kindergarten for the District in the 1995-96 
school year.  She sustained an on-the-job injury in May 1996 when she was moving 
large tables in her classroom.  This caused an injury to her left wrist and hand.  She 
reinjured the same hand in May 1997 when a large group of first graders pinned her 
in the doorway they were moving through the classroom.  During her third year of 
teaching, Jewel had surgery on her left arm and missed numerous days of work.  
After returning from FMLA leave in October 1998, the school district wanted to place 
her in a long-term substitute position.  She refused this placement because she 
believed it would be harder on her hand than a regular classroom position.  Jewell 
accepted a position at the district's administrative office to help with a reading grant.  
She finished out that school year doing light clerical work in the district office.  In 
April 1999, Jewell signed a contract to teach kindergarten for the following school 
year.  However, in July of that year she met with Jim Payne, the Executive Director 
of Human Resources to tell him that her left arm had worsened and she would likely 
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need another surgery.  Payne met with Jewell several times during the month of 
August to discuss possible accommodations for her injury.  Because he believed that 
a teaching position with older students would be more manageable for her, Payne 
offered Jewell several teaching alternatives.  She accepted an eighth grade position at 
a middle school with the understanding that she would not begin until after her 
surgery and recovery period.  Jewell had several discussions with Payne and Steve 
Davis, the middle school principal, in regards to specific accommodations that the 
district could provide to enable her to return to the classroom.  At these meetings, 
Jewell told Payne and Davis that she needed help lifting, grading papers, and 
recording grades in the grade book.  Mr. Davis determined that the custodial staff 
could assist her before and after school with the items she needed carried.  The 
custodians would also be told to report to Jewell's classroom during lunch to see if 
she needed any additional assistance.  Davis also discussed having paraprofessionals 
in the building assist her during the day.  He told her that the school was trying to hire 
an additional full-time paraprofessional who could also provide some assistance.  At 
no time did the district promise to assign a paraprofessional to work exclusively with 
Jewell.  On October 25, 1999, after her surgery, Jewell was released to return to light 
work.  Beginning on November 1, 1999, after having agreed to the accommodations 
proposed by Payne and Davis, Jewell returned to the classroom.  Upon her return, 
Jewell found that she needed a great deal of assistance.  In her deposition, she stated 
that she needed help moving desks and overhead projectors, helping kids find things 
in their textbooks, and grading papers.  She further testified that she needed a 
 
211 
 
paraprofessional to be available at all times to come to her classroom to move 
equipment and materials when she was teaching and then again during her planning 
periods to help with grading.  The school was using 4 of its 5 paraprofessionals to 
cover as much of Jewell's working day as possible.  Jewell did not want to have 
several different paraprofessionals because she did not want to have to explain what 
she needed each time a new person showed up to help her.  At one point in November, 
Jewell refused to come to work because Davis was not able to cover her entire 
workday with paraprofessionals to assist her; he was only able to cover four of her 
five class periods.  Davis contacted Payne to let him know that he could not get 
Jewell's entire schedule covered and that she refused to be in a classroom without 
some kind of para assistance.  On December 3, 1999, Jewell left her teaching 
assignment because she was not getting the kind of paraprofessional help that she 
needed to perform her job.  On December 21, 1999, Jewell left a message for Payne 
in which she told him that her doctor would not allow her in the classroom without 
para assistance for the entire time she was there.  She also met with Payne to discuss 
other available positions in the district, but there were none that she was able to 
perform.  Jewell filed suit against the school district alleging they had failed to 
accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. Section 12101 et seq.  The District moved for summary judgment on claims 
that Jewell had failed to show that with reasonable accommodations she could 
perform the essential functions of her job and that her request for a full-time 
paraprofessional to be available for her at all times was unreasonable. 
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The only claim to be addressed by the court was whether the defendant school district 
had discriminated against the plaintiff, Jewell, in violation of the ADA by failing to 
make reasonable accommodations for her disability.  To establish a prima facie case 
the plaintiff had to show that she had a disability as defined by the ADA; that the 
defendant had notice of this disability; that the plaintiff could perform the essential 
functions of the job with reasonable accommodations; and that the defendant had 
refused to make the necessary accommodations.  See Spielman v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of Kansas, Inc., 2002 WL 524549, at *4, 33 Fed. Appx. 439 (10th Cir.2002).  
It was undisputed that Jewell had a disability of which the district was aware and that 
Jewell could not perform the essential functions of her job without accommodations.  
The school district claimed that Jewell's request was unreasonable; Jewell argued that 
the issue was not whether the accommodation was reasonable but whether the district 
provided her the accommodations it promised to provide.  The district had promised 
to provide some assistance from custodians, some assistance from current 
paraprofessionals, and some assistance from a new paraprofessional that the school 
was trying to hire.  Jewell received very little assistance from the custodial staff and 
the school was not able to hire a new paraprofessional.  However, the court noted that 
the idea of accommodation is to "enable the employee to perform the essential 
functions of his or her job" (p. 1249).  In reviewing the record before it, the court 
found that even if the school district had fulfilled each of its promises, the plaintiff 
still would not have been able to perform the essential functions of her job.  There 
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was nothing to suggest that Jewell's inability to teach was related to a lack of 
custodial assistance.  Although the school had attempted to hire another 
paraprofessional that could have provided some additional assistance, there was no 
evidence to show that the district had suggested that the new para would have spent a 
specific number of minutes or hours with the plaintiff.  The district had promised to 
provide "some" assistance from the current paraprofessionals in the building, and it 
fulfilled that promise.  The school district had made no promises regarding any length 
of time that the paras would be able to assist the plaintiff.  Jewell refused to come to 
work even when she had assistance in four of her five classes.  The facts of the case 
showed that Jewell would not return to the classroom without a full-time 
paraprofessional available to her at all times.  For that reason, the court found that it 
was "irrelevant that the defendant did not fulfill all of its promises to provide plaintiff 
with accommodations" (p. 1250).  The court held that a request for a full-time 
assistant was not reasonable.  Courts have consistently held that employers are not 
required to assign existing employees or hire new employees to perform essential 
functions of a disabled employee's job that they cannot perform because of their 
disability.  The plaintiff in this case failed to show that she could perform the 
essential functions of her teaching position with reasonable accommodations, thus 
failing to establish a prima facie case.  Summary judgment was granted to the school 
district and Jewell's case was dismissed. 
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Henry v. Unified School District No. 503 
328 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Kan. 2004) 
 
Jerry Henry, a welding teacher, brought an employment discrimination claim 
in which he alleged that USD 503 violated the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section 12101, et seq. and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination 
(KAAD), K.S.A. 44-1001, et seq.  Henry also brought a claim of tortious interference 
with a business relationship.  The matter went before the district court on the school 
district's motion for summary judgment.  This case had a lengthy statement of facts, 
the highlights and timeline of which will be noted in this brief.  
Jerry Henry had taught for the school district for nineteen years.  He had been 
hearing impaired since birth.  His hearing loss was permanent and was getting 
progressively worse.  Henry wore hearing aids, but his hearing loss was so severe that 
he still had difficulty understanding conversations and had difficulty hearing on the 
telephone and intercom at school.  He taught industrial arts classes without any 
accommodations through 2000.  Henry also taught industrial arts courses at Labette 
Community College (LCC).  On February 10, 2000, Ted Hill, the assistant principal, 
prepared Henry's evaluation.  Henry received marks of "Needs Improvement" in the 
areas of classroom management and control and positive interactions with students.  
On December 22, 2000, the plaintiff met with Hill and Principal Carter to discuss a 
list of failing students that he had provided.  At that meeting, Carter discussed his 
concerns regarding the number of students failing Henry's classes, his concern about 
Henry leaving his class unattended, and various student discipline problems.  Carter 
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wanted Henry to prepare and submit lesson plans that would address his concerns as a 
part of a Plan of Assistance.  At this meeting, Henry expressed concerns with 
increasing health problems.  He said he was having stress and chest pains and 
complained that his hearing difficulties were causing problems with his classes.  
Carter asked Henry if he had looked into disability benefits.  Henry called a teacher 
from the district who had started receiving disability benefits and she recommended 
he talk to Alice Caldwell who worked at the District office.    
Henry saw a cardiologist on December 28, 2000 who stated in his notes that 
Henry "appeared to be disabled from his usual line of work" (p. 1137).  Henry met 
with Caldwell at the District office between Christmas 2000 and New Year's 2001 to 
talk about disability benefits.  He told Caldwell and Assistant Superintendent Linda 
Proehl that he had heart problems, stress, could not hear the students, and that his 
doctors would send notes to document his disability.  On January 2, 2001, Henry 
visited Caldwell again and said he would need to quit because of his health problems.  
Caldwell prepared a chart for him showing the benefits available to him, including 
KPERS disability benefits.  Caldwell noted that Henry seemed stressed, confused, 
and was not able to remember what she had told him about benefits.  On January 2, 
2001, the plaintiff told Superintendent John Benson that he needed to resign and 
apply for KPERS disability benefits and he did not want to return to his teaching 
duties.  When Henry offered to continue to work until they could hire someone in his 
place, Benson told him that he should not return to work.  At a basketball game that 
same evening, Henry told Principal Carter that he had retired on disability and would 
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not be back to teach.  Carter made an announcement at school on January 3, 2001 to 
notify the high school staff of Henry's retirement due to health issues.   
The school district received a letter of resignation from the plaintiff dated 
January 4, 2001.  Assistant Superintendent Proehl found a replacement teacher on 
January 5, 2001.  After he had resigned, Henry went to Superintendent Benson's 
office to thank him for allowing him to teach his LCC classes.  He asked Benson 
whether he could take KPERS disability benefits and continue teaching his night 
classes for LCC.  Benson suggested he call KPERS.  Henry then asked Caldwell 
about teaching at LCC while on disability.  She called KPERS and they said no.  
Caldwell told Henry that under total disability he could never work anywhere again.  
Henry called KPERS and discovered that there was no disability package that would 
provide benefits and still allow him to work.  This was the first time Henry 
understood that he needed to be "totally disabled" in order to obtain KPERS benefits.    
On January 5, 2001, Henry met with Proehl and told her that he wanted to 
return to work.  Proehl told him that he could not because they had already hired 
someone to take his place and that he needed a doctor's letter to return to work.  On 
January 7, 2001, Henry wrote letters to the District withdrawing his resignation but 
stating that he was on sick leave and would provide notice from his physician when 
he could return to work.  On January 15, 2001, Superintendent Benson met with 
Henry and his wife at which time he presented a Memo to him which expressed the 
district's concern in regards to Henry's health and its effect on his ability to provide 
satisfactory teaching to his students.  The Memo went on to state that if Benson did 
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not receive a written response that Henry was going to request KPERS disability 
before March 1, 2001, Benson would implement Negotiated Agreement Policy 
5067.01(e).  This policy stated that employees absent due to illness may be requested 
to present a doctor's statement indicating their readiness to return to work.  The policy 
went on to state that the Superintendent of Schools could require an examination by a 
medical practitioner specified by the superintendent at the expense of the district.  
Henry was informed that he had to remain on sick leave and that Benson would set up 
appointments for him to see several doctors.  The January 15 Memo also informed the 
plaintiff that the District would not renew his Supplemental Contracts for an extra 
teaching period, his position as Department Chair, or approve the teaching of LCC 
classes while Henry was on sick leave or on a Plan of Assistance.  The supplemental 
contracts were not renewed because the District wanted the plaintiff to concentrate on 
his primary job.  
 Shortly after the January 15 meeting and Memo, the District received a letter 
from Richard Tucker, attorney for Henry, which stated that Henry must be allowed to 
return to work immediately as he had never requested sick leave.  Tucker's letter also 
demanded that Henry's LCC classes be resumed.  Tucker sent work releases from the 
plaintiff's family doctor and hearing aid provider.  These releases did not comply with 
the District's requirement that Henry be examined by a cardiologist, audiologist, and 
neurologist.  On February 1, 2001, Tucker wrote another letter demanding immediate 
reinstatement for Henry and that he should not be charged for sick leave.  Benson 
replied that Henry would remain on sick leave and comply with the medical specialist 
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examination requirements after which the Board would make a decision.  On 
February 27, 2001, Tucker sent a report from a cardiologist, which stated that Henry 
was "stable to return to work."  Benson set appointment dates for March 15, 2001 for 
Henry to see his regular audiologist and a local neurologist.  Henry's evaluation with 
the neurologist showed him to be within normal limits.  His audiologist noted that he 
should be able to "function well in his work environment."  She mentioned several 
signaling and telecommunication devices that could be incorporated into his 
classroom, but she did not require any accommodation for Henry to be able to return 
to work.  
 On April 12, 2001, a meeting was held with the District's lawyer David 
Markham, Henry's lawyer Tucker, Henry, his wife, Proehl and Carter to discuss 
Henry's return to work.  At that meeting, Henry requested payment for teaching seven 
hours, payment for missed LCC classes, and assurance for teaching LCC classes in 
the high school shop, a flashing light phone, a para, and reinstatement to his 
supplemental duties.  Benson responded on April 16, 2001.  His letter stated that 
Henry's teaching assignment would be for four welding classes along with time in the 
afternoon to work on his Plan of Assistance with Carter and Hill.  Henry would be 
paid for six hours, was given paid administrative leave from January 17 - April 18, 
2001, he would receive no pay for the LCC classes he had not taught, no approval for 
teaching LCC classes while he was under a Plan of Assistance, no reinstatement to 
his supplemental duties, and would be provided a flashing light phone.  The District 
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also noted that it would provide paras only when certain special education students 
were in Henry's class.   
Henry returned to work on April 18, 2001 and on April 23, 2001, he told 
Principal Carter that he did not want a flashing light phone.  Instead, he wanted a loud 
bell and amplified phone handset in the welding shop.  On April 25, 2001, Carter 
noted that a company was coming to talk to Henry about his phone requests.  On May 
3, 2001, Proehl visited Henry's welding class and found his students unsupervised.  
Carter and Proehl both spoke to Henry about this concern.  On May 7, 2001, Carter 
met with Henry and gave him a list of issues to be addressed in the Plan of Assistance.  
Shortly after this meeting, Henry requested an aide as an accommodation.  On May 
25, 2001, Carter asked Henry about completing the Plan of Assistance and Henry said 
his lawyer had advised him not to complete the Plan. 
On June 8, 2001, the District received Henry's disability discrimination 
complaint filed with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  The alleged unlawful discrimination 
checked on the Complaint form was "Disability."  Markham represented the District 
before the KHRC.  On June 14, Tucker wrote Markham and stated that Henry did not 
need to complete a Plan of Assistance because he had not received any ratings of 
"Unsatisfactory" on his evaluation as was required by the negotiated agreement.  The 
evaluation form only had ratings of "Unacceptable" and "Needs Improvement."  
Tucker also demanded that the sick leave charged to Henry from January 2-17, 2001 
be changed to paid administrative leave.  He claimed that Henry had been "demoted" 
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when the District hired another automotive teacher, removed his supplemental duties, 
and demanded that Henry be reinstated to the same teaching and supplemental duties 
that he had prior to January 1, 2001.  Tucker made other claims of harassment and 
rude treatment of his client.  Markham responded to Tucker on July 24, 2001.  He 
noted the discrepancy in the wording of the negotiated agreement and the evaluation 
form, but stated that it was clear that a rating of "needs improvement" required job 
targets or a Plan of Assistance for a teacher.  Markham went on to state that if Henry 
failed to follow Board policies, "his noncooperation with Mr. Carter will be deemed 
as insubordination" (p. 1146).  Markham denied allegations that Henry had been 
demoted and pointed out that when any teacher was struggling in the classroom, the 
Board would limit their supplemental duties and other responsibilities.  Henry did not 
comply with the Board's policy and taught for LCC in the fall of 2001 using other 
facilities. 
On August 2, 2001, attorney David Calvert wrote the District and notified 
them that he was also representing Henry.  Calvert claimed that Henry had asked for 
an aide as a reasonable accommodation due to the noise level in his classrooms and 
that this had been denied.  He requested assurance that Henry would be allowed a 
classroom aide.  Benson had not understood any prior request from Henry asking for 
a "classroom aide."  Rather, Henry had asked for some help from a "para."  Typically, 
a para provided services for disabled students and was paid by the Special Education 
Cooperative.  A classroom aide would have to be paid for by the District.  On August 
21, 2001, Carter gave Henry a memo to set up a meeting on August 23, which would 
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include Benson and Hill.  The purpose was to discuss Henry's request for a classroom 
aide.  Henry was asked to bring a written request for an aide and his rationale for this 
need.  Henry was also asked to bring his Plan of Assistance.  At the August 23 
meeting, Henry expressed his belief that a classroom aide would help him with 
supervision, as he could not hear the student very well due to his disability.  A 
fulltime classroom aide would have cost the District approximately $15,000 per year.  
The parties discussed other accommodations, and the District agreed to provide a 
shop bell, flashing light and a separate phone line in the shop.  During this meeting, 
Henry presented a grievance letter to Carter which listed (1) the requirement of a Plan 
of Improvement; (2) demotion in violation of 5081(9) based on the removal of 
supplemental duties; and (3) denial of the use of facilities for LCC classes.  All three 
grievances dated back to the January 15, 2001 memo.  The grievance was denied by 
Carter on August 29, 2001, as untimely based on the requirement that all grievances 
had to be filed within 30 days of an occurrence.  Based on recommendations from the 
Kansas Association of School Boards, the District did not provide Henry with a 
classroom aide.  
On October 3, 2001, Henry's Plan of Assistance was completed and signed.  
On October 10, 2001, the KHRC found No Probable Cause for Henry's allegations of 
discrimination.  Henry did not file a Petition for rehearing with the KHRC.  On 
October 16, 2001, Calvert wrote to the District's attorney noting that they had not 
responded to Henry's request for a classroom aide.  Ten days later he wrote again and 
asked about the speaker needed for his plaintiff's classroom and again requested a 
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classroom aide.  Markham responded on November 8, 2001 to inform Calvert that the 
speaker had been installed and asked for the reason a classroom aide was requested.  
Calvert responded that the noise level of the classroom required an aide.  There was 
no suggestion that the noise level of the class had changed since Henry's audiologist 
had released him for work without accommodations, nor had Henry's hearing 
changed.  On January 16, 2002, Henry provided a memo to explain why he needed a 
classroom aide.  He did not describe any change in the welding shop environment that 
he had worked in since fall 2000.  The District did not provide an aide. 
On January 10, 2002, the plaintiff was removed from the Plan of Assistance 
by Carter because his evaluation showed improvement.  In April, Henry asked to be 
reinstated as department chair.  Carter responded that the position was filled and 
Henry could apply if the position became open in the future.  In December 2002, 
Henry asked if he could teach an additional class for LCC in the District's welding 
shop.  Carter discussed the request with new Superintendent Deborah Perbeck and 
raised some safety and performance issues he had noted in November.  In January 
2003, they denied the request for use of the District shop.  Carter left the District but 
he issued a reprimand on June 17, 2003 based on Henry's failure to install safety 
equipment as he had been requested to do in October and November 2002.  Carter 
also recommended that the new principal, Ted Hill, place Henry on an intensive Plan 
of Assistance to correct the safety issues.  Perbeck removed the reprimands from 
Henry's file and stated that the new building administration would observe his work 
in the fall and then decide if Henry needed to be placed on a plan.  Henry requested 
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use of the District facilities for September LCC classes and it was approved by Hill.  
Henry continued to teach for the District and LCC without an aide.   
The first claim addressed by the court was that the District had discriminated 
against Henry in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 12112(a).  To establish a case under 
the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of 
the ADA, (2) he is able to perform the essential functions of his job with or without 
reasonable accommodations, and (3) he was discriminated against because of his 
disability.  As Henry was disabled, the court focused on his ability to perform the 
essential functions of his job.  Henry believed he needed a classroom aide to help 
with classroom supervision, to help him communicate with students, and to assist him 
when announcements were given on the intercom.  Pursuant to K.S.A. 72-9004 and 
the school district's policy, classroom management is an essential function of the job.  
In Jewell v. Blue Valley Unified School District No. 229, 210 F. Supp.2d 1241 (D. 
Kan. 2002), the court noted that "the courts of appeals have consistently held that 
employers are not required to assign existing employees or hire new employees to 
perform certain functions or duties of a disabled employee's job which the employee 
cannot perform by virtue of his or her disability."  The court here found that Henry's 
request for a classroom aide was not reasonable.  Summary judgment was granted to 
the District on this count.  Henry's second claim alleged that the defendant had 
retaliated against him contrary to Section 12203(a).  In order to prove this, the 
plaintiff had to show that (1) he had engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, 
(2) his employer subjected him to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal 
 
224 
 
connection existed between the protected activity and the employment action.  By 
filing a complaint with the KHRC on June 8, 2001, Henry had engaged in protected 
activity.  Henry cited two incidents that he qualified as "adverse employment action."  
The first was Carter's comments on April 9, 2002 concerning his disapproval of 
Henrys teaching methods and safety test.  The second incident was Carter's June 17, 
2003 reprimand that recommended Henry be placed on another Plan of Assistance.  
The court found that Carter's comments did not rise to the level of "adverse action."  
Therefore, summary judgment was granted to the District on this claim.  The third 
claim addressed by the court was Henry's claim that the District had tortiously 
interfered with his LCC teaching contract when they denied the use of its facilities.  
Henry claimed these denials were a part of the defendants "scheme of harassment" (p. 
1159).  The District argued that it was "privileged and justified in making its 
decisions."  In Turner v. Halliburton Co., 240 Kan. 1, 722 P.2d 1106 (1986), the 
Kansas Supreme Court noted that "not all interferences in present or future 
contractual relations is tortious.  A person may be privileged or justified to interfere 
with contractual relations."  The Supreme Court in Turner listed seven factors to aid 
in the determination of whether a defendant's actions were privileged and proper.  
The district court found that the school district's denial of Henry's requests for 
facilities use met the definition for privileged and proper.  The Negotiated Agreement 
and Policies that governed secondary employment stated that a second job "must not 
interfere with the quality of work expected of the employee."  Henry's request was 
denied in January 2001 in the midst of concerns about his ability to teach students 
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adequately during the time he was placed on a Plan of Assistance.  The denial in 
January 2003 occurred after Henry's medical restrictions on standing and Carter's 
performance criticisms of Henry.  The court granted summary judgment to the school 
district on Henry's third count.  Finally, the court addressed Henry's claim of 
discrimination under the KAAD.  The District argued that the claim should be 
dismissed because Henry had failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies 
before filing suit.  If a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies under the 
KAAD, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.  K.S.A. 44-1010 
states, "no cause of action accrues until a petition for reconsideration is at least filed 
with the administrative agency."  On October 10, 2001, the KHRC found no probable 
cause for Henry's allegations of disability discrimination.  Henry did not file a 
petition for rehearing with the KHRC before he filed his lawsuit.  Therefore, the court 
found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Henry's KAAD claim and granted 
summary judgment to the school district on his fourth count.  All claims against the 
defendants were dismissed.    
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Chapter 6 
Termination and Other Disciplinary Procedures 
 
Employee termination makes up the majority of Kansas public education 
litigation and a large number of those cases deal with the non-renewal of a certified 
employee's contract.  This chapter contains sixty-one cases and forty-two of those 
deal with nonrenewal or termination of a certified teacher's contract.  State statutes 
that provide due process procedures and deadlines for school administrators to follow 
have changed somewhat since the early 1980's.  When possible, language from the 
current statute has been noted following the briefs within this chapter.  However, it 
would be wise for public school officials to be familiar with all statutes dealing with 
the termination or nonrenewal of administrative and teacher contracts. 
Due process rights vary based on an employee's years of experience.  The 
state of Kansas has specific statutes that outline these differences.  K.S.A. 72-5410 et 
seq., the Teacher Tenure Law, defines tenure and outlines procedures to follow when 
nonrenewing a teacher's contract.  The Kansas Administrators Act, K.S.A. 72-5451, 
gives the steps to follow for nonrenewal of an administrator.   
In general, most cases dealing with the termination of an employee result from 
the implication of a property interest under the due process clause.  Tenured teachers 
with continuing contracts have much greater property interests than nontenured 
teachers or school administrators.  For that reason, the due process procedures for 
tenured teachers are much more extensive.  
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In Kansas, if a school board decides to nonrenew a tenured teacher they must 
provide a reason for the nonrenewal and notify the teacher of their right to a due 
process hearing with a hearing officer.  K.S.A. 72-5438 through 72-5443 outlines the 
procedures to follow in such cases.  As it is now written, the decision of the hearing 
officer is final subject to appeal to the district court by either party.  Nontenured 
teachers must be notified of their nonrenewal by the appropriate date but no reason 
need be given for their nonrenewal and the teacher has no right to a hearing.  School 
administrators who are nonrenewed must be notified by the date specified and may 
request a meeting in front of the school board.  At this meeting, the administrator will 
be given the reasons for their nonrenewal and have the opportunity to respond.  No 
legal counsel is present for either side as this is not a hearing. 
Supplemental contracts for duties other than teaching are not protected by 
Kansas statute.  K.S.A. 72-5412a lists those activities defined as supplemental and 
notes that due process procedures do not apply to such contracts. 
 
Gragg v. Unified School District No. 287 
627 P.2d 335 (Kan. App. 1981) 
 
James Gragg taught and coached football during 1977-78 and 1978-79 school 
years.  His contract was nonrenewed on March 26, 1979.  He appealed to the district 
court and argued that, although he was a nontenured teacher, he should have been 
allowed a hearing because the notice of his nonrenewal was not given in a timely 
manner.  Gragg's contract for the 1978-79 school year contained two clauses that had 
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bearing on this case.  First, it was written in the contract language that teachers would 
be notified of any intent to nonrenew their contracts "on or before the 15th day of 
March."  The second relevant clause stated that provisions of the contract would be 
"subject to all laws, rules, regulations, and orders, now or hereinafter enacted, 
adopted, issued, altered, or amended..."  When the parties entered into the contract in 
June 1978, K.S.A. 72-5411 provided that written notice to terminate a teacher's 
contract had to occur on or before March 15.  However, a legislative amendment that 
became effective on July 1, 1978 changed the notice deadline to April 15.  The 
district court granted summary judgment to the school district, finding that the board 
had given timely notice before the April 15, 1979 deadline.  The court found that the 
paragraph of the contract that specifically mentioned laws that might be amended, 
effectively extended the deadline for notice of nonrenewal from March 15 to April 15.  
Gragg appealed this decision. 
At issue was whether the notice of nonrenewal was given in a timely manner 
under the terms of the contract and K.S.A. 72-5411.  The Court of Appeals agreed 
with the trial court's reasoning and added its own analysis.  It held that when the 
legislature amended the law, the amendment applied to the current contract and 
would have done so "even in the absence of the conformity clause in the contract" (p. 
339).  As the amendment took effect before Gragg's right to a new contract, it did not 
deprive him of any vested right.  No hearing was required because as a nontenured 
teacher, Gragg had no property right.  The decision of the district court was affirmed. 
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Scott v. Unified School District No. 377 
638 P.2d 941 (Kan. App. 1981) 
 
Eugene Scott was a teacher for USD No. 377 in Atchison County.  The school 
board, upon discovery that Scott had physically injured a student, called a special 
meeting and notified Scott.  At that meeting Scott, and others, made statements.  The 
Board went into executive session and upon reconvening, read a resolution stating 
that Scott would be suspended with termination to follow.  The resolution also stated 
that Scott was entitled to a hearing under the Kansas Due Process Act.  Scott 
requested a hearing but later withdrew his request and within a week filed action in 
court.  In his petition to the court, Scott stated that a due process hearing would be 
"useless" because the Board had made up its mind by the end of the executive session.  
The school district made a motion to dismiss.  On March 28, 1980, a hearing was held 
and the trial court sustained the school district's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction based on Scott's failure to exhaust his administrative and judicial 
remedies under the Kansas statutes that provide due process for teacher termination.  
The court in essence stated that it would not hear Scott's case until he had a due 
process hearing.  The trial judge then signed a document titled "Judgment or Order" 
which was filed that same day.  Then, following a hearing to settle form, a journal 
entry was signed by the trial judge and filed on May 5, 1980.  Scott filed a motion to 
alter or amend judgment pursuant to K.S.A. 60-259 on May 15, 1980.  The school 
district argued that the motion was not timely appealed because the judgment had 
been entered on March 28, 1980.  Scott countered by filing an affidavit from one of 
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his attorneys which asserted that a copy of the March 28 document was not in the 
attorney's files and that a clerk of the court had indicated that a copy was never 
mailed, but instead had been put in a box for the attorneys to pick up.  Thus, Scott 
argued that the May 5 journal entry should be held as the date for the entry of 
judgment, not the March 28 date.  On August 13, 1980, a hearing was held on Scott's 
motions to alter or amend judgment and the trial judge denied the motions.  Although 
the trial judge indicated that he thought a valid judgment had been entered on March 
28, he did not find that the motions had been filed out of time.  On September 8, 1980, 
Scott filed an appeal and the school district moved that the appeal be dismissed.   
K.S.A. 60-2103(a) provides that a motion to alter or amend judgment must be 
filed within 10 days after the judgment form is filed.  Scott did not meet this deadline 
if the court used the March 28 date.  However, the appellate court found the evidence 
to show that a copy of the March 28 judgment form had not been served on Scott's 
attorneys.  K.S.A. 60-258 requires that copies of the judgment form be served on all 
attorneys either "personally or by mail."  As this was not done, the time for filing a 
post-trial motion did not begin to run when the judgment form was filed on March 28, 
1980.  Instead, the time for filing such motions began when the journal entry was 
entered on May 5, 1980.  Since Scott's motion to alter or amend judgment was filed 
on May 15, 1980, he met the ten-day requirement.  The appellate court held that 
Scott's appeal was timely filed and therefore would not be dismissed.  Next, the 
appellate court addressed the issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing 
the action for lack of jurisdiction based on Scott's failure to exhaust the administrative 
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and judicial remedies afforded him by statute.  K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. provides in 
part that when a teacher is terminated before the end of his contract, he shall be given 
written notice of termination along with the reasons and a statement noting that the 
teacher may have the matter heard by a hearing committee.  The hearing committee 
would then make a recommendation to the school board and the board would decide 
whether to terminate or retain the teacher based on this recommendation.  A teacher 
could then appeal that decision to the district court.  Here, Scott had refused a hearing, 
which was why the district court determined it lacked jurisdiction.  The appellate 
court noted that this was "generally correct, but not applicable in this case" (p. 945).  
Scott's action was brought specifically under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which is a 
federal statute.  The question for the court to decide was what affect the existence of 
state statutory remedy, and Scott's failure to pursue that remedy, would have on his 
right to maintain a Section 1983 action.  The majority of courts have relied on 
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d  492 (1961) when facing 
similar situations.  Monroe dealt with the exhaustion of state judicial remedies and 
held that state remedies "need not be first sought and refused" before federal statutes 
are invoked.  When it examined the petition Scott presented, the appellate court found 
that the essential point of Scott's argument was that the actions of the school board on 
February 18, 1980, prior to serving him with the notice of termination, rendered the 
school board incapable of making an impartial decision under the statutory grievance 
procedures and violated his right to due process.  Therefore, even if the appellate 
court adopted the qualified rule as to the exhaustion of state remedies, exhaustion 
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would not be required in this case.  It appeared as though it would have been futile for 
Scott to comply with administrative procedures because his claim would have been 
rejected.  The court held that Scott's failure to comply with K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. did 
not preclude his action in court.  It further noted that this did not mean Scott was 
entitled to relief, as he would still have to prove his claims of bias and deprivation of 
due process.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded.      
 
Speece v. Unified School District No. 420, Osage County 
626 P.2d 1202 (Kan. App.1981) 
 
Defendant Reginald Speece worked for one year at Osage City High School.  
He was a teacher and also performed certain coaching duties for the high school from 
1976-77.  The extra duties and compensation for those duties was not included in 
Speece's contract.  Speece attempted to negotiate with the school administrators for 
extra compensation, but was not successful.  On March 14, 1977, the school board 
voted to nonrenew Speece's contract for the 1977-78 school year and notified him in 
writing the next day.  On April 11, 1977, Speece appeared before the school board 
with an attorney and requested that the board (1) reverse its decision to nonrenew his 
contract and give him thirty days to accept or reject a new contract and (2) pay him 
$294.00 for the coaching duties he had performed.  On April 18, 1977, Speece's 
lawyer sent a letter to the school board that restated his request.  That same day the 
board decided to agree to Speece's requests, to include payment of $294.00 if it was 
"legally permissible."  Speece claimed that he met with the superintendent within 
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thirty days and told him that he would teach for the district the following year.  If that 
conversation occurred, which was in dispute, it was not communicated to the school 
board.  On July 11, 1977, the board voted that Speece did not have a contract for the 
1977-78 school year because he failed to respond to the board's April 18 offer.  The 
board also voted not to pay the $294.00 on advice of its attorney.  Speece filed a 
notice of appeal with the school board on August 15, 1977, and his first petition in 
district court on August 23, 1977.  Speece file a claim for $294.00 for extra coaching 
duties and a breach of contact claim for lost salary for the 1977-78 school year.  
Speece's original court action was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.  Speece 
appealed this decision. 
The district court claimed a lack of jurisdiction based on its conclusion that 
Speece's only judicial remedy was by way of an appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101(d).  
This statute provides that a judgment or final order made by a governmental body 
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions may be reversed, vacated or modified 
by the district court on appeal.  The party must file a notice of appeal within thirty 
days of the entry of such judgment.  Both Speece's notice of appeal and first petition 
in the district court were filed more than thirty days after the board's decision.  The 
district court believed the school board's action was quasi-judicial, so the case was 
dismissed.  However, if the school board's action was actually executive or 
administrative in nature, the trial court would have been incorrect in the dismissal 
because the appeal would have been timely brought as an ordinary breach of contract 
action.  The appellate court sought to determine whether the school board's action had 
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been quasi-judicial or executive in nature.  To do so, the court had to consider 
Speece's status and rights at the time the board made its decisions.  First, the decision 
to nonrenew was made on March 14, 1977, and that decision was communicated to 
Speece the next day.  The decision to nonrenew met the deadline provided for by the 
continuing contract law in K.S.A. 72-5411.  Speece was not tenured and so was not 
entitled to a due process hearing.  At that point, he had no contract and no right to any 
contract.  On April 18, 1977, the board offered to rehire him and gave him thirty days 
to accept.  Whether Speece accepted the contract or not was an unresolved factual 
question.  Finally, on July 11, the board concluded that Speece had not accepted the 
offer of a contract.  There was no notice of a hearing, no grounds for nonrenewal 
specified, no evidence gathered, and no hearing was held.  As far as the board was 
concerned, none of that was required because it was not terminating a teacher's 
contract it was "simply reassuring itself that it had not hired one" (p. 1205).  The 
appellate court found that it could not put that type of determination in the category of 
quasi-judicial.  If the board was wrong and its offer had been accepted by Speece, 
then the decision would have amounted to a refusal to honor a contract.  Either way, 
according to the appellate court, the decision to breach (if that was what it was) was 
an executive, not quasi-judicial decision.  As far as the $294 claim for extra salary, 
the board's disallowance of that claim was "just like any public body's disallowance 
of a claim" (p. 1205).  If a governing body disallows a claim it does not mean they 
have acted in a quasi-judicial manner.  The appellate court held that the board had 
acted in an executive or administrative manner, rather than a quasi-judicial one.  The 
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decision of the district court was reversed and the case was remanded for 
determination of Speece's two breach of contract claims.    
 
Sells v. Unified School District No. 429, Doniphan County 
644 P.2d 379 (Kan. 1982) 
 
The five unified school districts in Doniphan County formed the Doniphan 
County Special Education Cooperative (Co-op) in 1975 to provide special education 
services.  U.S.D. 429 was the sponsoring district for the Co-op.  Each of the districts 
paid their share of the expenses for the program to U.S.D. 429, which administered it.  
While each district was represented on a board that provided advice to U.S.D. 429, 
U.S.D. 429 was the final authority for the Co-op and all of the decisions on the hiring 
and firing of teachers.  All of the teachers who taught in the Co-op had contracts with 
U.S.D. 429.  Margalee Sells was a tenured special education teacher who was 
employed by the Co-op.  Desiring an equal share in the responsibility for the 
administration of their special education programs, the unified school districts 
decided to form a separate entity to be known as the Doniphan County Education 
Cooperative (the interlocal).  The districts entered into a written agreement to 
terminate the Co-op as of June 30, 1979.  That agreement provided that U.S.D. 429 
was to give written notice of nonrenewal to all of the special education teachers who 
were then employed by U.S.D. 429.  The new interlocal would then hire most of 
those teachers.  All fifteen of the special education teachers employed by U.S.D. 429 
received notice by mail of the intent to nonrenew their contracts.  Two of those did 
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not plan to return to the district.  Twelve of the remaining thirteen teachers received 
with their nonrenewal notices a contract offering employment with the new interlocal.  
The thirteenth, Ms. Sells, only received a notice of nonrenewal.  She later received a 
second notice listing the reason for nonrenewal as being that U.S.D. 429 would no 
longer serve as the sponsoring district for the special education program.  Sells 
requested a due process hearing from U.S.D. 429.  The hearing was held and the 
committee recommended on a 2-1 vote that Sells' contract be renewed.  After 
considering the committees recommendation, the school board determined not to 
renew the contract.  Sells appealed to the district court.  The district court found that 
the decision made by U.S.D. 429 had not been arbitrary, capricious, or fraudulent.  
The court further held that the fact U.S.D. 429 would no longer offer special 
education but would gain services through the new interlocal amounted to "good 
cause" for not renewing the contract of a tenured teacher.  Sells appealed.  The 
Kansas Court of Appeals in Sells v. U.S.D. No. 429, 6 Kan.App.2d 968, 637 P.2d 422 
(1981) reversed the district court decision and remanded with directions.  The school 
district filed a petition that was granted by the Kansas Supreme Court.   
The issue on appeal was whether the notice give to Sells provided "good 
cause" for her termination.  The interlocal cooperation act, K.S.A. 12-2901 et seq., 
applies to all forms of local governmental units.  K.S.A. 12-2904(e) precludes "an 
existing local unit of government from entering into an interlocal cooperation 
agreement and in doing so avoid its legal responsibilities."  The court here questioned 
what legal obligations and responsibilities were imposed on U.S.D. 429 when the co-
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op was ended and the interlocal began.  The court did not believe that the statute 
required the school district to hire all fifteen special education teachers if the 
interlocal chose not to do so.  The legal responsibility of U.S.D. 429 in regards to the 
special education teachers was to either renew their contracts or give written notice 
that the contracts would not be renewed.  That written notice had to include the 
reasons for nonrenewal and notification of the teachers' right to a due process hearing.  
In the eyes of the court, those responsibilities had been met by U.S.D. 429.  The 
reason for Sells' nonrenewal was the discontinuation of special education programs 
under the sponsorship of U.S.D. 429.  The court determined that the school board 
showed "good cause" as it could find nothing in the evidence to suggest that the 
school board's decision was arbitrary or capricious.  The court further held that "the 
dissolution of the co-op and the formation of the new interlocal constituted good 
cause for the nonrenewal of the contracts of the tenured special education teachers" (p. 
381).  The opinion of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the judgment of the 
district court was affirmed.         
 
 
NEA-Valley Center v. Unified School District No. 262, Valley Center-
Sedgwick County 
644 P.2d 381 (Kan. 1982) 
 
During the 1980-81 school year, and for several previous years, U.S.D. 262 
served as the sponsoring district in an agreement pursuant to K.S.A. 72-968 to 
provide special education services to nine school districts in surrounding counties.  
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The school district employed 54 special education teachers to provide services to all 
nine districts, including its own.  During the 1980-81 school year, the districts 
decided to end this method of providing services and created an interlocal cooperative 
in its place.  The cooperative was made up of the same nine school districts.  All 
special education teachers, whether tenured or not, were sent notices of the intent to 
nonrenew their contracts for the 1981-82 school year.  A lawsuit was filed and the 
issue was brought before the district court.  The district court found in favor of the 
teachers.  It held in part that: (1) the joining of an interlocal and the discontinuation of 
its own special education program did not constitute a valid reason for the school 
district to nonrenew the teachers' contracts; and (2) the new interlocal cooperative 
was legally obligated to employ all special education teachers presently employed.  
The interlocal appealed from this decision. 
The main issue for the appellate court to determine was whether the school 
board had a legal right to nonrenew the 54 special education teachers.  This 
determination was controlled by the finding in Sells v. U.S.D. No. 429, 231 Kan. 247, 
644 P.2d 379 (1982).  Sells was a similar case except for the fact that only one teacher 
challenged the nonrenewal.  In Sells, the court held that "the termination of a special 
education cooperative and the transfer of the administrative duties of a sponsoring 
school district to an interlocal cooperative...whereby the sponsoring school district no 
longer provides special education services constitutes good cause..." to nonrenew 
teaching contracts of special education teachers.  As in Sells, there was no indication 
that the decision to nonrenew was arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant to building up an 
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efficient school system.  Based on the same rational used in Sells, the court here 
concluded that the school district had good cause to nonrenew the teaching contracts 
of its 54 special education teachers.  Next, the court addressed the district court's 
holding that the interlocal was legally obligated to employ all of the special education 
teachers who had previously been employed with them.  The Supreme Court found 
that the district court had erred in this decision because "it would be incongruous to 
conclude a school district may nonrenew a tenured teacher by reason of joining an 
interlocal cooperative and then hold that the interlocal cooperative is bound to take 
over the employment of that teacher in the name of preserving continuity" (p. 384).  
The decision in Sells held that the formation of an interlocal cooperative was 
sufficient reason to nonrenew a tenured teacher.  Once a teacher is nonrenewed, the 
employer-employee relationship is severed meaning that neither has further rights 
against or duties to the other.  In the absence of any statute requiring an interlocal 
cooperative to employ teachers whose contracts were nonrenewed by member 
districts as a result of its formation, the decision in Sells controls.  The judgment of 
the district court was reversed and remanded with directions to enter judgment in 
favor of the defendants.        
 
Arneson v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 236, Lebanon 
652 P.2d. 1157 (Kan. App. 1982) 
 
A teacher, Joe Arneson, brought mandamus action against the Board of 
Education, U.S.D. 236, seeking his reinstatement.  He had been employed as a 
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teacher in the district for eight years, resigned and taught in another district for one 
year, and then returned and was reemployed by U.S.D. 236.  The District voted to 
nonrenew his teaching contract after one year without giving any reasons for the 
termination.  Arneson filed a mandamus action claiming that the district failed to 
afford him his due process rights as a tenured teacher and asked for reinstatement.  
The District claimed that Arneson had lost his tenure rights when he left the district.  
The trial court found in favor of the District and stated that “if a teacher leaves, then 
he loses tenure, any interruption of the time, without a leave of absence, constitutes a 
waiver of tenure pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5445” (p. 1158).  Tenure, as defined by K.S.A. 
72-5445, applies to those teachers who have completed two consecutive years of 
employment in the school district*, except where the teacher alleges his termination 
or nonrenewal is the result of his exercising a constitutional right.  It further stated 
that a board may waive the two year requirement for any teacher employed by it, who 
had taught not less than two consecutive years in any school district in the state.  Both 
parties agreed that Mr. Arneson had earned tenure in his last period of employment 
with the district.  The issue on appeal was whether he was considered a tenured 
employee of the district when he received his letter of nonrenewal or whether his 
resignation had terminated that tenure. 
The Court of Appeals turned to state statute to make its determination in this 
case.  In looking at the terms of K.S.A. 72-5445, the court could find “nothing which 
could be said to prescribe the cessation of tenure upon resignation” (p. 1158).  The 
court went on to say  the fundamental rule in construing statute is that if intent can be 
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determined from the language itself, the court is not warranted in looking beyond the 
terms of the statute.  In this case, the statute only discussed when tenure was attained, 
not how or when it may be lost.  Therefore, while resignation of a teacher may end 
the contract with a school district, it does not appear to affect tenure with that district.  
The Court concluded that the trial court had been in error and that Mr. Arneson was 
entitled to due process rights as a tenured teacher.  Judgment was reversed and the 
case remanded to enter judgment for the plaintiff. 
Without contrary legislative language stating otherwise, a teacher’s 
resignation does not terminate his tenure.  Therefore, the teacher could not be 
terminated without due process afforded him under K.S.A. 72-5445. 
 
(*Note:  Applicable to the case above, as it is written today:  Statute 72-5445: Application of 
act; years of employment requirements, waiver; effect of nonrenewal or revocation of license.  (a) (1) 
Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), the provisions of K.S.A.72-5438 through 72-5443, and 
amendments thereto, apply only to: (A) Teachers who have completed not less than three consecutive 
years of employment, and been offered a fourth contract, in the school district, area vocational-
technical school or community college by which any such teacher is currently employed; and (B) 
teachers who have completed not less than two consecutive years of employment, and been offered a 
third contract, in the school district, area vocational-technical school or community college by which 
any such teacher is currently employed if at any time prior to the current employment the teacher has 
completed the years of employment requirement of subpart (A) in any school district, area vocational-
technical school or community college in this state.   (2) any board may waive, at any time, the years 
of employment requirements of provision (1) for any teachers employed by it.)   
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Schmidt v. Unified School District No. 497, Douglas County 
644 P.2d 396 (Kan. 1982) 
 
April Schmidt was employed by USD 497 on September 4, 1973, as a part-
time Title I teacher.  As her position was federally funded and the Board was unsure 
of whether the funding would continue, her position was nonrenewed in the spring of 
1974.  In July of 1974, Schmidt signed a new part-time contract under the same Title 
I program.  In December of 1974, Schmidt resigned her position.  On March 1, 1977, 
Schmidt signed a contract to teach part time under the same federally funded program 
for the rest of the 1976-77 school year.  That contract was nonrenewed in the spring.  
Schmidt was hired to teach summer school from June 6 to June 30, 1977.  In 
September, Schmidt interviewed for another Title I position and on September 22, 
1977, she signed a contract.  Notice of nonrenewal of this contract was given in the 
spring of 1978.  On June 6, 1978, Schmidt was hired by the Board as a regular 
classroom teacher.  On April 11, 1979, the Board gave Schmidt written notice of 
nonrenewal of her teaching contract.  Schmidt complained that this notice did not 
comply with due process protections.  The Board informed Schmidt that as she was 
not a tenured teacher, she was not entitled to those protections.  Schmidt filed for 
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the Board's nonrenewal of her 
teaching contract was deficient because it did not state the reasons for her termination 
and did not mention her right to a due process hearing.  The district court found in 
Schmidt's favor and the Board appealed. 
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Relevant statutes to this case were K.S.A. 72-5436 through 72-5445.  These 
statutes provided a definition for "teacher" and provided the due process protections 
for tenured teachers.  The Board argued that Schmidt was not a "teacher" within the 
definition of the statutes because she had been employed on a part-time basis.  In 
looking at the language of K.S.A. 72-5436, the court found "no attempt to limit the 
meaning of "teacher" to full-time employee" (p. 399).  Schmidt had been employed 
under written contracts and each year the Board gave her a notice of nonrenewal.  
Thus, in the eyes of the appellate court, she qualified as a "teacher" under the 
definition of the statute.  The next factor to consider was whether Schmidt met the 
definition of a tenured teacher.  K.S.A. 72-5445 provided that statutory due process 
protections applied only to "those teachers who have at any time completed two 
consecutive years of employment in the school district..."  The district court had 
found that since Schmidt was in the classroom teaching from March 1977 through 
May or June of 1979, she had achieved tenure.  The district court also determined that 
the summer session she taught in June of 1977 compensated for the late start in the 
fall of 1977.  The Board argued that a "year" within the context of the statute meant 
calendar year, so the two-year period should be calculated from the date a teacher is 
employed regardless of when that work begins.  The appellate court agreed with the 
Board.  In order to meet the consecutive years requirement, Schmidt would have had 
to be employed from March 1, 1977, to February 29, 1978, and from March 1, 1978, 
to February 28, 1979.  In actuality, Schmidt had been employed from March 1, 1977 
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to June 30, 1977, and from September 26, 1977, to June 30, 1979.  The gap from June 
to September of 1977 interrupted the successive nature of her employment.  Schmidt 
argued that the Board should not be allowed to deny tenure by delaying her 
assignment to a teaching position for a month.  While the court agreed that such abuse 
was possible, "it was not the case here" (p. 402).  The court believed that the "good 
faith uncertainty of federal funding" was the reason for the delay in Schmidt's 
employment in 1977.  Thus, the court held that a teacher's tenure "time clock" starts 
running the first day of employment during the regular school term, whether part-time 
or full-time, and continues running so long as the teacher is employed during the 
regular school term.  Summer employment was to be disregarded.  If there was a 
good faith gap in the employment, the time clock stopped.  As the court could find no 
evidence of bad faith on the part of the Board, it determined that Schmidt was a 
nontenured teacher and not entitled to due process under K.S.A. 72-5445.  The 
judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded with directions to enter 
judgment for the school district.   
 
Haddock v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 462, Cowley 
County 
661 P.2d 368 (Kan. 1983) 
 
Dwight Haddock was a tenured teacher who had been employed by U.S.D. 
462 as a teacher of vocational agriculture.  On April 11, 1979, Haddock was informed 
by letter that the Board intended to nonrenew his contract for the 1979-80 school year.  
The reasons given were: (1) failure to work with administration, (2) failure to 
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maintain classroom control, (3) failure to maintain adequate lesson plans, (4) failure 
to properly care for school livestock over the weekend, and (5) failure to care for the 
school equipment.  In August, the Board provided more specificity on what they 
meant by a "failure to work with administration."  They listed such things as, failing 
to leave adequate lesson plans for substitute teachers when Haddock was absent, 
allowing students to drive school vehicles after being ordered by his principal not to 
do so, and failing to follow directives to supervise students as they loaded the bus.  
Haddock requested a due process hearing.  The hearing committee voted two to one 
in recommendation of renewing Haddock's contract for the coming year.  The school 
board considered the hearing panel's decision and voted five to two to reject it.  
Haddock appealed to the district court which held that the Board's decision was "not 
supported by substantial evidence and the Board had denied the teacher's right to due 
process" (p. 370).  The Board appealed this decision.   
K.S.A. 72-5410 et seq., the Teacher Tenure Law, provides that a tenured 
teacher may only be terminated or nonrenewed if good cause is shown.  The burden 
of showing substantial evidence of good cause rests with the school board.  In Kelly v. 
Kansas City Kansas Community College, 231 Kan. 751, 648 P.2d 225 (1982), the 
court defined substantial evidence as that "which possesses relevance and substance 
and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issue can reasonably be 
resolved."  Id. at 755.  In its attempt to meet this burden, the Board provided as 
evidence testimony of the principal, Bob Wesbrooks; the superintendent, Dean 
McGrath; the custodian, Edwin Flower; and Myrl Dobbs, who taught in the shop next 
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to Haddock.  The court first addressed the accusation that Haddock had failed to 
follow the orders of his administrators by not having adequate lesson plans for 
substitute teachers.  Wesbrooks testified that Haddock's performance had deteriorated 
from above average in 1977 to needing improvement in 1979.  The Board offered 
three letters written to Haddock expressing concern about his lack of lesson plans.  
Haddock responded by stating that prior to 1979 he had either called in his lesson 
plans on the morning of his absence or left instructions written on his tablet without 
any objection from administrators.  Wesbrooks admitted that lesson plans were not 
essential for shop courses because the students often worked on their ongoing projects.  
Next, the court looked at the issue of classroom control.  The Board provided 
evidence of Haddock's failure to maintain classroom control by providing 
photographs of the shop area in disarray, statements from the custodian that shop 
tools were sometimes left outside the shop area, and testimony from Dobbs who 
claimed Haddock's students did not respect him because they would sometimes leave 
Haddock's classroom to visit his (Dobbs') students.  The Board offered administrative 
evaluations showing the rating in Haddock's ability to control his students had 
declined from above average in March 1978 to needs improvement in March 1979.  
Upon further questioning, Wesbrooks admitted he only had "indirect" knowledge that 
damage to the shop had been done by Haddock's students.  The shop was often used 
by the public and outside student groups.  There was no direct evidence proving 
Haddock's students had caused any damage or had failed to take care of school 
equipment.  In regards to the claim that Haddock had allowed his students to drive 
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school vehicles after being ordered not to allow them to do so, Haddock alleged that 
he had permitted his students to drive the tractor twice to clear a path through the 
snow in order to feed the livestock.  However, he stated that after he received a memo 
from Wesbrooks his students were not allowed to use the tractor again.  Another 
teacher testified that he had witnessed students of other teachers drive the tractor on 
numerous occasions after Wesbrooks' memo to Haddock.  The other accusations by 
the Board were questionable in that there was little to no evidence that Haddock was 
at fault.  In reviewing previous evaluations, the court noted that there had been 
"considerable evidence" that Haddock had been willing to work with his 
administrators.  All evaluations contained positive comments regarding Haddock's 
enthusiasm and co-operation until March 1979 when negative comments appeared.  It 
was discovered that Haddock had been the chief negotiator for the teachers' 
Association during negotiations in 1977-78 while McGrath was the chief negotiator 
for the Board.  When asked about this fact in court, McGrath stated that it was "one of 
his [Haddock's] problems" (p. 375).  The court believed this to be the reason for the 
sudden change in the ratings on Haddock's evaluation.  In light of all the Board had 
presented, and after listening to testimony from both sides, the court determined that 
the Board's complaints were not supported by substantial evidence.  The court also 
found that the Board had violated Haddock's right to due process in two ways.  First, 
three of the five board members who voted to nonrenew Haddock's contract had 
conducted their own independent investigations by interviewing witnesses and 
sampling public opinion.  This was a violation of due process in that Haddock had no 
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opportunity to hear the evidence gathered against him during the independent 
investigations, which was "fundamentally unfair" (p. 376).  They also violated 
Haddock's right to due process when, in the final decision to terminate Haddock's 
contract, the Board presented reasons for their decision that were different from those 
they had initially presented.  This gave Haddock no time to prepare a defense, as he 
had received no notice of the items.  The court determined that Haddock had been 
improperly nonrenewed.  The judgment of the district court was affirmed and the case 
remanded for determination of the amount of salary owed to Haddock. 
 
Coats v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 353, Sumner County  
662 P.2d 1279 (Kan. 1983) 
 
Leota Coats was a tenured high school English teacher who taught at 
Wellington Senior High School in USD No. 353.  The high school enrollment 
declined during the time Ms. Coats taught there.  As a result of this decline, the 
decision was made to reduce force in the language arts department at the high school.  
The administration removed from consideration for nonrenewal those teachers who 
taught specialized language arts courses, which left four English teachers.  Leota 
Coats had the least seniority of these four.  Junior High School English teachers were 
not considered for nonrenewal because the school board considered the high school 
teachers to be “unqualified” to teach in junior high.  So, although there were three 
nontenured teachers at the junior high level, they were not considered for nonrenewal.  
In March, the board adopted a resolution that indicated its intent to nonrenew Ms. 
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Coats due to a decline in enrollment.  As she was entitled to the protection of the 
Teacher Tenure Law, K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq., Ms. Coats requested a due process 
hearing pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5438.  The three person hearing committee was formed 
with the school district choosing its attorney as its designee.  The committee 
recommended by a two-to-one vote that Ms. Coat's contract be nonrenewed.  The 
Board followed this recommendation.  Ms. Coats appealed to the district court which 
found in her favor and reversed the school board decision.  The district court held 
that: (1) the appointment of the school board’s own attorney to the hearing committee 
violated Ms. Coats’ right to due process, and (2) the school board had acted 
“fraudulently, arbitrarily, and capriciously” when they nonrenewed Ms. Coats yet 
retained nontenured language arts teachers.  The school board appealed. 
Under the Teacher Tenure Law, K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq., a tenured teacher may 
be terminated or nonrenewed only if good cause is shown.  There must be evidence to 
support the good cause claim and the burden of proof is on the board.  In this case, a 
reduction in force could be used as a good cause claim.  However, Ms. Coats argued 
that the method of the reduction in force was arbitrary and capricious.  She was 
certified to teach composition, grammar, and literature at both the senior and junior 
high school levels, as well as social studies at the junior high level.  She argued that 
the school board’s nonrenewal of tenured teacher legally certified to teach junior high 
English while keeping nontenured junior high English teachers was not consistent 
with the purposes of the Teacher Tenure Law.  The court here found that a mere good 
faith requirement had the potential of “emasculating the Teacher Tenure Act" (p. 
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1284).  In this case, the school board’s action might be upheld if good faith was the 
only requirement.  There was a decline in enrollment, no evidence that the school 
board was out to get Ms. Coats, and the school board had considered other 
alternatives to the reduction in staff.  However, the court found that “when 
probationary teachers are retained while a tenured teacher certified to teach the same 
subjects is terminated, much of the theoretical protection of the Teacher Tenure Act is 
lost” (p. 1284).  The school board of USD 353 determined that high school teachers 
were not qualified to teach at the junior high level.  That determination was not 
recognized in school board policy, teacher certification, or the law.  There were 
several nontenured teachers who taught subjects in which Ms. Coats was certified to 
teach and yet they were rehired while Ms. Coats was nonrenewed.  The court found 
that the board had acted improperly in this manner and held that “unless good cause is 
otherwise shown, a tenured teacher may not be nonrenewed due to reduction in force 
until all nontenured teachers teaching subjects which the tenured teacher is qualified 
to teach are first terminated” (p. 1285).  Next, the court turned to the issue of whether 
Ms. Coats’ due process rights were violated when the school board appointed its own 
attorney to the hearing committee.  K.S.A. 72-5438 governs the selection of a hearing 
committee.  Each side is to designate one person to sit on the panel and then those 
two people designate a third person who serves as chairperson of the panel.  If the 
two people cannot agree on a third person, a district judge from the school districts 
county appoints a chairperson.  The procedural requirements for this hearing, found in 
K.S.A. 72-5439, state in part that the hearing shall afford procedural due process to 
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include “the right of the teacher to a fair and impartial decision based on substantial 
evidence.”  The statute does not place limitations on whom the parties may appoint to 
serve on the hearing committee, but it does require that the method of decision must 
not “offend the concept of fundamental fairness.”  The court held that in this case, the 
school board’s appointment of its own attorney to the committee violated this 
fundamental fairness rule.  The attorney would have a conflict of interest as he 
prepared the documents and gave counsel to the school board when it was making its 
decision to nonrenew Ms. Coats.  This was a violation of Ms. Coats’ right to due 
process.  The judgment of the trial court was affirmed and the case was remanded 
with an order to reinstate Leota Coats and to determine back pay owed to her. 
In cases involving a reduction in force, school districts must show good cause 
for the nonrenewal of a tenured teacher, which includes ensuring that nontenured 
teachers teaching subjects in which the tenured teacher is certified have first been 
nonrenewed. 
 
Unified School District No. 251 v. Secretary of Kansas Department of Human 
Resources 
661 P.2d 1248 (Kan. 1983) 
 
The North Lyon County Teachers' Association (NLCTA) filed a prohibited 
practices complaint with the Kansas Department of Human Resources (KDHR) that 
alleged the nonrenewal of two of its members, teachers William Tolliver and Holly 
Myers, was based on their activities on behalf of the Association.  NLCTA requested 
the secretary of KDHR to order the school district to reinstate the teachers and to 
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cease and desist from its prohibited practices.  The school district filed a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that the complaint did not allege a prohibited practice and that 
the KDHR was without authority to grant the relief requested by NLCTA.  A labor 
conciliator with the KDHR determined that:  (1) the Secretary of Human Resources 
was granted the authority to rule on any controversy regarding a prohibited practice, 
(2) a non-renewal based on an employee's exercise of his right to participate in an 
employee organization did qualify as a prohibited practice, (3) the Secretary was 
empowered with the authority to grant or deny the relief sought by NLCTA, and (4) 
the complaint filed by NLCTA was within the jurisdiction and was properly before 
the Secretary of Human Resources for resolution.  Subsequent to receiving the 
conciliator's letter, the school district filed action in the district court as an appeal 
pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5430a(b).  The NLCTA filed a motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the labor conciliator's ruling was not a final order and the school district 
had not exhausted its administrative remedies.  The district court overruled the 
motion to dismiss and found in favor of the school district.  The NLCTA and the 
secretary of the KDHR appealed this ruling.   
The appellate court's first task was to determine if the district court had 
jurisdiction.  K.S.A. 72-5430a(b) provides in part that the "secretary shall make 
findings of fact upon all the testimony…and shall enter a final order granting in 
whole or in part the relief sought.  Any person aggrieved by the final order of the 
secretary may obtain a review of such order in the district court…"  If the KDHR 
rulings were final orders and the school district had exhausted its administrative 
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remedies, then the rulings were appealable to the district court.  If they were not final 
orders, then they would not be appealable.  In reviewing the order from the labor 
conciliator, the appellate court determined that it was not a final order as it did not 
dispose of the merits of the complaint and was entered before any hearing or 
testimony.  The action in district court was premature because it was not an appeal 
from a final order of the KDHR.  Therefore, the school district had not exhausted all 
of its administrative remedies.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and 
remanded with directions to sustain the NLCTA's motion to dismiss. 
 
Atkinson v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 383 
684 P.2d 424 (Kan. App. 1984) 
 
In April of 1982 public school teacher, Waunetta Atkinson, was notified by 
the school board that after 12 years of service her contract would not be renewed.  
She requested a due process hearing which was held in July of 1982.  The hearing 
committee supported the Board’s decision and recommended her contract not be 
renewed.  On September 1, the Board, in an open meeting that Ms. Atkinson did not 
attend, voted to adopt the hearing committee’s recommendation to nonrenew her 
contract.  The Board mailed a letter to Ms. Atkinson on September 3 stating its 
decision to nonrenew.  On October 5, Ms. Atkinson filed her notice of appeal with the 
district court.  The Board received this notice by mail on October 6.  The district court 
sustained the Board’s motion to dismiss Ms. Atkinson’s appeal on the basis that her 
appeal had not been filed in a timely manner.  Atkinson appealed to the Court of 
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Appeals, 9 Kan. App.2d, 175, which reversed the district court’s decision stating that 
the teacher’s appeal had been timely filed.  The Board petitioned the Supreme Court 
for Review, which was accepted.  
K.S.A. 72-5443 provides that a teacher is entitled to appeal a school board’s 
decision to terminate her contract.  In part, it states, “…the hearing committee shall 
render a written recommendation not later than thirty (30) days after the close of the 
hearing, setting forth its findings of fact and recommendation as to the determination 
of the issues.  The recommendation of the hearing committee shall be submitted to 
the teacher and the board which shall…decide whether the teacher’s contract shall be 
renewed or terminated.  The decision of the board shall be submitted to the teacher 
not later than thirty (30) days after the close of oral argument or submission of written 
briefs.”  The board met its obligation in the prescribed time.  At issue was whether 
Ms. Atkinson’s filing of appeal was timely under K.S.A. 60-2101(d), which states in 
part: “…it shall be sufficient for an aggrieved party to file notice that such party is 
appealing from such judgment…within thirty (30) days of its entry…”  The court 
concluded that when the Board of Education mailed its decision by letter, the act of 
depositing the letter constituted the submission of the Board’s decision not to renew 
the teacher’s contract.  Time for appeal began to run when the decision was mailed to 
the teacher, which the court determined to be September 3.  Ms. Atkinson’s appeal 
was not filed until October 5, which was 32 days after the board submitted its 
decision.  She argued that when the Board chose to submit its decision by mail, she 
was entitled to three additional days in which to appeal.  Her claim was based on 
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K.S.A. 60-206(e), which states in part: “Whenever a party has the right or is required 
to do so act…within a prescribed period after the service of a notice…and the notice 
is served upon her by mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed period.”  
The Board contended that subsection (e) should not be applied because service of a 
notice is not required as a condition for an appeal.  The court reasoned that K.S.A. 72-
5443 required the board submit its decision to the teacher, and whether the word 
submitted rather than served was used in K.S.A. 72-5443 did not matter.  It was the 
submission of the decision that required the teacher to file her notice of appeal within 
a 30-day period or forfeit the right.  K.S.A. 60-206 (e) was brought into play when the 
Board submitted its decision by mail, thus increasing the filing period by three days.  
As Ms. Atkinson’s appeal was received by the court in 32 days, she had invoked the 
jurisdiction of the district court to hear her case in a timely manner.  The Court of 
Appeals decision was affirmed and the judgment of the district court was reversed 
and remanded to the district court for trial on its merits. 
When notice of a school board’s decision is submitted by mail, and it is the 
submission of the decision that begins the time to ask for an appeal, the three-day 
extension applies. 
 
Martin v. Unified School District No 434, Osage County, Kansas 
728 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1984)  
 
On April 14, 1980, the board of education voted unanimously to nonrenew 
A.V. Martin's contract.  Martin had served as the principal of an elementary school 
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for eleven years pursuant to a series of one-year contracts.  The school board refused 
to provide Martin with a written reason or a hearing on its decision.* On June 15, 
1980, Martin and his attorney met with the superintendent of schools to discuss the 
reasons.  Martin filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in which he alleged that his 
property and liberty rights were impaired by the school board without due process.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that 
Martin had no constitutionally protected property interest in his job and that the 
nonrenewal of his contract did not damage his liberty interest.  Martin appealed. 
In 1974, the Kansas legislature passed the Teacher Due Process Act, K.S.A. 
72-5436 et seq. which granted teachers tenure and the right to due process before 
termination.  School principals were not included in this legislature.  As an 
administrator, Martin had no formal tenure.  Martin argued that he had an expectation 
of continued employment because of an "implied promise" the he would not be fired 
unless there was good cause and he had an opportunity to correct any deficiencies.  
The court noted that a constitutionally protected property interest could arise through 
a mutual understanding between parties, but a "unilateral expectation is not 
sufficient" (p. 455).  Martin's claim of expectancy was based on the fact that he had 
been renewed eleven times previously.  However, he could not show that there was 
any sort of mutual understanding that would give rise to a protected property interest.  
Martin was notified before April 15, as was required by the Kansas Continuing 
Contract Law, and he had been evaluated once that year, as required by the Kansas 
Evaluation of Certificated Personnel Law.  The school district had not violated any of 
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the Kansas statutes that Martin based his claim upon.  The court held that Martin had 
no constitutionally protected property right that would have entitled him to a hearing 
before he was nonrenewed.  Next, the court addressed Martin's claim that the board 
president had violated his liberty interests.  Martin based his claim on one statement 
that appeared in the local newspaper in which the board president was quoted as 
saying that Martin's nonrenewal was "based on occurrences this year and continuance 
of previous concerns" (p. 455).  The liberty interest that is protected by the 
Constitution is an individual's good name and reputation.  A liberty interest "is 
implicated only when his ability to obtain other employment is damaged" (p. 456).  A 
statement would have to be such that it harmed the "honor and integrity of the person 
discharged."  Martin could not prove that the single statement made in the paper had 
done any more harm to his good name than had the dismissal itself.  The court found 
that Martin's liberty interests had not been impaired.  The decision of the trial court 
was affirmed. 
(*Note:  Applicable to the case above, as it is written today:  K.S.A. 72-5452 states that (a) Written 
notice of a board's intention to not renew the contract of employment of an administrator shall be given 
to the administrator on or before May 1 of the year in which the term of the administrator's contract 
expires.  K.S.A. 72-5453 states that (a) Whenever an administrator is given written notice of a board's 
intention to not renew the administrator's contract, the administrator may request a meeting with the 
board by filing a written request therefore with the clerk of the board within 10 days from the date of 
receipt of the written statement of nonrenewal of a contract.  (b) The board shall hold such meeting 
within 10 days after the filing of the administrator's request. The meeting provided for under this 
section shall be held in executive session and, at such meeting, the board shall specify the reason or 
reasons for the board's intention to not renew the administrator's contract.  The administrator shall be 
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afforded an opportunity to respond to the board.  Neither party shall have the right to have counsel 
present.  Within 10 days after the meeting, the board shall reconsider its reason or reasons for 
nonrenewal and shall make a final decision as to the matter.) 
 
Swager v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 412, Sheridan 
County 
688 P.2d 270 (Kan. App. 1984) 
 
Harvey Swager had been employed as a teacher with U.S.D. 412 for four 
years.  During the 1982-83 school year, Swager taught math and coached basketball 
and football.  At the end of the school year, Swager was informed that he would not 
be retained as head basketball coach and if he did not resign from that position, he 
would be removed from it.  On March 30, 1983, Swager wrote a letter to the board of 
education resigning his position as head basketball coach.  On April 8, 1983, the 
board president responded with a letter stating that the Board had accepted Swager's 
resignation of his employment contract for the 1983-84 school year.  In the letter, the 
Board stated that Swager's coaching duties were an "integral and substantial part" of 
his employment contract.  Swager wrote a subsequent letter contesting the Board's 
interpretation of his resignation and formally requesting a hearing on his nonrenewal.  
On May 2, 1983, the board president responded in a letter stating that Swager had not 
been nonrenewed by the Board.  Rather, Swager, by his own general resignation letter, 
had nonrenewed the contract.  Swager filed suit in district court.  The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the Board, finding that Swager had been employed by 
a single primary contract, which he tried to divide into a primary and supplemental 
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contract.  The trial court held that all of Swager's teaching and coaching duties were 
parts of a single, indivisible primary contract of employment and when he resigned 
his coaching duties, he severed the entire contract.  The court concluded by finding 
that Swager was not entitled to any of the due process provisions in K.S.A. 72-5438 
because he had nonrenewed his own contract.  Swager appealed this decision. 
K.S.A. 72-5413(o) defines supplemental contracts as meaning "contracts for 
employment duties other than those services covered in the primary contract," 
including services such as coaching.  K.S.A. 72-5412(a) provides the same definition 
and adds the provisions of state statutes that "relate to the continuation of teacher 
contracts and to due process upon termination or nonrenewal of a teacher's contract, 
do not apply to any supplemental contract of employment."  The question before the 
court was whether Swager's contract was several contracts: a primary contract to 
teach math and two secondary contracts to coach basketball and football; or whether 
his contract was a single contract to fill one position that required the performance of 
different duties.  The court reviewed the language of the contract and found that the 
provisions of K.S.A. 72-5412(a) required that Swager's primary contract was as a 
math teacher and his coaching duties were supplemental.  The language in the statute 
was a "clear expression of a legislative intent to prohibit school districts from making 
supplemental duties, such as coaching, part of a teacher's primary contract" (p. 276).  
The school district could not change supplemental contracts into primary ones by 
combining the contracts into one written document.  The court further concluded that 
it would reach the same result even if it applied the traditional rules of contract 
 
260 
 
construction.  In terms of contract construction, the court found the actual written 
instrument to be "ambiguous."  It could be construed as a single, primary contract, 
which consisted of several duties, or as a primary contract with supplemental duties.  
However, when looking at past practice, the court found that the school district had 
removed coaches from their positions without any due process.  By doing this, the 
school district demonstrated that it believed coaching duties to be outside the scope of 
the Kansas statutes dealing with nonrenewal and due process rights for teachers.  In 
other words, the district had in the past treated coaching duties as separate, 
supplemental contracts.  The fact that there was only one written contract of 
employment did not dissuade the court from this conclusion.  In the language of the 
employment contract, Swager's duties as a high school math teacher were labeled as 
his "tentative major assignment" and his coaching duties were described as 
"additional duties."  The court found these to be comparable to "primary contract" 
and "supplemental contract."  The court rejected the school district's claim that 
Swager's letter of March 30, 1983, was a resignation from all of his duties.  In the 
mind of the court, Swager had clearly stated his intent to resign only from his position 
as a basketball coach.  Swager was within his right to nonrenew his supplemental 
contract as a basketball coach and this nonrenewal had no effect on his primary 
contract as a math teacher.  The court determined that the school district's letters from 
April and May of 1983 were notices of nonrenewal of Swager's primary contract.  As 
such, they failed to meet the requirements of K.S.A. 72-5438.  The district had also 
been remiss in not allowing Swager a hearing on his nonrenewal.  The appellate court 
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concluded that Swager was entitled to reinstatement to his former position as a high 
school math teacher, as well as salary owed to him for the 1983-84 school year.  The 
judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded. 
 
Unified School District No. 503 v. McKinney 
689 P.2d 860 (Kan. 1984) 
 
On May 23, 1980, Don McKinney, Marilyn Taylor (a teacher employed by 
the district and wife of McKinney), and Steve Stocker went to the board offices of 
U.S.D. 503 to file a grievance.  On June 8, 1980, Stocker distributed a news release to 
the local media that stated there would be a press conference held at the district office 
before the next school board meeting to discuss the "turmoil" in the school district 
that included a state investigation and other problems in the schools.  The news 
release also stated that the superintendent of schools, Salvatore Alioto, and 
elementary school principal, Calvin Dill, would be present on the site.  Alioto did not 
know about the press conference until the news director of a local radio station 
questioned him about it.  Dill found out about it when he heard a news broadcast on 
the radio station the morning of June 9, 1980.  The board meeting was to be held on 
June 9 at 7:00 p.m.  That afternoon, the school district filed a petition seeking an 
order restraining McKinney, Taylor, and Stocker from coming on the premises of the 
superintendent's office, from making derogatory comments, from holding an 
unplanned press conference, and from any acts of harassment toward Alioto and Dill.  
The restraining order was issued by the judge at 4:00 p.m., on June 9, 1980.  
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McKinney, Taylor and Stocker met with the news media at 6:45 p.m. in the parking 
lot of the district office.  The restraining order had been served on them prior to that 
meeting, so they did not discuss their concerns about the district with the media.  On 
June 12, 1980, the district court held a hearing on the school district's motion for a 
temporary injunction.  The court ordered a temporary injunction against the 
defendants and required the school district post a $1,000 bond.  The injunction stated 
that the defendants were "enjoined from holding a press conference or any other 
public meeting" on any school district property, and from "disrupting or interfering 
with any meeting" of the Board of Education or "any activities of the school 
administrators" (p. 864).  The defendants did not appeal this temporary injunction.  
On November 16, 1983, the district court held a hearing on the defendants' motion to 
reconsider and set aside the temporary injunction.  The court ordered the temporary 
injunction become permanent.  On November 23, 1983, McKinney and Taylor filed 
their notice of appeal.   
In order to be granted injunctive relief, the petitioner must show that some act 
has been done, or has been threatened, that would produce irreparable injury.  K.S.A. 
60-903 provides for the issuance of a restraining order to prevent action pending a 
hearing on the request for a temporary injunction.  Restraining orders are matters of 
discretion for courts and are ordinarily done ex parte or without notice to the party 
affected.  Restraining orders that restrict free speech are valid only where necessary 
to" protect compelling public interests."  In this case, the defendants claim the 
restraining order and temporary injunction violated their constitutional right of free 
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speech.  They also claimed the restraining order violated provisions of K.S.A. 60-906 
because it did not set forth the reasons for its issuance.  The appellate court cited 
previous decisions dealing with ex parte restraining orders and found that the 
Supreme Court and various circuit courts have required that notice be given to those 
affected by a restraining order that denies them of a First Amendment right.  Only in 
"extreme circumstances or emergency can such orders be entered ex parte" (p. 865).  
In the case at hand, there was no evidence of an emergency or extreme circumstance 
that would have been prevented the school district from notifying the defendants of 
the restraining order against them.  Certain principles guide the allowable restraint for 
governmental regulation of speech and there are limited categories of written or 
spoken words that are not protected by the First Amendment.  Fighting words, 
obscenity, libel, and incitement are such examples.  Courts have emphasized that the 
First Amendment provides for the freedom to discuss matters of public concern 
without restraint by the courts, so long as they are discussed truthfully.  In order for 
courts to restrict free speech, the government must show a compelling state interest.  
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), 
dealt with a public school teacher who wrote a letter to the local newspaper criticizing 
the actions of the superintendent and school board and how they handled proposals to 
raise school taxes.  The court in Pickering held that public school teachers did not 
relinquish their rights of free speech to comment on matters of public interest, even if 
those statements were directed at their supervisors.  Without proof of false statements, 
a teacher's right to speak on issues of public importance could not be abridged.  The 
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appellate court found that the defendants had the right to comment on matters 
concerning the school district, whether at a public meeting or at a school board 
meeting.  The injunction restrained them from this right.  The injunction also 
prevented the defendants from interfering with the administrators' work activities, yet 
there was no proof that they ever attempted or intended to do any such thing.  In order 
to issue an injunction to restrain certain conduct, there must be some indication of a 
threatened injury.  That was absent in this case.  Only in instances where the 
expression of free speech threatens a significant state interest is the state allowed to 
restrict a person's exercise of a right guaranteed them by the U.S. Constitution.  The 
district court had issued a restraining order and injunction preventing the defendants 
from holding public meetings or speaking at school board meetings.  The appellate 
court considered this type of injunction to be an unconstitutional prior restraint as it 
violated the defendants' constitutional right to freedom of speech.  Accordingly, the 
injunction issued by the district court was dissolved and the case was remanded to 
determine the amount of damages suffered by the defendants.        
 
Hein v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 238, Smith County 
698 P.2d 388 (Kan. App. 1985) 
 
Jerome Hein was a tenured teacher whose contract was nonrenewed.  Hein 
was notified of his nonrenewal by a notice sent to him by the superintendent that 
stated that the board had voted 7-0 in favor of his nonrenewal due to staff reduction 
and the creation of a new position.  Hein requested and was granted a due process 
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hearing.  Hein did not contend that the decision was arbitrary or capricious, rather he 
argued that the notice he received on April 12, 1983, was "deficient" which he 
believed meant his contract should have been continued as prescribed by K.S.A. 1984 
Supp. 72-5437.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hein and 
ordered his reinstatement.  The school board appealed this decision.    
The specific procedures for nonrenewal of a tenured teacher's contract are 
found in K.S.A. 72-5437.  It states in part that the teacher must be given written 
notice of the proposed termination that should include the reasons for nonrenewal, 
and a statement explaining the teacher's due process rights along with the timeline 
associated with this process.  The statue also mandates that a tenured teacher's 
contract "shall continue unless notice is served as provided."  The letter that the 
superintendent sent to Hein did not state specifically that he was being nonrenewed 
nor did it inform him of his statutory right to a due process hearing.  In spite of the 
deficient notice, Hein requested a hearing in writing, filed the request with the Clerk 
of the Board, notified the board that he had selected counsel, and designated a hearing 
committee member.  Hein acknowledged that he had received a fair hearing in which 
he was able to present his side of the controversy.  As a result of this, the court found 
that Hein received all of the rights he would have been entitled to if he had received 
proper notice.  The court could find "no harm" caused by the deficient notice.  The 
court also held that "even if the notice was defective, his request for a hearing before 
the school board and his participation therein constituted a waiver of any deficiencies 
present in the notice" (p. 391).  The decision of the district court was reversed. 
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Neunzig v. Seaman Unified School District No. 345 
722 P.2d 569 (Kan. 1986) 
 
On October 15, 1979, Kurt Neunzig was notified of the proposed termination 
of his contract as a teacher with U.S.D. 345.  His termination was due to four 
unexcused absences in a row that occurred while he attended a religious event.  
Neunzig received a hearing before the Board of Education on October 22, 1979.  On 
October 30, Neunzig was notified by the Board of his termination.  Neunzig 
requested and was granted a due process hearing.  At the hearing, Neunzig argued 
that the termination of his contract was based on the performance of his constitutional 
right of free exercise of religion.  On March 14, 1979, the hearing committee made its 
recommendation to the Board that Neunzig's termination should be final based upon a 
breach of his employment contract.  The Board approved this recommendation and 
terminated Neunzig's employment.  Rather than appealing this decision to the district 
court pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5443, Neunzig filed a complaint on April 3, 1980, with 
the Kansas Commission on Civil Rights (KCCR) under the Kansas Act Against 
Discrimination (KAAD) in which he claimed that his termination was discriminatory 
and a violation of his constitutional right to a free exercise of religion.  A public 
hearing was held on November 16, 1983, and the hearing examiner for the KCCR 
ordered that Neunzig be reinstated and compensated for the loss of income.  This 
decision was approved by the KCCR chairperson on May 3, 1984.  U.S.D. 345 
appealed that decision to the district court and claimed that the KCCR lacked 
jurisdiction to hear Neunzig's complaint.  The district court found in favor of the 
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school district.  It ruled that Neunzig could have initially filed his complaint with the 
KCCR, rather than requesting a due process hearing.  After he chose to have the due 
process hearing, Neunzig should have appealed to the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 
72-5443.  Neunzig and the KCCR appealed this decision.   
The due process procedure for terminating a teacher's contract is found in 
K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.  It provides for a full due process hearing if requested by the 
teacher.  At the due process hearing, all parties may be represented by counsel, may 
cross-examine each other, may present witnesses, and may testify on their own behalf.  
The hearing committee may administer oaths, issue subpoenas, receive evidence, 
regulate the course of the hearing and take other actions necessary to make the 
hearing accord with procedural due process.  Once the hearing committee makes its 
recommendation to the Board, the Board issues its decision.  The decision of the 
Board is final, subject to appeal to the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101 and 
K.S.A. 72-5443.  Under the KAAD, the KCCR is empowered to receive and 
investigate complaints alleging discrimination in employment because of things such 
as religion.  The KCCR can hold a public hearing if necessary at which notice, 
representation, introduction of evidence, cross-examination, etc..., will take place.  
Once the KCCR has made its determination, a dissatisfied party may file for a 
rehearing, and if denied may take their appeal to the district court.  The question for 
the appellate court to decide was whether Neunzig was prevented from filing a 
complaint with the KCCR on the same allegations that had been litigated before a 
hearing committee.  Neunzig first litigated his claim of discrimination in front of a 
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hearing committee.  After receiving the results of that hearing, he filed a second 
complaint with another administrative body in which he alleged the same matter 
previously heard by the hearing committee.  Essentially, he "moved laterally" - from 
one administrative body to another without exhausting his remedy under K.S.A. 72-
5443 by appealing to the district court.  The doctrine of res judicata prevents such a 
lateral move as the court next explained.  In citing United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 
384 U.S. 394, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966), the court found that" res 
judicata should cut off a second administrative proceeding when the first proceeding 
has provided opportunity for something like the procedural protection that a court 
provides."  Id. at 422.  Both the hearing committee and the KCCR are quasi-judicial 
in nature and perform functions similar to those associated with a court proceeding.  
Res judicata prevents the relitigation of claims previously heard and contains four 
elements:  (1) the same claim; (2) the same parties; (3) the existence of claims that 
were or could have been raised; and (4) a final judgment on the merits.  In this case, 
all four elements of res judicata were satisfied.  For these reasons, the appellate court 
held that Neunzig was prevented under res judicata from instituting a second 
administrative claim before the KCCR on issues that were or should have been 
previously raised in front of the hearing committee.  The judgment of the district 
court was affirmed.     
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Burk v. Unified School District No. 329, Wabaunsee County, Kansas 
646 F. Supp. 1557 (D. Kan. 1986) 
 
Ron Burk brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against 
USD 329, the Superintendent, and the Board claiming they had violated his civil 
rights when they nonrenewed his contract as the high school principal.  In connection 
with the nonrenewal, Burk claimed he had been denied a hearing to “clear his good 
name and reputation” (p. 1560).  Burk was employed as the principal of Wabaunsee 
High School in 1982-83.  His contract was renewed in the spring of 1983 for another 
year.  In January 1984, he was evaluated and rated “inadequate” on the “Public 
Relations” objective.  On the evaluation form, the Superintendent recommended that 
the Board nonrenew Burk’s contract.  The Board met in executive session on 
February 13, 1984 and reached consensus to nonrenew the principal’s contract.  
During that session, a letter from a student was read in which the student complained 
that Burk had made inappropriate sexual comments to her at school.  Legal counsel 
for the district was informed of the student letter on February 14, 1984.  As the letter 
had nothing to do with the nonrenewal of the principal’s contract, counsel advised the 
Board “not to discuss the letter and to do nothing further with it” (p. 1560).  Burk was 
informed of his nonrenewal on February 14, 1984 but was not told about the student 
complaint.  Later, rumors began in the community about a student letter that charged 
Burk with sexual misconduct.  Rumors also surfaced that Burk’s misconduct was the 
reason for his nonrenewal.  On March 5, 1984, the Board met with Burk in executive 
session and informed him that he had been nonrenewed for his failure to develop a 
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positive rapport with his faculty.  When Burk asked about the letter, the Board 
refused to discuss it with him and also refused his request for a hearing to clear his 
name.  The case was tried before a jury on October 14, 1984 through October 28, 
1984.  At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendants moved for a directed 
verdict on Burk’s claims that he was deprived of his liberty and property interests 
without due process of law, and for all of the claims against the individual defendants.   
The court first turned toward the plaintiff’s claim that although he was a 
nontenured administrator, he had a property interest in continued employment with 
the district.  Plaintiff claimed that the Board’s evaluation policy in conjunction with 
the Kansas Evaluation Act and other documents created an implied contract of 
employment.  The Board’s policy required that an employee (regardless of tenure) be 
given notice of any performance deficiencies and then be given the opportunity to 
improve.  The court stated that the “sufficiency of entitlement must be decided by 
reference to state law” (p. 1561).  In the court’s opinion, the plaintiff’s position that 
he had a property interest based on the Evaluation Act and the school board’s policy 
was contrary to the intent of the Teachers’ Due Process Act and the Administrators’ 
Act.  The Administrators’ Act, K.S.A. 72-5451 et seq., only applies to administrators 
who have completed two consecutive years of employment with the same school 
district.  The Act requires that a tenured administrator receive timely notice of their 
nonrenewal and be provided with the opportunity to meet with the school board to 
hear their rationale and given the chance to respond.  A nontenured administrator 
receives none of the protections of the Administrators’ Act, other than an entitlement 
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to timely notice, and may be nonrenewed for any reason.  Although the purpose of the 
Evaluation Act is to provide a method of improvement for school personnel, there is 
no requirement that an employee must be given an opportunity to improve before 
they are given notice of nonrenewal.  The Board’s evaluation policy did require that 
an employee be given a chance to improve once they are notified of concerns in their 
performance.  However, this requirement is in opposition to the Due Process and 
Administrators’ Acts which provide nontenured employees no expectation of 
continued employment.  The court stated that “any attempt by a district or board to 
enter into a contract or formulate a policy that violates state law is ultra vires and 
void” (p. 1564).  Thus, the court held that Burk had no contractual right to continued 
employment and the defendants’ motion for directed verdict on his claim that he was 
deprived of a property interest was granted.   
The court next turned towards the claim that the defendants had deprived the 
plaintiff of his liberty interests in two ways.  First, the plaintiff claimed that the 
statements made in his evaluation regarding his reasons for nonrenewal had damaged 
his reputation and foreclosed future employment.  Second, the plaintiff claimed that a 
defamatory impression was created by the defendants with regard to the student 
complaint that had “stigmatized his good name and foreclosed future employment” (p. 
1565).  If an employee’s dismissal comes with charges that stigmatize the employee’s 
reputation or foreclose future employment opportunities, due process requires that the 
employee must be given a hearing in which he/she can clear his reputation and refute 
the charges.  The court determined that Burk was entitled to go to the jury on his 
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claim that his reputation and ability to obtain another job were harmed in connection 
with the Board’s handling of the student complaint.  It was the opinion of the court 
that this complaint, and the rumors associated with it, clearly called the plaintiff’s 
morality into question and this was sufficiently stigmatizing so as to implicate a 
liberty interest.  On the other hand, the allegations of improper job performance were 
not considered to be so stigmatizing as to harm the plaintiff’s reputation or prevent 
him from getting another job as a principal.  After a review of cases, the court found 
that the Ninth Circuit had held that “only charges of moral turpitude may implicate a 
liberty interest” (p. 1566).  As a result of these findings, the court held that a directed 
verdict was proper against the claim that comments in his evaluation had damaged his 
reputation and foreclosed him from future employment.  The court also granted the 
defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on all claims against them on the grounds 
that they were entitled to qualified immunity.   
The Evaluation Act only requires that a school board follow its own 
procedures and evaluate an employee at some point before they are nonrenewed.  It 
does not require that an employee be given the chance to improve before they are 
nonrenewed.  Any attempt by a school district to enter into a contract that violates 
state law is beyond the scope of their powers and such contract will be void.  If an 
employee is dismissed with charges that are harmful to their reputation, due process 
requires that the employee be given a hearing.  Those charges must be serious enough 
to not only damage a person’s reputation but also prevent them from gaining further 
employment.  Claims against a person’s morality or honesty would be sufficient to 
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require due process.  Charges that a principal cannot get along with faculty members 
or is an ineffective communicator are not sufficient enough to invoke a liberty interest. 
 
Unified School District No. 241, Wallace County v. Swanson 
717 P.2d 526 (Kan. App. 1986) 
 
Charles Swanson was a tenured teacher who also coached boys' basketball and 
track.  On May 11, 1984, Swanson wrote a letter resigning from his position as 
basketball coach.  In August of 1984, the school district issued a contract to Swanson 
with the basketball position eliminated.  In September, the superintendent posted 
notices seeking applications for the basketball job but no one applied.  Subsequently, 
the superintendent assigned the position to Swanson.  When Swanson declined the 
assignment, the school district brought a declaratory judgment action in district court.  
The district court entered judgment in favor of the school district, finding Swanson's 
refusal to take the extra position amounted to insubordination and was a breach of 
contract.  Swanson appealed. 
The district court had relied upon a provision in the negotiated agreement for 
teachers in U.S.D. 241 that allowed for the assignment of supplemental duties when 
those duties could not be filled voluntarily.  That provision stated, "Vacant extra duty 
positions shall be first filled by teachers willing to accept the position.  The 
balance…shall be assigned by the administration."  In addressing this issue, the 
appellate court turned to Swager v. Board of Education, U.S.D. No. 412, 9 
Kan.App.2d 648, 688 P.2d 270 (1984).  In Swager, the court held that a teacher could 
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not be required to accept supplemental duties as part of the primary teaching contract 
and could unilaterally terminate or nonrenew the supplemental contract.  Language 
found in K.S.A. 72-5412(a) clearly demonstrates the legislature's intent to prohibit 
school districts from making supplemental duties, such as coaching, part of a 
teacher's primary contract.  In Ottawa Education Ass'n v. U.S.D.  No. 290, 233 Kan. 
865, 666 P.2d 680 (1983), the court held that provisions of a negotiated agreement 
that conflicted with statutory language were void and unenforceable.  In the case at 
hand, the provision of the negotiated agreement conflicted with the statutory scheme 
as it related to the assignment of supplemental contracts.  Therefore, the appellate 
court found the provision to be void and not the basis for the finding of a breach of 
contract.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded with 
directions to enter declaratory judgment in favor of Swanson.        
 
Hein v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 238, Smith County 
733 P.2d 1270 (Kan. App. 1987) 
 
Jerome Hein was a tenured teacher certified to teach English, driver's 
education, health and physical education.  In the spring of 1983, the Board asked 
Hein to appear at a school board meeting to discuss his contract.  At that meeting, 
Hein was asked if he was certified to teach speech because the Board was considering 
the creation of a new course that would include speech as a replacement to the current 
English IV class.  The English IV course was taught by a retiring teacher and the 
Board wanted to create a new course titled English, Speech, and Drama.  Although 
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Hein was certified to teach English, he was not qualified to teach speech and in April 
1983, the Board voted to nonrenew his contract.  He obtained a due process hearing, 
which was discussed in Hein v. Board of Education, U.S.D. No. 238, 10 Kan. App.2d 
303, 698 P.2d 388, rev. denied, 237 Kan. 886 (1985).  The due process hearing panel 
unanimously recommended that if Hein agreed to become certified to teach speech, as 
he had offered to do, his contract should be renewed.  The Board ignored the hearing 
committee's recommendation and did not renew Hein's contract.  Hein appealed to the 
district court which found that the Board had acted in an arbitrary, capricious, and 
unreasonable manner and ordered Hein's reinstatement along with back pay.  The 
Board appealed this decision. 
Previous court decisions dealing with the nonrenewal of a tenured teacher 
held that a school board must show good cause and make a good faith effort to 
examine the competence and training of a teacher before a tenured teacher could be 
replaced by a nontenured teacher.  In its justification for nonrenewing Hein's contract, 
the Board cited increased operational expenses, lost tax base, decline in enrollment, 
and the teaching efficiency of combining a retiring staff member and Hein's position 
into an English, Speech, and Drama course.  The Board noted that there was not a 
nontenured teacher in this area who could be released before Hein and that Hein 
could not become certified in speech in less than two or more years.  The only change 
in the courses, which Hein was teaching, would have been the modification to the 
English IV class to include speech and drama.  The retiring teacher had taught 
elements of speech and drama in the English IV class, but they were not part of the 
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curriculum requirements.  Mr. Hein was not certified to teach speech and drama but 
he had offered to obtain a provisional license and become fully certified in two years 
by taking additional courses.  At the time of this action, there had been no cases in 
Kansas dealing with the issue of whether a school board had acted in good faith when 
making a curriculum change that had the effect of replacing a tenured teacher with a 
nontenured one.  The court turned to other states which had dealt with this type of 
situation and found in Catron v. Board of Education, 126 Ill.App.3d 693, 81 Ill. Dec. 
750, 467 N.E.2d 621 (1984) that "incidental reassignment of single courses to 
established teaching positions to maximize the use of staff and accommodate changes 
in enrollment and economy may be permissible...as long as [1] the tenured teacher is 
not qualified to teach the course and [2] teaching assignments are not aligned in bad 
faith to avoid the existence of a position which could be filled by a tenured teacher for 
whom dismissal is sought." Id. at 697.  In Hein's case, the Board had claimed to be 
acting on good faith due to economic reasons.  However, they only made one 
curriculum change that consisted of adding one component to one course in an effort 
to eliminate a tenured teaching position.  The court did not find this to be a substantial 
change, since elements of speech and drama had been present in the original English 
IV class for many years.  The Board had made no effort to investigate or accept 
Hein's offer to get a provisional certification and take courses to become fully 
certified in speech.  The court agreed with the district court and held that the Board 
had not acted in good faith and was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable in its 
decision to nonrenew Hein.  The district court decision was affirmed.   
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Bauer v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 452, Johnson, 
Kansas 
765 P.2d 1129 (Kan. 1988) 
 
 James Bauer, a tenured industrial arts teacher who was also certified to teach 
social science, was nonrenewed by the board of education.  His position was reduced 
due to a decrease in the enrollment in his auto mechanics class.  Bauer’s remaining 
classes were to be taught by the district’s other industrial arts teachers who had more 
seniority.  The Board voted to terminate Bauer due to a “reduction in force.”  The 
Board later hired a nontenured teacher certified to teach social science and physical 
education for a junior high school position.  Although he was certified to teach social 
science, Bauer was not considered for the social science position.  Bauer claimed that 
because he was certified to teach social science, he was improperly terminated by the 
board.  After being notified of the nonrenewal, Bauer requested a due process hearing 
claiming that the enrollment numbers were not correct, that the administration had no 
authority to change the course of study, and that the Board had not followed its own 
policy regarding reduction in force situations when they nonrenewed him and hired a 
nontenured teacher to teach a subject in which Bauer was certified.  The hearing 
panel voted to uphold the Board’s decision.  Bauer appealed to the Stanton County 
District Court.  After reviewing the evidence of the decrease in enrollment, the 
district court found in favor of the Board.  Bauer appealed.  The Court of Appeals 
agreed with the district court holding that under Coats v. U.S.D. No. 353, 233 Kan. 
394, 662 P. 2d 1279 (1983),“certification by the State Board of Education is not 
synonymous with qualification” (p. 1132).  The Court of Appeals believed Bauer 
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needed to show he was both “certified” and “qualified” to teach social science in 
order to have priority over the nontenured teacher.  Bauer was only able to show he 
was certified, as all of his teaching experience and background was in the field of 
industrial arts.  The Court of Appeals placed the burden of proof on Bauer to show he 
was qualified to teach social science.  Bauer appealed.  The Kansas Supreme Court 
granted review.  In his petition for review, Bauer did not argue that a reduction in 
force had been necessary in the industrial arts teaching staff.  He claimed that the 
Board’s methods to accomplish the reduction in force were “arbitrary and capricious” 
because (1) he should have been considered a candidate for the social science position, 
and (2) the Board improperly determined that that the position had to be filled by 
someone who was certified in both social science and physical education.       
In order to terminate or nonrenew a tenured teacher, a board of education must 
follow the procedures outlined in K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.  A tenured teacher may only 
be released if good cause is shown.  The decision must not be shown to be arbitrary, 
irrational, or unreasonable.  "Good cause must be supported by substantial evidence 
and the burden of proof is on the Board."  Citing Schmidt v. U.S.D. No. 497, 231 Kan. 
267, 269, 644 P.2d 396 (1982).  In Coats, the court held that under Kansas statutes a 
“school board should first conduct a good faith examination of the competence, 
interest, and training of all teachers in the area where the reduction in staff is to 
occur” Id. at 401-402.  Upon review of this case, it was found that the Board had 
made no determination regarding Bauer’s certification to teach the social science 
class.  It appeared that the Board was unaware that Bauer was certified to teach social 
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science until it came up during his initial due process hearing.  Once it was known 
that Bauer was certified to teach social science, the Board made no determination as 
to whether or not he was qualified to do so.  Therefore, Bauer had been nonrenewed 
without good cause.  In addition, K.S.A.72-1394 (a) and (b) provide in part:  “(a) the 
state board of education shall prescribe an examination designed to insure that 
certification of a person as a teacher is a reliable indicator that the person has the 
basic knowledge and qualifications necessary to engage in the profession of teaching. 
(b) …the state board of education shall select an examination which will measure the 
…qualifications of applicants for certification as teachers…”  Similar legislative 
intent is found in K.S.A.72-1381 that provides the state board of education, upon 
being satisfied with the qualifications of an applicant may issue a “special certificate 
specifying the subjects that the holder of the certificate is authorized to teach.”  A 
teaching certificate indicates that the teacher has completed a required course of study 
and passed an examination, which determines the teacher’s qualifications in a 
particular area.  Accordingly, “every teacher is entitled to rely on his or her certificate 
as substantive proof of the teacher’s qualifications to teach the subject endorsed” (p. 
1135).  Thus, Bauer was both certified and qualified to teach social science, unless 
the school board could show otherwise.   
The Board next argued that Bauer was not qualified for the job because he 
was not certified to teach both social science and physical education.  Upon review, it 
was shown that the only connection to physical education was a need for someone to 
assume some coaching duties.  There was no requirement to actually teach a physical 
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education class.  K.S.A. 72-5413(o) lists duties such as coaching as being considered 
supplemental.  Statute prohibits a school district from requiring supplemental duties 
be part of a teacher’s primary contract.  Therefore, a teacher is not required to accept 
supplemental duties as part of his primary contract of employment.  The Board’s 
requirement of coaching duties with the social science position was an 
“impermissible joining of primary and supplemental contracts” (p. 1136).  The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals and the district court were reversed.  The case was 
remanded with an order to reinstate James Bauer and to determine the amount of back 
pay owed to him.    
When there is a need for a reduction in force, the Board must conduct a good 
faith examination into all of the areas a tenured teacher is certified to teach before 
they vote to nonrenew a contract.  When vacancies exist in areas in which the tenured 
teacher is certified to teach, they must be placed into that position unless there is good 
cause not to do so.  The burden of proof is placed on a Board to show that a tenured 
teacher is not qualified to teach in an area in which they are certified. 
 
Hachiya v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 307, Saline 
County 
750 P.2d 383 (Kan. 1988) 
 
Plaintiffs Robert Hachiya and Cheri Livingston were both full time, tenured 
teachers who taught six class periods and had one planning period.  Both were 
coaches and their sixth period classes were seventh and eighth grade athletics.  This 
class was practice time for the competitive seventh and eighth grade sports teams who 
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did not practice after school.  In November 1984, both Hachiya and Livingston 
resigned from their supplemental duties as head coaches for all junior high sports for 
the 1985-86 school year.  In March 1985, the resignations from the "position of coach 
for" junior high athletics were accepted by the Board.  In April, the Board minutes 
were amended by deleting the words "coach for" to state that the Board would accept 
the resignations of their positions "of seventh and eighth grade athletics."  Both 
plaintiffs were then offered 6/7 contracts for the 1985-86 school year.  This meant 
they would be paid for one less class period.  In June 1985, the plaintiffs filed 
petitions with the Board alleging the reduction in their teaching contracts was a 
violation of their right to resign from a supplemental duty without penalty.  Both 
plaintiffs and defendant filed motions for summary judgment and on April 23, 1986, 
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.  The district court 
held that the plaintiff's obligations to coach the junior high school practice classes 
was governed by their primary teaching contract and that they had "voluntarily 
resigned" one of their regular classroom duties.  The teachers appealed and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the decision.  The Court of Appeals found that the Board was 
within its rights to make what is normally a supplemental duty a part of the contract 
of junior high teachers.  The teachers then petitioned for review from the Supreme 
Court of Kansas.   
At issue was whether the junior high school athletics classes taught by the 
plaintiffs were covered by their primary contracts of employment, or whether they 
were duties that fell under a supplemental contract.  K.A.R. 91-31-14(c)(4) (1986 
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Supp.) permitted junior high schools to schedule one hour of practice time per school 
day to prepare for interscholastic athletic competition.  Therefore, the Board was 
within its right to schedule practice time during the school day.  They argued that 
because the practice sessions were held during the day, they were a part of the 
teachers' primary teaching contracts.  K.S.A. 72-5412(a) provides language dealing 
with supplemental contracts.  It states in part that a supplemental contract "means a 
contract for services other than those services covered in the principal or primary 
contract of employment and shall include but not be limited to such services as 
coaching, supervising, directing and assisting extracurricular activities..."  The 
Kansas Supreme Court determined that while Kansas Administrative Regulations 
permitted junior high schools to hold practice during the school day, that regulation 
had "no relevance in resolving the issue of the type of contract which governs the 
coaching of such practice sessions" (p. 387).  Kansas statutory law requires that 
coaching positions fall under a supplemental contract.  K.S.A. 72-5412(a) mandates 
that coaching duties be governed by a supplemental contract, it does not contain 
language that permits an exception for coaching activities that occur during the school 
day.  The Board treated the plaintiff's coaching duties as being subject to their 
primary contracts when they reduced the plaintiff's salaries by one-seventh after they 
resigned their coaching positions; something that is not allowed by statute.  The 
mandate of a statute cannot be negated by an administrative regulation.  The Supreme 
Court found that the plaintiffs were "within their rights to resign their supplemental 
coaching duties without affecting their primary contract duties as junior high school 
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teachers" (p. 389).  The Board failed to meet the requirements of state statute when it 
did not renew their primary contracts as full-time teachers.  The decision of the Court 
of Appeals was reversed, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and the case 
was remanded with directions to find in favor of the plaintiffs.   
 
Leaming v. Unified School District No. 214 
750 P.2d 1041 (Kan. 1988) 
 
Larry Leaming was a tenured teacher for the Ulysses, Kansas school district.  
In the spring of 1983, two high school students qualified for the International Science 
Exhibition Fair (ISEF) meeting in Albuquerque, New Mexico that would be held May 
9-14, 1983.  The superintendent of schools, Dr. Timothy Rundus, was informed that 
Leaming, a seventh grade science teacher, planned to accompany the two girls on 
their trip to New Mexico.  Because Leaming had not made a formal request to attend 
the meeting, Rundus called him on May 3, 1983.  Leaming then informed Rundus 
that he was planning on going to the ISEF.  Rundus told Leaming that he had 
teaching responsibilities on those dates and would not be give permission to attend 
because the two students were not under his jurisdiction.  On May 5, 1983, Leaming 
was again advised by Rundus that he would not be allowed to make the trip.  
Leaming informed him that he intended to go anyway.  Leaming was told that if he 
chose to go, he should submit his resignation to the school district by 4:00 p.m. on 
May 6, 1983.  On May 7, 1983, Leaming called Rundus and told him that he was 
leaving school on May 9, 1983 to attend the science fair.  Rundus urged him to 
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reconsider, encouraged him to have someone else attend, and told him that if he went 
without submitting his resignation Rundus would make a recommendation to the 
board of education that he be suspended or that the board make some other 
arrangement concerning his contractual obligation.  Rundus advised Leaming that 
possible consequences of his action could be suspension, loss of pay for the time he 
was away from school, and/or nonrenewal of his teaching contract.  Leaming left to 
attend the science fair on May 9, 1983 and a substitute teacher was hired to teach his 
classes.  Leaming would later acknowledge that he had committed an act of defiance 
toward the superintendent and that he was aware he had signed a contract in which he 
agreed to obey the rules and regulations of the board of education and the directions 
of the superintendent of schools.  On May 12, 1983, Rundus sent a letter to Leaming 
in which he advised him that an inquiry into his alleged breach of duty as a teacher 
would be held by the board of education on May 16, 1983.  At that meeting, the 
Board unanimously voted to terminate Leaming's teaching contract for the 1983-84 
school year.  On May 27, 1983, Leaming requested a hearing by a hearing committee 
and designated Melvin Wilson as a member of the committee.  The school district 
designated Richard Pickler.  The hearing was held on January 20, 1984.  Testimony 
was heard and cross-examination was allowed for all parties.  At Leaming's request, a 
continuation of that hearing was granted and a second hearing was held on March 31, 
1984.  The hearing committee unanimously upheld and sustained the decision of the 
school district to terminate Leaming's contract.  This recommendation was submitted 
to Leaming and the school district.  Leaming did not appeal to the district court as 
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provided in K.S.A. 72-5443, rather he filed a separate court action in which he 
alleged wrongful termination and denial of due process by the failure of the school 
board to provide a fair hearing.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the school district.  The court held that it could grant summary judgment because 
the basic facts of the case were undisputed; the facts showed that Leaming had not 
been denied a due process hearing, and Leaming's own evidence clearly showed that 
he had violated his teaching contract.  Leaming appealed this decision. 
On appeal, Leaming claimed that the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of the school district because he had been denied certain due 
process rights under the Kansas Due Process Procedure Act (K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.).  
Leaming had been provided a full evidentiary hearing before a hearing committee.  
The hearing committee upheld the decision of the school board and submitted its 
recommendation to both Leaming and the school district.  The record does not show 
whether the school board ever took any action on the committee's recommendation.  
In fact, the school board did not notify Leaming whether or not it had adopted the 
decision of the hearing committee.  It was clear from the record that both Leaming 
and the school board knew that it was the intention of the board to nonrenew 
Leaming's teaching contract.  Leaming had already obtained another teaching position 
at the time of the hearing committee's final decision.  Prior to July 1, 1984, K.S.A. 
72-5443 provided that "after considering the hearing committee's recommendation 
and after receiving oral arguments or briefs from the teacher, the board of education 
was required to decide whether the teacher should be terminated or not."  K.S.A. 72-
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5443 was amended, effective July 1, 1984, to provide that if the hearing committee's 
decision was unanimous, "the board of education shall adopt the opinion as its 
decision in the matter and such opinion shall be final, subject to appeal to the district 
court."  That amendment had been approved within a week following the close of 
Leaming's final hearing, although it did not go into effect until July.  The Kansas 
Supreme Court believed that under those circumstances, both Leaming and the school 
district could have assumed that his teaching contract had been terminated.  Leaming 
had made no request for a hearing or the chance to offer arguments or submit briefs to 
the school board.  He did not do anything until over a year later when he filed his 
court action on May 15, 1985.  Those facts created a jurisdictional issue that the court 
first addressed.  Typically, if a teacher fails to make a timely appeal to the district 
court in a contract termination case, as required by K.S.A. 60-2101, that ends any 
chance of litigation.  Although his court action was not taken in a timely manner, 
Leaming was allowed to bring his case to both the district and Supreme courts 
because the school board had failed to act on the report of the hearing committee as 
required by K.S.A. 72-5443.  Because there was no final decision of the school board, 
the right of Leaming to appeal to the district court was "never triggered" (p. 1048).  
Next, the court addressed Leaming's claim that he had been denied procedural due 
process.  Leaming maintained that there were three reasons he had been denied this 
right: (1) his hearing before the hearing committee was completed ten months after 
his contract was terminated; (2) Richard Pickler, the school districts choice as hearing 
committee member, was treasurer for U.S.D. No. 214 which violated the rule of 
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fundamental fairness; and, (3) the school board failed to review the hearing 
committee's decision and render a final decision as required by K.S.A. 72-5443, 
which denied him the right to an appeal to the district court.  The Supreme Court 
addressed each of these reasons.  Concerning the delay in his committee hearing, 
K.S.A. 72-5438 required that a teacher request a hearing within fifteen days of the 
school board's decision to terminate.  The school board then had fifteen days from 
that point to designate a hearing committee.  The court found no statutory guidelines 
which set a specific time for holding a committee hearing.* Leaming had received 
appropriate notice and a hearing.  The hearing had been continued for two months at 
Leaming's request.  At no time did Leaming object to the time of the hearing.  For 
these reasons, the court found that the trial court had correctly determined that 
Leaming's due process rights were not violated by any delay in the committee hearing.  
Next, the court addressed the selection of Richard Pickler who served on the hearing 
committee as the board's representative.  Pickler was a local attorney who had no 
financial interest in the outcome of the hearing.  Although he served as treasurer for 
the school district, he did so voluntarily; his services were provided free to the district.  
Pickler was not an attorney or legal advisor for the school board.  At no time during 
the hearing did Leaming's attorney object to the service of Pickler on the committee.  
The decision of the committee was unanimous which included the vote of Leaming's 
designee, Melvin Wilson.  The court held that this was not similar to the situation in 
Coats v. U.S.D. No. 353, 233 Kan. 394, 662 P.2d 1279 (1983) because in that case the 
school board had appointed its own attorney to serve on the hearing committee which 
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created an obvious conflict of interest.  A school board attorney would have a 
financial interest in confirming the school board's decision, whereas Pickler had no 
such interest.  Thus, the court supported the trail court's decision that Leaming's due 
process rights were not violated by the service of Pickler on the hearing committee.  
Finally, the court turned to the claim that Leaming had been denied a right of appeal 
to the district court by the board's failure to review the hearing committee's decision 
and render a final decision.  The court agreed that the board "should have considered 
the hearing committee's report and acted thereon so that plaintiff's statutory right of 
appeal to the district court would have been made possible" (p. 1050).  However, the 
court did not believe remanding the case just so the school board could make its final 
decision on the hearing committee's decision was warranted.  The court did not 
believe there was any reason to do so because the hearing committee's decision had 
been unanimous, which meant that according to statute it had to be adopted by the 
board of education.  The district court had already examined the record and 
determined that Leaming's due process rights had not been violated.  Remanding the 
case would accomplish nothing new.  In the opinion of the court, the only real issue 
was whether Leaming had suffered a denial of any due process rights by reason of his 
contract termination.  The court determined that "the evidence in this case was 
undisputed that Leaming violated his contract of employment" (p. 1051).  The 
superintendent gave Leaming specific directions and he willfully violated those 
directions.  Contract language gave the board of education the right to terminate a 
teacher if they failed to obey the directions of the superintendent.  Leaming had been 
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terminated for good cause and received notification and a hearing as prescribed by 
law.  The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.   
 
(*Note: Applicable to the case above, K.S.A.72-5438 now provides that whenever a teacher is given 
written notice of intent by a board to not renew or to terminate the contract of the teacher, the teacher 
has 15 calendar days from the date of such notice of nonrenewal or termination to request a hearing.  
Within 10 calendar days after the teacher files their written request, the board must notify the 
commissioner of education to obtain a list of qualified hearing officers.  The commissioner then has 10 
days after the receipt of notification from the board to provide a list of five randomly selected hearing 
officers to the board and the teacher.  Once the hearing officer is selected, the hearing "shall 
commence" within 45 calendar days unless the hearing officer grants an extension.) 
  
Miller v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 470, Cowley 
County 
752 P.2d 113 (Kan. 1988) 
 
Doris Miller was a teacher with several years of teaching experience in 
another district in Kansas.  U.S.D. 470 first employed her for the school year 1984-85.  
Her contract was renewed for the 1985-86 school year, but during that second year, 
she was given notice that her teaching contract would not be renewed for the 
following year.  No reason was given for the nonrenewal by either the school board or 
the building principal.  During the time she was a teacher for the district she had 
received five evaluations and never received an "unsatisfactory" rating.  Nothing in 
her evaluations indicated that she was not performing in a satisfactory manner or that 
her job might be in jeopardy.  Article XI in the teachers' negotiated agreement 
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provided for a procedure to evaluate and assist all teachers in the school district.  This 
agreement basically followed the Kansas Evaluation of Certified Personnel Act, 
K.S.A. 72-9001 et seq.  In relevant part, Article XI provided that if a teacher received 
an unsatisfactory rating they would be placed on a Plan of Assistance.  On May 7, 
1986, Miller filed suit alleging a breach of the Board's "contractual duty to provide 
notice to plaintiff of any alleged unsatisfactory performance on her part and to place 
her on a plan of assistance" (p. 114).  She also alleged that the Board acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner and violated K.S.A. 9004(f), which prohibits 
nonrenewal based on incompetence without an evaluation of the teacher in 
compliance with the Board's policy.  The Board filed their answer in which they 
alleged that Miller had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and 
requested summary judgment.  The trial court found in favor of the Board and 
sustained their motion for summary judgment.  Although it was questionable that 
Miller even came under Article XI, the trial court chose to base its decision on a 
determination that the school board was precluded as a matter of law from entering 
into any agreement that would restrict its right to nonrenew a nontenured teacher.  
Miller appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court 
in Miller v. U.S.D. No. 470, 12 Kan.App.2d 368, 744 P.2d 865 (1987).  The appellate 
court also based its decision on whether the school board could "by a collectively 
negotiated contract, restrict its right to terminate a nontenured teacher" (p. 114).  In 
their decision, the appellate court discussed the four acts controlling the formation, 
continuation, and termination or nonrenewal of teacher contracts.  They found that as 
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Miller was a nontenured teacher, and the school board had given her timely notice as 
required by K.S.A. 72-5411 and K.S.A. 72-5437, she had no cause for action without 
a valid contract for the following year.  Previous court decisions and state statute did 
not provide the same protection for nontenured teachers as for tenured teachers.  
Article XI, according to the court, could not protect Miller because a school district 
could not enter into a contract that would have the effect of defeating the two 
consecutive years of employment provision found in K.S.A. 72-5445.  Miller filed a 
writ of certiorari, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
The Supreme Court agreed with the decision reached by both the trial court 
and the Court of Appeals, but it was of the opinion that those decisions were reached 
for the wrong reason.  In the opinion of the Supreme Court, the issue, which the lower 
courts should have addressed, was whether Miller even came under the provisions of 
Article XI of the negotiated agreement which she relied upon for her cause of action.  
Miller had been evaluated regularly, as was required by contract.  At no time did she 
receive a mark of unsatisfactory which would have required school officials to put her 
on a plan of action.  Miller was under the assumption that under the negotiated 
agreement a nontenured teacher could not be nonrenewed unless she was rated 
unsatisfactory.  Yet, nowhere in the negotiated agreement was there "any indication 
that it was the intent of the parties to limit the Board's ability to nonrenew a 
nontenured teacher under any and all circumstances" (p. 115).  Article XI simply sets 
forth a procedure for a plan of assistance for teachers who had been evaluated as 
unsatisfactory.  Miller was not rated as unsatisfactory, and Article XI should have had 
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no bearing on the Board's decision to nonrenew her contract.  Because she failed to 
show that she came under the provisions of Article XI, the Supreme Court agreed 
with the Board's initial point that Miller failed to state a cause of action. Because 
Miller failed to meet the "threshold requirement" of showing that Article XI applied 
to her case, the Supreme Court determined that the Court of Appeals opinion as it 
related to the "issue of whether a school board could restrict its authority to nonrenew 
a nontenured teacher is dicta and should not be considered as precedent on that issue" 
(p. 115).  The judgment of the district court and the Court of Appeals were affirmed.  
 
Butler v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 440, Harvey 
County 
769 P.2d 651 (Kan. 1989) 
 
Kenneth Butler, although tenured, was the lowest in seniority of the industrial 
arts teachers.  His contract was nonrenewed due to a need to reduce the teaching force 
in this area because of decreasing enrollment.  The only other area in which Butler 
was certified to teach was physical education grades 7-12.  In the spring of 1984, the 
superintendent of schools met with Butler and recommended he become certified in 
another area because of the declining enrollment in industrial arts courses.  On 
February 20, 1986, Butler was advised of the possibility of a reduction in staff and 
was asked if he could teach in another area.  On March 19, 1986, the superintendent 
met with all of the industrial arts teachers and asked if they could be certified in a 
number of other areas, one of which was elementary physical education.  None of the 
teachers indicated that they could or would become certified in any of the mentioned 
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areas.  The superintendent suggested to the Board on March 17, 1986 that either 
Butler’s contract be nonrenewed or he become certified to teach elementary physical 
education.  On March 31, 1986 the Board compared Butler’s certification with that of 
Steven Serer, the nontenured football coach who taught three elementary physical 
education classes along with a freshman health class, none of which Butler was 
qualified to teach.  The Board adopted a resolution to nonrenew Butler’s contract and 
the superintendent notified him after the meeting.  Butler requested and was granted a 
due process hearing, which was held in November of 1986.  The hearing committee 
recommended his reinstatement with a 2-1 vote.  However, since the vote was not 
unanimous, it was not binding upon the Board, pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5443(c).  The 
Board heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the record, and made a determination on 
May 18, 1987 to reject the committee’s recommendation.  On June 5, 1987, Butler’s 
attorney mailed a notice of appeal to the Board’s attorney and to the clerk of the 
district court.  In July, Butler found out that the district court had not received his 
notice of appeal due to a problem with its mail delivery.  Therefore, he filed a copy of 
his original notice on July 24, 1987.  The district court heard Butler’s case and 
affirmed the decision of the Board.  Butler appealed. 
The court first determined that, although the notice of appeal was not filed 
with the district court within 33 days of Butler’s nonrenewal, the trial court still had 
jurisdiction of the case.  In Atkinson v. USD No. 383, 235 Kan. 793, 684 P.2d 424 
(1984) the court held that a teacher had 33 days in which to file a notice of appeal 
from the Board’s action with the district court.  Butler had filed his notice of appeal 
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with the Board within the required 33 days but there were 49 days between the notice 
to the Board and the actual filing of the appeal with the district court.  The court 
turned to LeCounte v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 48, 587 P. 2d 310 (1978) in which 
they held that as long as the notice of appeal is filed with the administrative board 
within the prescribed amount of time, the “aggrieved party is allowed a reasonable 
amount of time to perfect the appeal” before filing with the district court.  It was 
determined that 49 days was a reasonable amount of time.  Next, the court turned to 
the issue of Butler’s nonrenewal.  In Coats v. U.S.D. No. 353, 233 Kan. 394, 662 P.2d 
1279 (1983), the court found that without good cause, a tenured teacher may not be 
nonrenewed until all nontenured teachers teaching subjects which the tenured 
teachers is qualified to teach are first released.  Butler argued that he should have 
been assigned to teach Seirer’s three physical education classes for which he was 
certified and two periods assigned to the nontenured basketball coach for which no 
certification was required.  He believed that his other required hour could be made up 
of a supplementary position, such as study hall monitor.  The court noted that doing 
this would have required that two nontenured teachers be placed on half-time 
contracts.  The nontenured teachers’ duties could not be completely absorbed by 
Butler because they taught courses he was not certified to teach.  The court used a 
balancing test to weigh the rights of students, the school board, and the teacher to 
determine whether Butler had the right to be retained in the school system.  In doing 
so, the court found that the hardship the Board would face if it had to rearrange the 
entire class schedule and then end up with three part-time teachers outweighed the 
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tenured teacher’s right to contract renewal.  The Board had made a good faith effort 
when they informed Butler of the effects declining enrollment could have on the 
industrial arts program and recommended he expand his certification.  Absent bad 
faith, the court found that a school board is not required to make such drastic changes 
to its teaching assignments.  Finally, the Board turned toward the issue of Butler’s 
expanded certification.  In April 1986, Butler had informed the superintendent that he 
would see about becoming certified in another area.  Over the summer, he became 
certified to teach 5th and 6th grade physical education which would have made him 
certified to teach five scheduled classes.  The Board was not informed of this new 
certification until several weeks into the school year.  Pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5411, a 
Board must give notice of nonrenewal to a teacher by April 10 of each year.  In this 
case, when the Board made its decision to nonrenew Butler as he was only certified to 
teach three of the six scheduled classes taught by Seirer.  The court held that a 
“teacher’s certification status prior to April 10 is controlling absent a specific 
agreement otherwise” (p. 658).  The judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
 
Copp v. Unified School District No. 501 
882 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1989) 
 
Richard Copp, head custodian at Topeka High School, was transferred to a 
different building in the district.  He claimed this transfer was because he had made a 
speech at a board meeting in support of the high school principal, who was one of his 
close friends.  Frank Blackburn, the principal, had been transferred due to a lawsuit 
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brought about by a female employee who claimed sexual harassment.  During his 
time at Topeka High, Blackburn delegated considerable authority to Copp.  It was 
reported that Copp sat in on staff meetings and performed functions that many 
considered to be administrative.  In June 1984, Copp had spoken at a public meeting 
of the Board of Education and expressed his opposition to Blackburn’s transfer.  The 
Board, nonetheless, transferred Blackburn to an elementary school and three weeks 
later transferred Copp to the Topeka Adventure Center.  Dennis Dunklee, the acting 
principal of Topeka High, had recommended Copp’s transfer because he thought it 
would be the “least disruptive way to diminish the excessive authority” (p. 1549) that 
Copp had acquired.  Copp brought action against the Board claiming it had 
transferred him out of retaliation for his speech and because of his association with 
Blackburn.  He also claimed that the Board had deprived him of due process of the 
law.  The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded him $83,000 in damages.  
Defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  The trial court 
granted the motion in regards to the due process claim but left the verdict standing on 
the freedom of speech and association claims.  Defendants then appealed on the 
grounds that neither Copp’s speech nor association with Blackburn was protected by 
the First Amendment.    
In addressing the freedom of association claim, the court determined that 
while there was evidence to support the assertion that Copp was transferred due to his 
general association with Blackburn, it was not the type of association that is sheltered 
by the First Amendment.  The right to associate protects an individual’s decision to 
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“enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships.”  Roberts v. United 
Stated Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984).  
However, in a review of cases it was found that, in general, the relationships 
protected by association have involved “familial” settings.  Thus, the Court of 
Appeals held that Copp possessed no First Amendment right to associate with 
Blackburn.  After determining that Copp did not have a valid freedom of association 
claim, the court turned towards the issue of whether Copp was transferred because of 
his speech at the school board meeting.  In order to prevail on this issue, the court 
determined that Copp had to satisfy the three-prong test established by the Supreme 
Court in Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 
568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).  Under Mount Healthy, an employee who challenges an 
employment decision must first show that, as a matter of law, his speech is protected.  
If the speech is worthy of constitutional protection, the employee must next prove that 
the protected speech was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the employment 
decision.  If both of these prongs are met, the burden shifts to the employer to show 
that the same employment decision would have been made “even in the absence of 
the protected conduct.”  Mount Healthy at 287.  The first prong of Mount Healthy 
involves the two-part test from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. 
Ct. 1731, L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), the court found that Copp’s speech was a matter of 
public concern and that his interest in making statements regarding Blackburn’s 
transfer did not have any negative effects on the regular operations of the school.  
Because he met this two-part test, the court determined that Copp’s speech was 
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protected.  The court next attempted to determine if Copp could meet the second 
prong of Mount Healthy, which was the question of causation.  It was the court’s 
opinion that there was enough evidence of cause to send the speech issue back to the 
jury.  They based this opinion in part on (1) a comment that had been made by the 
acting principal after Copp’s speech to the board, (2) the lack of documentation 
supporting the districts claim that the transfer was a “human relations problem” of 
Copp’s inability to get along with people, and (3) the chronology of events led to the 
inference that Copp’s speech may indeed have led to his transfer.  In turning to the 
third prong of Mount Healthy, the court found that the school district had presented 
evidence showing they had transferred Copp due to his association with Blackburn 
and because of his human relations problem.  Because the court had determined there 
was no constitutional right to associate with Blackburn, the district would be relieved 
of liability if they could show that they would have reached the same decision if Copp 
had not made his speech.  However, because the district court jury had combined the 
speech and association claims it was not possible for the Court of Appeals to 
determine if the jury had concluded Copp had been transferred because of his 
association with Blackburn or because of his speech.  For these reasons, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict on the plaintiff’s association claim and remanded for a 
new trial to determine whether the plaintiff’s speech was a “substantial or motivating” 
factor in the plaintiffs transfer.  The court also remanded for a new determination of 
the damages awarded to plaintiff. 
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Peterson v. Unified School District No. 418, McPherson County, Kansas 
724 F. Supp. 829 (D. Kan. 1989) 
 
Jerry Peterson had been the principal of Lincoln Elementary School from 
1983-1986.  Each year he entered into a one-year contract with the District.  On 
February 24, 1986, the school district's superintendent, Jack Hobbs, recommended to 
the school board that Peterson's contract not be renewed for the following year.  
Hobbs told the board that he did not think Peterson could regain the confidence of 
several of his staff members.  Several staff members had contacted Hobbs regarding 
their concerns.  This, in Hobbs' opinion, would make it very difficult for Peterson to 
be effective.  The Board followed Hobbs' recommendation and elected not to renew 
Peterson's contract.  The Board president notified Peterson of the decision a month 
later.  Peterson met with the Board in executive session on April 14 and April 18, 
1986, to discuss his nonrenewal.  After these meetings, the Board informed Peterson 
that his contract would be nonrenewed due to "staff relationships."  Peterson filed a 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 stating that U.S.D. No. 418 violated 
his civil rights when it nonrenewed his employment as principal and denied him a 
hearing to clear his good name and reputation.  The school district made a motion for 
summary judgment.  
The court began by determining if Peterson had a statutory property interest in 
continued employment.  In order to make this determination, the court looked at state 
statute.  The Administrators' Nonrenewal Procedure Act (Administrators' Act).  
K.S.A. 72-5451 et seq. outline the procedures that must be followed for 
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administrators who have completed two consecutive years of employment with the 
district.  These statues provide that a tenured administrator must be given notice of 
nonrenewal by April 15.  Administrators are entitled to a hearing with the school 
board in executive session in which the board must provide its reasons for the 
nonrenewal and the administrator is given the opportunity to respond.  In the case at 
hand, Peterson was given his notice on March 24 and was advised on that same day 
that he could request a hearing before the board.  At Peterson's request, two such 
hearings were held in which he had the opportunity to respond to the Board's 
rationale for nonrenewal.  After considering all of the evidence, the court held that the 
school district had complied with the Administrators' Act.  Principals in Kansas are 
also covered by the Evaluation of Certified Personnel Act, K.S.A. 72-9003, which 
provides that a school board must adopt a written evaluation policy and file it with the 
State Board of Education.  K.S.A. 72-9004(f) further provides that "the contract of 
any person subject to evaluation shall not be nonrenewed on the basis of 
incompetence unless an evaluation of such person has been made prior to notice of 
nonrenewal of the contract..."  The court found that the school board had complied 
with this statute as well.  Peterson had been evaluated and received a copy of his 
evaluation on or about February 10, 1986.  Peterson also claimed he had a statutory 
property right in the form of an implied contract with the school district.  He argued 
that he was entitled to notice of any deficiencies in his job performance and an 
opportunity to improve.  Peterson based this on the past practice of the superintendent 
of assisting principals by making them aware of problems that could lead to 
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nonrenewal.  Peterson admitted that the perceived problems he was having with his 
staff had been brought to his attention in the fall of 1984 by the assistant 
superintendent.  Thus, even if Peterson had implied contractual rights to notice of and 
the opportunity to improve his alleged deficiencies, the court could find no indication 
that the school district had failed to honor those rights.  The court next addressed 
Peterson's claim that his meetings with the school board in April did not afford him 
procedural due process as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Peterson argued 
that he was entitled to, among other things, the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, the opportunity to be represented by counsel and a hearing conducted by a 
fair-minded and impartial decision-maker.  The court noted that the "law is clearly 
established that fourteenth amendment due process 'requires some kind of hearing' 
prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property 
interest in his employment" (p. 833).  However, due process does not have to be a full 
evidentiary hearing prior to termination.  As required by statute, Peterson had been 
afforded a meeting with the Board where he had an opportunity to hear the reasons 
for the Board's intent to nonrenew and to respond to those reasons.  The court here 
believed that the procedures provided in K.S.A. 72-5452 and K.S.A. 72-5453 were 
sufficient to protect the property interest of a school administrator.  Finally, the court 
addressed Peterson's claims of a violation of his liberty interests.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment concept of liberty recognizes a public employee's interest in the 
protection of his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.  In order to establish a 
liberty interest, Peterson had to show that:  (1) he was stigmatized in connection with 
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his termination; (2) the stigma arose from substantially false characterizations of him 
or his conduct; and (3) the damaging characterizations were made public through 
channels other than litigation.  Peterson claimed that his private and professional 
reputations were damaged by his termination.  He claimed that the superintendent 
knew of rumors that related to his alleged behavior and that board members added to 
those rumors when they stated that there was "a very good reason" for his nonrenewal. 
He also claimed that the Board did not allow him the opportunity to clear his name.  
The court found nothing in the evidence to show that the manner in which Peterson's 
contract had been nonrenewed would implicate a liberty interest.  After the court 
reviewed all of the evidence, it held that it could find "no indication beyond 
Peterson's conclusory allegations that rumors were created, furthered or publicly 
disseminated by the school district" (p. 835).  Thus, the court found no violation of 
Peterson's liberty interest.  The school district's motion for summary judgment was 
granted.    
 
Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D. 305, Salina, Kansas 
869 F.2d 555 (10th Cir. 1989) 
 
James Pitts was a tenured physical education teacher at Lincoln Junior High 
School.  On April 26, 1984, three students reported that Pitts was intoxicated to Vice 
Principal Don Heath.  When Heath investigated, he found that Pitts was hung over 
from consuming alcohol the previous night.  Rumors of Pitts' condition became 
widespread in the school and the assistant superintendent received a number of 
 
303 
 
complaints from parents.  As a result of the complaints, Pitts was suspended with pay 
for two school days.  Pitts was cleared in a formal hearing and returned to work.  On 
November 24, 1984, the school board passed a resolution not to renew Pitts' contract 
for the 1985-86 school year.  There were numerous grounds cited, but those grounds 
were "not relevant" to the court's decision and so were not discussed.  The resolution 
of intent to nonrenew was the first step in the process required by Kansas law to 
terminate a tenured teacher.  Pitts received notice of the Board's decision as well as an 
outline of his procedural rights.  Pitts requested a due process hearing.  In April of 
1985, before the hearing committee met, Pitts filed a lawsuit in court under 42 U.S.C. 
Section 1983 against the school board of Salina and a number of individuals alleging 
that his property and liberty interests were violated when he was discharged without 
due process.  He also charged the defendants with a conspiracy in violation of 42 
U.S.C. Section 1985(3).  The hearing committee held a prehearing conference in May, 
which neither Pitts nor his counsel attended.  In a letter dated July 25, 1985, Pitts 
indicated that he was waiving his right under Kansas law to the pretermination 
hearing.  In September, the Board finalized its decision to nonrenew Pitts' contract.  
With regard to his court action, the district court dismissed the action on the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment.  The district court first held that Pitts' 
initial two-day suspension was not a violation of property without due process 
because he had been suspended with pay.  The district court also found that Pitts' 
termination had not deprived him of property without due process because he waived 
his due process rights when he refused to take advantage of the procedural due 
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process rights he was afforded under Kansas law.  Pitts appealed the district court 
decision. 
In addressing Pitts' first claim that the two-day suspension was a denial of 
property without due process, the appellate court cited Bailey v. Kirk, 777 F.2d 567, 
575 (10th Cir. 1977) and noted that "while suspension of a public employee without 
pay may infringe upon a property right, the two-day suspension with pay did not 
deprive Pitts of any measurable property interest."  Id. at 575.  Next, the court turned 
to the claim that Pitts had been deprived of property without due process, and that 
some of the grounds listed by the Board deprived him of a liberty interest by 
stigmatizing him.  K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. outlines the procedural steps required 
before a tenured teacher may be dismissed.  Pitts was fully informed of these rights.  
Because Pitts knowingly failed to take advantage of those procedures, he waived his 
right to challenge them in federal court.  Pitts argued that this holding required him to 
exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding to federal court and he 
believed that he should exempt from any exhaustion requirement.  The appellate court 
stated that Pitts misunderstood the nature of his federal claim.  He asserted that he 
was denied due process.  The purpose of a federal court is not to determine the merits 
of a discharge decision, but to "ensure that employees are provided due process when 
the decision is made" (p. 557).  Therefore, the holding of the appellate court was not 
that Pitts had to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing his case to 
federal court, but that unless state law failed to provide him with adequate due 
process, he had no federal constitutional claim to begin with.  When he waived his 
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right to a hearing, Pitts "deprived the school board of the opportunity to provide him 
with due process, and he gave up his right to test the correctness of the Board's 
decision" (p. 557).  Pitts also argued that the defendants' actions constituted a 
conspiracy in violation of U.S.C. 42 Section 1985(3).  The appellate court found that 
the district court had correctly dismissed this claim for a failure to allege any "class-
based animus" behind the conspiracy.  The judgment of the district court was 
affirmed.   
 
Unruh v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 300 
775 P.2d 171 (Kan. 1989) 
 
Marcia Unruh was a tenured teacher for U.S.D. 300.  She had been a learning 
disabilities teacher for the Ki-Com Special Services Cooperative from 1977 through 
1986.  On April 9, 1986, the school board notified Unruh of its intention to nonrenew 
her teaching contract for the 1986-87 school year.  The reasons given were a failure to 
obey reasonable rules and consistent below-expectation ratings in the areas of 
instructional procedures, management skills, and professional relationships.  In a 
letter dated April 14, 1986, Unruh requested a due process hearing and demanded that 
the school board state the specific actions constituting the grounds for her nonrenewal.  
The director of special education, Mary Ann Jones, responded with a letter dated June 
30, 1986, which included a four-page document that provided examples of Unruh's 
actions.  The school board had given Jones the responsibility of responding to 
Unruh's letter.  The due process hearing committee conducted a series of hearings in 
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September and November of 1986.  Four witnesses testified on the Board's behalf and 
fifteen witnesses testified on behalf of Unruh.  In April of 1987, a majority of the 
hearing committee found that the school board had produced substantial evidence to 
support the reasons for nonrenewal on the grounds that Unruh had failed to obey 
reasonable rules and received below-expectation ratings in the areas of management 
skills and professional relationships.  The committee unanimously found the board 
had not presented sufficient evidence supporting their allegation that Unruh was 
consistently below expectations in the area of instructional procedures.  On June 1, 
1987, the school board considered the hearing committees' decision.  After 
approximately 15-20 minutes in open session, the board unanimously adopted a 
resolution to nonrenew Unruh's contract.  Unruh appealed to the district court.  The 
district court found in favor of Unruh.  In doing so, the district court found that none 
of the board members attended the due process hearing, they did not read or review 
the transcript of testimony from the hearing, nor did they have the contents of the 
record made known to them.  The district court further held that the school board 
made its final resolution to nonrenew Unruh's contract solely on the recommendations 
of the administrators without any attempt to make an independent review of the facts 
presented at the due process hearing.  The district court ordered Unruh reinstated at 
the same classification, rank and salary she would have been entitled if her 
employment had not been interrupted.  The school board appealed the judgment of 
the district court claiming that:  (1) the court erred in finding that the school board 
had not conducted a good faith review that satisfied the requirements of due process; 
 
307 
 
(2) the court erred in finding the decision of the board was not supported by 
substantial evidence; and (3) the district court had not applied the appropriate 
standard of review in examining the school board's decision.  
The appellate court first addressed the issue of whether the school board had 
conducted a good faith review that satisfied the requirements of due process when 
they considered the decision to nonrenew Unruh's contract.  K.S.A. 72-5443(c), at the 
time of this case, required that once the decision of the hearing committee was made, 
it was to be submitted to the teacher and the school board.  If members of the hearing 
committee were not unanimous in their decision, the board was required to "consider 
the opinion, hear oral arguments or receive written briefs from the teacher and a 
representative of the board, and decide whether the contract of the teacher shall be 
renewed or terminated."  Haddock v. U.S.D. No. 462, 233 Kan. 66, 661 P.2d 668 
(1983) held that once the hearing committee's decision is rendered, the school board 
acts as a quasi-judicial body in reviewing its prior decision to nonrenew a contract.  In 
so doing, the board must become more objective, "abandon its role as prosecutor…, 
and make a good faith review of its previous tentative decision in light of the case 
presented to the hearing committee."  Haddock at 78.  While the Teacher Tenure Law 
does not require the school board read the entire transcript of the due process hearing, 
the board must consider all information available from the hearing.  Procedural due 
process requires that the decision be made in a manner that "does not offend the basic 
concept of fundamental fairness" (p. 174).  In the case at hand, none of the school 
board members read any of the record from the hearing committee proceedings.  
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There was only a brief discussion at the school board meeting following receipt of the 
hearing committee's recommendation.  As the hearing committee's decision was not 
unanimous, K.S.A. 72-5443(c) outlined specific tasks the board was required to 
undertake.  Although the school board received the hearing committee's 
recommendation, oral arguments were not presented by counsel; instead, the written 
briefs of closing arguments filed with the committee were presented to the school 
board.  Only one board member could even recall reading the brief.  All of the school 
board members indicated during testimony in district court that they had acted upon 
the recommendation of district administrators.  There was no evidence that a 
summary of the evidence presented at the due process hearing was made available to 
the board members.  No executive session was held to review any of the evidence.  
There was nothing to show that the school board looked beyond the recommendation 
of its administrators and the brief of its own attorney when it made its final decision 
to nonrenew Unruh's teaching contract.  The appellate court found that this failure 
offended the "basic concept of fundamental fairness and deprived [Unruh] of property 
without due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 176).  The 
appellate court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the school board had 
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.  The appellate court did not find it 
necessary to consider the other issues raised by the school district on appeal because 
of its finding on this matter.  Therefore, the judgment of the district court was 
affirmed.             
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Ware v. Unified School District No. 492, Butler County, Kansas 
881 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1989) 
 
After working for the school district for sixteen years, nine of which were as 
the superintendent's secretary, Norma Ware was fired.  Ware had also served as clerk 
of the board of education from 1968 until her dismissal on April 8, 1980.  The year 
before she was terminated, the superintendent, Larry Geil, and the school board had 
developed a plan for a proposed bond issue to raise funds for new construction of a 
new school building and for maintenance and repairs to old ones.  Ware agreed with 
most of the bond proposal, but in some discussions with board members and district 
patrons, she had expressed her displeasure of the proposal to seek money for certain 
repairs.  Geil had two conversations with Ware regarding the bond issue.  In February 
of 1980, Geil asked why Ware opposed the bond issue and she told him of her 
concerns with the portion that was to pay for maintenance work.  After that 
conversation, Ware stopped calling patrons and talking openly about the bond issue.  
The second conversation took place on April 2, 1980, when Geil told Ware he was 
going to recommend that the board not renew her contract.  Geil gave Ware three 
reasons for his recommendation:  poor working relationships in the office; his belief 
that working on the bond issue would upset Ware; and Ware's resistance to typing, 
authority, computers and changes in the office.  That evening Ware and her husband 
called several school board members complaining that Ware was being fired for her 
disagreement on the bond issue.  The next day, Geil had the locks on the school 
district offices changed and did not give Ware a key.  At the April 8 school board 
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meeting, the board reviewed employment contracts for all non-certified personnel.  
The board went into executive session where Geil made a formal recommendation not 
to renew Ware's contract.  He gave several reasons for his recommendation, including 
his belief that he and Ware could not work together.  One board member, Dale 
Remsburg, moved to reject Geil's recommendation regarding Ware's contract, but his 
motion was voted down.  A second motion to accept all of Geil's recommendations 
passed with a four to three vote.  Ware brought suit against the school district and 
Geil alleging she had been terminated in retaliation of her exercise of free speech 
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  The district court 
determined that Ware's speech was protected but entered a directed verdict for the 
school board.  The court concluded that Ware had presented no evidence showing her 
speech had played a part in the school board's decision to terminate her contract.  The 
district court also granted Geil's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
(j.n.o.v.) following a jury verdict against him.  In granting the j.n.o.v., the court held 
that Ware had failed to present sufficient evidence proving that her speech was a 
motivating factor in Geil's decision to fire her.  Ware appealed. 
The court first addressed the issue of whether Ware's speech on the bond issue 
was constitutionally protected.  Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 
L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) held that in determining whether a public employee's speech is 
protected, a court had to first consider whether the speech related to a matter of public 
concern, that was, "a matter of political, social, or other concern to the community."  
Ware met that burden with evidence that the bond issue was a matter of community 
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interest.  Once it has been shown that the matter was one of public concern, the court 
must balance the interest of the employee with that of the employer in maintaining the 
efficiency of its public services.  In Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 
S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), the court held that an employee's First 
Amendment rights were protected "unless the employer shows that some restriction is 
necessary to prevent the disruption of official functions or to insure effective 
performance by the employee."  In reviewing the record of this case, the appellate 
court found no evidence that Ware's speech interfered with the functioning of Geil's 
office or impeded the performance of Ware or those with whom she worked.  
Therefore, the appellate court determined that Ware's speech was entitled to First 
Amendment protection.  Next, the court addressed the district court's decision to 
overturn the jury verdict against Geil.  In order to render a judgment n.o.v., the court 
must have evidence that is so strong that "reasonable minds could not differ" (p. 911).  
Further, it must be shown that the jury verdict was supported by sheer speculation 
with no factual support.  For each of the reasons Geil gave for his recommendation 
that Ware be dismissed, Ware was able to show evidence to the contrary.  Geil 
claimed his decision was based partly on poor working relationships in the office, but 
Marguerite Banks, who worked as a secretary in the office with Ware and Geil, 
described the office atmosphere as friendly.  Banks further testified that she thought 
Geil and Ware's relationship remained pleasant even after the bond issue.  Ware also 
presented evidence that demonstrated the high quality of her job performance.  She 
received a raise every year of her employment and Geil had never criticized her.  The 
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court further noted evidence in the form of statements by Geil indicating he was not 
happy with Ware's stance on the bond issue.  In light of this evidence, the appellate 
court concluded that the district court had erred when it determined Ware's evidence 
was insufficient.  Therefore, the grant of j.n.o.v. in favor of Geil was reversed.  
Finally, the appellate court addressed Ware's claim that the district court erred in 
granting a directed verdict for the school board.  Ware believed she had presented 
sufficient evidence to impose liability on the board for Geil's illegal actions.  In order 
to state a claim for liability, there must be a direct causal connection between the acts 
of the governing body and the alleged constitutional deprivation.  This connection can 
be established when the governing body delegates its decision-making authority to 
the official whose conduct caused the harm or when the governing body retains its 
authority but acts with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those 
affected by its decisions.  The appellate court believed that the evidence presented 
was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the school board had delegated its power to 
fire Ware to Geil.  Geil changed the locks to Ware's office the day after he told her he 
was going to recommend her dismissal and five days before the school board's 
decision.  That could lead a jury to believe Geil considered his decision to be final.  
During testimony, a board member stated that when Geil was hired it was with the 
understanding that he could choose his immediate secretary.  The court also found 
evidence to support Ware's claim that even if the school board retained its decision-
making authority, it acted with deliberate indifference to Ware's First Amendment 
rights.  The record provided evidence showing the board members knew about Ware's 
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disagreement with parts of the bond issue and that they had been told Ware believed 
her termination was in retaliation for her opinions of the bond.  The school board 
made no independent investigation into Ware's concerns and they did not ask Geil 
any questions about the matter.  In the appellate court's opinion, this was sufficient 
evidence for a jury to question whether the school board had acted with deliberate 
indifference.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded with 
instructions to reinstate the jury verdict against Geil and for further proceedings in the 
directed verdict decision for the school board.     
 
Ware v. Unified School District No. 492, Butler County, Kansas 
902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1990) 
 
In the previous Ware case, the appellate court reversed a directed verdict in 
favor of the school board on Norma Ware's claim that she was dismissed in violation 
of her First Amendment rights.  The school board filed for a rehearing alleging that 
under Kansas law the school board, not school superintendent Larry Geil, was the 
final decision-maker regarding Ware's employment and there had been no delegation 
of authority.  The board also argued that the court had erred when it applied the 
deliberate indifference standard. 
The appellate court turned to a recent Supreme Court decision in Jett v. Dallas 
Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), to help it 
decide the question of whether the board was liable for the termination of Ware's 
contract.  The court in the previous Ware case held that the board had delegated its 
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authority to Superintendent Geil who then made the final decision.  However, after 
reviewing the Jett decision, the appellate court concluded that state law provides the 
school board with final decision-making authority.  It further held that the board in 
this case had not delegated this authority to Geil.  The Supreme Court in Jett found 
that a local government entity could only be held liable for decisions made by 
officials who have authority under state law to speak as final decision makers on an 
issue.  The school board in this case argued that it was the final authority, it did not 
delegate its authority to Geil and it should not be held liable for approving Geil's 
decision because it had no notice of the motive underlying his decision.  The court 
agreed that the school board was indeed the final decision-making authority and 
turned to the issue of whether the board could be held liable under section 1983 for 
the alleged constitutional deprivation that arose from its decision to fire Ware.  In 
spite of the board's argument to the contrary, the court reaffirmed its previous 
decision that the deliberate indifference standard was the appropriate one to use in 
this case to determine whether a "direct causal link" existed between the alleged 
deprivation of Ware's First Amendment rights and the board's decision, as final 
policymaker, to fire her.  The appellate court believed there was evidence in the 
record to support Ware's claim that the board had acted with deliberate indifference.  
There was evidence showing that board members knew about Ware's opinions on the 
bond issue and some had been told that Ware believed her termination was because of 
her contrary opinions.  The school board made no independent investigation into the 
termination and did not ask Geil any questions about his reasons for the 
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recommendation.  School boards are charged with the knowledge that an employee 
may not be fired for a lawful exercise of a first amendment right.  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence on the issue to create a jury 
question as to whether the board had acted with deliberate indifference.   
  
Gaylord v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 218, Morton 
County 
794 P.2d 307 (Kan. App. 1990) 
 
Steve Gaylord's teaching contract for the 1987-88 school year was renewed by 
the Board in April of 1987.  Gaylord wanted to explore other employment 
opportunities and scheduled a job interview for May 21, 1987.  He requested personal 
leave for that day but it was denied by his principal, Steve Barnes, because it fell 
during the last week of school.  The negotiated agreement forbade teacher absences 
the first or last week of any semester.  Barnes told Gaylord that the only person who 
could approve his personal leave request during that time period was the 
superintendent, Kenneth Fowler.  Gaylord submitted his request to Fowler and it was 
denied.  Gaylord's wife called Barnes on the morning of May 21, said that Gaylord 
was sick, and would not be at work.  Later that day, a high school principal in Texas 
called Barnes to request a recommendation for Gaylord.  From the conversation, 
Barnes discovered that Gaylord had been in Texas interviewing for a job that morning.  
The next day, Gaylord completed a sick leave form for his May 21 absence and 
attached a physician's note.  Fowler called Gaylord to his office, told him he knew 
about his interview in Texas, requested his keys, and told him to leave school 
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property.  Later, the Board notified Gaylord of their intent to nonrenew his contract.  
The reasons given were insubordination, failure to follow Board policy, and abusive 
treatment of students.  Gaylord called for a due process hearing.  The due process 
panel determined, by a two to one vote, that there was just cause to terminate 
Gaylord's contract on the finding of insubordination.  The panel unanimously 
concluded that there was insufficient evidence of the other two charges.  Following 
the statutory mandate found in K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. to review less than unanimous 
decisions of a hearing panel, the Board considered the opinion and voted to terminate 
Gaylord's contract.  Gaylord appealed to the district court, which affirmed the Board's 
decision.  Gaylord next appealed to the Court of Appeals.  He argued that there was 
not sufficient evidence to support the finding of insubordination and that the Board's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious. 
Under K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.a board of education must follow certain 
procedures in order to terminate the contract of a tenured teacher.  K.S.A. 72-5443 
provides in part that when more than one reason is given for a nonrenewal or 
termination, and the hearing committee is unanimous on one or more reasons but not 
on another, the board "is required to adopt the unanimous portions of the committee's 
decision and may make its own decision on the nonunanimous portions."  In this case, 
the only issue the court had to review was the charge of insubordination.  
Insubordination is defined as "disobedience to constituted authority.  Refusal to obey 
some order which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed" (p. 309 citing 
Black's Law Dictionary).  Gaylord requested a personal day off during a time 
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prohibited by the negotiated agreement and was denied twice.  When he did not get 
permission, he had his wife call in sick for him and drove to Texas for a job interview.  
Upon his return, he filled out an absence sheet claiming he had been ill that day.  
Upon review of these facts, the court found that there was "substantial evidence" to 
support the finding of insubordination.  The court also held that the Board had acted 
within the scope of its authority, and found no evidence that the Board had acted in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner.  The decision of the district court was affirmed.   
 
Mason v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 209 
741 F. Supp. 879 (D. Kan. 1990) 
 
Jones Mason had been employed as an elementary principal and a high school 
counselor for five years.  On April 9, 1987, the Board sent two notices of nonrenewal 
to Mason informing him that his contract would not be renewed for the 1987-88 
school year.  At its meeting on April 13, 1987, the Board voted to extend Mason's 
contract another year with his duties divided 55% as elementary principal and 45% as 
high school counselor.  Mason's employment was governed by a single contract titled 
"Principal's Contract for Moscow Public Schools."  In April of 1988, Mason was 
notified by letter that the Board had voted that his contract as an administrator not be 
renewed for the 1988-89 school year.  The letter explained Mason's right to request a 
meeting in executive session with the Board at which time the Board would specify 
the reasons for its decision.  The letter also cited a provision of the Administrator's 
Act that states neither side shall have the right to have counsel present at the meeting.  
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The letter did not mention the portion of Mason's contract that dealt with his duties as 
a counselor.  The Board held a meeting and Mason was told the Board's reasons for 
his nonrenewal and he was given a chance to respond.  At this meeting, the Board 
also told Mason that he was not being renewed as a high school counselor and that no 
additional hearing would be provided to him.  Mason brought a civil rights action 
under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the school board and the board president 
alleging that the Board's nonrenewal of his contract as a teacher violated K.S.A. 72-
5436 et seq. and denied him due process.  The Board first filed a motion of summary 
judgment in which it argued that Mason had "post-deprivation remedies under state 
law which adequately redress[ed] him for any denial of due process" (p. 881).  The 
Board and defendant William Preheim, school board president, joined in a second 
motion for summary judgment arguing that Mason had to show that the Board's 
actions were taken as a result of a practice or policy of the Board and that Preheim 
was entitled to qualified immunity.   
The court first addressed the Board's motion on the adequacy of post-
deprivation state law remedies.  It held that "in the present case the State is 
undeniably in a position to provide predeprivation process, since it has done so under 
the Teachers' Due Process Act, K.S.A. 72-5436, et seq., and the Administrators' Act, 
K.S.A. 72-5451 et seq."  (p. 882).  Therefore, post-deprivation remedies alone would 
not sufficiently protect Mason's property interest in employment.  For that reason, the 
court denied the Board's first motion for summary judgment.  The court next 
addressed the second motion.  The court first rejected the Board's argument that 
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Mason had to prove that the Board's denial of his due process rights was the result of 
an existing Board practice, instead of an isolated decision.  In Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 
475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), the Supreme Court held that 
"...a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 for a single decision by its 
properly constituted legislative body - whether or not that body had taken similar 
action in the past or intended to do so in the future..."  Id. at 479-80.  The Board, in 
this case being the legislative body, had decided not to renew Mason's contract 
without affording him the procedural protections under K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.  Thus, 
the Board's argument was without merit.  Next, the court turned to the issue of 
whether Preheim was entitled to good faith immunity on the grounds that Mason's 
right to the procedures under the Teacher's Due Process Act was not clearly 
established at the time of his renewal.  Preheim argued that because Mason had 
responsibilities as both an administrator and a teacher, and because the Board acted 
on the advice of legal counsel, it was not clear whether Mason was entitled to the 
process under the Teacher's Due Process Act.  Qualified immunity provides that a 
government official is "generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as 
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known" (p. 884).  The burden is on the 
plaintiff to prove that the law was "clearly established" and to show how the 
defendants' conduct violated this clearly established law.  Neither the Administrators' 
Act nor the Teachers' Due Process Act address or offer guidance on the type of 
situation presented in this case.  Mason was both an administrator and a teacher under 
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a single contract.  In fact, the statutory definition of a teacher excludes anyone who is 
an administrator, but the definition of an administrator does not exclude anyone who 
is a teacher.  The court found that it was "objectively reasonable for an official faced 
with applying two distinct procedural acts for nonrenewal of an employee's contract 
to believe that compliance with one act is sufficient and to opt for conformance with 
that act appearing to be most applicable to the employee's circumstances" (p. 886).  
The court also held that it was not a matter of "clearly established law" that the 
procedures in the Administrators' Act would not provide due process to Mason.  
Because Mason was unable to show that it was clearly established that only the 
procedures of the Teachers' Due Process Act would have met the constitutional 
requirement of due process, the court found that Preheim was entitled to summary 
judgment on his defense of qualified immunity.  The Board's motions for summary 
judgment were denied in both instances.   
 
O'Hair v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 300, Comanche 
County 
805 P.2d 40 (Kan. App. 1990) 
 
Carl O'Hair was a tenured teacher whose contract was nonrenewed because of 
a Board-directed policy to reduce the budget following a loss in the school district's 
assessed valuation.  At the time of his nonrenewal, O'Hair was a part-time assistant 
principal at Coldwater High School and taught three classes.  After he was 
nonrenewed, other administrators assumed his administrative duties and three other 
tenured teachers with less seniority than O'Hair took over his classes.  After he 
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received notice of his nonrenewal, O'Hair requested a hearing that was held on 
January 30, 1989.  At the hearing, O'Hair presented evidence alleging he could have 
been given a full schedule if he had been allowed to teach physical education and 
American History at the other high school in the district.  The Board presented 
evidence explaining the procedure they followed before recommending O'Hair be 
nonrenewed.  The hearing committee voted 2-1 in support of the Board's decision to 
nonrenew O'Hair.  The Board heard the arguments of counsel on the findings of the 
hearing committee on February 15, 1989, but no action was taken at that meeting.  
Before the next meeting on March 6, 1989, Superintendent James Chadwick prepared 
a resolution confirming O'Hair's contract nonrenewal.  At the March 6 meeting, the 
Board went into executive session, discussed the nonrenewal issue with the 
superintendent and reviewed the exhibits that had been presented to the due process 
committee.  The Board returned to an open meeting and voted unanimously to 
approve O'Hair's nonrenewal.  O'Hair appealed to the district court.  The district court 
reversed the Board's decision and found that (1) the preparation of the resolution in 
advance of the hearing precluded due process and showed that the Board had acted in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner; (2) the Board's failure to examine O'Hair's 
competence and training, as well as that of the teachers who replaced him, was 
arbitrary and capricious; (3) no good cause was shown for O'Hair's nonrenewal 
because the three teachers who took on his classes had less seniority than did O'Hair 
and one, John McNeely, was not certified to teach American history: (4) there was no 
evidence that O'Hair was not competent; (5) the Board failed to consider O'Hair for 
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other full- or part-time positions for which he was certified; and (6) the decision to 
nonrenew O'Hair was made in executive session which violated K.S.A. 75-4319 and 
was another example of how the decision to nonrenew O'Hair's contract was arbitrary, 
unreasonable, and capricious.  The Board was ordered to reinstate O'Hair and pay him 
the salary and fringe he would have been due had he been an employee.  The Board 
appealed the decision. 
The first question addressed by the Court of Appeals, was whether the Board's 
decision to nonrenew O'Hair had been properly reached.  Board policy GBQA dealt 
with the procedures to follow in case of the need for a reduction in teaching staff.  A 
review of this policy and of the record from the due process hearing showed the court 
that "ample evidence" had been presented to indicate that school administrators had 
followed Board policy in choosing O'Hair's contract for nonrenewal.  The 
administrators had first looked to see if there were any nontenured teachers who 
could be dismissed.  Once it was found that there were none, the administrators 
evaluated the teaching skills and abilities of the tenured teachers in relation to the 
district's need to maintain existing programs.  Every teacher was assessed to 
determine if his or her termination would still allow the district to continue a program.  
The only person who met those criteria was O'Hair.  The administrators next looked 
to see if O'Hair could bump someone who was in another position that O'Hair could 
teach.  After this process, the administrators determined that O'Hair was one of the 
employees who would fit into the reduction in force.  The court found the record 
showed that the trial court was incorrect in its finding that the school district had not 
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considered O'Hair's competence, skill and training.  It was true that they had not 
assessed the various levels of competence among all employees, but that was not 
required by Board policy.  O'Hair contended that he could have had a full schedule if 
the Board had allowed him to teach American history and high school physical 
education.  To do this, the Board would have had to place three tenured teachers on 
part-time contracts.  In Butler v. U.S.D. No. 440, 244 Kan. 458, 769 P.2d 651 (1989), 
the court considered the question of whether a school district had to reduce some 
teachers to part-time in order to retain a tenured teacher.  The court in Butler held that 
"in the absence of bad faith, a board is not required to make such a drastic 
rearrangement of its teaching assignments."  Id. at 470.  Citing the court's finding in 
Butler, the appellate court held here that the Board could not be required to force 
three tenured teachers to become part-time teachers in order to accommodate one 
tenured teacher, O'Hair.  The court also noted that there was nothing in either 
Continuing Contract Law, K.S.A. 72-5410 et seq., or the Due Process Procedure Act, 
K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq., stating that a reduction in size of a teaching staff must be 
accomplished on a seniority basis.  The court did find it "troubling" that although 
administrators thought McNeely was fully certified to teach American history, he was 
not.  The evidence showed that an inquiry had been made to the State Department of 
Education by administrators and it was believed that he was certified.  The court 
determined that in this circumstance, there was no finding of bad faith on the part of 
the Board to retain McNeely, as it did not appear that the educational opportunities of 
students were compromised by allowing him to teach American history.   
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The next question for the court to decide was whether the actions of the Board 
in considering the opinion of the hearing committee violated O'Hair's due process 
rights.  The Board president had testified that each member of the Board read the 
transcript of the hearing committee and listened to the arguments from counsel for the 
teacher and the school district.  No one testified that they had acted only on the 
superintendent's recommendation.  The appellate court determined that the 
superintendent's involvement, and his writing of a resolution prior to the March 6 
meeting, was "inadvisable," but it did not amount to a due process violation.  The 
appellate court further held the district court's finding that the decision to nonrenew 
O'Hair's contract had been made by the Board either before or during executive 
session was incorrect.  The Board president's deposition clearly stated that no 
decision was reached during executive session and that all of the evidence was 
discussed.  When the executive session ended, the Board voted in open session that 
O'Hair's contract be nonrenewed.  The action was not taken in closed or executive 
session so the Kansas Open Meetings act had not been violated.  The subject 
discussed in executive session was "personnel matters of non-elected personnel," 
which is allowed under K.S.A. 75-4319(b)(1).  Although the Board indicated that 
consensus was reached in executive session as to how each member intended to vote, 
the motion and the action all took place in an open meeting.  The decision of the 
district court was reversed and the decision of the Board to nonrenew O'Hair's 
contract was reinstated.         
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Unified School District No. 457, Finney County, Kansas v. Phifer 
729 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Kan. 1990) 
 
Jimmy Phifer served as superintendent of schools beginning on July 1, 1984.  
He was then given a two-year contract that began on July 1, 1985.  During his time as 
superintendent, Phifer submitted monthly requests for reimbursement that totaled 
$116,000 during the first twenty months of his employment.  On March 31, 1986, the 
local newspaper published an article that discussed Phifer's problems with personal 
debt.  Later articles questioned some of the reimbursements Phifer had received from 
the school district.  The school board held a special meeting on April 2, 1986, in 
which the board decided that any insinuation of impropriety by Phifer would be 
investigated by an independent auditor.  On April 9, 1986, the board decided to hire a 
local accounting firm to handle the investigation into the reimbursements paid to 
Phifer.  On April 12, 1986, Phifer submitted a letter of resignation to the school board.  
In his letter Phifer stated that his resignation was conditioned on stipulations that he 
be placed on paid leave until June 30, 1986 and that his insurance continue until that 
time as well.  Phifer also requested that he be paid for any unused vacation leave.  He 
explained that he was resigning due to the series of "false and malicious articles" that 
had appeared in the local newspaper.  Phifer and his wife left town on April 13, 1986, 
for Arizona and never returned.  The school board met on April 14 and accepted 
Phifer's resignation on his stated conditions but withheld payment of the money he 
requested until the district's investigation was concluded.  The board's attorney sent a 
letter to Phifer dated April 15, 1986, which informed him of the board's decision.  
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The letter included language explaining that the board would "suspend or otherwise 
escrow in a special account the balance of the contract remuneration as called for 
under the terms of accepted resignation pending a satisfactory conclusion of the 
special investigations currently being conducted" (p. 1302).  The investigation was 
completed and the auditors reported on May 28, 1986, that Phifer owed the school 
district at least $15,178.65.  A copy of the audit was mailed to Phifer who responded 
in a letter dated June 24, 1986, to the items listed.  On March 10, 1987, the county 
attorney filed a seventeen count criminal complaint against Phifer in the district court.  
He was charged with multiple counts of theft of funds and presenting false claims to 
the school district.  On April 20, 1987, the school board voted to rescind its 
conditional acceptance of Phifer's resignation and to terminate him for a material 
breach of contract.  The school district brought suit against Phifer seeking damages 
on claims of wrongful conversion of district property and breach of contract.  Phifer 
brought a countersuit claiming that the school district had breached a contract to him 
to pay him additional earned and unearned salary and vacation pay.  Phifer also 
claimed that the district had deprived him of a protected property interest and/or 
liberty interest without due process of law.  The school district moved for summary 
judgment.   
In order to state a claim for due process, the claimant must show that he was 
deprived of an interest within the Fourteenth Amendment's protected institutions of 
property or liberty.  Generally, a public employee hired for a definite term has a 
property interest in continued employment.  The school district argued that Phifer lost 
 
327 
 
any property interest he may have had when he resigned.  Phifer claimed that his 
resignation was conditioned upon certain terms and, because those terms were not 
unconditionally accepted, his contractual stake in the superintendent position 
continued until the school board voted to terminate his contract.  At issue was 
whether Phifer's resignation ended any interest he might have reasonably had in 
continued employment.  After his resignation, Phifer never attempted to act as 
superintendent nor ever demanded his job back.  He left town the day after he 
resigned and moved out of state.  The court found nothing ambiguous about either 
parties' intent after April 14, 1986.  Both the school district and Phifer obviously 
considered that his employment with the district had ended.  Phifer's attempt at 
building his property interest claim on the school board's conditional acceptance of 
his conditional resignation was "legally insufficient."  The school board's conditional 
acceptance did not give rise to any legitimate claim of an expectation of continued 
employment.  Thus, the board's decision to terminate Phifer did not deprive him of 
any property interest.  The court next examined whether Phifer had been deprived of 
any liberty interest.  Liberty, in public employment, consists of:  (1) the protection of 
the employee's good name and reputation, and (2) his freedom to take advantage of 
other employment opportunities.  An injury to an employee's reputation alone will not 
trigger due process protection unless it is "entangled with the loss of some more 
tangible interest, such as employment."  Phifer claimed that the "more tangible 
interest" behind in liberty claim was his contractual right to continued employment, 
which existed as a result of the school board's "ineffective" acceptance of his 
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conditional resignation.  The court again reiterated the point that no employment 
relationship existed after Phifer resigned and the school board's acceptance, 
conditional or not, of it.  In the court's opinion, Phifer voluntarily relinquished all 
rights to continued employment by submitting his resignation and no longer 
performing under his contract.  The court found no implication of a liberty interest 
and held that Phifer was without an action under Section 1983.  Finally, the court 
turned to Phifer's claims that the school district owed him for unearned salary and 
vacation pay.  Phifer based this claim on the fact that his resignation was offered 
pursuant to certain conditions that he believed the school district accepted in its April 
15 letter.  After reviewing all of the evidence, the court determined that the school 
board did not unconditionally accept Phifer's conditions; instead, it made a 
counteroffer consisting of changes to Phifer's terms.  Therefore, the school district's 
motion for summary judgment was granted.   
 
Ginwright v. Unified School District No. 457 
756 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Kan. 1991) 
 
Nadine Ginwright filed action in which she claimed that the school district 
had dismissed her from her teaching position due to her race.  Ginwright had been 
hired as an elementary school teacher in 1983 by the defendant school district.  In 
1986, she was transferred to the new Edith Scheuerman Elementary School.  At that 
time, Ginwright was the only black teacher within the school district.  During her 
time at Scheuerman, Ginwright was under the supervision of Ron Brown, the 
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principal.  When Brown introduced the new teachers at the school during an assembly, 
he referred to Ginwright as “the lady with the best suntan” (p. 1460).  Brown claimed 
that he introduced other teachers by reference to their physical characteristics in order 
to help students remember their names.  Ginwright disagreed with Brown’s statement, 
claiming that she was the only one singled out by her physical characteristics.  In 
October 1986, a conflict developed between Ginwright and a special education 
teacher.  The nature of the disagreement was disputed between parties, but Ginwright 
received an oral reprimand from Brown as a result of the problem while the white 
special education teacher did not.  Other issues were identified by the defendants as 
having occurred in 1986, including the allegation that Ginwright had abused her 
teenage daughter.  However, other than the child abuse claim, little was offered in 
terms of elaboration or explanation of these concerns.  Charges had been filed in the 
district attorney’s office against Ginwright for the abuse of her 15-year-old daughter.  
Those charges were dismissed with prejudice under a plea agreement.  The 
allegations against Ginwright did not cause the district to nonrenew Ginwright’s 
teaching contract.  She was renewed for the 1987-88 school year and her annual 
evaluation report, completed by Brown, was complementary of her teaching skills.  
Brown allegedly made other racially-oriented remarks in February of 1987.  Again, 
the parties did not agree on the nature or context of the remarks.  In the spring of 
1987, Brown was allegedly contacted by parents who complained that Ginwright 
gave too much homework, he did not name the parents and according to Ginwright, 
Brown never discussed these phone calls with her.  Other parent complaints were 
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alleged by Brown and denied by Ginwright.  In April 1987, Ginwright was suspended 
by Brown for one day because she had permitted a student to post test scores of other 
students.  Ginwright claimed that teachers had been allowed to do so in her previous 
school.  On May 27, 1987, the last day of school, Brown relieved Ginwright of her 
position as the head of the math and science department because of a parent 
complaint regarding a math competition.  Ginwright again stated that Brown had not 
discusses the complaint with her nor had he allowed her an opportunity to present her 
side of the story.  When the next school year started, Ginwright was placed on a "Plan 
of Assistance."  This plan was a seven-page document that required Ginwright to 
undergo a psychiatric examination, established a system for monitoring her classroom 
instruction, and required her to follow a program to correct her errors cited in the 
plan's "Statement of Deficiency."  This portion of the plan stated that Ginwright's 
teaching was not conducive to learning, that her behavior had been unprofessional, 
that she disregarded school rules, and that she evidenced a pattern "suggesting 
emotional instability" (p. 1467).  After receiving the plan, Ginwright underwent two 
psychiatric evaluations both which indicated that Ginwright was not a danger to 
herself or her students.  In November, Brown made his quarterly review of 
Ginwright's performance.  He stated that she needed further improvement in creating 
an atmosphere "conducive to learning," and in correcting her unprofessional behavior.  
The report did not provide any examples of misconduct on the part of Ginwright.  In 
February, Brown made his annual review of Ginwright's teaching and concluded that 
she had not "lived up to the minimum teacher expectations" (p.1468).  Again, Brown 
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provided no elaboration or specific examples to support his conclusions.  At a school 
board meeting on March 21, 1988, the assistant superintendent recommended that 
Ginwright's contract not be renewed.  The Board unanimously passed the motion to 
give Ginwright a notice of nonrenewal.  The notice of intent was given to Ginwright 
on March 22 and she was informed of her right to request a hearing.  Ginwright 
initially requested a hearing, but on May 24, 1988, her attorney informed the school 
district that she was dropping her due process hearing request and pursuing her 
remedies under federal law.  Ginwright denied the truth of the various allegations 
made against her in the plan of assistance.  She also denied the validity of the 
defendant's claims that her teaching did not meet "minimum teacher expectations."  
Ginwright claimed that the term had never been defined by the defendants and that 
Brown had never explained how her teaching deviated from these standards.  She 
brought action against the school district and certain school officials asserting claims 
under federal civil rights law and state tort law.  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment against Ginwright's civil rights action. 
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine 
all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  In this case, 
Ginwright's claims would be assumed true, unless the defendants could demonstrate 
their entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.  Because of this 
standard, the court rejected the defendant's arguments that Ginwright's claims of 
discrimination lacked evidentiary support and that she could not establish that their 
stated reasons for her termination were pretextual.  In accepting Ginwright's version 
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of the facts, the defendants showed a consistent racial motive against Ginwright 
starting on the first day of school when she was introduced as the teacher with the 
suntan.  Brown made other racial remarks in Ginwright's presence without any 
legitimate reason to do so.  The defendants could show no legitimate rationale for 
their treatment of Ginwright and offered no evidence of her teaching below minimum 
standard.  The court also found that white teachers who had been accused of similar 
deeds received no disciplinary action nor had they been placed on plans of assistance.  
For these reasons, the court denied the defendant's request for summary judgment on 
Ginwright's Title VII claims of disparate treatment and recommended that the matter 
be placed on trial.  The defendant's motion for summary judgment on a Title VII 
harassment and retaliation claims were also denied.  Although the court viewed with 
"some doubt" the strength of the plaintiff's claims on these allegations, it believed that 
the matters could be "addressed in a more satisfactory fashion at trial, where further 
evidence" (p. 1475) would be available.  The defendant's motion was also denied with 
respect to Ginwright's equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as the 
court found evidence from which an intent to discriminate could be inferred.  
Ginwright's due process claim was dismissed because the school board had extended 
the opportunity for a hearing, but Ginwright waived that opportunity in order to bring 
the action to court.  Ginwright's state tort claims of outrage, wrongful discharge, 
defamation, and breach of privacy were also denied, as she made "no great effort to 
salvage them from the defendant's attack" (p. 1476).  The court therefore ordered that 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied in part.     
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Loewen v Board of Education, School District No. 411, Marion County, 
Kansas 
813 P.2d 385 (Kan. App. 1991) 
 
Martha Loewen was a tenured Kindergarten teacher for U.S.D. No. 411.  In 
the fall of 1986, Perry McCabe, the building principal, expressed concern about 
Loewen's teaching methods and classroom management.  McCabe had been contacted 
by parents who expressed similar concerns.  After evaluations, McCabe determined 
that Loewen was an ineffective teacher who needed to be placed on a plan of 
assistance.  In April of 1987, McCabe and the superintendent, Robert Van Arsdale, 
met with Loewen and told her that although her teaching contract would be renewed 
for the following school year she would be placed on an intensive assistance plan and 
be required to submit to a physical and mental examination.  All parties agreed to 
bring in Dr. Jeri Carroll, professor of elementary and early childhood education at 
Wichita State University, to observe Loewen in the classroom and provide her with 
suggestions for improvement.  After his visits, Dr. Carroll made specific 
recommendations to Loewen and the administration and these were added into the 
plan of assistance in January of 1988.  In March of 1988, the Board decided not to 
renew Loewen's contract based on her failure to maintain the requirements of the 
assistance plan and implement Dr. Carroll's suggestions.  Written notice of the 
nonrenewal was served and Loewen requested a due process hearing.  Loewen also 
requested and was given a more specific statement from the Board providing the 
reasons for her nonrenewal.  A hearing was held on January 11, 12, and 13, 1989 with 
the majority of the hearing committee finding that Loewen should be reinstated.  The 
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Board considered the opinions of the hearing committee panel and accepted briefs 
from both parties as required by K.S.A. 72-5443.  An executive session was held in 
early August in which the members of the school board, the superintendent, McCabe, 
who was being replaced as principal, and Chet Roberts, the incoming principal, were 
present.  At the next school board meeting on August 14, 1989, the Board voted 
unanimously to affirm its earlier decision to nonrenew Loewen's contract.  Loewen 
appealed this decision to the district court.  In June of 1990, the trial court found that 
Loewen had not been denied due process, that she had received a fair and impartial 
hearing, that evidence outside the record was not considered, and that substantial 
evidence existed to justify her nonrenewal.  Loewen appealed the district court 
decision on the grounds that she had been denied due process and that the Board's 
decision was arbitrary and not supported by the evidence.   
As required by K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq., a nonrenewed tenured teacher has the 
right to a due process hearing before a three-person hearing committee.  If the hearing 
committee does not reach a unanimous decision, "the board shall consider the opinion, 
hear oral arguments or receive written briefs from the teacher and a representative of 
the board, and decide whether the contract of the teacher shall be renewed or 
terminated."  K.S.A. 72-5443(c).  Evidence and depositions of Board members 
revealed a thorough discussion of the hearing committee's transcript and a conscious 
attempt to make the best decision for all parties involved.  However, these depositions 
also showed that Board members had discussed Loewen's situation with patrons after 
the end of the due process hearings.  In Haddock v. U.S.D. No. 462, 233 Kan. 66, 661 
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P.2d 368 (1983), three board members had conducted their own outside investigations 
into the facts in a teacher nonrenewal case.  The Supreme Court found these actions 
to be a violation of due process because the teacher in the case would have had no 
opportunity to hear evidence gathered during independent investigations.  This 
procedure, according to the Supreme Court, "was fundamentally unfair."  The fact 
that Board members in this case also obtained the opinions of members of the public 
was clearly in violation of the Supreme Court's prohibition in Haddock, where it was 
stated that a teacher "whose contract is being nonrenewed is entitled to be judged 
solely on the reasons enunciated in the notice of nonrenewal.  Due process requires 
no less" 233 Kan. at 78.  Loewen also contended that the presence of the 
superintendent and the principal during the Board's executive session violated her 
right to due process.  The court pointed out that there were actually three 
administrators present, as both the former and present building principals were in 
attendance.  Kansas courts have held that allowing a superintendent to be present at 
due process deliberations is not a violation of due process.  However, the presence of 
McCabe and Roberts "severely damaged the elements of 'fundamental fairness' that 
the Board had the obligation to establish" (p. 391).  The court did not agree with the 
Board's contention that because McCabe and Van Arsdale had not been asked for 
their opinions during the meeting, their presence had no effect on due process.  
Finally, the court addressed Loewen's complaint that the Board had relied on reasons 
for nonrenewal not recorded in their notice for nonrenewal.  The court determined 
that it could not determine whether the allegation had merit based on the Board's 
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decision.  K.S.A. 72-5443(c) only requires that the Board "decide whether the 
contract of the teacher shall be renewed or terminated."  The statute does not require 
the Board to set forth its findings of fact.  In the case at hand, a majority of the 
material facts were in dispute by the parties.  For that reason, the court held that 
"when the controlling facts are disputed, as here, meaningful review cannot be made 
of a school board's decision without it either adopting the findings of the hearing 
committee or making its own specific findings upon which its conclusion is deemed 
to be justified" (p. 393).  The court did not order reinstatement of Loewen, as it 
believed there were valid factual issues presented that could jeopardize the 
educational opportunities of students.  There were also facts that could support her 
reinstatement, but the court chose not to express an opinion either way.  The decision 
of the trial court was reversed because of the procedural due process violations 
previously mentioned.  The matter was also remanded with instructions that the trial 
court remand the case to the Board for due process considerations and for the Board 
to make findings of fact upon which its decision could be justified. 
 
Thompson v. Unified School District No. 259, Wichita 
819 P.2d 1236 (Kan. App. 1991) 
 
LeRoy Thompson was a tenured avionics teacher in the vocational education 
program.  Thompson was only certified to teach avionics.  In May of 1989, the 
director of the school board's division of vocational education recommended that the 
avionics program be discontinued.  In order for the vocational department to received 
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state funding, at least 70% of its graduates had to be placed in jobs in private industry.  
The Wichita program had not come close to this placement rate and the enrollment in 
the vocational program was low.  On July 10, 1989, the Board voted to discontinue 
the avionics program and to layoff Thompson and another avionics teacher.  In a 
letter dated July 11, 1989, the school board notified Thompson that he was laid off 
effective August 11, 1989.  The letter also informed Thompson that the layoff was in 
accordance with Article XVIII of the teacher's negotiated agreement.  Thompson filed 
suit in district court claiming that his employment had been terminated unlawfully.  
He further claimed he was entitled to notice on or before April 10 of the year he was 
terminated pursuant to K.S.A. 72 5411 and K.S.A. 5437.  Thompson's final claim was 
that Article XVIII of the negotiated agreement was void because it violated state 
statutes and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.  The trial court found in 
favor of the school district.  It determined that Thompson had been laid off, not 
terminated, and the layoff was governed by Article XVIII and not by K.S.A. 72-5411 
and 72-5437.  Thompson appealed the trial court's decision.   
Article XVIII of the negotiated agreement provided that teachers whose 
positions were eliminated could be laid off.  The agreement further provided that only 
30 days written notice needed to be given in cases of teacher layoffs.  Under the 
agreement, a layoff was not to be considered a termination or nonrenewal under 
K.S.A. 72-5436 or K.S.A. 72-5411.  K.S.A. 72-5411 and 72-5437 clearly state they 
apply to teacher terminations or nonrenewals, not layoffs.  Layoff and recall of 
teachers is a mandatory negotiable topic under the Professional Negotiations Act and 
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it had been negotiated by both the Board and NEA-Wichita.  Thus, Thompson was 
bound by the negotiated agreement.  Thompson next argued that the district court's 
interpretation of the statutes resulted in a taking of his property interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment without due process.  The essential elements of due process 
are notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Under K.S.A. 72-5210 et seq. public 
school teachers have a property interest in expectancy of continued employment 
sufficient to require notice and hearing prior to nonrenewal of the contract.  In this 
case, the negotiated agreement waived the April 10 notice requirement for instances 
of teacher layoffs.  Thompson received his notice within the agreed upon 30-day time 
period and the Board had provided him with an opportunity to be heard.  Therefore, 
Thompson had been afforded the due process rights required.  The judgment of the 
district court was affirmed.   
 
Ames v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 264 
864 P. 2d 233 (Kan. 1993) 
 
A tenured teacher, Everett Ames, was notified of the board’s intent to 
nonrenew his contract after 12 years of teaching in the district.  The Board stated that 
the rationale for nonrenewal was “inadequate teaching and communication techniques 
over an extended period of time with basic resistance to change.”  Ames requested 
and was granted a due process hearing.  After conducting a full evidentiary hearing, 
the committee found that Ames probably had inadequate teaching and communication 
techniques but did not possess a resistance to change; that the evaluation procedures 
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in K.S.A. 72-9001, which is, in part, an act that provides for a “systematic method for 
improvement of school personnel in their jobs” were not followed properly; and that 
the nonrenewal was improper.  The Board adopted the committee’s findings, but still 
nonrenewed Ames’ contract without providing any further rationale for doing so.  
Ames sought judicial review of the decision and the trial court entered a judgment in 
favor of the Board.  The trial court found that the Board had adopted the decision of 
the hearing committee as required by K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 72-5443 and concluded that 
the Board’s decision was supported by the evidence introduced at the due process 
hearing.  Ames sought review of his case with the Court of Appeals. 
K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 72-5443 provides: “(b) Upon receiving the written opinion 
of the hearing committee, the board shall adopt the opinion as its decision in the 
matter and such decision shall be final, subject to appeal to the district court as 
provided in K.S.A. 60-2101, and amendments thereto.”  In this case, the Board had no 
discretion to exercise, as it was required to adopt the committee’s opinion as its own.  
While the Board stated its two reasons for nonrenewal were inadequate teaching 
techniques and resistance to change, the committee found that Ames did not resist 
change.  The committee also found that statutory evaluation procedures had not been 
followed and concluded that Ames’ nonrenewal was improper.  K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 
72-5443 mandates that the Board must adopt the committees’ opinion as its own.  If 
nonrenewal was improper, as determined by the committee, then Ames should have 
had his contract renewed.  The Appeals Court determined that the Board, and on 
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appeal the district court, did not follow K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 72-5443.  The trial court’s 
decision was reversed. 
Statute requires that a Board of Education must adopt the written opinion of a 
due process committee as its own on issues of renewal of tenured teachers.  In this 
case, the board should have reinstated Everett Ames after the hearing committee 
determined that nonrenewal was not proper.  
 
Unified School District No. 380, Marshall County v. McMillen 
845 P.2d 676 (Kan. 1993) 
 
Dwight McMillen was a tenured teacher for U.S.D. No. 380.  On April 1, 
1991, the school board adopted a resolution stating its intent to nonrenew McMillen's 
contract for the following year.  On April 19, 1991, the board notified McMillen in 
writing of their intent to nonrenew.  McMillen requested a due process hearing which 
was held in August 1991.  On October 30, 1991, the hearing committee issued its 
written opinion that, in a two-to-one decision, it had found that McMillen's contract 
should have been renewed because the school board failed to show good cause for the 
termination.  The committee concluded that McMillen should be reinstated to his 
teaching position with back pay.  On November 4, 1991, the school board adopted the 
opinion of the hearing committee as was required by K.S.A. 72-5443.  The board 
filed a notice of appeal on November 20, 1991 in district court.  The school board 
alleged that it did not agree with the opinion of the hearing committee, but was forced 
to accept it by state statute.  The school district included an allegation that K.S.A. 72-
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5443 was unconstitutional because it violated Sections 2 and 5 of Article 6 of the 
Kansas Constitution.  After the briefs were filed, the trial court held a hearing on the 
issue of the constitutionality of K.S.A. 72-5443.  The court first found that the 
authority granted to the hearing committee was not an unlawful delegation of 
legislative authority.  The court next found that K.S.A. 72-5443 did violate Sections 2 
and 5 of Article 6 because the statute removed the authority from the school board to 
make the final decision on whether a teacher's contract should be renewed.  The trial 
court further concluded that the board was not bound by the statutory requirement to 
adopt the hearing committee's decision.  McMillen appealed the district court's order 
finding K.S.A. 72-5443 unconstitutional.   
A review of the legislative history of the statute was first discussed by the 
court.  K.S.A. 72-5443 was originally adopted in 1974 and at that time, it permitted a 
board of education to accept or reject the recommendation of a hearing committee.  In 
1984, the statute was changed to state that if the hearing committee's decision was 
unanimous it had to be accepted by the board.  In 1991, the statute was amended to 
make all decisions by the hearing committee binding on a school board.  The statute 
was changed again in 1992 at which time the legislature replaced the hearing 
committee with a single hearing officer.  The decision of the hearing officer is final, 
subject to appeal by either party.  It was the 1991 amendment that was controlling 
when this case was brought to court.  The merits of McMillen's dismissal and findings 
of the hearing committee were not at issue in this case.  The question the Kansas 
Supreme Court sought to answer was whether K.S.A. 72-5443 violated the Kansas 
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Constitution.  Section 2(a) of Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution provide in part that 
the legislature shall provide for a state board of education "which shall have general 
supervision of public schools, educational institutions and all the educational interests 
of the state, except educational functions delegated by law."  Section 5 of Article 6 
discusses local public schools.  It provides in relevant part that local public schools 
under the general supervision of the state board, "shall be maintained, developed and 
operated by locally elected boards."  The school board maintained that it had a 
constitutional right to hire and fire, and K.S.A. 72-5443 was usurping this right by 
taking it out of the hands of the board and placing it in the hands of a hearing 
committee.  However, the court pointed out that Section 2 limits the power of the 
state board to "general supervision."  In State, ex rel., v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 
482, 511 P.2d 705 (1973), general supervision was defined as the "power to inspect, 
to superintend, to evaluate, and to oversee for direction."  The powers of the hearing 
committee, in the opinion of the court, did not unconstitutionally infringe on the state 
board of education's general supervision authority.  Hiring and firing teachers or other 
employees in a school district had not been considered part of the supervisory duty of 
the state board, thus K.S.A. 72-5443 did not violate Section 2(a) of Article 6 of the 
Kansas Constitution.  Next, the court addressed the school districts' claim that the 
statute violated Section 5 of Article 6.  The school district argued, and the trial court 
agreed, that the duty to "select and maintain an efficient, knowledgeable, and 
adequate teaching staff is one that devolves upon the local school board under its 
constitutional mandate to maintain, develop, and operate the local school system" (p. 
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683).  The court agreed that this argument made sense and even "appealed" to most of 
the members of the court.  However, it held that as long as a legislative enactment 
was constitutional, the members of the court could not substitute their own opinion 
for that of the legislature.  If K.S.A. 72-5443 did not clearly oppose the provisions of 
Section 5, the duty of the court was to uphold the statute.  To determine its 
constitutionality, the court weighed the power granted to the legislature by Section 1, 
Article 6 against the power granted to the school board by Section 5, Article 6.  It 
found in Article 1 that the legislature had the "broad duty" of establishing and 
maintaining the public school system.  The local school board's duties under Section 
5 were dependent upon statutory enactments of the legislature.  The court held that 
the "duties and obligations vested in the legislature and the local school boards by the 
Kansas Constitution must be read together and harmonized so both entities may carry 
out their respective obligations" (p. 685).  The court did not find that K.S.A. 72-5443 
was so irrational that it interfered with the school boards' performance of its duty to 
maintain, develop, and operate the local public school.  According to the court, the 
legislature had the power to give a hearing committee the right to make a binding 
determination on the issue of a teacher's nonrenewal and this determination was 
subject to the board's right to appeal.  The judgment of the district court was reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings.   
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McMillen v. U.S.D. No. 380, Marshall County, Kansas 
855 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1993) 
  
This court action is related to the decision in U.S.D. No. 380 v. McMillen, 252 
Kan. 451, 845 P.2d 676 (1993).  The details of that case were previously discussed 
and the case will be referred to as McMillen I.  In McMillen I, the Supreme Court of 
Kansas remanded the case to the district court for review on the merits.  While that 
case was pending in district court, Dwight McMillen filed a petition for mandamus in 
district court in which he sought an order requiring the school board to continue 
payment of his salary until his continuing contract with the district was terminated as 
a result of the appeal in district court.  The trial court denied his petition because it 
believed that the board had followed the applicable law for teacher termination.  The 
district court also reasoned that McMillen would be fully compensated if the school 
district lost its appeal and so he was protected.  McMillen appealed and the appeal 
was transferred to the Supreme Court of Kansas. 
The issue before the court was whether the school board was required to pay 
McMillen's salary past the end of the 1990-91 contract year, and if so, for how long 
thereafter.  The court relied heavily on language from Cleveland Board of Education 
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487,  84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) to determine the 
extent of due process required prior to the termination of a tenured teacher's right to 
continue to receive his salary.  In Loudermill, the court held that "all the process that 
is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-
termination administrative procedures as provided by [state] statue." 470 U.S. at 545.  
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Once a pretermination hearing is provided, an employee may be terminated as long as 
state statutes provide for a full administrative hearing thereafter.  K.S.A. 72-5436 et 
seq. establish due process procedures for tenured teachers who disagree with a school 
board's notice of intent to nonrenew their contracts.  There is nothing in Kansas 
statute requiring a nonrenewed teacher's salary be paid until all the statutory due 
proceedings are completed.  Based on Loudermill and the failure of Kansas statutes to 
address the issue, the court determined that McMillen had a right to continue to 
receive his salary until given a pretermination hearing.  A pretermination hearing 
need not be anything more than a hearing in which the teacher is advised of the 
charges and given a chance to present his or her side of the story.  In this case, 
however, no pretermination hearing was provided before or after the 1990-91 contract 
year.  The comprehensive due process hearing provided for in K.S.A. 72-5439, absent 
any pretermination hearing, would fulfill constitutional due process and supplant the 
need for a pretermination hearing.  Thus, McMillen had a constitutional right to 
continue to receive his salary, but only until the due process hearing was completed.  
McMillen next argued that he should continue to receive his salary until all court 
proceedings were completed because he had not been "legally discharged" from his 
teaching position.  He relied on one sentence from K.S.A. 72-5412 to support his 
argument.  That sentence provided that all contracts were binding until the teacher 
had been "legally discharged from such teacher's teaching position or until released 
by the board of education from such contract."  The court pointed out that this 
argument ignored the language of K.S.A. 72-5411 and K.S.A. 72-5437.  Both statutes 
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state that all contracts of employees were deemed to continue for the next succeeding 
year unless written notice of intent to nonrenew a contract was served by a board of 
education on or before April 10.  The court held that "when all applicable statutes are 
read together, it appears clear that the legislature intended the contract to terminate at 
the end of the contract year if appropriate notice was given.  Termination of the 
contract also terminates the teacher's right to receive any further salary" (p. 904).  The 
court concluded that if a predetermination hearing as described in Loudermill had 
been provided, McMillen's right to receive his salary would have ended along with 
his contract at the end of the contract year.  In McMillen's case, no pretermination 
hearing was held which meant he was entitled to continue to receive his salary until 
the statutory due process hearing was completed.  The court further held that, in a 
case such as this, the appropriate time for termination of the contract and salary is 
"when the school board rejects the opinion of the hearing committee and files an 
appeal to the district court" (p. 905).  The court recommended that if a statutory due 
process hearing could not be completed before the end of the contract year, a school 
board should comply with the pretermination hearing requirements of Loudermill as 
early as possible.  The court concluded by finding that McMillen was entitled to 
receive his salary until November 20, 1991, which was the date the school board filed 
its notice of appeal with the district court.  The judgment of the trial court was 
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.   
 
 
 
347 
 
Unified School District No. 434, Osage County v. Hubbard 
868 P.2d 1240 (Kan. App. 1994) 
 
Robert Hubbard had taught at Santa Fe Trail High School for ten years.  
During free time in one of his art classes, some of his students made a videotape that 
contained off color humor that included zoom shots of crotch areas and alleged sexual 
harassment.  Hubbard was in his work area during the videotaping.  After the Board 
watched the tape, they decided to terminate Hubbard's contract.  The Board claimed 
the tape showed his lack of classroom control and his failure to intervene and prevent 
a female student from being sexually harassed by two male students.  Because he was 
a tenured teacher, Hubbard requested a due process hearing.  The three-member 
Committee watched the videotape and concluded that the evidence did not warrant 
the termination of Hubbard's contract.  The Board disagreed with the decision of the 
Committee and filed an appeal with the district court.  The district court affirmed the 
Committee's decision, denied the Board's appeal and ordered the Board to reinstate 
Hubbard with pay.  The Board appealed. 
The first issued addressed by the appellate court was whether the Committee 
or the Board's decision was entitled to deference upon review.  A hearing committee's 
purpose is to determine if the school board's decision to terminate a tenured teacher 
was for good cause.  An amendment to K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. in 1991 made the 
decision of the hearing committee final, subject to appeal to the district court.  
Therefore, the Board is not the factfinder and its decision is not entitled to any 
deference upon review by the courts.  Next, the court determined that the proper 
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standard of review was to decide if: (1) the committee's decision was within the scope 
of its authority; (2) the committee's decision was supported by substantial evidence; 
and (3) the committee did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily, or capriciously.  The Board 
argued that the Committee acted beyond the scope of its authority when it failed to 
consider the Board's sexual harassment policy.  However, the Committee had 
reviewed the sexual harassment policy and determined that the behavior captured on 
the videotape did not rise to the level necessary to constitute sexual harassment.  No 
female students complained of harassment and the actions were not repetitive in 
nature.  The Committee believed that these isolated incidents did not warrant 
termination of Hubbard's contract.  The appellate court found this to be substantial 
evidence and concluded that the Committee had acted within the scope of its 
authority.  The Board next contended that the Committee had acted outside its scope 
of authority when it ignored the Board's standards of teacher conduct and adopted a 
different one for "free time."  The Board's standards required a teacher to maintain 
control of his classroom at all times, with no distinction between free time and regular 
class time.  The court agreed that the Committee acted outside the scope of its 
authority in adopting a standard that was contrary to the expectations of the Board.  
However, its distinction between free time and regular time simply pertained to its 
final decision that the Board lacked good cause to terminate Hubbard.  Thus, the court 
again found that the Committee had acted within the scope of its authority.  The court 
also concluded that the Committee's decision was supported by substantial evidence 
as it had listened to all of the evidence presented and viewed the videotape.  The 
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Committee's determination that the activities on the videotape were isolated and did 
not justify Hubbard's termination was not arbitrary or capricious.  The decision of the 
district court was affirmed. 
 
Hubbard v. Board of Education, U.S.D. No. 434, Osage County 
882 P.2d 483 (Kan. App. 1994) 
 
Robert Hubbard was a tenured teacher in Osage County.  On April 7, 1992, 
the Board of Education informed him of their intent to terminate his contract due to 
the behavior of some of his students recorded in a videotape that had been made 
during his class.  On April 14, the Board conducted a hearing and suspended Hubbard 
pending a due process hearing.  On September 28, the due process hearing committee 
recommended reinstating Hubbard.  On October 5, 1992, the Board voted to appeal 
the hearing committee's decision to the district court.  The Board also voted to hold 
another hearing to determine if Hubbard should be suspended with or without pay 
during the pendency of the court case.  At that hearing, the Board adopted a 
resolution to suspend Hubbard without pay until the case was resolved.  Hubbard 
filed a petition in district court seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983 (1988).  The court granted the injunction, which prevented the 
Board from suspending Hubbard's pay pending the district court's decision on the 
Board's appeal.  When the district court affirmed the hearing committee's decision, 
the Board appealed to the Court of Appeals.  U.S.D. No. 434 v. Hubbard, 19 
Kan.App.2d 323, 868 P.2d 1240 (1994), rev. denied June 7, 1994.  After the district 
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court decision, and while awaiting the appellate court case, the Board moved for 
summary judgment in the civil rights case (this case), asking for a cancellation of the 
restraining order and a decision in its favor on the issue of monetary damages.  The 
district court entered summary judgment for the District and held that they were 
entitled to qualified immunity.  The court also lifted the injunction.  Hubbard 
appealed this decision claiming the injunction should not have been lifted, the school 
district was not entitled to qualified immunity, and he should be entitled to relief by 
mandamus.  
Qualified immunity is a way to protect government officials who are required 
to use their discretion and the related public interest when performing their official 
duties.  Hubbard argued that the Board did not have the authority to suspend him 
without pay while they were appealing the hearing committee's decision.  In 
McMillan v. U.S.D. No. 380, 253 Kan. 259, 855 P2d 896 (1993) (McMillan II) the 
court determined that a school board may terminate a teacher's contract and pay after 
the board decides to appeal a due process hearing committee's recommendation to 
reinstate the teacher.  The school board had not violated any clearly established laws, 
nor had Hubbard's due process rights been violated.  Thus, the Board was entitled to 
qualified immunity for its actions.  Hubbard next argued that the district court should 
not have removed the temporary injunction that prevented the Board from suspending 
him without pay.  The appellate court disagreed and pointed out that "by the time 
Hubbard's 42 U.S.C. Section1983 action was heard in district court, the same district 
judge had already ruled in Hubbard's favor on the on the substantive issue" (p. 488).  
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Therefore, the need for the injunction had ended.  Hubbard had applied to the Court 
of Appeals for an injunction pending the resolution of the appeal, but the court denied 
his motion.  The district court did not have the authority to continue the injunction 
once it was denied by the Court of Appeals, so the issue was without merit.  Finally, 
the court addressed Hubbard's claim that he was entitled to mandamus.  Mandamus is 
a remedy that compels a public agency to perform an act required by law when it has 
neglected or refused to do so.  Mandamus is not appropriate when one is not seeking 
action but instead is seeking redress from action that has already been taken.  The 
Board in this case was not refusing to act.  It was just acting in a way that Hubbard 
thought was against the law.  The appellate court stated, "Mandamus was not an 
appropriate remedy - Hubbard did not want action, he wanted redress" (p. 488).  The 
decision of the district court was affirmed.   
 
Francis v. Unified School District No. 457 
871 P.2d 1297 (Kan. App. 1994) 
 
Loralea Francis was an elementary school principal whose employment was 
terminated after she was charged with shoplifting.  She received an administrative 
suspension on July 30, 1992, which was followed by a notice of intent to terminate on 
August 31, 1992.  Francis requested a due process hearing which was granted on 
November 9, 1992.  On December 3, 1992, she was notified in person of the Board's 
decision to end her contract.  Francis filed a petition in district court on January 4, 
1993, which she described as an appeal of the "action taken by the defendant pursuant 
 
352 
 
to K.S.A. 60-2101(d) as well as an original action for breach of contract, continuing 
contract damages and tort" (p.1298).  A copy of this petition was served on the school 
board on January 6, 1993.  The district court dismissed the case for lack of 
jurisdiction owing to the fact that Francis had not filed her notice of appeal with the 
school board within 30 days pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(d).  Francis appealed this 
dismissal. 
The Court of Appeals set out to determine if Francis' appeal of her termination 
was timely and, if not, what affect that would have on her independent action for 
breach of contract and tort.  K.S.A. 60-2101(d) is the only means available to appeal a 
school board's termination of an employment.  That statute requires that the notice of 
appeal be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order being appealed.  It is only after 
filing this notice with the school board that anything is required to be filed with the 
district court.  In this case, the plaintiff filed with the district court within 30 days, but 
not with the school board.  Because nothing was filed with the school board within 
the time frame set forth by statute, Francis' appeal was "not timely perfected."  Filing 
with the district court did not satisfy the statutory requirements.  As the appeal was 
not timely filed, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the action and 
correctly dismissed the case.  Next, the appellate court turned to the issue of whether 
the untimely appeal of her contract termination was fatal to the maintenance of an 
independent action for breach of contract and tort.  The trial court held that the fact 
that Francis did not follow "the statutory procedure for appeal from the board order of 
December 3, 1992, this court is without jurisdiction to hear this independent action 
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collaterally attacking the board's order" (p. 1300).  The Court of Appeals agreed with 
the holding of the trial court.  In referencing the holding in Schulze v. Board of 
Education, 221 Kan. 351, 559 P.2d 367 (1977), the court found that as the school 
board had been acting in a quasi-judicial nature, the only remedy was an appeal under 
60-2101(d).  Because she had failed to comply with the requirements of the statute, 
Francis was prohibited from making a collateral attack on the school board's decision 
by an independent action.  The trial court's decision was affirmed.   
 
Allen v. Board of Education, Unified School District 436 
68 F.3d 401 (Kan. 1995) 
 
A school principal, Carlton Allen, whose contract was not renewed for the 
school year sought judicial review of the school district’s decision.  While the appeal 
was pending in state court, the principal began separate original action in state court 
in which he raised both state and federal claims.  Mr. Allen sought actual and punitive 
damages against all defendants plus attorney’s fees, interest, and costs.  The 
defendants removed the action to federal district court.  After removal of action, the 
US District Court for the District of Kansas granted the school district’s motion to 
dismiss, and Allen appealed.  The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss 
on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the action because Mr. Allen’s suit was 
an attempt to attack the Board’s decision, an action prohibited by state law.  Mr. 
Allen then appealed to the Kansas Court of Appeals. 
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The Appeals Court did not agree that the case was governed by state law.  Mr. 
Allen raised issues of federal law, which were in federal court at that time.  Therefore, 
because he had two cases pending in two different courts, the district court should 
have considered whether abstention was appropriate (under abstention doctrine, 
district courts can decline or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction in light of 
parallel state proceedings).  The district court would need to determine whether or not 
the state and federal proceedings were parallel, meaning the same parties are 
litigating essentially the same issues in two different forums.  If the cases are not 
parallel, the district court should proceed.  If they are parallel, the court must decide 
whether to abstain.  The Appeals Court noted a preference in abstention in cases for 
issuances of a stay rather than dismissal.  By issuing a stay in the federal action 
pending the outcome of the state proceedings, a federal forum is available in which to 
litigate the claims not resolved in state court without the plaintiff having to file a new 
federal action.  
Because the Appeals Court did not agree that this case was governed by state 
law and believed that the district court needed to make a determination of whether to 
abstain in light of parallel state proceedings, the judgment of the United States 
District Court of Kansas was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
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Allen v. Board of Education, Unified School District 436 
Not reported in F. Supp., 1997 WL 374289 
D. Kan., 1997 
 
High school principal, Carlton Allen, brought various claims against the 
school district that employed him.  Mr. Allen was principal at Caney Valley 
Junior/Senior High School from 1979 to 1993.  He was an "at will" employee and his 
contract was voted on each year by the school board.  The school superintendent, 
Harold Howard, had recommended his renewal every year except for 1992 and 1993.  
Mr. Allen had been placed on a plan of improvement as the result of a survey done in 
1990 that indicated a number of issues, including low staff morale and poor treatment 
of employees.  The principal had not made significant improvements and was 
recommended for nonrenewal in 1992.  As the resulting school board vote was tied, 
Mr. Allen’s contract was automatically renewed.  The following year, Mr. Allen 
again received marginal ratings on his evaluation.  After considering his previous 
year’s evaluations, the school board voted to nonrenew Mr. Allen’s contract.  The 
board held several subsequent hearings to allow Mr. Allen a chance to respond to the 
intent of nonrenewal.  The final decision was made in March of 1993 to nonrenew.  
Mr. Allen appealed to the courts bringing action against the district based on claims 
of age discrimination.  His claim was based on the fact that he would have been 
eligible for the district’s early retirement bonus program had he been renewed for the 
1993-94 school year.  He was replaced in May 1993 by a Mr. Van Winkle, who was 
52 years old. 
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Under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), it is illegal for 
an employer to discharge an employee because of his or her age.  A violation of the 
ADEA only occurs when age is the “determining factor” in the employer’s challenged 
decision.  A plaintiff making an ADEA claim must show that an employment 
decision was motivated by age by presenting direct evidence of motive.  A plaintiff 
must first present a prima facie case by showing that he was (1) within the protected 
age group; (2) doing satisfactory work; (3) discharged or received adverse 
employment action; and (4) replaced by a younger person.  Greene v. Safeway Stores, 
Inc. 98 F. 3d. 554, 558 (10th Cir. 1996).  If a prima facie case is established, the 
burden shifts to the defendant who must provide evidence that the adverse 
employment actions were taken for a nondiscriminatory reason.  In this instance, even 
if Allen could establish a prima facie case, his case must be dismissed since the 
school district met its burden of coming forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
rationale for its decision.  The only evidence of either pretext or direct discrimination 
presented by Allen was that he was one year away from eligibility for an early 
retirement program.  However, as there was no other corroborating evidence of age 
discrimination, simply being eligible for a retirement program did not qualify as the 
reason for the board’s action.   
All of the evidence presented in court supported the conclusion that the school 
board’s decision to nonrenew was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.  It 
was ordered that all claims against the defendants be dismissed. 
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(* In an unpublished opinion, Carlton Allen appealed to the US Court of 
Appeals Tenth Circuit in 1998.  The judgment of the US District Court for the District 
of Kansas was affirmed.  162 F.3d 1172 (Table), 1998 WL 777376 (C.A.10 (Kan.))). 
 
Baldwin v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 418 
930 P.2d 18 (Kan. 1996) 
 
Allen Baldwin, a tenured teacher, initiated an action for injunctive relief and 
damages under 42 U.S.C.Section 1983 (1994) claiming that the Board of Education 
violated his due process rights by nonrenewal of his teaching contract.  For five years 
prior to the 1991-92 school year, Mr. Baldwin had been allowed 30 paid extended 
duty days in addition to the contract-designed minimum days.  These extended days 
were considered additional work and not treated as a supplemental contract.  In June 
of 1992, the McPherson Education Association, which was the authorized bargaining 
agent for teachers, and the Board ratified a negotiated agreement which added five 
duty days to all teacher contracts and decreased the number of extended duty days for 
some teachers.  Mr. Baldwin’s extra duty days were reduced from 30 to 12.  Rather 
than follow the grievance procedure outlined in the negotiated agreement, Baldwin 
complained to the superintendent about the reduction.  The superintendent took his 
complaint to the Board, which chose not to change Baldwin’s contract.  Baldwin 
contended that the reduction in his extended duty days resulted in a “partial” 
nonrenewal of his contract.  He alleged that the Board violated K.S.A. 72-5437 by not 
providing him with notice of the nonrenewal by May 1, which, in turn violated the 
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due process procedures of K.S.A. 72-5438.  Baldwin took his case to the district court 
which granted summary judgment to the Board of Education.  Baldwin appealed. 
The basic elements of a claim under Section 1983 entail a “person” acting 
“under color of” state law to deprive the claimant of a constitutional or federal right.  
Baldwin’s claim that he had been deprived of a property right by the Board of 
Education satisfied these elements.  The court sought to determine if he truly had any 
property interest that had been violated causing his due process rights to be denied.  
Tenured teachers in Kansas receive a property interest in continuing employment.  
K.S.A. 72-5438 gives specific procedures a board must follow whenever a teacher is 
given notice of nonrenewal.  In this case however, unless the negotiated agreement, 
which reduced Baldwin’s extended duty days, constituted a nonrenewal of his 
contract, the due process procedures of K.S.A. 72-5438 would not be applicable, and 
there could be no 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action.  Kansas statutes relating to teachers’ 
contracts are divided into three subsections: Continuing Contract Law, K.S.A. 72-
5410; Professional Negotiations, K.S.A. 72-5413; and Due Process Procedure, 
Contract Termination, K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.  K.S.A. 72-5437 states that a teacher’s 
contract shall continue for the next year unless written notice of “termination or 
nonrenewal” is given.  The court found nothing in the language of the statute to 
support an interpretation of the term “nonrenew” to mean a change in the terms of the 
contract as Baldwin proposed.  Nothing found in the Continuing Contract Law, K.S.A. 
72-5410 et seq. would suggest that a change in terms of professional service 
constitute a nonrenewal of an existing contract.  Nor did the court find anything in the 
 
359 
 
Professional Negotiations subsections that would suggest that a change in conditions 
of professional service constitute a nonrenewal of an existing contract.  The 
Professional Negotiations subsection gives the recognized bargaining agent the ability 
to negotiate terms and conditions of professional service with a board that will 
become binding on all teachers after the contract is voted upon by members and 
ratified by the board.  In this case, the Board and Association bargained to change the 
terms of all teacher contracts.  The agreement was ratified.  Thus, the negotiated 
agreement became the contract that would be subject to the Continuing Contract Law.  
K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. only comes into consideration when a board “severs an 
employment relation with a teacher, thereby affecting the teacher’s property interest 
in continued employment” (p. 22).  The statute provides that the terms of a contract 
can be changed at any time by mutual consent as outlined by the Professional 
Negotiations subsection.  The decision of the district court was affirmed. 
Procedural due process rights do not come into play unless a property interest 
has been impaired.  Reducing the teacher’s extended duty days did not constitute 
nonrenewal of the contract, thus it did not invoke statutory notice and due process 
procedures. 
 
Brown v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 333, Cloud County 
928 P.2d 57 (Kan. 1996) 
 
Barbara Brown had been an elementary school principal in Cloud County for 
four years.  In March 1995, the Board adopted a resolution which directed that Brown 
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be notified of the Board’s intent to nonrenew her contract.  Brown received the notice 
and requested a meeting with the Board in executive session pursuant to K.S.A. 72-
5453.  The Board met with Brown within the time required and provided her with the 
rationale for their decision to nonrenew her contract.  Brown was given the 
opportunity to respond to the Board’s statement.  Neither party had legal counsel 
present nor was a record of the meeting taken.  After meeting with Brown, the Board 
decided not to renew her contract for the following school year.  Brown appealed this 
decision to the district court who found that Brown had been denied due process.  The 
district court determined that the Board had not shown good cause for the nonrenewal 
and that their action had been arbitrary.  The Board appealed this decision.  In their 
appeal, the Board contended that it had not exceeded its authority because it had 
followed the requirements of the Kansas Administrators’ Act, K.S.A. 72-5451 et seq., 
for nonrenewing the contract of an administrator.  The Board believed it had provided 
Brown with all the due process necessary.  Brown contended that the Board had 
failed to act in a quasi-judicial manner because it had not investigated the facts, failed 
to present evidence to support its reasons for the nonrenewal and had not complied 
with the Evaluation of Certificated Personnel Act, K.S.A. 72-9001 et seq., the year of 
her nonrenewal.  The Board countered by stating that the required meeting a Board 
has with a nonrenewed administrator is not quasi-judicial in nature and K.S.A. 72-
9001 et seq. is not applicable to this case. 
This case involved the application of the Kansas Administrators’ Act.  This 
Act imposes certain requirements when a school board nonrenews the contract of an 
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administrator who has completed two consecutive years as an administrator with the 
district.  The Act requires in part that: (1) an administrator is given written notice of 
the board’s intention to nonrenew before April 10 of the year in which the contract 
expires; (2) once written notice has been given, the administrator may request a 
meeting with the board by filing a written request within 10 days of receipt of the 
nonrenewal notice; and (3) the board will hold the meeting within 10 days of the 
administrator’s request.  The Act specifies that during the meeting with the board and 
administrator, the board must specify reasons for the nonrenewal and provide the 
administrator an opportunity to respond.  There is no right to legal counsel for either 
party.  Through the application of the Act, the court determined that the intention of 
the legislature was to limit the procedures granted to administrators to a “meeting” 
without legal counsel, or the more formalized procedures required if it had intended 
for a “hearing” to take place.  Therefore, the court determined that an administrator 
who had been employed for at least two years could be nonrenewed without a show 
of good cause.  The court next turned towards the issue of whether the board's action 
was of a quasi-judicial nature.  The court cited Black's Law Dictionary as defining 
quasi-judicial as a term that is applied to the action of public administrative officers 
or bodies who are required to investigate facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and 
draw conclusions as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a 
judicial nature.  The meeting held between the Board and Brown had none of the 
formalities of a hearing or any other judicial-type proceeding.  Because no hearing 
was required, the court found the action to be of an executive nature rather than a 
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judicial one.  The final issue the court addressed was the argument that Brown had 
some right under K.S.A. 72-9001 et seq. that had been violated.  This act deals with 
the evaluation of certified personnel.  K.S.A. 72-9003(d)(1) states in part that every 
board will adopt an evaluation procedure in which every employee during the third 
and fourth years of employment shall be evaluated at least once by February 15.  
Brown had not been evaluated the year she was nonrenewed.  She argued that the 
Board could not nonrenew her contract because K.S.A.72-9004(f) provides "the 
contract of any person subject to evaluation shall not be nonrenewed on the basis of 
incompetence unless an evaluation of such person has been made prior to the 
notice..."  The Board did not believe K.S.A. 72-9004(f) was applicable because 
incompetence was not the reason for Brown's nonrenewal.  She was nonrenewed 
because her performance was unsatisfactory.  The court agreed with the Board's 
position and held that the "failure to make the February 15, 1995 evaluation does not 
preclude the nonrenewal of Brown's contract" (p. 70).  The court reversed the district 
court's decision and the case was remanded to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss Brown's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the Board's proceedings were 
not quasi-judicial under K.S.A. 72-5453. 
A good cause requirement is not a part of the Kansas Administrators’ Act.  An 
administrator’s expectation of continued employment should extend no further than 
an expectation that a school board will follow the procedures defined by the statute.  
The property interests of administrators are similar to those of nontenured teachers in 
contract renewal, which does not require a hearing or other protective processes.  The 
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state law procedural rights afforded by the Act do not invoke the protections of the 
Due Process Clause.  As long as a board meets the procedural formalities, they have 
satisfied the requirements of the Act. 
 
Miller v. Brungardt 
916 F. Supp. 1096 (D. Kan. 1996) 
 
Plaintiff, Jane Miller, was employed as a counselor at Lansing Middle School 
for U.S.D. No. 469 beginning in August of 1992.  During all relevant times, Kerry 
Brungardt was the Vice-Principal at the Middle School and Richard Flores was 
Superintendent.  Miller alleged that during the course of her employment, Brungardt 
made sexually inappropriate comments to her and she lodged a formal grievance with 
Flores.  In her complaint, Miller claimed that Brungardt had walked into her office 
and made comments that included accusing her of having a lesbian relationship with a 
student's mother and other inappropriate comments regarding lesbian behavior.  She 
alleged that she had felt threatened and intimated by his comments.  Miller also 
claimed Flores had verbally reprimanded her for lodging the grievance against 
Brungardt.  Miller filed a sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge complaint with 
the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  She also requested, and was granted, a transfer to 
Lansing High School.  On April 4, 1994, approximately six weeks after her transfer, 
Miller was notified that her contract would not be renewed for the following school 
year.  Miller sued the school district, vice principal and superintendent alleging sexual 
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harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII and the Kansas Act 
Against Discrimination (KAAD).  She also alleged intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under Kansas common law.  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that Miller had failed to comply 
with the notice requirement of K.S.A. Section 12-105b (1991).  The District Court, in 
Miller v. Brungardt, 904 F.Supp. 1215 (D.Kan.1995),  held that: (1) Miller's claim 
against the board was defective because it failed to refer to amount of monetary 
damages claimed, but (2) the claims against Brungardt and Flores were sufficient.  
Following that court decision, the defendants brought the case before the court on a 
motion to dismiss by defendants Brungardt and Flores and a motion to reconsider the 
court's previous memorandum and order.   
In her complaint, Miller listed Brungardt and Flores as individuals.  Brungardt 
and Flores argued that the Title VII claims against them should be dismissed because, 
under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their official capacity.  They 
further argued that if they were being sued in their official capacities, the Title VII 
claims against them would not stand.  In Redpath v. City of Overland Park, 857 
F.Supp. 1448 (D.Kan.1994), the court found that "if the employer has been sued 
directly, it is duplicative to sue the supervisory employees in their official capacities."  
Id. at 1456.  The court here agreed that it was duplicative to sue Brungardt and Flores 
in their official capacities because Miller had directly sued their employer, the school 
district.  Therefore, the court dismissed the Title VII claims against Brungardt and 
Flores.  The court also found federal court decisions applying Title VII were 
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"persuasive authority" in analyzing KAAD claims because the statutory schemes 
were similar.  So, for the same reasons the Title VII claims were dismissed against 
Brungardt and Flores, the KAAD claims were also dismissed.  Because the Title VII 
and KAAD claims were dismissed, the only remaining state-law claim against 
Brungardt and Flores for the court to reconsider was that of emotional distress.  
Under K.S.A. 12-105b(d) (1991), "any person having a claim against a municipality 
which could rise to an action brought under the Kansas tort claims act shall file a 
written notice as provided in this subsection before commencing such action."  Under 
King v. Pimentel, 20 Kan.App.2d 579, 890 P.2d 1217 (1995), the notice requirements 
applied to "municipal employees who caused injury or damages to another while 
acting within the scope of their employment."  This meant that Section 12-105b(d)'s 
notice requirements had to have been completed before Miller filed her claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Brungardt and Flores if their 
actions occurred within the scope of their duties.  Accepting Miller's allegations as 
true, Brungardt's actions were not within the scope of his employment because sexual 
harassment would obviously not be found within the job description of a school 
administrator.  Thus, the Kansas notice requirement did not apply to Miller's claim 
against Brungardt.  However, the claims that Flores had verbally reprimanded Miller 
for filing a sexual harassment grievance, had inadequately investigated the grievance, 
and had failed to take proper remedial action would fall within the scope of a 
superintendent's employment.  Therefore, Miller was required to comply with 12-
105b(d) notice requirements, which she had failed to do.  Accordingly, the intentional 
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infliction of emotional distress was dismissed.  The only two remaining claims were 
Miller's Title VII claim against U.S.D. 469 and the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress against Brungardt.  The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in 
part.  The motion to reconsider was granted in part and denied in part.  Richard Flores 
was dismissed from the action.    
 
Forsythe v. Board of Education of Unified School District No. 489, Hays, 
Kansas 
956 F. Supp. 927 (D. Kan. 1997) 
 
Olga Forsythe had been employed as a high school Spanish teacher for two 
years.  When her contract was nonrenewed at the end of her second year of teaching, 
Forsythe accused the Board of discrimination stating that she was terminated because 
of her strong Hispanic accent and national origin.  The Board denied these allegations.  
They argued that the decision to nonrenew Forsythe was based upon their conclusion 
that her students could not understand her instructions and assignments, that she was 
not effectively able to teach students, and that numerous parents and students had 
complained about her performance.  Forsythe was an Hispanic female who had been 
born in Cuba.  The district hired her in 1992 to teach Spanish at Hays High School.  
Despite generally favorable employer reviews during her first two years of teaching, 
several students and their parents voiced repeated concerns that they had a hard time 
understanding Forsythe.  These complaints were attributed to her strong accent and 
fast manner of speech.  Forsythe agreed that she spoke quickly and with a strong 
accent.  Other district employees offered to assist Forsythe in addressing some of the 
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shortcomings in her teaching manner and skills, but those efforts were often met with 
resistance.  Members of the board, as well as the school’s principal, cited both student 
complaints and Forsythe’s unwillingness to change as reasons for nonrenewing her 
contract.  Forsythe’s contract was not renewed by the Board on April 4, 1994.  As she 
was a non-tenured teacher, no reason was given for her termination pursuant to K.S.A. 
5436 et seq. until Forsythe pursued her discrimination claim.  Forsythe appealed the 
Board’s decision to the District Court and the school district made a motion for 
summary judgment.   
The court held in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 that in the absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff in Title VII 
actions must establish a “prima facie” case of racial discrimination.  To establish such 
a case, a plaintiff must show (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was 
qualified and satisfactorily performing her job; and (3) she was terminated under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.  If the plaintiff is 
successful in proving a prima facie case, then the defendant is presumed to have 
discriminated against the plaintiff unless they can show “legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons” for their decision.  The Tenth Circuit in Arzate v. City of 
Topeka, 884 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Kan. 1995) held that a “foreign accent that does not 
interfere with a Title VII claimant’s ability to perform duties of the position he has 
been denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment decisions.”  Id. at 
1504.  However, if language difficulties are shown to interfere with a performance of 
duties, this may be considered in employment decisions.  Although Forsythe 
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identified a few instances in which employees of the district mentioned or commented 
on her accent in an uncomplimentary manner, most of those comments were made in 
the context of evaluating her teaching skills or addressing student /parent concerns.  
The court found that Forsythe had not presented anything that would cast any doubt 
on the fact that many students had expressed concerns regarding their difficulty in 
understanding her speech.  It went on to state that “as the ability to communicate is 
one of the hallmarks of effective teaching, the Board’s concern that Forsythe was 
unwilling or unable to slow down or otherwise address students’ complaints is 
undoubtedly the basis of a legitimate business decision to not renew her contract” (p. 
934).  The court held that the limited number of comments that could have been 
construed as derogatory, along with Forsythe’s belief that she was the victim of 
discrimination, were “insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment” (p. 934).  As the court could find no evidence that would cause 
them to conclude  the reasons offered by the Board for not renewing Forsythe’s 
teaching contract were pretexts for discrimination, the Board’s motion for summary 
judgment was granted.  
 
Munguia v. Unified School District No. 328, Ellsworth County, Kansas 
125 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997) 
 
Ramon Munguia taught high school Spanish in three different school districts 
between 1983 and 1994.  He was under a written contract with USD 327 (the 
Ellsworth School District) from 1983-84 through 1990-91.  For 1991-92 and 1992-93, 
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Munguia was under contract with USD 401 (the Chase School District).  During 
1993-94, he was under a one-year contract with USD 328 (the Lorraine School 
District).  Although Munguia had taught in the Lorraine District from 1985-1993 
through a series of inter-district agreements, he had not signed a written contract with 
Lorraine until 1993-94.  Inter-district agreements are used to gain the services of 
teachers from other school districts.  They are often found in smaller, rural school 
districts not able to afford full-time teachers in specialty areas, such as foreign 
language.  Prior to 1993-94, the Lorraine District would pay the Ellsworth or Chase 
Districts for Munguia's services.  Munguia was not a party to these inter-district 
agreements and he did not have a written contract with, nor did he receive a paycheck 
from, the Lorraine District.  In March of 1993, Munguia notified the Chase District 
that he was resigning.  On July 1, 1993, he began to receive Kansas Employees 
Retirement System benefits derived from his employment with the Ellsworth and 
Chase school districts.  On August 2, 1993, Munguia signed a contract with the 
Lorraine District to teach half-days with the district during the 1993-94 school year.  
In April 1994, the Lorraine District notified Munguia that it was not going to renew 
his teaching contract for the upcoming school year.  Munguia requested a due process 
hearing under K.S.A. 72-5438(b), but it was denied by the school district on the 
grounds that Munguia did not meet tenure requirements pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5445 
(1992).  Munguia brought action against the Lorraine District based on the allegation 
that the school district had denied his request for a hearing in violation of his 
constitutional right to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
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Amendments.  The defendant school district moved for summary judgment on the 
ground that, under Kansas law, Munguia was not a tenured teacher and had no 
property interest in continued employment.  The district court granted the school 
district's motion.  Munguia appealed claiming that the district court had erred in 
finding he was not a tenured employee of the Lorraine School District.   
Under the Kansas Teacher Due Process Act, K.S.A. 72-5436 to -5446, a 
tenured teacher's contract may only be terminated for good cause and the teacher 
must be afforded timely notice and an opportunity for a hearing.  Nontenured teachers 
are only entitled to timely notice of their nonrenewal.  Munguia argued that a written 
contract was not necessary to satisfy the tenure provisions of the statutes.  He claimed 
that the fact that the Lorraine District had considered him to be certified personnel 
and evaluated his performance for eight years was enough to make him tenured in 
their district.  Munguia further asserted that he had an implied contract of 
employment with the Lorraine District during the eight-year period he was on written 
contracts with the Ellsworth and Chase Districts.  The appellate court did not agree 
with Munguia's arguments.  It cited K.S.A. 72-5412 as evidence that the Kansas 
legislature determined the position of a teacher in a public school system would be 
created by a contract, the terms of which are binding on both the teacher and the 
board of education of the contracting school district.  As a result, the appellate court 
did not find the statutes permitted a school district to create an employment 
relationship simply on the grounds that it evaluated a teacher's performance.  
Personnel evaluations and classifications alone do not qualify as a contract between a 
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school district and a teacher.  From 1983 through 1993, the Ellsworth and Chase 
Districts paid Munguia's salary and contributed to the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System on his behalf.  The appellate court found no support for Munguia's 
claim that he had been employed by the Lorraine District at any time before the 1993-
94 school year.  As Munguia was only employed by the Lorraine District for one year, 
he did not meet Kansas tenure requirements and was not entitled to the protections 
found under the Kansas Teacher Due Process Act.  Accordingly, the judgment of the 
district court was affirmed.   
 
Schartz v. Unified School District No. 512 
953 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Kan. 1997) 
 
John Schartz worked as a science teacher for U.S.D. No. 512 for twenty-nine 
years.  From 1981-87 there were six documented complaints of Schartz's classroom 
conduct.  From spring 1994 through spring 1995, several students brought complaints 
to the principal, Blanche Banks, regarding Schartz's behavior.  In April 1994, a 
female student alleged that Schartz had made several inappropriate comments, some 
of a sexual nature, in class.  When Banks met with him, Schartz denied the allegations 
and said he could not remember exactly what he said in class and that it was taken out 
of context.  Banks and the associate principal informed Schartz that further incidents 
could result in disciplinary action.  In September 1994, another female student 
complained that Schartz had said "I'll bet you're sweet 16 and never been kissed" (p. 
1212).  The student was embarrassed by this comment and other remarks, and 
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requested to transfer from his class.  Schartz admitted making the comment, but 
claimed that the statement was a common phrase and not intended to embarrass the 
student.  In October 1994, a student complained that Schartz had been sarcastic and 
used loud, inappropriate language.  Banks again met with Schartz to discuss the 
complaint.  At that meeting, Banks documented the student's complaint and Schartz's 
response, but did not formally reprimand Schartz.  In December 1994, an African 
American female student and her mother complained of Schartz making inappropriate 
comments of a racial nature when he talked about a "negro girl" in class.  Banks, the 
student, her mother, and Schartz all met to discuss these concerns.  In early January 
1995, Banks prepared a formal letter of reprimand to Schartz stating that his conduct 
was inappropriate and unprofessional.  Later that month, a female student brought a 
number of complaints against Schartz and her mother alleged that Schartz had 
allowed her daughter to leave campus without permission.  Banks, Schartz, and Dr. 
David Stewart, the Associate Superintendent, met to discuss these complaints.  
Schartz denied the allegations and Stewart advised him that he would investigate the 
complaints.  On February 16, 1995, Mr. Steve Martin, counsel for the school district, 
sent Schartz's counsel a letter explaining that Schartz's upcoming meeting with Mr. 
Robert DiPierro, the Deputy Superintendent,  would be his final opportunity to 
present his position.  Martin's letter also explained the options available to Schartz 
should the school district suspend, terminate, or nonrenew his contract.  On about 
February 28, 1995, DiPierro and other school district representatives met with Schartz, 
his attorney, and his KNEA representative.  To start the meeting, Martin announced 
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that the hearing was a "pre-termination" hearing.  When the meeting was over, 
Schartz's KNEA representative told him that, based on her experience, she thought 
the school district would fire Schartz or nonrenew his contract.  On or about March 3, 
1995, Schartz chose to retire because he did not want to risk losing his health 
insurance benefits.  Schartz then brought action against the school district and Ms. 
Banks claiming they had forced him to retire from his teaching position.  Schartz's 
complaint included claims of age discrimination, breach of contract, and wrongful 
termination against the school district.  His complaint also included allegations of 
intentional interference with contract or business expectancy and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress against Banks.  The defendants moved for summary judgment.   
Counts I and VI of Schartz's complaint alleged age discrimination in violation 
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), and the Kansas Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (KADEA).  The court considered the claims 
together because the analysis of the ADEA and KADEA were identical.  To establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination under ADEA, the a plaintiff must show that:  
(1) he was a member of the protected class, which for the ADEA is individuals at 
least 40 years old; (2) he was performing his work satisfactorily; (3) he was 
discharged; and (4) his position was filled by a person who was substantially younger.  
As Schartz met elements one and four, the court addressed the second and third 
requirements.  Because Schartz was not discharged, he voluntarily retired; he had to 
rely on the theory of constructive discharge in order to meet the third prong of a 
prima facie case.  The standard for determining whether constructive discharge has 
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occurred is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt 
compelled to resign.  Here, Schartz claimed he was faced with the choice of 
retirement with health benefits or termination without benefits.  Although the 
defendants denied that Schartz was ever given this choice, he voluntarily retired, the 
evidence favored Schartz.  Counsel for the school district had called the hearing a 
"pretermination hearing," the KNEA representative thought the district would 
probably fire or nonrenew Schartz's contract, and counsel for the school district told 
Schartz's counsel that the district was contemplating termination.  The court found 
this to be enough evidence for a jury to conclude that a reasonable person would have 
felt compelled to retire under similar circumstances.  The final element to address was 
whether Schartz was performing his work satisfactorily.  The school district argued 
that he was not.  Schartz offered evidence in the form of affidavits and his 29-year 
performance record to show that he was performing his work in a satisfactory manner.  
The court concluded that although the student allegations, if true, could suggest 
unsatisfactory performance, the school district had to do more to support their 
contention that Schartz could not meet his prima facie burden.  Thus, Schartz met the 
four necessary elements of establishing an age discrimination case.  Once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendants to give a 
nondiscriminatory rationale for its actions.  The school district's offered reason for 
termination was unsatisfactory job performance based on five student complaints in 9 
months.  The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reasons provided by 
the defendants are not true.  In this case, Schartz could offer no direct evidence of age 
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discrimination.  Schartz argued that he had presented data to show a pattern in 
discrimination in the school district's practices, but the court found that the data 
offered showed no significant disparity in the District's treatment of its employees.  
Schartz had no comparative evidence showing older employees were treated any 
differently than younger employees.  The court next addressed Schartz's claim that 
Banks and the school district made statements suggesting that age was a factor in the 
termination decision.  However, the court found these statements to be "isolated, stray, 
and ambiguous" (p. 1217) as they were mainly random comments about teachers who 
happened to be over the age of forty.  All were hearsay and none had been directed at 
Schartz.  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the District on 
Schartz's age discrimination claims (counts I and VI).  The remaining claims were all 
state law claims.  The court first dismissed without prejudice Schartz's breach of 
contract claim (count II).  The court found that as the contract issue could not be 
resolved without further proceedings, it did not have jurisdiction over the claim.  The 
other state claims were addressed because they could be resolved without further 
proceedings, which meant the court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction.  The 
court first granted summary judgment in the District's favor in Schartz's claim that he 
had been terminated due to his age.  Because Schartz had an adequate remedy 
available under the ADEA and KADEA that he had not pursued, the court determined 
there was no cause of action for wrongful discharge (count III).  Next, the court 
addressed the claim of tortious interference with a business claim brought against 
Banks.  To maintain a cause of action for tortious interference, Schartz had to 
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establish:  (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract by Banks; (3) 
and intentional interference by Banks with the known contract rights without legal 
justification; and (4) resulting damage.  Banks conceded that Schartz could establish 
the first, second, and fourth elements.  In order to meet the third element, Schartz had 
to show that Banks caused his constructive discharge.  The only thing the record 
showed was that Banks had recommended a two-day suspension without pay for 
Schartz's alleged comments.  There was nothing to prove that Banks' actions were the 
proximate cause of the school district's decision to give Schartz the choice between 
termination and retirement.  The court found that Banks actions were consistent with 
her duties as a principal.  Her recommendation of a two-day suspension was intended 
to protect the students, not to force Schartz to retire.  Accordingly, the court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Banks on the claim of intentional interference with a 
contract (count IV).  Finally, the court examined the claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or outrage against Banks (count V).  To prove such a claim, 
Schartz was required to present evidence that:  (1) the conduct of the defendant was 
intentional or in reckless disregard; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) 
there was a causal connection between Banks' conduct and Schartz's mental distress; 
and (4) Schartz's distress was extreme and severe.  Schartz also had to meet two 
threshold requirements to maintain a claim for outrage.  The court found that Schartz 
was not able to meet the first threshold requirement because he had not established 
that Banks' conduct could "reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to 
permit recovery" (p. 1221).  Schartz's claim was based on allegations that Banks 
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targeted older teachers for retirement, accepted the allegations of complaining 
students without meaningful investigation, and sided with students when older 
teachers were involved.  In the opinion of the court, Schartz had not offered enough 
factual support for his allegations to prevent summary judgment on his claim.  Even if 
the court assumed Schartz's claims to be true, Banks' alleged conduct did not meet the 
"stringent standard" for an outrage cause of action.  Banks was granted summary 
judgment on count V.  The defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted 
on counts I, III, IV, V, and VI.  The motion for count II was denied.   
 
Unified School District No. 500, Wyandotte County v. Robinson 
940 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1997) 
 
Mable Robinson had been a teacher for U.S.D. 500 for twenty-seven years.  
Dr. Nelda Kibby was the principal at the elementary school where Robinson worked 
for most of Robinson's tenure.  Kibby originally believed Robinson was a "mediocre" 
teacher but felt with support she would improve over time.  Kibby's concern over 
Robinson's performance continued so she placed Robinson on intensive assistance for 
the 1993-94 school year.  During that year, Kibby worked with Dr. Georgia Berry, 
another elementary principal in the district, on Robinson's assistance program.  Berry 
helped in developing the program and observed Robinson six times throughout the 
school year.  Robinson also had an "efficacy consultant," Eva Tucker, who was 
assigned to support Robinson and work with her on the goals of her assistance 
program.  By the spring of 1994, the decision was made to terminate Robinson.  She 
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received notice of the intent to nonrenew her contract which stated the grounds as 
being a failure to satisfactorily plan and teach lessons, and a failure to provide an 
orderly teaching and learning environment.  Robinson filed a request for a due 
process hearing.  After a two-day hearing in which evidence was presented by both 
sides, the hearing officer found that the school district had failed to sustain its burden 
of proof because the evidence presented did not support the district's stated reasons 
for nonrenewal.  The hearing officer also ordered reinstatement with back pay and 
benefits.  The district appealed twice, losing in the district court and winning in the 
Court of Appeals (U.S.D. No. 500 v. Robinson, 22 Kan.App.2d 892, 924 P.2d 651 
(1996)).  The Supreme Court of Kansas then granted Robinson's petition for review.  
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the hearing officer erred in 
calling for Robinson's reinstatement.  The court considered three questions.  Did the 
hearing officer:  (1) apply his own standards of teacher performance and thus exceed 
the scope of his authority; (2) ignore undisputed evidence which supported the school 
district's decision to nonrenew Robinson's contract; and (3) act arbitrarily or 
erroneously in considering the school district's evidence?  K.S.A. 72-5443b provides 
"the decision of the hearing officer shall be final, subject to appeal to the district court 
by either party."  The Court of Appeals in the first Robinson case set out the factors a 
hearing officer must consider and apply in teacher due process hearings.  Those 
factors were:  (1) the burden of proof is on the school board, (2) the school board's 
reasons for termination had to constitute good cause, and (3) the decision had to be 
supported by substantial evidence.  In reviewing the testimony, the Supreme Court 
 
379 
 
found that the reasons for nonrenewal provided by the school district did not "lend 
themselves well to objective determination" (p. 6).  Kibby and Berry presented 
evidence showing that Robinson had failed to meet the goals of her improvement 
program.  However, Robinson, along with Tucker and Debbie Parker, a special 
education teacher who spent two hours a day in Robinson's classroom, presented 
evidence that she had not failed.  The school district did not give Robinson any other 
reasons for her nonrenewal, other than what was in the notice.  The hearing officer 
concluded that there was not substantial evidence proving Robinson had failed to 
satisfactorily plan and teach lessons and failed to provide an orderly teaching 
environment.  Evidence presented by both sides was conflicting, but it was for the 
hearing officer to weigh the evidence and make findings of fact to determine if 
Robinson had been terminated for good cause.  Kibby had stated that Robinson's 
failure to maintain accurate grade records, failure to supervise children outside her 
classroom, failure to use team resources, inadequate parent participation at 
conferences, and failure to use manipulatives all factored into her decision to 
nonrenew Robinson.  Berry described Robinson's teaching as "inconsistent" and not 
to the level of second grade teachers at the elementary school.  Parker, who spent 
much more time in Robinson's classroom than either Kibby or Berry, provided a 
different view of Robinson.  She saw Robinson as doing an acceptable job in dealing 
with difficult students and being as effective with them as other teachers at the school.  
Parker believed that Robinson tried to follow the goals set for her by Kibby, but "no 
matter what she [Robinson] did, Kibby could not see anything positive" (p. 8).  Eva 
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Tucker, the efficacy consultant who also had nineteen years of teaching experience, 
stated that Robinson was not a substandard teacher.  When the hearing officer asked 
Tucker to review a sample of Robinson's lesson plans from the 1992-93 school year, 
Tucker stated that she could have taught from them.  Tucker believed her own 
personal plans would have been more detailed, but Robinson's were adequate.  There 
were also inconsistencies in the school district's evidence.  Tucker had been teaching 
for twenty-seven years and no previous action had been taken to put her on a plan of 
assistance.  Robinson consistently received satisfactory ratings on her evaluations.  
Although none of the witnesses described Robinson as a "star teacher," it was the 
court's opinion that the testimony of Parker, Tucker, and Robinson cast doubt on the 
credibility of the school district's evidence.  The court held that it did not appear that 
the hearing officer had applied his own standards of teacher performance but simply 
determined which evidence was more credible.  The court further held that the 
hearing officer had not ignored undisputed evidence, nor had he acted in an arbitrary 
manner.  The school district presented opinion evidence that Robinson was a 
substandard or incompetent teacher, but those reasons were not stated as reasons for 
nonrenewal in the notice the district had given to Robinson.  The court found that the 
hearing officer did not ignore evidence that Robinson was a substandard teacher but 
instead considered it in connection with the grounds for nonrenewal given in the 
district's notice (failure to satisfactorily plan and teach lessons and failure to provide 
an orderly learning environment).  The judgment of the Court of Appeals was 
reversed; the judgment of the district court was affirmed.                     
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Seaman Unified School District No. 345 v. Kansas Commission on Human 
Rights 
990 P.2d 155 (Kan. App. 1999) 
 
Donald Reed was hired as a night custodian for U.S.D. 345 in February 1990.  
Reed had insulin dependent diabetes, which he controlled with daily insulin injections, 
proper diet and regular medical checkups.  When he was hired, Reed was being 
treated for diabetic retinopathy, a disorder that would cause the blood vessels in his 
retinas to hemorrhage.  Reed had surgery for his eye disorder and was placed on 
postoperative restrictions by his doctor requiring that he not stoop over, strain or lift 
and remain in a semi-upright position for 2 weeks.  Reed started back to work on 
February 15, 1990, but the next day took sick leave without pay through March 6, 
1990.  Additional eye surgery was performed with similar restrictions.  Treatment 
ended for his retinopathy in April 1990, and no restrictions were placed on Reed's 
activity.  Reed was concerned that the lifting he would be required to do in the 
summer would affect his eyes and asked his physician to write a letter that limited the 
amount of weight he could lift.  His physician provided a letter setting a 25-pound 
lifting restriction.  Reed gave the assistant superintendent the letter and shortly 
thereafter was terminated.  The assistant superintendent stated that Reed was fired 
because of the lifting restrictions, poor work performance, and falsifying his job 
application.  The lifting restrictions would not allow Reed to perform the necessary 
parts of his job, which often required unsupervised, heavy lifting.  Reed filed a 
complaint with the Kansas Human Rights Commission (KHRC), which found U.S.D. 
345 had discriminated against Reed based on his disability.  The KHRC then denied a 
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motion for reconsideration and the district filed a petition for judicial review with the 
district court.  The district court found in favor of the school district.  KHRC and 
Reed appealed. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Kansas Act 
Against Discrimination (KAAD) both define a disability as a "physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more...major life activities."  Employers 
are prohibited from discriminating against individuals because of their disabilities.  
For Reed to establish a case of disability discrimination he had to prove that:  (1) he 
was a disabled person within the meaning of the KAAD; (2) he was able to perform 
the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) 
his employer terminated him because of his disability.  Based on these requirements, 
the appellate court concluded that Reed did not meet the definition of a disability.  
Reed had testified that he was able to control his diabetes with proper diet and 
monitoring and his physical activities were not limited.  The court found no evidence 
that Reed's diabetes, in its medicated state, substantially limited the major life activity 
of working.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defined 
"substantially limits," in regards to the major life activity of working, as "significantly 
restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills 
and abilities" (p. 158).  The inability to perform a single, particular job, such as lifting, 
does not constitute a substantial limitation to working.  In this case, Reed failed to 
demonstrate there was a "genuine issue of material fact" as to whether he was 
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regarded as disabled.  Reed was fired because he could not perform the heavy lifting 
that was part of his position as night custodian.  According to the appellate court, at 
most, Reed was "regarded as unable to perform only a particular job, not a broad class 
of jobs" (p. 159).  This was not sufficient to prove that Reed was substantially limited 
in the major life activity of working.  The judgment of the district court was affirmed.             
 
Baughman v. Unified School District No. 500 
10 P.3d 21 (Kan. App. 2000) 
 
The appellees in this case were four tenured teachers at Area Vocational 
Technical School (AVTS) in the Kansas City school district.  During the 1997-98 
school year they taught summer classes under an extended contract in addition to 
their primary contract.  In April 1998, the teachers were notified that their summer 
contracts would not be renewed due to low enrollment in the summer classes.  The 
appellees requested, and were given, the enrollment data the district had used in 
making its decision.  They prepared a memorandum voicing their objections to the 
ending of the summer classes and presented it to their superintendent.  The 
superintendent took this to the board of education, along with some additional 
information beyond which had been given to the teachers.  The school board voted 
not to renew the teachers’ summer contracts.  The teachers then requested a hearing 
per K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq., which they received on November 5, 1998.  The hearing 
officer determined that the appellant school district had demonstrated good cause for 
the nonrenewal of the summer contracts, but found that the teachers had been denied 
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adequate pretermination process to allow them to respond.  The hearing officer also 
found that the teachers should have received a “salary inclusive of the extended 
contract amount through an appropriate period of time” (p. 24).  Both parties 
appealed to the district court, which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision.  The 
school district appealed. 
In order to determine if the teachers had received a proper hearing prior to the 
nonrenewal of their extended contracts, the court had to determine whether they had a 
constitutionally protected property right, and if so, to what extent.  In Kansas, a 
tenured teacher’s right to continued employment is a property right that is covered by 
the Continuing Contract Law, K.S.A. 72-5410 et seq.  The contract issues in this case 
were extended contracts for additional duties during the summer, which are 
considered supplemental.  K.S.A. 72-5412(a) states that due process procedures do 
not apply to supplemental contracts.  The language within their extended summer 
contracts stated:  “It is hereby understood and agreed that this Extended Contract is 
valid only for the 1997-98 school term and is not renewed under the terms of the 
Continuing Contract Law K.S.A. 72-5437” (p. 24).  In spite of the language of the 
contract and the exception of K.S.A. 72-5412(a) regarding supplemental contracts, 
the teachers were still given timely notice and an opportunity to respond in writing.  
Since both the school district and teachers assumed that the teachers had a property 
interest sufficient to require due process requirements, the court turned to the question 
of “how much process is due teachers who have for a number of years been teaching 
summer courses in addition to primary teaching assignments, before a decision is 
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made to eliminate the courses?”  (p. 25).  The teachers argued that (1) they had 
received inadequate notice because they had not received all of the information that 
the superintendent presented to the board when recommending the courses be 
dropped and (2) they were not given an adequate hearing because they were not 
allowed to address the board in person.  In this case, the board was faced with a 
policy decision regarding whether or not to offer certain courses.  There were no 
personal allegations against the teachers nor were their primary contracts affected.  In 
Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997), the 
United States Supreme Court “rejected the proposition that due process always 
requires the State to provide a hearing prior to the initial deprivation of a property 
interest.”  They listed three factors to consider when determining how much process 
is constitutionally due:  (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 
and (3) the government’s interest in prompt termination.  Under the facts presented in 
this case, the court determined that “whatever private interest that was implicated was 
adequately protected by the procedure that was followed” (p. 26).  The teachers 
retained their positions under their primary contracts.  The property interest in 
question was not on the same level as if this had been a case of teacher termination.  
The decision of the district court was reversed. 
Although the teachers may have expected their summer contracts to continue, 
their expectation was not reasonable considering the language of their supplemental 
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contract.  Supplemental teacher contracts are not afforded the same due process rights 
as primary contracts.  The decision to end the contracts was an objective one based on 
enrollment data and not on any allegations of teacher misconduct.  The district in this 
case actually provided more due process than was required. 
 
Kansas State Board of Education v. Marsh 
50 P.3d 9 (Kan. 2002) 
 
On February 28, 2000, Chris Kurz, a teacher and coach at the Kansas State 
School for the Deaf (KSSD) asked an assistant football coach to recruit KSSD 
football players to go to Charles Marsh's property to move railroad ties.  Marsh was 
also a teacher at KSSD and owned forty acres of land that he was in the process of 
improving.  Kurz gained approval from LuAnn Ward, the Head Teacher, who signed 
the request form on March 6, 2000.  On the field trip request form, the purpose of the 
trip was stated to be "community service - help Charles Marsh move train tracks to 
his Haven" (p. 11).  Before giving permission, Ms. Ward asked Kurz to clarify the 
words, "train tracks."  Kurz told Ward that it meant moving railroad ties to Mr. 
Marsh's property.  Two KSSD football players, Justin Barnett and Brian Harmon, met 
Kurz and Marsh at the property on March 11, 2000.  Marsh and Kurz reported that 
they talked to the students about safety, specifically the importance of watching for 
trains.  After working for an hour, Marsh went inside to make lunch and Kurz 
remained outside with the boys.  Kurz told Justin to stand in a ditch to keep watch of 
the tracks while he and Brian moved a railroad tie to the van.  As Kurz and Brian 
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were moving a railroad tie, Kurz noticed a train approaching.  Kurz also saw that 
Justin had left the ditch and was standing with a railroad tie supported on his shoulder 
right next to the track.  Kurz and Brian tried to warn Justin by throwing snowballs 
and waving their arms, but they were not successful.  Justin was hit and killed by the 
train.  The Kansas State Board of Education (Board), the governing body of the 
KSSD, investigated the incident.  The Board appointed a committee to interview 
witnesses and create a report.  As a result of the report, the Board gave Marsh notice 
that it had made a motion to terminate his teaching contract for the following reasons:  
(1) Marsh jeopardized the health and safety of two KSSD students by engaging in an 
inappropriate and dangerous activity, (2) Marsh failed to exercise appropriate 
professional judgment and care regarding student safety,  (3) Marsh failed to comply 
with school policies and regulations, and  (4) Marsh failed to conduct himself in a 
manner that reflected positively on the school and to maintain the respect and 
confidence of other professional employees, students and the employer.  Marsh 
requested to have the matter heard before a hearing committee.  The hearing 
committee heard testimony from both parties.  A majority of Marsh's witnesses were 
from the deaf community and they were of the opinion that educational experiences 
for deaf students should be no different from those for hearing students.  They did not 
believe the railroad tie activity was unreasonable.  The witnesses for the Board 
criticized Marsh for his decision, which placed a deaf person on an active railroad 
track.  The hearing committee determined that the Board's evidence could be placed 
into three categories:  (1) that Marsh failed to properly inform the parents as to the 
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nature of the project, (2) that Marsh did not have permission from the railroad 
company to remove their ties, and (3) that Marsh improperly organized an activity 
around an active railroad track.  As it related to the first category, the committee 
found there was no evidence that Marsh was required to inform the parents of the 
activity, as this was the responsibility of the head teacher.  The committee stated that 
while there was evidence that Marsh had not obtained permission from the railroad 
company, there was no evidence that his actions were "knowingly violative of 
railroad rights," (p. 14) as it was common for people to remove the ties without first 
getting permission.  The committee also found that the Board's evidence did not 
substantiate their claim of Marsh's lack of professional responsibility.  The committee 
also found no evidence that Marsh had failed to maintain the respect and confidence 
of other staff or students.  After listening to the testimony and evidence, the hearing 
committee found in Marsh's favor and ordered his reinstatement.  The Board appealed 
the hearing committees' decision.  The district court found that the hearing 
committee's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that it was 
arbitrary and capricious.  Marsh appealed. 
The court had previously held in U.S.D. No. 434 v. Hubbard, 19 Kan.App.2d 
323, 868 P.2d 1240 (1993) that the standard of review of a due process hearing 
officer's decision was limited to deciding if: (1) the hearing officer's decision was 
within the scope of his/her authority; (2) the hearing officer's decision was supported 
by substantial evidence; and (3) the hearing officer did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily, 
or capriciously.  The court first found that the hearing committee had acted within the 
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scope of its authority as it was granted to them by the provisions of K.S.A.  76-11a06 
through 76-11a11.  The hearing committee, according to the court, had "appropriately 
recognized its legislative authority" (p. 19) in making the final determination as to 
whether the Board had shown good cause to terminate Marsh's contract.  Next, the 
court found that although there was conflicting evidence, the conflicts had been 
resolved by the hearing committee and "there was substantial evidence to justify its 
opinion" (p. 20).  Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the hearing 
committee had acted in a manner that could be considered arbitrary or capricious.  
The hearing committee had listened to testimony for two days from fourteen different 
witnesses.  It had fully discussed and reviewed the four stated reasons given by the 
Board for Marsh's termination before determining that the Board had not provided 
substantial evidence that good cause existed to release Marsh from his contract.  For 
these reasons, the court stated that it could "find nothing which compels a finding of 
any fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious action" (p. 20).  The court held that the 
procedures established in K.S.A. 76-11a04 had been followed.  The decision of the 
district court was reversed. 
 
Lassiter v. Topeka Unified School District No. 501 
347 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Kan. 2004) 
 
Sandra Lassiter had been an employee of U.S.D. No. 501 for thirty-three years.  
During that time, she served as a counselor, teacher, and administrator and never had 
any grievance or disciplinary actions taken against her.  In March 2002, while 
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Lassiter was the principal at Quinton Heights Elementary School, six teachers at the 
school made allegations against her to her supervisor, Barbara Davis, the Director of 
Elementary Education.  Davis did not inform Lassiter of the allegations until May 13, 
2002.  On May 14, Lassiter met with the superintendent of schools, Robert McFrazier, 
and informed him that the allegations were false.  An investigation into the 
allegations began on June 6, 2002.  McFrazier scheduled a meeting with Lassiter on 
July 25, 2002 to discuss the results of the investigation.  Because she was concerned 
about the way McFrazier was handling things, Lassiter brought two people to be 
witnesses at the meeting.  McFrazier became upset with the presence of the witnesses, 
cited Lassiter with insubordination and wrote her a letter of reprimand.  On July 31, 
2002, Lassiter attended the rescheduled meeting with McFrazier and Davis where she 
was informed that she would be placed on probationary status for the 2002-2003 
school year due to an unsatisfactory evaluation performed by Davis.  The evaluation 
was based in part on the false allegations made by the teachers despite the fact that 
those allegations had been cleared by the investigation.  During the first semester of 
the school year, Lassiter reported that she was harassed by McFrazier and Davis.  In 
December of 2002, McFrazier gave Lassiter a document that consisted of questions 
dealing with the same false allegations.  He told her to respond to the questions within 
five days.  Lassiter hired an attorney to help her respond.  On January 3, 2002, 
McFrazier suspended Lassiter and told her that he was going to request that she be 
terminated because he did not agree with her responses to his questions.  Lassiter and 
her attorney requested a due process hearing.  On February 7, 2003, Lassiter entered 
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into a resolution of personnel matter with McFrazier.  In this resolution, McFrazier 
withdrew his recommendation that Lassiter be terminated, Lassiter withdrew her 
request for a due process hearing, Lassiter was reassigned to an administrative 
position within the district for the remainder of the school year, and it was agreed that 
Lassiter would be considered for employment in the district for the following year if 
she complied with the terms of her probation and successfully completed the school 
year and the evaluation process.  The resolution also included a confidentiality clause 
and a waiver and release of liability from the events surrounding Lassiter's evaluation, 
the fact she had been placed on probation, and McFrazier's recommendation that she 
be terminated.  Lassiter completed the 2002-2003 school year with a satisfactory 
evaluation and met with McFrazier on April 30, 2003 concerning the completion of 
her probationary status.  McFrazier told her that her probation was complete and that 
he would "take care of it later" (p. 1039).  McFrazier retired at the end of June 
without having cleared Lassiter's probationary status.  Lassiter met with Tony Sawyer, 
the new superintendent of schools, on August 3, 2003.  She explained the situation 
regarding her probation and asked him to clear her probationary status.  Sawyer 
refused to do anything about her status.  When Lassiter told Sawyer that she was 
concerned about being in a position created by McFrazier for which she was not 
certified, Sawyer either responded by telling her that she could stay in that position or 
retire.  Lassiter appealed to the school board numerous times, but they did not provide 
any recourse or clear her probationary status.  Lassiter alleged that because the 
defendants kept her in an uncertified position on probationary status she could have 
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been terminated, which would have affected her retirement benefits.  Therefore, she 
retired.  Lassiter brought a lawsuit against the school district, school board, McFrazier, 
Davis, and Sawyer on seven separate claims which were entitled:  (1) violation of 42 
U.S.C. Section 1983; (2) violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; 
(3) violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981; (4) breach of contract; (5) negligence under 
the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA), K.S.A. 75-6103; (6) malice or reckless 
indifference; and (7) forced retirement.  The defendants made a motion to dismiss 
arguing that Lassiter waived any claims against them when she signed the waiver and 
release provision contained in the resolution of personnel matter.   
The court first addressed the issue of whether the waiver and release provision 
in the resolution should be enforced.  Although the resolution did include such a 
provision, Lassiter argued that it was not enforceable because the defendants 
committed a material breach of the confidentiality clause by sharing confidential 
information with members of the public.  A provision of the resolution stated, "each 
and every element of this agreement is a material part of the agreement and a breach 
of any such element is a breach of the entire agreement" (p. 1041).  The court stated 
that it could "envision that the confidentiality portion may have been material in the 
sense that it was one of the major benefits that plaintiff anticipated receiving by virtue 
of entering into the resolution" (p. 1042).  Accordingly, the court found that the 
defendants' argument based on the waiver and release provision was without merit 
and the motion to dismiss the case on that basis was denied.  Next, the court 
addressed the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims.  Her Section 1983 Fourteenth 
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Amendment claims included alleged deprivation of procedural due process with 
respect to her property interest in continued employment and her liberty interest in 
her good name and reputation, as well as an alleged deprivation of substantive due 
process.  The court looked at Kansas law to determine the extent of Lassiter's alleged 
property interest.  Lassiter was an administrator at the time in question and not 
afforded the same rights as a tenured teacher.  The Kansas Administrators' Act 
(KAA), K.S.A. Sections 72-5451 and 72-5455, provide details of the protection give 
to a school administrator.  The KAA merely gives administrators the right to be 
notified of a nonrenewal and the right to an executive session "meeting" with the 
board of education.  Because of this, the plaintiff had no property interest in her 
continued employment with the school district.  The district was not constrained by 
state law to discharge Lassiter only for cause, so she was "terminable at will" and had 
no claim of entitlement of continued employment.  Thus, the defendants' motion to 
dismiss was granted with respect to the procedural due process claim.  The motion to 
dismiss with respect to Lassiter's liberty interest was also granted as she failed to 
identify any specific defamatory statements made by the defendants.  She alleged that 
McFrazier and Davis disclosed confidential information, but the nature of those 
disclosures was not clear to the court.  Lassiter next argued that her deprivation of 
substantive due process claim was that her good name, reputation, honor and integrity 
were stigmatized by the defendants' actions of making false allegations and 
statements to the public regarding her suspension and leaving her on probationary 
status without clearing her name.  The court noted that in order to state a substantive 
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due process claim a plaintiff must "demonstrated a degree of outrageousness and a 
magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking" (p. 1047).  In 
this case, the court did not find the defendants alleged conduct to be outrageous and 
they granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the substantive due process claim.  
Next, the court addressed the plaintiff's claim of forced retirement, or constructive 
discharge.  Constructive discharge is viable under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 if the 
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected property interest.  Because the court had 
already concluded that Lassiter failed to show a constitutionally protected property 
interest in her continued employment, her complaint of forced retirement failed to 
state a Section 1983 constructive discharge claim.  Lassiter's third complaint was that 
of a violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981.  To make a claim under Section 1981, the 
plaintiff had to show that the defendants "intentionally or purposefully discriminated 
against her on the basis of her race or ethnicity."  Lassiter did not allege any direct or 
circumstantial evidence that would show she had been discriminated against.  In fact, 
she did not even allege that she belonged to a minority group.  Thus, the defendants' 
motion was granted with respect to the plaintiff's Section 1981 claim.  Because the 
court had dismissed all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, the court declined to 
resolve the parties' remaining arguments, for example the defendants' claims of 
qualified immunity.  The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the plaintiff's awaiting state claims.  Finally, the plaintiff requested leave to 
amend her complaint.  Because some of her claims were not specific enough, the 
court determined to grant Lassiter the opportunity to make amendments.  The court 
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granted the defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice to plaintiff filing an 
amended complaint on or before January 3, 2005.   
 
Unified School District No. 215 v. McGlynn 
107 P.3d 1234 (Kan. App. 2004) 
 
Five tenured teachers, who were employed by U.S.D. 215, were given 
extended day contract assignments.  The salary for those extended contracts was fixed 
by a negotiated formula.  The Lakin Teachers’ Association (LTA) represented all 
teachers for contract negotiations with the Board.  The LTA had negotiated a base 
contract for a school year of no more than 186 days for teachers, with the exception 
of those who had entered into extended day contracts.  In January 2002, the school 
district notified the LTA that it intended to reduce or eliminate the extended contracts 
due to financial constraints.  The school district did eventually renew the base 
contracts with reduced or no extended days.  The teachers who lost their extended 
days were originally told they would be entitled to a hearing.  However, both the 
teachers and the district agreed to continue the hearing pending a court order on 
whether the teachers were entitled to a hearing.  The district court heard the case and 
concluded that any agreements to extend the teachers’ contract beyond the 186 
negotiated days would be considered supplemental contracts and not subject to due 
process hearings.  The teachers appealed this decision arguing that their extended day 
contracts warranted the same protections afforded under K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. as 
their primary contracts.   
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K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq. outlines the due process procedures that a school 
district must follow when a primary contract is terminated or nonrenewed.  These 
procedures do not apply to supplemental contracts.  Any assignment that is beyond 
the normal teaching duties is considered supplemental and cannot be turned into part 
of the primary contract.  The court in Swager v. Board of Education, U.S.D. No. 412, 
9 Kan.App.2d 648, 688 P.2d 270 (1984) held that “even when all duties are included 
in a single instrument, the supplemental duties can still be unilaterally terminated by 
either party.”  Id. at 656.  The extended duty day contracts went beyond the teachers 
basic requirements.  The evidence for this was the fact that these duties increased the 
teachers’ salaries above that which had been negotiated in the base contract.  Only the 
primary teaching contract is protected by the Due Process Procedure Act.  As the 
extended days fell under the definition of a supplemental contract, no hearing was 
required when the district terminated those duties due to budget constraints.  The 
decision of the district court was affirmed.   
 
Dockery v. Unified School District No. 231 
382 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2005) 
 
This action, filed by Reginald Dockery, alleged claims of employment and 
racial discrimination against USD 231 and Tim Yoho, the director of human 
resources for the school district.  Dockery, an African American, was hired as a 
custodian by the school district in 2002.  His children, including K.C.D., attended 
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schools in the district.  K.C.D. was the victim of racial slurs and was physically 
attacked by other students while on school grounds, on the bus, and at the bus stop.  
In early December 2002, Mr. Dockery called Dr. John Hetlinger, the superintendent 
to report the racial harassment of his children and his concerns about the lack of 
response by school officials.  A series of letters were exchanged, but the Dockerys 
were not satisfied with the resolution.  Mr. Dockery also alleged that at about this 
time in December he was cleaning the classroom of Nikki Lovell, a teacher at the 
high school, and was offended by a movie she was showing in class that contained a 
scene involving sexual activity.  A few days after this, Ms. Lovell complained to her 
supervisors about Mr. Dockery’s poor work performance.  On February 19, 2004, 
Dockery met with Dr. Yoho and other school administrators and attempted to initiate 
a written complaint of sexual harassment and retaliation against Ms. Lovell, but Dr. 
Yoho would not accept it.  Yoho did not believe that Ms. Lovell’s conduct constituted 
sexual harassment or a pattern of retaliation.  On March 2, 2004, two of Dockery’s 
supervisors met with Dockery to discuss his time sheet.  Dockery had indicated that 
he had worked on a Saturday.  Mr. Dockery acknowledged that he had not worked on 
that day and that the entry was a mistake.  He removed the entry from his time sheet 
at his supervisor’s instruction who then signed the time record.  On March 5, 2004, 
Dockery was called to a meeting with Dr. Yoho and other school administrators.  
Yoho informed Dockery that he was being terminated because he had falsified his 
time record.  Mr. Dockery attempted to appeal his discharge by sending letters to his 
supervisors, Dr. Hetlinger, and each member of the school board.  No one responded 
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to these attempts.  Mr. Dockery then filed a complaint seeking redress for himself on 
February 15, 2005.  The first amended complaint was filed in April 2005 so that 
Dockery could pursue claims on behalf of K.C.D.  There were six counts included in 
Mr. Dockery’s suit.  In Count 1, Dockery alleged that the school district retaliated 
against him for exercising his First Amendment rights; in Count II, Dockery alleged 
that the school district and Dr. Yoho fired him because of his race in violation of 
Section 1981; in Count III, Dockery alleged that the district terminated him in 
retaliation for opposing sexual harassment in violation of Title VII; in Count IV, Mr. 
and Mrs. Dockery, on behalf of K.C.D., alleged that the district violated Title VI 
when it failed to provide K.C.D. with a nondiscriminatory educational environment; 
in Count V, the Dockerys, on behalf of K.C.D., alleged that the school district 
deprived K.C.D. of his Constitutional and statutory rights to a nondiscriminatory 
educational environment in violation of Section 1983; and in Count VI, the  Dockerys, 
on behalf of K.C.D., alleged that K.C.D. was subjected to a hostile educational 
environment due to his race, which threatened his personal security and denied him 
the benefits of a program receiving federal funding in violation of Section 1981.  The 
defendants moved to dismiss all counts.  
As it related to Count 1, the court sited Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 
563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811(1968) when it noted that a government employer 
may not, as a condition of employment, compel an employee to relinquish his First 
Amendment right to comment on matters of public concern.  To prevail on a claim of 
retaliation due to free speech, an employee must show: (1) the speech involved a 
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matter of public concern, (2) the employee’s interest in engaging in the speech 
outweighed the employer’s interest in regulating the speech, and (3) the speech was a 
“substantial motivating factor” behind the decision to take adverse employment 
action.  Mr. Dockery had only brought this complaint against the school district.  For 
Dockery to establish liability against the school district, he “must show (1) the 
existence of a municipal policy or custom, and (2) that there is a direct causal link 
between the policy or custom and the injury alleged.” At p. 1240 citing Hinton v. City 
of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10thCir.1993).  Dockery had not alleged the existence of 
any policy or custom that caused an injury.  Absent the facts that would establish 
liability against a governmental unit, the district dismissed Dockery’s claim in Count 
1 of his complaint.  Next, the court addressed the Count II and Count IV claims, 
which arose under Section 1981.  In Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 
109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), the Supreme Court held that Section 1983 is 
the only means for a plaintiff to pursue a Section 1981 claim against a municipality. 
The court in this case, found that Count II and Count IV had “pleading defects,” (p. 
1241) as Section 1983 offered the exclusive remedy for damages against a state actor.  
Therefore, the court granted the Dockerys leave to amend those counts so that the 
claims brought under Section 1981 could be brought under Section 1983.  In regards 
to Count II, Dr. Yoho argued that the complaint must be dismissed against him as he 
was entitled to qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”  At p. 1241 citing Holland ex 
rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.2001).  Courts employ a two-
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part test to determine qualified immunity.  First, the facts alleged by the plaintiff must 
show that the conduct of the defendant violated a constitutional right.  If it does this, 
the next step is to determine if the right was clearly established at the time of the 
defendant’s conduct such that a reasonable person would have known that the alleged 
conduct violated the law.  Mr. Dockery failed to allege that Yoho had individually 
engaged in conduct that violated a clearly established law.  He asked for, and was 
granted by the court, leave to amend this complaint.  In regards to the Count III 
claims of retaliation due to Dockery’s opposition of sexual harassment, the court 
found that the single incident of viewing a movie that contained sexual activity was 
not severe enough to create the conditions necessary for sexual harassment.  To raise 
an actionable claim for sexual harassment under Title VII, the harassment must be “so 
severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create 
an abusive work environment" (p. 1243).  Mr. Dockery’s claims fell far short of this 
requirement and as a result, his Count III claim was dismissed by the court.  Finally, 
the court addressed the Count IV and V claims of personal injury due to 
discrimination filed on behalf of K.C.D.  The defendants argued that as two years had 
passed since plaintiffs knew of the conduct complained about; the statue of 
limitations prevented them from filing a claim.  The Dockerys contended that K.S.A. 
60-515(a) which tolls the statute of limitations for minors, allowing a minor to bring 
suit one year after turning eighteen, allowed them to bring these claims on behalf of 
K.C.D. who was ten years old.  The court here held that the Kansas two-year statute 
of limitations applied to the Title VI and Section 1983 claims of discrimination 
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presented in Counts IV and V.  They further stated that the “plaintiffs missed the 
purpose of K.S.A. 60-515(a)" (p. 1244).  The purpose of the statute is to mitigate 
difficulties of maintaining a civil suit while under a legal disability; it does not 
suspend or extend the statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations had run out on 
the Dockery’s ability to bring a claim on their son's behalf.  Accordingly, the court 
dismissed Counts IV and V of the complaint.   
Courts may grant leave to amend a complaint when “justice so requires, 
unless the amendment would be futile.”  (See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)) The plaintiffs in 
this case were given until August 30, 2005 to amend Count II and IV of their 
complaint. 
 
Dockery v. Unified School District No. 231 
406 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (D. Kan. 2006) 
 
This is the amended complaint from Reginald Dockery resulting from the 
district court decision in Dockery v. Unified School District No. 231, 382 F. Supp. 2d 
1234 (2005).  In this action, plaintiff asserted two counts.  Count I was a claim by Mr. 
Dockery against both the school district and Mr. Yoho, the human resources director, 
for racially discriminatory discharge in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section1981, 1983.  
Count II was a claim by K.C.D., minor child of Mr. Dockery, against the school 
district for a racially hostile environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, 1983.  
The plaintiffs also sought to amend their complaint for a third time to assert a Section 
1983 complaint against the school district for retaliatory discharge in violation of Mr. 
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Dockery’s First Amendment free speech rights.  The defendants asked the court to 
dismiss both counts and to deny plaintiffs’ motion to amend.   
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide in Fed.R.Civ.P 15(a) that a 
party may amend his pleading “only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”  The court 
has discretion when determining whether to grant leave to amend.  The court may 
refuse leave to amend on grounds of undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure 
deficiencies by previously allowed amendments, or futility of the proposed 
amendment.  If the amendment failed to state a claim, it may be deemed futile.  If it 
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim then the court may dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The court relied on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as it considered both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
requests.   
Count I had been previously brought before the court only under Section 1981.  
This complaint placed the claim as a violation of Section 1981 “and” Section 1983.  
The court determined that Section 1981 created the statutory right for Mr. Dockery’s 
discriminatory discharge claim and Section 1983 provided the exclusive remedy for 
the alleged violation of his statutory right.  Next, the court turned to Mr. Yoho’s claim 
of qualified immunity with respect to Count I.  To evaluate this claim, the court used 
a two-part inquiry.  First, they determined that Mr. Yoho’s actions, as alleged in the 
complaint, violated a statutory right under Section 1981.  The complaint alleged that 
Mr. Dockery’s race was the factor in Yoho’s decision to discharge and Section 1981 
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“forbids all intentional racial discrimination in the making or enforcement of private 
or public contracts.”  Thus, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged a statutory violation.  
Second, the court had to determine whether the right violated was “clearly 
established” and “…was sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right” (p. 1225).  In this case, the court determined 
that any reasonable official would understand that dismissing an employee based on 
race violated that employee’s rights under Section 1981.  Thus, Mr. Yoho’s claim of 
qualified immunity failed as a result of this two-part inquiry.  The court pointed out 
that Mr. Yoho was “free to test these allegations in light of facts revealed during 
discovery on a motion for summary judgment” (p. 1226).  Count II alleged that the 
school district discriminated against K.C.D. by subjecting him to a racially hostile 
environment as the result of school district policy because the school board was 
aware of the racial harassment but failed to initiate an investigation and take any 
reasonable remedial action.  The court found this claim, as it was pleaded, adequately 
placed the school district on notice of the nature of K.C.D.’s claim against it.  
Plaintiffs next sought to amend their complaint to allow Mr. Dockery to assert a claim 
of retaliatory discharge based on the district’s violation of his First Amendment free 
speech rights.  In order to hold the school district liable on this claim, Mr. Dockery 
had to show that the “governmental entity’s policies caused the constitutional 
violation” (p. 1228).  Plaintiffs argued that Mr. Yoho was a final policymaker for the 
purposes of establishing the school district’s liability.  The amendment alleged that 
the retaliatory discharge resulted from the school district policy because the board of 
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education delegated final policymaking authority to Mr. Yoho, and the board then 
approved Mr. Yoho’s decision to dismiss Mr. Dockery.  The court concluded that if 
the allegations were true, Mr. Yoho’s decision to discharge Mr. Dockery constituted 
school district policy, which caused the alleged violation of Mr. Dockery’s First 
Amendment free speech rights.  Thus, the proposed amended complaint contained the 
causal link needed to establish the school district’s liability.  The plaintiffs' motion to 
amend their complaint was granted.  Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaints 
was denied.   
 
Dees v. Marion-Florence Unified School District No. 408 
149 P.3d. 1 (Kan. App. 2006) 
 
Kerry Dees was a tenured elementary school counselor who was nonrenewed 
due to a need for the Board of USD 408 to reduce staff because of declining 
enrollment in the elementary school.  The district had been experiencing a significant 
decline in student enrollment for a number of years and this was having an adverse 
impact on the school district’s budget.  The Board directed the school administration 
to reduce personnel at the elementary level and suggested that the reductions be made 
in areas that would have the least impact on instructional programs.  The elementary 
principal was directed to make a recommendation to the Board.  As the principal 
placed a higher priority on the classroom teachers working directly with students, the 
counselor’s position was one that she recommended be reduced.  Based on that 
recommendation, the Board passed a resolution to nonrenew Dees’ contract in April 
 
405 
 
2003.  Two weeks after receiving her notice of nonrenewal, Dees requested a due 
process hearing.  At the request of Dees’ counsel, the hearing was delayed until 
March 2004.  The final brief took place in May 2004.  It was agreed upon by both 
parties that the written decision would be completed by July 12, 2004.  The final 
decision was issued on September 10, 2004.  At the hearing, Dees contended that the 
high school counselor, Phoebe Janzen, should have been nonrenewed because she had 
less seniority.  Dees was certified as a K-12 counselor and had been in the district 
longer than Janzen.  The District’s negotiated contract contained a systematic 
procedure for the Board to follow in case of a necessary reduction in force.  Dees’ 
contention was that step 1(e) specifically stated that if the Board had followed all 
previous steps and a reduction was still necessary, “then teachers with the least 
number of years of continuous teaching experience” in the district will be “terminated 
first, provided they are fully qualified fully certified, teachers to replace and perform 
all the needed duties of the terminated teachers” (p. 4).  The negotiated contract went 
on in step 2 to define “fully qualified and fully certified.”  The Board held that it had 
acted in good faith when it initiated the reduction in force and that the decision to 
nonrenew Dees was not arbitrary or capricious.  The hearing officer found for the 
Board.  Dees appealed to the district court where she argued that the Board did not 
comply with the reduction in force provisions in the negotiated teachers’ contract and 
that the hearing officer violated her due process rights by failing to issue the written 
opinion within the statutory time frame.  The district court affirmed the decision of 
the hearing officer.  Dees appealed.  
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First, the court considered whether the Board correctly followed the 
contractual procedure for a reduction of force.  It was found that the superintendent 
had followed the step-by-step approach in the teachers’ contract and considered each 
subparagraph of section 1 in order.  Dees contended that step 1(e) should have 
governed her situation.  The court focused on the sentence in step 1(e) which stated 
that teachers with the least seniority are terminated first “provided there are fully 
qualified, fully certificated” teachers to replace them.  The court believed it was 
incumbent on the Board to determine if Dees was fully qualified to perform the duties 
of a high school counselor.  In making their decision regarding qualifications, the 
Board used the definition in step 2(a) of the negotiated contract which stated that 
“fully qualified shall be taken to mean recency of training and experience” (p. 6).  
The superintendent identified the required duties of a high school counselor and the 
experience and training of Dees and Janzen was compared.  Dees had no experience 
at the high school level and her recent training had not been directed at performing 
duties of a high school counselor.  Janzen, who was also tenured, not only had 
experience in fulfilling the required duties of a high school counselor but she had 
numerous hours of recent training that focused on the high school level.  This 
evidence established that Dees was not “fully qualified” to replace Janzen and 
perform her duties.  As a result, the court found that the Board had followed the 
reduction in force procedure as it was designed by the negotiated teachers’ contract.  
Dees argued that pursuant to Bauer v. U.S.D. No. 452, 244 Kan. 6, 765 P.2d 1129 
(1988), she was “fully qualified” for the high school position because she was 
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certified K-12.  The court pointed out that in Bauer there was no definition of “fully 
qualified” in that district policy and the Board in that case had not made an effort to 
examine the areas in which the teacher was certified.  The Bauer decision did not 
prevent USD 408 from establishing, through a negotiated contract, a standard for 
measuring the qualification of a certified, tenured teacher to replace another certified, 
tenured teacher.  In fact, having such a provision provided the Board with the method 
to meet the Bauer directive to “conduct a good faith examination of the competence, 
interest, and training of all teachers in the area where the reduction of staff is to 
occur” (p. 9).  While Dees had a contractual right to preference because of her 
seniority, the court found nothing in case law or state statute that would have 
precluded the school district from creating the condition that the senior teacher must 
possess the training and experience necessary to perform the duties of the less-senior 
teacher.  Finally, Dees claimed that she should have been granted summary judgment 
because her due process right had been violated by the hearing officer’s delay in 
issuing a decision.  Her argument was based on K.S.A. 72-5443(a) which provides 
that, unless otherwise agreed upon, “the hearing officer shall render a written opinion 
not later than 30 days after the close of the hearing…”  The hearing officer’s decision 
was issued approximately 60 days after the agreed upon July 12, 2004 deadline.  The 
court found this issue to be analogous with the finding in Expert Environmental 
Control, Inc. v. Walker, 13 Kan.App.2d 56, 761 P.2d 320 (1988) in which the court 
found that the 30-day limit of K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 77-526(g) was not mandatory but 
directory in nature because it did not require strict compliance with the provision and 
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there was no penalty or other consequence for noncompliance of the 30-day limit.  
This same analysis could be applied to K.S.A. 72-5443(a).  Thus, the court held that 
the 30-day limit in K.S.A. 72-5443(a) was directory, not mandatory.  Because Dees 
made a due process claim, the court also had to consider whether the hearing officer’s 
delay denied Dees notice and an “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a 
meaningful manner” (p. 12).  Dees contended that she suffered damages because of a 
loss of a teaching position and salary while she waited on the hearing officer’s 
decision.  The court pointed out that Dees had requested continuances, which delayed 
the due process hearing by approximately 4 months, and her counsel agreed to the 
submission of the closing arguments in writing, which extended the proceedings for 
another 2 months.  As a result, it took over a year to complete her due process hearing.  
Because she actively participated in extending the hearing process by at least 6 
months, the court did not find Dees’ claim of prejudice from a 60-day delay to be 
persuasive.  The court held that the “minimal delay of 60-days” did not deprive Dees 
of her due process hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  The 
decision of the district court was affirmed. 
When a school district must reduce the number of its teachers, no statutory 
law or case law requires that the reduction must be based solely on seniority.  
Districts may require that a teacher possess the training and experience needed to 
perform the duties of the position in question.  It would be wise for a school district to 
include language in its negotiated agreement with teachers that defines how the 
district would determine whether a teacher was qualified for a position.  
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Rettie v. Unified School District 475 
167 P.3d 810 (Kan. App. 2007) 
 
Helen Rettie was a tenured teacher for USD 475 in an early childhood 
handicapped classroom.  Rettie renewed her teaching contract for the school year 
2003-04, but on July 7, 2004, her teacher's certificate lapsed due to her failure to 
complete the required continuing education requirements.  She applied for a substitute 
teacher's certificate, which was granted on July 12, 2004.  A letter dated July 12, 2004, 
was sent to Rettie notifying her that her position with the district had been terminated 
because she had let her contract lapse and, therefore, no longer met the requirements 
of her teaching contract.  The Board had not passed a resolution terminating Rettie 
before the July 19 letter, and the Board passed no resolution authorizing or approving 
her termination.  Rettie filed in district court alleging that she had not been provided 
with a due process termination hearing.  At trial, the Board acknowledged that no 
resolution had been adopted regarding Rettie's contract because it was the position of 
the Board that Rettie was not entitled to any of the protections of a property interest in 
continuing employment because her contract was void.  The trial court found in favor 
of the Board.  Rettie appealed. 
The question for the appellate court to decide was whether a void employment 
contract eliminated a tenured teacher's property interest in continued employment.  
Paragraph seven of Rettie's employment contract provided that "the contract shall be 
void if the Teacher fails to have on file with the Board continuously during 
employment a valid Kansas Teaching Certificate..."  Contract language clearly 
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showed that the school district was within its authority to terminate Rettie's 
employment for the 2004-05.  However, the court pointed out that the "right to 
terminate employment is distinct from the right to due process" (p. 813).  It is Kansas 
statutes, not contract provisions, which provide tenured teachers with a property 
interest in continued employment.  Because Rettie was tenured, she qualified for 
protection under the Teachers Due Process Act, K.S.A. 72-5436 et seq.  Although her 
certificate lapsed, she was still entitled to the protections of this Act.  K.S.A. 72-
5445(b) requires that the provisions of the Act be applied to "any tenured teacher 
except those whose certificate is revoked due to a conviction or diversion for specific 
crimes listed in the statute."  Under this Act, Rettie had a property interest in 
continued employment unless she received notice of termination or nonrenewal that 
included a statement of the reasons for her termination and of her right to a hearing 
within 15 days of the notice.  In this case, Rettie had received a notice of termination, 
but the notice failed to provide for the right to request a hearing.  Whether the school 
district would have been justified in terminating Rettie's contract was immaterial in 
the eyes of the court.  Because they failed to comply with 72-5438, they had violated 
due process.  No matter how strong the grounds for dismissal may have been, Rettie 
could not be deprived of her property interest in continued employment without the 
due process required in the Act.  The appellate court held that "the contract cannot 
trump the due process policy embodied in the Teachers Due Process Act" (p. 814).  
The judgment of the district court was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.   
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Nickels v. Board of Education of Unified School District 453 
173 P.3d 1176 (Kan. App. 2008) 
 
Leslie Nickels had been a teacher for USD 453 for three years when she was 
notified on May 1, 2006, that her teaching contract would not be renewed for the 
following year.  Nickels filed a notice of hearing with the Board in which she alleged 
that her constitutional right to employment had been abridged by her nonrenewal.  
She also claimed that her contract had not been renewed because of her age.  The 
Board denied Nickels' request for a hearing, stating that the hearing procedures 
required by K.S.A. 72-5446 were not applicable to the circumstances in Nickels' 
notice of nonrenewal.  The Board stated that the statute required Nickels provide 
notice that her contract had been nonrenewed by reason of her exercising a 
Constitutional right.  Nickels had only claimed that her constitutional right to 
employment had been curtailed, and the Board noted that there was no Constitutional 
right to remain employed.  Nickels appealed to the district court and claimed that she 
had the right to a due process hearing as the result of the abridgment of her 
constitutional right to not be discriminated against in her job because of her age.  The 
district court held that Nickels' allegations fell within the statute and she was entitled 
to a due process hearing.  The Board appealed. 
K.S.A. 60-2102(a)(4) provides that a party has the right to appeal a "final 
decision" in any action.  The issue for this court to decide was whether the district 
court's decision was a final, appealable decision.  The court looked to NEA-Topeka v. 
U.S.D. 501, 260 Kan. 838, 925 P.2d 835 (1996) which was a similar case in which the 
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school district had appealed the district court's decision that they submit to arbitration 
with the union.  The appellate court in that case concluded that because the trial court 
had ordered arbitration, the parties had to submit to arbitration first and "then 
challenge the arbitrator's decision before there is a final order which is appealable to 
an appellate court."  NEA-Topeka at 843.  The case at hand was very similar to NEA-
Topeka in that the Board was appealing the decision of the district court that they 
hold a due process hearing.  The district court made no factual findings and had made 
no final decision regarding the outcome of the case.  Thus, the court held that because 
the due process hearing had not been held, the Board's appeal was not a final, 
appealable order.  The appeal was dismissed. 
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Chapter 7 
Professional Negotiations 
 
The nineteen cases in this chapter were suits brought by employees on issues 
dealing with professional negotiations.  Kansas collective-bargaining laws clearly 
specify provisions giving public school employees the right to join a union and 
prohibit employers from retaliating against a teacher due to their membership in a 
union.  Court cases in Kansas over the past thirty years have typically dealt with 
negotiability of an issue or the perceived refusal of a school board to negotiate in 
good faith.  K.S.A. 72-5413(l) lists the items that are mandatorily negotiable in the 
state of Kansas.  School officials may not make changes to these mandatory items 
without first negotiating with union representatives. 
 K.S.A. 72-5423 is another important statute that provides, "notices to 
negotiate on new items or to amend an existing contract must be filed on or before 
February 1 in any school year by either party, such notices shall be in writing and 
delivered to the chief administrative officer of the board of education or to the 
representative of the bargaining unit and shall contain in reasonable and 
understandable detail the purpose of the new or amended items desired."  School 
district officials and union representatives must meet that deadline in order to propose 
changes to the current negotiated agreement. 
School boards would do well to keep in mind that they are held to 
requirements of state statute and the power delegated to them through those statutes.  
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They cannot add clauses into agreements that extend or broaden this power.  Courts 
will generally rule contract language that is contrary to statute or attempts to provide 
more authority to a board than is required by statute to be invalid. 
 
Dodge City National Education Association v. Unified School District No. 
443 
635 P. 2d 1263 (Kan. App. 1981) 
 
The National Education Association (NEA) of Dodge City and the Board of 
Education entered into professional negotiations for the 1980-81 school year.  On 
June 4, 1980, they reached an agreement, which was ratified by the Board and the 
teachers.  Prior to this time, six class periods were held at Dodge City Junior High 
and each teacher taught five periods.  No mention of any change to this practice was 
discussed during negotiations.  Shortly after the agreement was reached, the Board 
changed the number of class periods at the junior high from six to seven, which 
would have required the teachers to teach one additional class each day.  NEA 
challenged the Board’s action by filing suit.  The district court held that since the 
number of teaching periods is a mandatorily negotiable item, the Board had “no 
authority to unilaterally change the number of teaching periods without first 
submitting the proposed change to negotiations pursuant to K.S.A. 72-4523” (p. 
1265).  The Board appealed. 
In Chee-Craw Teachers Ass’n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 225 Kan. 561, 593 P. 2d 406 
(1979), the court determined that the number of teaching periods is mandatorily 
negotiable under K.S.A. 72-5413(l) as part of that statue includes “hours and amounts 
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of work.”  The Board in the case at hand made a change in a mandatorily negotiable 
item through a unilateral action.  K.S.A. 72-5423 provides in part that notices to 
negotiate may include new items or items that change an existing contract.  The 
number of class periods was not negotiated, nor was it included in the negotiated 
agreement.  That made it a “new item,” and since it was an item that was mandatorily 
negotiable, it should have been noticed and negotiated before being changed.  The 
Board argued that the individual teacher contracts permitted them to make such a 
change because the contract language provided that a teacher was “to teach, govern, 
and conduct classes assigned and conform to the Rules and Regulations and Policies 
of the Board of Education” (p. 1265).  The court answered by pointing out that the 
negotiated agreement was a part of the individual contracts, and no change in the 
number of teaching periods was authorized.  If the Board wanted to make a change to 
the number of class periods, it had to notice the item for negotiation as provided by 
statute.  The decision of the district court was affirmed.   
After a negotiated agreement is reached, a school board may not make any 
changes to mandatorily negotiable items.  Written notice of the intent to make 
changes to a contract must be provided before the negotiations process begins.   
 
Unified School District No. 315, Thomas County v. DeWerff 
626 P.2d 1206 (Kan. App. 1981) 
 
Neil DeWerff had been employed for many years as a teacher and basketball 
coach.  On June 28, 1978, DeWerff gave the school district notice of his resignation.  
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He was notified that his resignation would be accepted upon receipt of the $400 fee 
required by the negotiated agreement.  DeWerff refused to make the payment and the 
school district sued.  The contract provision in the negotiated agreement at issue was 
titled "Penalty for Breaking Contracts."  It proposed that staff members would be 
considered under contract after April 15 of the current school year.  If a teacher under 
contract failed to honor the full term of the contract, a lump sum of $400 would be 
collected between contract acceptance and August 1.  After August 1, a penalty of 
$75 would be charged for each full or part of a month remaining in the contract.  The 
provision further stated that the Board "reserves the right to waive the provisions of 
this penalty policy" (p. 1208).  The district court found in favor of the school district.  
It held that the contractual provision was a "valid liquidated damages clause," the 
$400 amount was reasonable, and the school district had applied the contract 
provision impartially and fairly in the past.  DeWerff appealed this decision. 
Parties to a contract may stipulate to the amount of damages for breach of 
contract as long as the stipulation is deemed to be a liquidated damages clause rather 
than a penalty.  The difference between a liquidated damages clause and a penalty is 
that the purpose of a penalty is to ensure performance, while a liquidated damages 
clause is for "payment of a sum in lieu of services" (p. 1208).  Liquidated damages 
provisions are generally enforceable in employment contracts.  According to the 
appellate court, the use of the term "penalty" in the negotiated agreement provision 
did not defeat the district court's finding that the provision was a liquidated damages 
clause.  The appellate court cited Beck v. Megli, 153 Kan. 721, 114 P.2d 305 (1941) 
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which explained, "courts must look behind the words used by contracting parties to 
the facts and the nature of the transaction.  The use of the terms "penalty" or 
"liquidated damages" in the instrument is of evidentiary value only."  Id. at 726.  Beck 
further stated that there were "two considerations that are given weight in support of a 
holding that a contractual provision is for liquidated damages rather than a penalty," 
the first being that the amount is reasonable "in view of the value of the subject 
matter of the contract"; and the second being that the "nature of the transaction is such 
that the amount of actual damage resulting from the default would not be easily 
determined."  Beck at 726.  A contract provision will generally be held to be a penalty 
when there has been no attempt to determine the true amount of damages that might 
be incurred if a breach of contract occurs.  In the case at hand, the school district had 
testified that it was harder to find qualified teachers after the April 15 contract 
deadline.  As the school year progressed, the contract required payment of a larger 
sum.  The court took this as proof that the school district had made an attempt to 
calculate the amount of damages that might occur if there was a breach in a teacher's 
contract.  DeWerff claimed that the contract provision was "coercive" because there 
was a waiver provision that allowed the school district discretion in their enforcement 
of the provision.  The appellate court did not agree with this reasoning.  It held that 
there was no requirement that enforcement of a liquidated damages provision had to 
be mandatory.  In reviewing the testimony, the appellate court found that the school 
district had only waived enforcement in cases where the teacher was forces to resign 
for health reasons or other circumstances beyond his control.  The provision was 
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enforced in all other cases where the teacher had voluntarily broken his contract.  The 
appellate court also found that the amount of actual damages in cases such as this 
would be difficult to establish.  The school district's superintendent had testified to 
the actual expenses incurred in advertising for DeWerff's vacated position.  He also 
testified to the number of hours spent on recruiting, interviewing and hiring.  The 
uncertainty of actual damages resulting from a teacher's breach of contract had also 
been addressed in previous court cases.  The appellate court determined that in this 
case, the school district had suffered real but unascertainable damages when DeWerff 
resigned past the April 15 deadline.  There had been no challenge to the original 
finding that the amount of damages was reasonable and not excessive.  Therefore, the 
two requirements of a valid liquidated damages clause had been met.  The judgment 
of the district court was affirmed.             
 
National Education Association-Topeka v. Unified School District No. 501 
644 P.2d 1006 (Kan. App. 1982) 
 
This case involved a grievance initiated by a teacher who was employed by 
USD 501.  The details of the grievance were not included in the court's syllabus, but 
it was noted that the grievance process had been followed as provided for in the 
negotiated agreement.  On April 15, 1980, the arbitrator issued a decision sustaining 
the teacher's grievance.  The school district refused to accept the arbitrator's decision, 
claiming that it was not in accordance with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.  The 
action was taken to district court and the plaintiff sought confirmation of the 
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arbitrator's award under the Uniform Arbitration Act, K.S.A. 5-401 et seq., or in the 
alternative for specific performance of the contract between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.  The district court judge granted summary judgment under K.S.A. 5-401 
which confirmed the arbitration award.  The school district appealed. 
The appellate court first sought to determine whether the school district's 
refusal to abide by the arbitrator's decision was a prohibited practice under K.S.A. 72-
5430(b)(7).  K.S.A. 72-5430(b)(7) states in relevant part that it shall be a prohibited 
practice for a board of education to "refuse to participate in good faith in 
the...arbitration pursuant to an agreement entered into pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5424..."  
The court believed that the language of the statute was "plain and unambiguous."  
The words "refuse to participate" are basic and easy to understand.  They do not apply 
in this case because the school district participated in the arbitration; it just failed to 
abide by the arbitrator's decision.  The court held, "there is no way that a refusal to 
abide by the decision could be a prohibited practice if in fact the decision was not 
made in accordance with the jurisdiction and authority of the arbitrator" (p. 1008).  
For that reason, the appellate court found the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction.  The next issue addressed was whether the Uniform Arbitration Act 
should have been applied to an arbitration clause in an employment contract between 
a school district and a teachers' bargaining unit.  K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 5-401 provided 
that a "written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a 
provision in a written contract, other than a contract of insurance or a contract 
between an employer and employees or between their respective representatives...is 
 
420 
 
valid, enforceable and irrevocable..."  Again, the court found the language in the 
statute to be plain and unambiguous and it excluded all contracts between an 
employer and employees, or their respective representatives.  Thus, the court found 
that the district court had erred in granting summary judgment under the Uniform 
Arbitration Act.  The district court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded 
with directions to proceed with the plaintiff's action for specific performance of 
contract.   
 
National Education Association-Wichita v. Unified School District No. 259, 
Sedgwick County 
674 P.2d 478 (Kan. 1983) 
 
The National Education (NEA) of Wichita was the exclusive bargaining 
representative for all teachers in USD 259.  Between February and October of 1981, 
NEA and Unified School District No. 259 (the Board) participated in negotiations 
concerning the terms and conditions of professional service.  The effective date of the 
contract was August 1, 1981 and it extended through July 3, 1983.  During the 1978-
79 school year, the schedule at Roosevelt Junior High School consisted of a six 
period day in which teachers taught five periods and had one planning period.  The 
schedule was unilaterally changed by Roosevelt's administration for the 1979-80 
school year.  Without changing the length of the school day, the number of periods 
was increased from six to seven periods with the length of each period being 
shortened.  A new team concept was instituted by the administration and in order to 
provide for a team-planning period, the extra class period was added.  Teachers 
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taught for five periods, had one personal planning period and one period to meet with 
their team.  The unilateral implementation of the team teaching process was accepted 
by all of the teachers at Roosevelt.  The seven-period team teaching concept was in 
effect at Roosevelt when the August 1, 1981, agreement took effect.  In February of 
1982, the Board issued to Roosevelt's principal a bulletin that required the seventh 
period be used for teaching regular subjects rather than for team planning.  The Board 
directed this change in order to implement remedial reading classes, which had been 
recommended by a community task force.  The principal changed the schedule and 
the team period was converted to a teaching period.  The result of this change was 
that the teachers at Roosevelt had to prepare for and teach one additional class each 
day.  NEA-Wichita claimed that the Board had unilaterally changed, without 
negotiations, the teachers' "hours and amount of work," a mandatorily negotiable item 
provided for in K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  The district court granted the NEA's motion to 
permanently enjoin the Board from unilaterally changing a term and condition of the 
teachers' employment without first negotiating the topic with the NEA.  The district 
court relied upon the decisions made in Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 
225 Kan. 561, 593 P.2d 406 (1979) and Dodge City Nat'l Education Ass'n v. U.S.D. 
No. 443, 6 Kan.App.2d 810, 635 P.2d 1263 (1981) in finding that the number of class 
periods taught per day is a topic that is, by statute, mandatorily negotiable.  The court 
also found that the number of class periods taught during the school day by a 
classroom teacher in USD 259 from 1981-83 had not been a subject of the 
negotiations process that led to the agreement in force during the time of this dispute.  
 
422 
 
The Board appealed from the district court's decision and the case was transferred 
from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. 
The Board first contended that it had negotiated the number of class periods to 
be taught with the NEA during negotiations.  They argued that the language in Article 
V, Section D, Paragraph 7 had been changed to delete the term "hours" and substitute 
the term "periods" pursuant to a proposal made by the Board.  This language change 
only occurred in a paragraph that dealt with the activities and hours of a department 
coordinator, not to all teachers.  The trial court had concluded that this change in 
wording was made as an attempt at "semantic clarification concerning departmental 
coordinators and not the result of full negotiations concerning the number of class 
periods to be taught by all certified personnel" (p. 482).  The Supreme Court agreed 
with the trial court's finding that the number of class periods to be taught per day had 
not been negotiated.  The Board next alleged that there was a distinction between 
Dodge City and this case because the contract at issue in Dodge City contained 
neither a "management rights clause" nor a "closure clause."  Both of these clauses 
appeared in the language of the contract between the Board and NEA-Wichita.  The 
management rights clause stated in part that the Board and the Superintendent had 
"certain exclusive statutory rights and responsibilities" which they could not 
surrender and nothing within the negotiated agreement could be construed to limit 
that power.  The closure clause provided in part that the Board and the NEA 
"acknowledge that all mandatory subjects of negotiations have been negotiated and 
neither party has any right to negotiate further on these or any other subjects during 
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the term of this agreement" (p. 482).  The Board argued that its inclusion of these 
clauses justified its unilateral change in the number of class periods taught.  The court 
noted that school districts in Kansas have only the power and authority that has been 
delegated to them and the inclusion of a management rights clause could not increase 
the authority granted to the Board by the legislature; it simply preserved that which 
had already been granted.  That authority is limited by K.S.A. 72-5413(l) which 
provides that certain topics are mandatorily negotiable.  Among those topics is "hours 
and amounts of work."  This item has been interpreted to include the number of class 
periods per day.  The existence of a management rights clause could not extend the 
power granted to the Board and did not distinguish this case from Dodge City.  The 
closure clause, in the opinion of the court, was nothing more than a "diluted form of a 
waiver" (p. 483).  A waiver of a union's right to bargain must be "clear and 
unmistakable."  In the case at hand, NEA-Wichita had not waived any of its 
bargaining rights.  Neither of the clauses presented by the Board justified the Board's 
unilateral change in the number of class periods taught at Roosevelt.  The court found 
that there was not sufficient basis for distinguishing this case from Chee-Craw and 
Dodge City.  Justice Miller in Dodge City stated that "since the number of teaching 
periods is a mandatorily negotiable item, the Board has no authority to unilaterally 
changed the number of teaching periods without first submitting the proposed change 
to negotiations pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5423."  6 Kan.App.2d at 811.  The appellate 
courts in Kansas have held that if a topic is by statute made a part of the terms and 
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conditions of professional service, then that topic is mandatorily negotiable.  The 
decision of the district court was affirmed.   
 
Ottawa Education Association v. Unified School District No. 290 
666 P.2d 680 (Kan. 1983) 
 
The Ottawa Education Association (OEA) and the Board entered into a 
negotiated agreement for the 1981-82 school year.  Article XIII of that agreement set 
procedures to be followed in case of a need to reduce teaching staff due to declining 
enrollment or lower revenues.  The article required the administration to follow 
certain steps before releasing teachers.  In short, the procedure stated that if a 
reduction was necessary, it should first be achieved through "normal attrition."  If 
further reductions were then needed, K-8 principals and junior and senior high 
department heads would submit the names of one or two teachers for consideration.  
An evaluation committee, made up of three members selected by the Board and three 
members selected by the OEA, would determine which teachers would be released.  
Any teacher who had the potential of being affected by the proposed reduction would 
be notified by April 1 that his position had been terminated pending a decision of the 
evaluation committee.  Teachers wanting to stay would have to submit "merit folders" 
to the superintendent's office by May 1.  The evaluation committee would review the 
merit folders and then determine which teachers would be released from their 
contracts.  Teachers affected by the committee's decision would be notified by May 
15.  The Board would then make the final decision.  The purpose of this article was to 
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give the teachers, through the OEA, some input in deciding which teachers would be 
released when a reduction in staff was required.  
While this negotiated agreement was in effect, the number of students 
attending Ottawa schools for the upcoming school year was predicted to be much less 
than current student numbers.  As a result of this declining enrollment, the Board 
found it necessary to reduce staff.  On March 8, 1982, the Board met and voted to 
nonrenew the contracts of ten nontenured teachers.  Notice of intent was given to the 
ten teachers and on March 15, the Board unanimously passed a motion to nonrenew 
the contracts.  As the Board did not follow the procedures found in Article XIII, the 
OEA filed action in court.  The OEA sought judgment declaring that the Board 
violated Article XIII, and for temporary and permanent orders enjoining the Board 
from breaching the provision of Article XIII, and an order of mandamus directing the 
Board to reinstate the ten teachers.  The Board filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a cause of action.  The district court heard arguments on April 29, 1982, and 
found in favor of the Board.  The OEA appealed that decision.   
The appellate court first considered the meaning of the word "attrition."  The 
district court had concluded that "normal attrition" included the process of 
nonrenewing nontenured teachers.  The appellate court disagreed and quoted the 
Webster's Dictionary definition of attrition as meaning the "reduction chiefly as a 
result of resignation, retirement or death."  Relying on that definition, as well as the 
fact that the word attrition typically carries the connotation of voluntary or natural 
reduction in employees, the appellate court found that the trial court erred when it 
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included nonrenewal of nontenured teachers within the scope of the meaning of 
"normal attrition."  The next issue addressed by the court was whether Article XIII 
conflicted with any of the provisions of the teachers' contracts statutes, K.S.A. 72-
5401 et seq.  K.S.A. 72-5437 provided in part that written notice of termination or 
nonrenewal of a contract "shall be served by a board upon any teacher on or before 
the fifteenth day of April.*" If notice was not given by that deadline, a teacher's 
contract would be deemed to continue for the next school year.  Under this statute, the 
Board was required to make a determination of which teachers were to be 
nonrenewed and give those teachers their notice by April 15.  If the Board had 
followed the procedures of Article XII, it would not have given notice until May 15.  
The Board was bound by statute to provide notification by April 15, or else it would 
lose its chance to reduce the teaching staff.  The April 1 notification that a teacher's 
position was being terminated would not be the same as a notice of intent to 
nonrenew a contract.  The Board could have given notice to nonrenew the contracts 
of a large group of teachers on April 15 and then waited until the evaluation 
committee's decision before deciding which of those teachers would be retained and 
which would be released.  However, as the court pointed out, that would not have 
been a realistic option, as it would have left the affected teachers, departments, and 
the Board in "limbo" for a month.  The court concluded that the Board was "fully 
authorized by statute" to give notice of nonrenewal to the nontenured teachers before 
April 15, 1982.  The provisions in Article XIII of the negotiated agreement conflicted 
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with the purposes of the statute and were therefore "ineffective and void" (p. 684).  
The judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
 (* As it is written today, K.S.A. 72-5437 requires that notification be given 
on or before May 1.) 
 
Unified School District No. 501 v. Secretary of the Kansas Department of 
Human Resources 
685 P.2d 874 (Kan. 1984) 
 
The National Education Association-Topeka (NEA) provided notice for 
renegotiation of all provisions contained in the negotiated agreement for teachers.  
During the course of negotiations, the school board refused to negotiate eight topics 
proposed by the NEA.  Subsequently, the NEA filed a prohibited practice complaint 
with the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Human Resources (secretary).  After 
considering the eight topics, the secretary determined that five of them were not 
mandatorily negotiable.  Three topics entitled "Reduction in Staff," "Employee Files," 
and "Student Teacher Program" were deemed to be mandatorily negotiable.  The 
school district filed an appeal with the district court, which considered the 
negotiability of the three topics.  The district court affirmed the decision of the 
secretary and found that the school board had violated K.S.A. 72-5430(b) by refusing 
to negotiate those proposals.  The school board appealed.   
At issue on appeal, was whether the three proposals fell within the category of 
subjects that are mandatorily negotiable.  Both the secretary and the district court 
used the "topic approach" in determining the question of mandatory negotiability.  
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Under the topic approach, a proposal does not have to be specifically listed under 
K.S.A. 72-5413(l) to be mandatorily negotiable.  All that is required is that the 
proposal be within the scope of one of the categories listed under "terms and 
conditions of professional service."  K.S.A. 72-5413(l) provides an extensive list of 
those topics that fall under the meaning of terms and conditions of professional 
service.  Relevant to this case are the categories of "hours and amounts of work," 
"termination and nonrenewal of contracts," and "re-employment of professional 
employees."  The statute further states "except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
subsection, the fact that any matter may be the subject of a statute or the constitution 
of this state does not preclude negotiation thereon so long as the negotiation proposal 
would not prevent the fulfillment of the statutory or constitutional objective."  K.S.A. 
72-5413(l).  None of the parties challenged the use of the topic approach to consider 
the mandatorily negotiable categories under K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  The court next 
addressed the three specific proposals in this appeal to determine if they would be 
mandatorily negotiable under the statute.  One of the proposals the secretary and 
district court found to be under the statute was a reduction in staff.  The specific NEA 
proposal described the process that the school district was to follow in the event of a 
reduction in staff of teachers beyond what could be accommodated by attrition.  The 
secretary and the district court found that the mechanics of staff reduction was a 
mandatorily negotiable subject under K.S.A. 72-5313(l).  The NEA's proposal was 
contained within the topics of "termination and nonrenewal" and "re-employment."  
The appellate court agreed with the secretary and the district court.  The decision to 
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reduce staff is a managerial decision for the school board and is not negotiable.  
However, the mechanics for termination and nonrenewal of teachers as a result of a 
reduction in staff are mandatorily negotiable items.  Another proposal from the NEA 
dealt with employee files and the rights of an employee to have access to such files.  
The secretary and district court found that the topic of Employee Files was 
mandatorily negotiable under K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  A school district could use an 
employee's file to determine salary and wages, termination and nonrenewal of 
contracts, and re-employment of teachers.  Employee files also contained evaluations 
and under K.S.A. 72-9005, a teacher has the right to examine and respond to 
evaluations.  Therefore, the district court believed that the employee was entitled to 
have access to all evaluation documents and supporting materials and any other 
information contained in his personnel file.  The appellate court agreed with the 
district court's decision that the subject of Employee Files was mandatorily negotiable 
under K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  Finally, the appellate court addressed the NEA proposal 
entitled Student Teacher Program.  In this proposal, the NEA outlined provisions that 
would allow for teachers to opt out of being assigned a student teacher and set a 
deadline for notification of any student teaching assignment.  The secretary ruled that 
the subject matter contained in the student teacher proposal fell under the categories 
of "hours and amounts of work" and perhaps "nonteaching duty assignments" which 
are mandatorily negotiable topics.  The district court affirmed the secretary's decision 
and noted that the NEA proposal did not affect the board's managerial policy to 
maintain a student teacher program.  The proposal only dealt with the fact that 
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because teachers would have to spend extra time assisting and evaluating a student 
teacher, their "hours and amounts of work" would be affected.  The appellate court 
agreed with the district court's finding that the Student Teacher Program proposal was 
mandatorily negotiable under K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  The judgment of the district court 
was affirmed. 
The appellate court emphasized that the fact a proposal is mandatorily 
negotiable does not require a school board to accept the proposal.  K.S.A. 72-5413(l) 
simply requires the school board to discuss the proposal and try to arrive at a fair 
result.   
 
Board of Education, Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick County v. 
Kansas-National Education Association 
 716 P. 2d 571 (Kan. 1986) 
 
This dispute arose as the result of a refund paid by Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Kansas (BCBS) to the school district as trustee.  The premiums collected by BCBS 
for the plan year November 1, 1981 to October 31, 1982, exceeded total claims, 
expenses and reserves by $354,839.83.  This amount is referred to as “divisible 
surplus.”  BCBS refunded the surplus to the Board and it was the distribution of these 
funds that created controversy.  The National Education Association-Wichita (NEA-
W), the exclusive bargaining agent for the teachers of USD 259, negotiated a contract 
with the district in 1981, which was ratified by teachers and signed by the Board.  
Health insurance for teachers was negotiated and was a part of this contract.  A 
divisible surplus rider was included as part of the contract between the Board and 
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BCBS which provided for the distribution of any refund.  This provision stated that 
the surplus would be paid in cash “to the Contract Holder or upon written request 
applied as an adjustment of future dues” (p. 573).  It also stated that this excess would 
be applied for the “sole benefit of the Subscribers.”  The Board filed seeking 
declaratory judgment that the surplus be determined to be a mandatorily negotiable 
item under K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  The district court found that the refund was a 
mandatorily negotiable item and the teachers employed by USD 259 were entitled to 
share in the benefit of the divisible surplus.  The court further determined that the 
Board, as contract holder, was entitled to negotiate how the surplus would be applied.  
The teachers appealed this decision. 
The first issue was whether or not the surplus was a mandatorily negotiable 
item pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5413(l).  The court here found that since the health 
insurance policy had been a part of the negotiated agreement, thus making it a 
mandatorily negotiable item, and as the surplus came about as a result of this contract 
with BCBS, it fell under the negotiated agreement.  The policy included a Divisible 
Surplus Rider and so there was no reason to renegotiate the refund as it resulted from 
benefits paid through the previously agreed upon contract.   
The second issue was to determine who was entitled to receive the refund.  
The Board as “Contract Holder” made no claim to the refund and the teachers 
declined to have the surplus applied as an adjustment of future dues.  Therefore, the 
section of the divisible surplus rider that provided "any excess refund shall be applied 
for the sole benefit of the Subscribers” was at issue.  The BCBS policy defined 
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subscribers as the person named on the identification card, and so the court 
determined that any individual covered by the health insurance fell into this category.  
Finally, the court turned to the divisible surplus rider of the BCBS contract to 
determine who was entitled to the refund.  While the school district and teachers 
believed the surplus should be divided among all the subscribers during the two-year 
term of the teaching contract, the rider showed otherwise.  The divisible surplus rider 
provided that the determination of any surplus accrued would be made at each 
"anniversary of the contract date."  When looking over the BCBS "Merit Rated-
Retrospective Worksheets," the court found that the only year in which a divisible 
surplus occurred was for the plan year November 1, 1981, through October 21, 1982.  
The court had "no hesitation" in concluding that the subscribers for the period of 
November1, 1981, through October 21, 1982, were entitled to the refund of the 
premium overpayment.  The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case 
remanded for further proceedings to determine the names of the individual 
subscribers and the amount of premium paid by each, with the refund apportioned 
accordingly. 
A divisible surplus that falls under a group insurance policy purchased by a 
school board pursuant to a negotiated agreement with teachers is not subject to 
additional mandatory negotiation.  If there is a provision in the health plan which 
specifies how a divisible surplus is to be divided, that provision stands.   
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Unified School District No. 252 v. South Lyon County Teachers Association 
720 P.2d 1119 (Kan. App. 1986) 
 
On January 31, 1985, the president of the South Lyon County Teachers 
Association (SLCTA) sent a letter to the school district's superintendent that served 
notice the SLCTA intended to meet with the Board for negotiations.  Within the letter, 
the union stated its "intent to notice on each and every article in the unilateral 
contract" (p. 1120) in effect at the time the letter was written.  The Board refused to 
negotiate on the grounds that the notice was insufficient.  The SLCTA brought action 
in the district court.  The district court found the teachers' union had provided 
sufficient notice of intent to negotiate under the Professional Negotiations Act.  The 
school board appealed this decision. 
K.S.A. 72-5423(a) provides in relevant part that notices to negotiate on new 
items or to amend an existing contract must be filed on or before February 1 and must 
be delivered to the superintendent or a representative of the bargaining unit.  The 
statute further states that notices "shall contain in reasonable and understandable 
detail the purpose of the new or amended items delivered."  The appellate court, in 
considering the language of the statute, determined that the notice provision of K.S.A. 
72-5423(a) appeared to be mandatory.  Compliance with the notice provision would 
be essential to preserving the rights of all parties.  The negotiations process is 
facilitated when the notice "fully details the purpose behind the proposed additions or 
amendments to an existing contract" (p. 1121).  In the case at hand, the notice 
provided to U.S.D. 252 was not specific.  It informed the school board of the general 
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topics to be discussed but it did not state the purpose of any new or amended items in 
"reasonable and understandable detail."  Because of its lack of detail, the appellate 
court held that the notice did not comply with the requirements of the statute.  
Therefore, the school board was never served with a timely sufficient notice and was 
under no obligation to enter into professional negotiations with SLCTA.  The 
judgment of the district court was reversed.   
 
Board of Education, Unified School District No. 352, Goodland v. NEA, 
Goodland 
785 P. 2d 993 (Kan. 1990) 
 
In the fall of 1985, the Board of Education of U.S.D. 352 put together a 
committee to study evaluation procedures.  The committee met monthly and had the 
purpose of assisting the Board in adopting a policy of written evaluation.  The policy, 
which the committee developed, was called the Professional Improvement Plan.  
During negotiations between the Board and NEA, a dispute arose regarding the 
Professional Improvement Plan.  The Board was willing to negotiate the portions of 
the plan dealing with evaluation procedures but would not negotiate portions 
regarding evaluation criteria.  The NEA filed a prohibitive practice complaint against 
the Board with the Department of Human Resources.  A hearing with a representative 
of the Secretary of the Department of Human Resources found in favor of the NEA.  
An order from this hearing stated in part that the examiner was "convinced the 
legislature contemplated inclusion of the criteria upon which one is evaluated in their 
use of the words ‘employee appraisal procedures’ when defining those subjects listed 
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at K.S.A. 72-5413(l) as terms over which bargaining was mandatory" (p. 994).  The 
Board petitioned the district court for review of this decision and argued that 
professional appraisal procedures are different than the appraisal criteria.  NEA 
contended that the two terms were dependent upon one another.  The district court 
found in favor of the Board and stated that while “professional appraisal procedures 
involve the ‘mechanics’ and the ‘how’ and ‘when’ of employee evaluation and are 
mandatorily negotiable,” (p. 995) the criteria involve the “what” used to evaluate the 
quality of work expected which is a managerial decision.  The district court 
determined that as the school district was not required to negotiate teacher evaluation 
criteria, no prohibitive practice occurred.  The NEA appealed this decision. 
K.S.A. 72-5414 gives teachers the right to organize in order to negotiate with 
boards of education “for the purpose of establishing, maintaining, protecting or 
improving terms of service.”  Professional employee appraisal procedures are listed in 
the K.S.A. 72-5413(l) definition of “terms and conditions of professional service.”  A 
topic is mandatorily negotiable if by statute that topic is made a part of the terms and 
conditions of professional service.  At issue was whether procedures and criteria are 
distinguishable.  In U.S.D. No. 501 v. Secretary of Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 
235 Kan. 968, 685 P. 2d 874 (1984) the court “distinguished managerial decisions 
and policies and the mechanics of such policies."  Id. at 963.  In applying this 
distinction to the case at hand, the court defined evaluation criteria as a managerial 
policy solely within the domain of the Board.  Evaluation procedures were defined as 
the mechanics of applying such criteria.  Thus, evaluation criteria and evaluation 
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procedures were found to be distinct from one another.  NEA accused the Board of 
committing a prohibited practice when it refused to negotiate evaluation criteria.  
Included in K.S.A. 72-5430, which defines prohibited practices, is the refusal to 
negotiate in good faith.  The court found that evaluation criteria were not mandatorily 
negotiable under the Professional Negotiations Act.  Therefore, the court concluded 
that the Board did not commit a prohibited practice.  The decision of the district court 
was affirmed. 
Evaluation procedures and criteria are distinguishable from one another.  
Procedures are specifically stated in K.S.A. 72-5413(l) and thus are mandatorily 
negotiable; evaluation criteria are not. 
 
Unified School District No. 279, Jewell County v. Secretary of the Kansas 
Department of Human Resources 
802 P.2d 516 (Kan. 1990) 
 
In January 1985, the Jewell-Randall Education Association (Association) and 
the Board of Education of Unified School District No. 279 (Board) submitted notice 
of the items they proposed to negotiate for the 1985-86 school year.  During 
negotiations, the parties agreed to all of the issues except base salary and fringe 
benefits.  In May 1985, both parties declared an impasse and the impasse procedures 
of mediation and fact-finding were started.  In October 1985, the Board's 
representative rejected the fact finder's recommendations and made a counter 
proposal to the Association.  The Association rejected the proposal.  As no agreement 
was reached, the Board issued each teacher a unilateral contract.  The Association 
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filed a complaint against the Board alleging that the unilateral contract altered certain 
terms not noticed for negotiations and that the Board's failure to negotiate those terms 
was a prohibited practice.  A hearing was held before the Secretary of the Kansas 
Department of Human Resources (Secretary) who concluded:  (1) the Association had 
standing to file a timely complaint after the Board issued a unilateral contract offer, 
(2) the Board's act of changing unnoticed topics in the unilateral contract was 
remedied by subsequent negotiations, (3) the deduction of $8,536 from the Board's 
original salary offer and the suggestion that $7,700 of the deduction was used to pay 
for the Board's fact-finding services was a violation of K.S.A. 72-5430(b)(1) and (5).   
The Secretary ordered the Board to pay $7,700 to the Association for reimbursement 
of teachers in the district.  The Board appealed the Secretary's order to the district 
court.  The district court held the issue was moot because contracts had been entered 
into for the two years following the years in question.  The case went to the appellate 
court and in an unpublished opinion filed January 20, 1989, the court reversed and 
remanded the case for a determination of whether the Board had complied with K.S.A. 
72-5439.  On remand, the district court held that: (1) the teachers' association had the 
authority to file prohibited practice after negotiations with the school board were 
completed, (2) the school board was free to include terms which had not been noticed 
for negotiation, (3) the Board committed a prohibited practice when it reduced the 
offered teacher salary by the costs of mediation and fact-finding, (4) the Board did 
not commit a prohibited practice when it did not make the unilateral salary increase 
retroactive, (5) the Secretary did have the authority to order the Board to pay $7,700 
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to the Association, and (6) the authority granted to the Secretary did not violate the 
Kansas Constitution.  The Board appealed rulings (1), (3), (5), and (6).  The 
Association and the Secretary cross-appealed rulings (2) and (4).  The Court of 
Appeals, in 14 Kan.App.2d 248, 788 P.2d 867 (1990), affirmed in part and reversed 
in part.  The case next went to the Supreme Court of Kansas.      
The Supreme Court addressed each issue in the order noted above.  In 
determining whether the teachers' association had the authority to file a prohibited 
practice complaint after impasse and mediation procedures had been completed, the 
court reviewed state statutes.  It found no restrictions requiring that such a complaint 
had to be filed during negotiations.  Thus, the findings of the district court and the 
Court of Appeals were affirmed as to this issue.  The court next considered the 
Secretary and Association's issues on cross-appeal.  First addressed was whether the 
Board committed a prohibited practice when it included terms in the unilateral 
contract that had not been negotiated.  The unilateral contracts were not issued by the 
Board until the negotiations process had been completed, as required by K.S.A. 72-
5428(a).  Where mediation and fact-finding fail, K.S.A. 72-5428(f) mandates that the 
board of education "shall take such action as it deems in the public interest…and 
make such action public."  The court believed this to indicate intent by the legislature 
to grant school boards "complete freedom" in their actions where impasse procedures 
fail, subject to the limitation to act in the public interest.  There is no requirement 
within the statutes that a school board must offer the same terms negotiated prior to 
impasse.  Therefore, the Supreme Court found no violation of statute by the inclusion 
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of non-negotiated items in the unilateral contracts offered by the Board.  The second 
issue on cross-appeal was whether the Board had committed a prohibited practice by 
refusing to make the unilateral contracts retroactive with respect to salary increases.  
As previously discussed, the unilateral contracts were not issued until after 
negotiations were completed and impasse procedures had been unsuccessful.  The 
court found no evidence that the Board had negotiated in bad faith and held that their 
action was within the authority granted in K.S.A. 72-5428(f).  The next issue 
considered was whether the Board had committed a prohibited practice by reducing 
the teachers' salaries by the amount of the Board's mediation and fact-finding costs.  
K.S.A. 72-5429 provides in part that all of the costs incurred for mediation and fact-
finding "shall be borne equally by the board of education and the professional 
employees' organization…"  The Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 72-5429 only 
pertained to the costs of the mediator and the impasse board.  The $7,700 at issue in 
this case was the Board's attorney fees and other expenses.  The court held that the 
Association did not owe any of those expenses, just as the Board was not responsible 
for the Association's legal fees.  The Supreme Court further found the Board's action 
a prohibited practice and thus bad faith negotiations in violation of K.S.A. 72-
5430(b)(1).  The final issues examined were whether the Secretary had the authority 
to award the Association $7,700 as a remedy and, if so, whether that authority 
violated the Kansas Constitution.  K.S.A. 72-5430(a) states in relevant part that any 
controversy related to prohibited practice may be submitted to the Secretary and the 
Secretary "shall enter a final order granting or denying in whole or in part the relief 
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sought."  The Court of Appeals had reversed the district court and determined that the 
reimbursement of $7,700 would benefit the teachers.  The Court of Appeals believed 
that the teachers were not parties to the complaint and the Association's right to 
request reimbursement on their part ended when the teachers signed unilateral 
contracts, thus the Secretary did not have the authority to reimburse the Association.  
The Supreme Court disagreed.  It found the Court of Appeals ruling contrary to the 
legislative intent to grant the Secretary discretionary authority to determine 
appropriate relief.  Requiring teachers to decline a unilateral contract or "otherwise 
lose the right to seek a remedy for a prohibited practice is harsh and contrary to the 
express intent of the Professional Negotiations Act…"  (p. 524).  After reviewing 
cases in federal court that dealt with labor relations, the Supreme Court was 
"convinced" that the Court of Appeals had erred when it ruled the Association lacked 
the authority to request a monetary remedy for the Board's violation of K.S.A. 72-
5429.  Finally, the court addressed the Board's contention that the power granted to 
the Secretary was in violation of Article 2, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution.  The 
Supreme Court found that legislative authority could be delegated to an 
administrative body where guidelines were set forth in statutes.  There are definite 
standards on the exercise of authority granted to the Secretary in several statutory 
provisions of K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq.  The court further held that the Secretary 
exercised a quasi-judicial function in investigating, initiating, and conducting 
hearings on impasse procedures and prohibited practice complaints, not a legislative 
function.  The Secretary's function did not conflict with the basic mission of school 
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boards and was not in violation of the Kansas Constitution.  The judgment of the 
Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part.  The judgment of the 
district court was affirmed.        
 
Garden City Educators' Association v. Board of Education, Unified School 
District No. 457, Garden City, Finney County 
805 P.2d 511 (Kan. App. 1991) 
 
During negotiations for the 1988-89 school year, the Board suggested the 
addition of a liquidated damages clause to Article VII, Section A of the teachers' 
contract.  Previous contracts had simply stated that if a teacher did not fulfill the 
terms of their contract they would be subject to "any and all legal remedies available."  
The Board wanted to add a clause that would specify the amount of money a teacher 
would be required to pay if they attempted to get out of their contractual agreement 
with the school district.  The Garden City Educators' Association (GCEA) did not 
agree to the addition of a liquidated damages provision and so it was not a part of the 
1988-89 negotiated agreement.  Between May 10, 1988 and August 5, 1988, eighteen 
teachers submitted requests for resignation from their contracts.  In each instance 
after June 1, 1988, the Board required damages be paid by the employees.  On August 
26, 1988, GCEA filed a complaint with the Secretary of the Department of Human 
Services alleging that the Board had committed prohibited practice under the 
Professional Negotiations Act, K.S.A. 72-5413 et seq., when they imposed a 
liquidated damages clause after the clause had been negotiated for but not included in 
the contract.  The Board filed a complaint with the State Board of Education pursuant 
 
442 
 
to K.S.A. 72-5412 against the five teachers who had not paid damages.  The Board 
also filed a civil suit against each of them in district court alleging breach of contract.  
The Secretary determined that a prohibited practice had not occurred and denied 
GCEA's complaint.  The Secretary found that the Board was entirely within its rights 
to demand damages from the teachers who had broken their contracts because the 
negotiated agreement specifically stated that any breach of contract would subject the 
teacher to "any and all legal remedies available."  Legal remedies could include the 
right of the board to be reimbursed for its incidental and consequential damages in the 
event a teacher chose not to fulfill his contract.  The fact that collective bargaining 
failed to result in agreement on the inclusion of such a clause in the contract, did not 
cause the board to lose its right to seek damages against individual teachers for breach 
of contract.  GCEA appealed to the district court.  The district court affirmed the 
Secretary's decision that a prohibited practice had not occurred, but it enjoined the 
Board from requiring "liquidated damages" for breach of contract in the future and 
ordered them to reimburse the money collected from teachers who had requested to 
be released from their 1988-89 contracts.  The court viewed the Board's attempt to 
collect damages as unenforceable.  Both parties appealed the district court decision. 
The GCEA complained that the Board had committed prohibitive practice 
under K.S.A. 72-5340(b)(5) and (6) which state that it shall be prohibitive practice for 
a board of education to refuse to negotiate in good faith with representatives of a 
recognized professional employees' organization and to deny the rights accompanying 
recognition of a professional employees' organization which are granted in K.S.A. 72-
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5415.  GCEA claimed that the Board had forced the usage of its rejected proposal for 
liquidated damages, which violated its duty to negotiate in good faith.  The court 
disagreed, finding that the Board had not refused to negotiate in good faith as was 
required by statute.  The Court of Appeals did not agree with the trial court's decision 
to grant injunctive relief and order of the return of monetary damages collected.  
K.S.A. 72-5430a grants authority and power to the Secretary to dismiss a complaint 
of prohibitive practice or to grant any relief sought.  Thus, the court held that because 
the authority granted to the Secretary by legislature was limited to dismissal or the 
finding of a prohibited practice and a prohibitive practice did not exist in this case, the 
only correct finding was the dismissal of the complaint.  The trial court could not 
award relief beyond the authority of the administrative agency.  The ruling that 
prohibitive practice had not occurred was affirmed.  The judgment that enjoined the 
Board from attempting to collect liquidated damages and awarded damages to 
teachers who had already paid liquidated damages was reversed. 
 
Board of Education, Unified School District No. 314, Brewster, Thomas 
County v. Kansas Department of Human Resources By and Through Dick 
856 P.2d 1343 (Kan. App. 1993) 
 
In January 1989, the Board formed an evaluation committee to develop a 
teacher evaluation instrument.  On January 31, 1990, the Board and the NEA 
submitted letters noting the items each wanted to negotiate for the coming year.  
Neither letter mentioned an evaluation form or procedure.  In April, the Board 
directed the superintendent to begin revising the current evaluation document.  No 
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copies of the proposed form were presented to the NEA for their input.  At the May 
1990 Board meeting, the evaluation form was read and adopted without objection.  
The new evaluation form was included in the August teachers’ handbook.  NEA then 
wrote the superintendent requesting that the old form continue to be used until a new 
one could be developed through negotiations.  The superintendent responded by 
saying that the changes had “involved criteria, not procedure, and therefore, were not 
mandatorily negotiable” (p. 1345).  In September 1990, NEA filed a complaint with 
the Kansas Department of Human Resources, alleging that the Board had engaged in 
a prohibited practice by “unilaterally imposing a change in the evaluation procedures 
by imposing a new evaluation instrument.”  At the hearing, the Board was found to 
have failed to negotiate in good faith with NEA in violation of K.S.A. 72-5430(b)(5).  
They were ordered to “cease and desist” from using the new evaluation form.  The 
Board petitioned for judicial review and the district court adopted the findings set out 
in the initial order and concluded that “the new evaluation form is an evaluation 
procedure and involves the ‘mechanics’ and the ‘how’ and ‘when’ of employer 
evaluation and is mandatorily negotiable” (p. 1345).  The Board appealed this 
decision. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, in USD No. 352 v. NEA-Goodland, 246 Kan. 137, 
785 P. 2d 993(1990), held that teacher evaluation procedures are mandatorily 
negotiable but evaluation criteria are not.  The Board argued that in this case no new 
evaluation procedures were required to implement the new evaluation criteria.  They 
stated that the “same evaluation procedures were in effect for February 1, 1990 that 
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were used as of February 1, 1989, and in fact were the same procedures used under 
the old criteria” (p. 1346).  Failure to negotiate an item that is mandatorily negotiable 
is a prohibited practice under K.S.A.72-5430.  K.S.A. 72-5430(b) states that it is 
prohibited practice for a board to willfully refuse to negotiate in good faith with 
representatives of a recognized professional employees’ organization.  NEA’s 
contention was that the new evaluation instrument required new evaluation 
procedures and the Board’s failure to negotiate these procedures amounted to a 
refusal to negotiate in good faith.  The question for the court was whether the new 
evaluation instrument adopted by the Board contained any procedural matters.  In 
comparing the two evaluation instruments, the court found that although they looked 
similar they were in fact quite different.  The Board had changed the rating system for 
teachers and a Board member testified that this was a change in the “mechanics” of 
applying the criteria listed.  The Board also made changes in requiring that detailed 
lesson plans be submitted for evaluation, thus changing the frequency of evaluations 
and the manner in which the teachers’ work was evaluated.  These new criteria could 
not be implemented in the absence of adequate procedures, and procedures are 
mandatorily negotiable.  While in some cases existing procedures can be used to 
implement new criteria, that did not hold in this case.  When the NEA wrote a letter 
requesting that the old evaluation form be used until a new one could be developed 
through negotiations, the Board did not respond or indicate a willingness to proceed 
to negotiations.  The court found that the Board’s failure to “enter into professional 
negotiations concerning the procedures employed to implement the new criteria when 
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requested by the NEA constituted a failure to negotiate in good faith and a prohibited 
practice as set forth in K.S.A. 72-5430(b)(5)” (p. 1347).  The decision of the district 
court was affirmed. 
While teacher evaluation criteria are not mandatorily negotiable, evaluation 
procedures must be negotiated with the teachers’ bargaining organization before 
implementation.  It is prohibited practice to fail to negotiate an item that is 
mandatorily negotiable.  In this case, the new evaluation criteria could not be 
implemented without adequate procedures and these procedures are mandatorily 
negotiable. 
 
National Education Association-Topeka v. Unified School District No. 501 
925 P.2d 835 (Kan. 1996) 
 
The individual plaintiffs in this case were Duane Pomeroy, an Adult Homeless 
Literacy Instructor, Mari John, a Kan-Work Instructor, Nancy Meschke and Kathy 
Fox, Adult Basic Education Instructors, were all employed by USD 501.  All of these 
individuals performed their duties during the regular professional duty day and were 
required by the Kansas State Board of Education to meet teacher certification 
requirements.  NEA-Topeka was the union, which represented the employees of USD 
501.  NEA- Topeka filed a grievance on behalf of the individual teachers alleging 
they were not receiving the proper salary and benefits as established in the negotiated 
Professional Agreement.  USD 501 refused to hear the grievance because it claimed 
that because the employees were "continuing education only" they were not members 
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of the bargaining unit as established in Article 3 of the Agreement and not entitled to 
file a grievance.  When USD 501 refused to hear the grievance, NEA-Topeka 
requested arbitration.  USD 501 refused to arbitrate, and again alleged that the 
plaintiff teachers were not parties to the negotiated Agreement and not entitled to the 
Agreement remedy of arbitration.  NEA-Topeka filed an action in district court 
asking the court to compel USD 501 to submit to arbitration.  They argued that the 
defendants had to submit to arbitration so that an arbitrator could interpret the 
Agreement and determine whether the plaintiffs were part of the bargaining unit and 
entitled to grievance and arbitration procedures.  The defendant school district filed a 
cross-motion for summary judgment in which it argued that only a court could 
determine if the plaintiffs were actually parties to the arbitration agreement because 
an arbitrator would not have the power to determine his own jurisdiction.  The district 
court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' 
motion.  The court ruled that under Article 10 of the Agreement, the parties had 
agreed to arbitrate all matters dealing with the "application or interpretation of the 
Agreement."  Since the question of whether the teachers were part of the bargaining 
unit dealt with the application or interpretation of the Agreement, the court found that 
the parties had contractually agreed to allow an arbitrator to decide the issue.  
Accordingly, the district court ordered the defendant to submit to arbitration.  The 
defendant appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals and the case was transferred to 
the Supreme Court of Kansas.   
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K.S.A. 72-5424(b) allows a party to file a motion with the district court asking 
the court to compel the opposing party to submit to arbitration.  The statute does not 
mention anything about the right to appeal from the grant or denial of such a motion.  
Under K.S.A. 60-2012(a)(4), a party can appeal a final decision in any court action.  
The question for the Supreme Court to decide was whether the district court's grant of 
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment equated a final, appealable order.  The 
court looked at several cases under the Kansas Uniform Arbitration Act that 
addressed what type of orders were appealable, similar to this case and could be used 
as authority in reaching a decision.  From a synthesis of these cases, the court 
concluded, "if a trial court denies a motion to arbitrate, then no other action can be 
taken by either party.  Thus, that is a final order and appealable.  However, if the trial 
court grants a motion to compel arbitration, then the parties must submit to arbitration 
and then challenge the arbitrator's decision before there is a final order which is 
appealable to an appellate court" (p. 838).  The court cited several cases, including In 
re Estate of Ziebell, 2 Kan.App.2d 99, 575 P.2d 574 (1978) which found that "an 
order must have some semblance of finality to be appealable."  Id. at 100-01.  In the 
case at hand, the grant of NEA-Topeka's motion for summary judgment resulted in an 
order compelling arbitration.  There was more for the parties to resolve, which meant 
this was not a final and appealable order.  The Supreme Court held that there was no 
right to appeal an order to submit to arbitration.  The appeal was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.      
 
 
449 
 
Junction City Education Association v. Board of Education, Unified School 
District No. 475, Geary County 
955 P.2d 1266 (Kan. 1998) 
 
The Junction City Education Association (JCEA) and the Board of Education 
entered into negotiations for the 1996-97 school year.  An article in the 1995-96 
agreement was in dispute during their negotiations sessions.  Article XIII dealt with 
involuntary transfers and stated that if a teacher was involuntarily transferred within 
five days of the first contract day of any school year they would receive additional 
compensation.  Negotiations reached an impasse and the parties implemented impasse 
procedures pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5426 with the Secretary of the Department of 
Human Resources (Secretary) to resolve the dispute.  One issue was whether Article 
XIII from the 1995-96 negotiated agreement was mandatorily negotiable under the 
Negotiations Act.  Mediation was not successful and a factfinder was appointed.  The 
factfinding hearing was scheduled for October 17, 1996, when the JCEA filed a 
declaratory judgment action seeking a determination from the Geary County District 
Court that the involuntary transfer proposal was mandatorily negotiable.  The JCEA 
requested an injunction that would require the Board to negotiate the terms of the 
proposal.  The Board moved to dismiss.  It alleged that the district court lacked 
jurisdiction because the JCEA had failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.  A 
hearing was held on November 1, 1996, and the court ruled that it had jurisdiction 
pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1701 as well as Chee-Craw Teachers Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 247, 
255 Kan. 561, 593 P.2d 406 (1979).  The court also ruled that a provision for 
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involuntary transfers was not a mandatorily negotiable item, nor was compensation 
for such transfers.  The JCEA appealed the denial of its requested relief. 
When Chee-Craw was decided, disputes regarding impasses and prohibited 
practices were resolved by filing with the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 72-5426(a) 
and 72-5430.  In 1980, the Kansas Legislature amended both of these statutes to allow 
parties to submit disputes to the Secretary, rather than the district court.  Subsection 
(d) of K.S.A.1979 Supp. 72-5430 which allowed a board or professional organization 
to file for injunctive relief in district court was deleted by Section 12 of the 1980 
amendments.  In its place, the legislature enacted Section 13 which provided in 
relevant part that "any controversy concerning prohibited practices may be submitted 
to the secretary."  Parties are not to seek review from the courts unless they have been 
aggrieved by the final order of the secretary.  In reading the Negotiations Act as it 
was amended in 1980, the court determined that "all disputes involving professional 
negotiations are to be resolved through the Secretary" (p. 1273).  In light of these 
statutory changes, Chee-Craw was no longer appropriate.  The district court had also 
offered K.S.A. 60-1701 as a ground for jurisdiction of this case.  Other court cases 
have rejected 60-1701 as a method of obtaining jurisdiction over a case being 
litigated in another forum.  For these reasons, the court held that the district court did 
not have jurisdiction over this matter and the JCEA had failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies.  The appeal was dismissed.  
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Marais Des Cygnes Valley Teachers' Association v. Board of Education, 
Unified School District No. 456, Osage County 
954 P.2d 1096 (Kan. 1998) 
 
The negotiated agreement between the school district and the teachers union 
of Marais Des Cygnes for the 1995-96 school year contained an evaluation procedure 
for certified personnel.  The procedure required the development of a written 
improvement plan for any teacher who received a "5" (Must Improve) rating on any 
of the evaluation criteria.  During the 1995-96 school year, three tenured teachers 
received at least on "5" rating and were given a plan of assistance.  Despite the fact 
that all teachers must be evaluated by February, pursuant to K.S.A. 72-9003 and the 
teachers' negotiated agreement, the plans of assistance were dated March 11, 1996 
and the evaluations were dated March 15, 1996.  All three teachers had their contracts 
renewed for the following school year.  The Teachers' Association filed a declaratory 
judgment action in October 1996, in which they requested that the evaluations and 
plans of assistance be removed from the files of the three employees on the grounds 
that they were not completed by February 15.  The school district contended that the 
only statutory penalty for failing to complete an evaluation before the February 15 
deadline was that an employee's contract could not be nonrenewed based on 
incompetence.  The trial court denied the Teachers' Association's motion and ruled 
that the court "specifically notes that the February 15 date in K.S.A. 72-9003(d)(1) is 
not as restrictive as the Plaintiffs claim" (p. 1098).  The evaluations were not used for 
nonrenewal, but for plans of assistance.  The Teachers' Association appealed this 
decision. 
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The court determined that it needed to address one question: When a teacher's 
evaluation is completed after February 15 of the school year, is the evaluation and 
resulting plan of assistance invalid?  In order to do so, they had to ascertain whether 
the February 15 provision of K.S.A. 72-9003(d)(1) was mandatory or directory.  The 
court found that the only condition in the Evaluation Act for a penalty or consequence 
of noncompliance related to nonrenewal of personnel.  In this case, that was not an 
issue as all three teachers had their contracts continued for the upcoming school year.  
The court also determined that the language in the Evaluation Act did not "reflect a 
mandatory interpretation that would invalidate any evaluation for all purposes when 
completed after the February 15 deadline" (p. 1099).  The purposes of the evaluations 
in question was to improve personnel, not to nonrenew them.  The court noted that 
although it did not encourage or suggest that evaluations should be completed after 
the deadline, it was not willing to invalidate attempts to improve teaching when "the 
remedy the Teachers' Association requests is absent from the provisions of the 
Evaluation Act" (p. 1100).  Accordingly, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.   
 
 
NEA-Coffeyville v. Unified School District No. 445, Coffeyville, 
Montgomery County 
996 P.2d 821 (Kan. 2000) 
 
This case involved a dispute between teachers represented by the National 
Education Association-Coffeyville (NEA-C) and Unified School District No. 445 (the 
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District) over a refund on the group health insurance policies.  The amount of 
$138,775.52 was paid to the District by Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) as a 
"divisible surplus."  A divisible surplus occurs when there is a lower use of insurance 
benefits by subscribers than was anticipated when the premiums were determined.  
The health insurance that created the divisible surplus was part of the teachers' fringe 
benefit package.  When the District received the refund, it did not notify the Board or 
the individual members who were insured.  The District deposited $60,000 of the 
surplus into a special education fund and put the remaining $78,775.52 into a health 
insurance account.  During contract negotiations in July 1996, NEA-C negotiator 
Darrel Harbaugh found out that BCBS had refunded money to the District the 
previous year.  In August 1996, Harbaugh requested a copy of the previous year's 
BCBS policy, but was told that the District could not locate one.  Harbaugh spent the 
next six months writing letters and making phone calls in an attempt to gather 
information about the refund.  Harbaugh made a written request to the Coffeyville 
School Board that he be placed on the agenda during the next scheduled meeting to 
request that the surplus be returned to the subscribers.  On March 10, 1997, Harbaugh 
appeared before the Board and made his request.  The Board made no decision and 
tabled the matter until its next meeting in April.  At the April 14 meeting, the Board 
went into executive session to discuss the matter and then stated that it would delay 
its action until July when the new Board members were in place.  NEA-C filed action 
on May 15, 1997, in district court.  The district court determined that the refund 
belonged to the teachers.  In its decision, the district court cited equitable principles 
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and the decision in U.S.D. 259 v. Kansas-National Education Ass'n, 239 Kan. 76, 716 
P.2d 571 (1986).  The District appealed and the case was transferred to the Supreme 
Court of Kansas.   
The Supreme Court first found that the NEA-C was a proper party to bring 
this action.  The District had argued that NEA-C, as an unincorporated association, 
could only sue a school district under situations involving a dispute arising from the 
negotiations process.  The Supreme Court disagreed as it found that NEA-C satisfied 
the requirements set about by the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington 
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).  In 
Hunt, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an association had standing to sue on behalf 
of its members when: (1) the members had standing to sue individually; (2) the 
interests the association sought to protect were pertinent to the organization's purpose; 
and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested required participation of 
individual members.  As NEA-C met all three prongs of this test, the court held that it 
was a proper party plaintiff.  Next, the court addressed the District's claim that NEA-
C had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before bringing the case before the 
courts.  The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's holding that the 
administrative procedure available to NEA-C was not an adequate one and based on 
the facts of the case, the NEA-C had exhausted their administrative remedies.  Finally, 
the court turned to the central issue of the case which was a determination of to whom 
the divisible surplus belonged.  The District claimed it was entitled to the entire 
refund because it paid the premiums that created the refund.  NEA-C argued that the 
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subscribers were entitled to the entire refund because they, not the District, paid the 
premiums that created the refund.  The health and medical insurance policies had 
been bargained for and were a part of the teachers' fringe benefit package.  In NEA-
C's opinion, the insurance premiums paid to BCBS were part of each teacher's annual 
salary and, thus, paid by them.  The only contracts to mention the refund were the 
contracts between the District and BCBS.  In the section of the contract titled 
"Distribution of Divisible Surplus," the language stated that the refund would be paid 
in cash to the Contract Holder.  There was no dispute that the District was indeed the 
contract holder, thus the entire divisible surplus should have been paid to the District.  
That conclusion did not resolve the issue present in this case because the insured 
teachers were not a party to the contract.  In the opinion of the court, the agreement 
between BCBS and the District defined the rights and responsibilities of BCBS and 
the District but "it did not govern the rights in and to the divisible surplus between the 
District and NEA-C" (p. 828).  The court next addressed the language within the 
negotiated agreement and found that it was silent on how a refund was to be divided.  
Accordingly, the court determined that it was faced with "an omitted term."  The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 204 (1981), provided that "when the 
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a contract have not agreed with respect 
to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights and duties, a term which 
is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court."  In the case at hand, the 
negotiated agreement failed to foresee the possibility of the refund.  Deciding which 
party is entitled to the surplus is essential in determining the parties' rights and duties 
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under the contract.  The court determined that under these circumstances, it should 
apply a term that would be considered reasonable.  In order to reach a decision, the 
court turned to the only other Kansas case that concerned a divisible surplus, U.S.D. 
No. 259 v. Kansas National Education Ass'n, 239 Kan. 76, 716 P.2d 571 (1986).  Although 
U.S.D. No. 259 is factually distinct, the court considered that it had addressed 
community standards of fairness and policy.  In U.S.D. No. 259, the court held that 
the divisible surplus in that case had occurred "as the result of lower use of insurance 
benefits by the subscribers than was anticipated when the premiums were determined.  
The subscribers overpaid their premiums.  Hence, those who overpaid their insurance 
premiums created the surplus and should receive the refund."  239 Kan. at 80.  
Applying that finding, the court determined that there was no dispute that the 
divisible surplus was created by the actions of the teachers who filed fewer and/or 
smaller claims than were anticipated when BCBS set the premiums.  Thus, the court 
concluded that in the absence of a contract provision, those whose conduct generated 
the refund, the teachers, were entitled to the refund.  The decision of the district court 
was affirmed.    
 
National Education Association-Topeka v. Unified School District No. 501 
7 P.3d 1174 (Kan. 2000) 
 
The National Education Association-Topeka (NEA-T) was recognized as the 
bargaining representative for the professional employees of Unified School District 
No. 501 (the District).  NEA-T and the District regularly entered into Professional 
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Agreements (PA's) which set forth the terms and conditions of professional 
employment.  This dispute was over entitlement to a health insurance premium 
"divisible surplus" which had been refunded to the District by Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Kansas (BCBS).  At issue were the PA's for the 1993-94 and 1995-96 school years.  
Article 41 of the PA's dealt with the establishment of a fringe benefit program (the 
Cafeteria Plan) which provided that any professional employee who was employed at 
least the equivalent of a half-time position would be eligible to participate in the 
Defined Health Insurance and Cafeteria Plan.  It further discussed the Board's 
contribution of $166.68 per month towards these benefits.  The contract also had a 
"divisible surplus rider" (Rider) which governed the distribution of any surplus held 
by BCBS at the end of a plan year.  A surplus accumulated during the policy period 
of August 1, 1993, to July 31, 1994, and August 1, 1995, to July 31, 1996.  In 1994, 
BCBS refunded the District $731,046.47 as divisible surplus.  The District distributed 
half of this amount to the plan participants and placed the rest in a premium 
stabilization fund to adjust future premiums.  In 1996, the refund to the District was 
$1,007,678.  The District kept $395,000 for an employee wellness program and to 
adjust future premiums.  The remainder went to the policyholders.  Before making its 
decision on how to distribute the surpluses, the District alerted its employees and 
discussed how to disperse the surplus at length with its insurance committee.  NEA-T 
representatives were participants on the insurance committee and all of the District's 
decisions were made in public meetings.  NEA-T and three representative teachers 
brought suit against the District and BCBS for declaratory relief contending that 
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teachers were entitled to the entire divisible surplus.  The district court first dismissed 
all claims against BCBS because it did not find that BCBS had breached any 
contractual duty by giving the divisible surplus to the District.  Next, the court held 
that the dispute involved an interpretation of the PA and arbitration would be the 
proper place for the dispute.  However, as the plaintiffs had failed to file a grievance 
in a timely manner as required by Article 9 of the PA, arbitration was no longer an 
option.  Thus, the district court granted the District's motion for summary judgment.  
The plaintiffs appealed this decision.  The case was transferred from the Court of 
Appeals to the Supreme Court of Kansas.  
NEA-T argued that the insured's were entitled to the entire surplus and 
initially based its claims on the PA.  However, when the District raised the issue of 
the PA's grievance procedures, NEA-T amended its position and claimed the 
language in the Rider entitled the insured's to the refund.  On appeal, NEA-T 
maintained that the Rider created the obligation to refund the divisible surplus, not the 
PA.  The District claimed that the Rider determined who was entitled to the divisible 
surplus and if the Rider entitled the District to the surplus, then the District was only 
required to pay the surplus to its employees if it had agreed to do so by contract.  
Thus, any right to the surplus would come from the PA.  As each party's argument 
dealt with the Rider, the court addressed this issue by examining the wording found 
within it.  The Rider stated in relevant part that the divisible surplus would be "...paid 
in cash to the Contract Holder or upon written request applied as an adjustment of 
future premiums."  The Rider at issue in this case was identical to the Rider in NEA-
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Coffeyville v. U.S.D. No. 445, 268 Kan. 384, 996 P.2d 821 (2000).  NEA-Coffeyville 
also dealt with a school district/BCBS divisible surplus issue and the decision from 
that case applied to certain aspects of the case at hand.  The trial court here ruled that 
the District was the "Contract Holder" and NEA-T did not appeal that ruling.  For that 
reason, the Supreme Court held that because the District was the Contract Holder, "it 
was proper for BCBS to refund the divisible surplus to the District" (p. 1181).  The 
Rider did not entitle NEA-T to the surplus, thus, if an entitlement existed it had to 
come from some other source.  Although NEA-T argued that the source was the 
cafeteria plan, the court found that the cafeteria plan specifically referred to the PA.  
Therefore, the employees' rights under the cafeteria plan were contingent on how 
those rights were defined in the PA.  If any written instrument obligated the District 
to pay any of the divisible surplus to its employees, it would have been the PA.  
Articles 9 and 10 of the PA governed the grievance procedure for resolution of any 
problems concerning the interpretation and application of the PA.  According to 
Article 9, the plaintiffs had 15 school days after the questionable act to file their 
complaint with the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel Services.  Grievances that 
were not settled could be submitted for arbitration under Article 10 of the PA.  The 
trial court had found that NEA-T failed to act in a timely manner under Article 9, and 
so arbitration was no longer an option.  NEA-T argued that under the PA, issues of 
timeliness had to be submitted to the arbitrator.  The Supreme Court found that 
although this was correct, the NEA-T could not even ask to submit the dispute to an 
arbitrator because it had failed to initiate the mandatory two-step process in Article 9.  
 
460 
 
"Compliance with Article 9 was a mandatory prerequisite to arbitration" (p. 1183).  
The decision of the district court was affirmed. 
 
312 Education Association v. U.S.D. No. 312 
47 P.3d. 383 (Kan. 2002) 
 
During contract negotiations between the 312 Education Association (312 
E.A.) and the District, 312 E.A. filed grievances against the District for improperly 
placing a beginning teacher on the second rather than first step of the pay scale.  The 
first level 2 grievance was filed in June of 2000 with the Superintendent of Schools 
and contended that Article IV(B)(2) of the negotiated agreement had been violated.  
In it, 312 E.A. requested, "all teachers new to the district be placed on the salary 
schedule according to the terms of the contract."  The Superintendent denied the 
grievance.  He pointed out in part that, (1) both parties were currently discussing the 
step placement issue, (2) the agreement only allowed teachers, not 312 E.A., to file 
grievances, and (3) the agreement had not been violated because the person hired had 
relevant educational experience.  The Superintendent also proposed a time for the 
parties to meet for further discussion if needed.  On September 29, 2000, 312 E.A. 
filed a level 3 grievance with the District.  The October 10 response from the 
superintendent reiterated that the complaint had not been filed by a teacher or within 
the time specified in the contract.  The Board agreed to formally hear the complaint 
on October 16, 2000 but concluded their response by saying that "it must be clearly 
understood that the Board's decision to hear this complaint, which does not comply 
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with negotiated agreement procedures, may not be construed as a waiver of the 
Board's right to insist upon compliance with the negotiated contract's provisions in 
the future" (p. 385).  The Board considered the grievance and affirmed the placement 
of the teacher on the salary schedule finding it was in accordance with the negotiated 
agreement.  On November 3, 2000, 312 E.A. filed a complaint with the Kansas 
Department of Human Resources (Labor Relations Section) and alleged that USD 
312 had engaged in prohibited practices within the meaning of K.S.A. 72-5430(b)(5) 
in its refusal to negotiate in good faith by the placement of the teacher in step 2 
instead of step 1 as required by contract.  On November 21, 2000, 312 E.A. filed an 
appeal in district court pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(d) from the Board's rejection of its 
September 29 grievance.  The District filed a motion to dismiss.  It contended that 
312 E.A. lacked standing to pursue the grievance, the grievance procedures under the 
negotiated agreement were available to individual teachers and not to 312 E.A., the 
appeal constituted an attempt to interfere with pending contract negotiations, and the 
312 E.A. had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies when it filed a complaint 
with the Kansas Department of Human Resources requesting the same relief it had 
asked for in the grievance filing.  In their response, 312 E.A. argued that (1) the 
District's improper placement of a teacher on the salary schedule allowed them, as the 
professional employees' organization, the right to file a grievance, (2) by its 
acceptance of, and agreement to hear the grievance, the District had waived any claim 
of procedural defects, (3) the negotiation process was not an issue as it involved a yet 
to be agreed upon agreement, and (4) it did not have to exhaust administrative 
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remedies, as a prohibited practice allegation under K.S.A. 72-5430 differed from an 
appeal mandated under K.S.A. 60-2101(d).  The trial court granted the motion to 
dismiss and stated in part that (1) 312 E.A. was the exclusive representative of all 
teachers for the purposes of professional negotiations, (2) Article V Section B of the 
negotiated agreement only mentions the right of a teacher to file a grievance, not the 
professional association, (3) 312 E.A. did not have standing under the three-pronged 
test in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 
53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977), and (4) 312 E.A. had a conflict of interest in this case because 
it had "a contractual duty to represent the interests of all teachers and at least one 
teacher's interests would be adverse to the stated purpose of the lawsuit" (p. 387).  
312 E.A. appealed this decision. 
In Hunt, the Supreme Court held that" an association has standing to sue on 
behalf of its members when: (1) the members have standing to sue individually; (2) 
the interests the association seeks to protect are germane to the organization's 
purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require 
participation of individual members."  268 Kan. at 387.  Both parties agreed that the 
first two prongs are met.  In examining the third prong, the court reviewed previous 
court decisions, such as Hunt, and determined that there was "no question but that the 
teacher who it is contended was improperly placed on the wrong salary step would be 
individually involved as U.S.D. 312's defense to the claim" (p. 389).  The court also 
believed that it would be necessary to involve beginning teachers in order to 
determine their experience level to see if they had been placed appropriately on the 
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salary schedule.  Thus, to "properly litigate" the claims by 312 E.A., the participation 
of individual members would be required.  This would violate the third prong of the 
Hunt test.  The court also found that after an examination of the negotiated agreement, 
312 E.A. would not have standing to make a claim.  The court found "neither 
exclusion nor inclusion of 312 E.A. in the grievance procedure" (p. 391).  The 
language of the policy indicated that a teacher could present a grievance, which led to 
the conclusion that 312 E.A. was not to be a party to any grievance proceedings.  The 
appellate court agreed with the trial court's decision that standing did not exist.  
However, this did not resolve the case because 312 E.A.  had a claim of waiver that 
had to be considered.  The question that needed to be answered was whether the 
District had waived the standing defense by its actions and the language of its letters 
when it agreed to hear the complaint.  The appellate court held that this was an issue 
for the trial court to determine.  Other issues the trial court would need to consider 
were the status of the 312 E.A. claim to the Department of Human Resources and 
whether the teacher placed on step 2 was improperly placed.  If a breach in the 
contract was found, the trial court may also have to examine the experience of 
beginning teachers to find out if they had properly asserted a claim.  The trial court 
decision was reversed and remanded with directions. 
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Unified School District No. 233 Johnson County v. Kansas Association of 
American Educators 
64 P.3d 372 (Kan. 2003) 
 
The Olathe National Education Association (ONEA) had been recognized by 
the Olathe School District and the State of Kansas as the exclusive collective 
bargaining representative for the school district’s teachers since 1970.  In the mid-
1990’s, several of the district’s teachers became members of the Association of 
American Educators (AAE), an alternative to the NEA.  In February of 1996, the new 
AAE members contacted school board members and asked about potential AAE 
membership on the Professional Council and use of the District’s internal mail system 
to distribute their recruiting materials.  The school district denied this request, citing 
its collective bargaining/negotiated agreement with ONEA as the basis for its refusal.  
More than two years later, Douglas Barnett, who had been an early member of the 
AAE and was now the president of the Kansas Association of American Educators 
(KANAAE), asked the school district’s superintendent for permission to use the 
school mail system to distribute his newly incorporated organization’s membership 
brochure.  This brochure encouraged ONEA members to drop their membership and 
join KANAAE.  The school district refused this request, again citing its negotiated 
agreement with ONEA.  In January of 1999 and again on May 27, 1999, Barnett 
accessed the district’s electronic mail system to solicit the entire district staff to join 
KANAAE.  On May 5, 2000, Vince Snowbarger, Executive Director of KANAAE, 
made another request for use of the internal mail system to distribute a revised 
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membership brochure.  This brochure again encouraged teachers to join KANAAE 
but it also stated that the KANAAE had agreed not to engage in professional 
negotiations.  The school district consulted with the president of the ONEA and again 
refused the request to utilize the district mail system in spite of KANAAE’s recent 
resolution.  As a result of this refusal, the district was faced with KANAAE’s 
allegations that its member’s rights to free speech and association were being violated.  
However, the district was also faced with ONEA’s allegations that allowing such 
distributions would be prohibited practice under the Negotiations Act.  On June 2, 
2000, the school district filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Johnson 
County District Court.  During testimony, representatives for KANAAE explained 
that their organization was interested in enhancing teachers’ compensation but did not 
intend to negotiate with the district.  However, it was acknowledged that a future 
board of directors could void the recent “no negotiations” resolution and seek to 
negotiate.  After two days of hearings, the district court found in favor of the school 
district and ONEA and held that the school district would not be in violation of 
Kansas law if it declined to distribute the KANAAE brochure through the school’s 
internal mail system.  The KANAAE appealed this decision.   
In its analysis of this case, the appellate court sought to answer three 
questions: (1) was KANAAE a professional employees’ organization under the 
negotiations?  (2) did the school district properly deny KANAAE use of the internal 
mail system?  and (3) did the school district’s denial of access to the mail system 
violate KANAAE members’ First Amendment right of association?  In order to 
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answer the first question, the court examined the provisions of the Negotiations Act.  
This act grants the right of certified teachers to form, join, or assist professional 
employees’ organizations (PEO).  While the act allows more than one PEO per 
district, a particular PEO becomes the exclusive negotiations representative when a 
majority of the professional employees so designate.  ONEA was the exclusive 
bargaining representative for the Olathe school district.  K.S.A. 5413(e) defines a 
PEO as an organization or group of any kind (1) in which professional employees 
participate, and (2) which exist for the purpose, in whole or part, of engaging in 
professional negotiations with boards of education.  KANAAE admitted that 80 to 
90% of its members were professional employees, thus it met the first element of a 
PEO.  In reviewing the record, the appellate court found substantial evidence 
demonstrating that KANAAE existed for a negotiating purpose.  One of the brochures 
KANAAE wanted to distribute stated that the organization sought “to enhance the 
compensation of educators.”  A flyer titled “10 Reasons to Dump the Union and Join 
KANAAE” discussed the lower cost of joining KANAAE with “the same benefits 
that the teacher union provides…”  The information contained in the flyers was proof 
to the court that KANAAE had concerns about professional employees’ 
compensation, a mandatory topic of negotiation under the Negotiations Act.  The 
record also showed KANAAE’s attempts to expand its membership by encouraging 
ONEA members to leave that organization.  If enough members left ONEA and 
joined KANAAE, KANAAE could then attempt to decertify ONEA as the exclusive 
bargaining representative in the district by filing a petition with the Secretary of the 
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Kansas Department of Human Resources.  This was enough evidence in the eyes of 
the appellate court to hold that the district court was correct in finding that KANAAE 
was a “professional employees’ organization” as defined by the Negotiations Act.  
Next, the court turned to the question of whether the district properly denied 
KANAAE the use of the internal mail system to distribute its materials.  K.S.A. 72-
5415(a) provides that when a majority of professional employees selects a 
representative for the purpose of negotiation, “such representative shall be the 
exclusive representative of all the professional employees in the unit for such 
purpose.”  Individual members may still present their positions or proposals to the 
board, but the right to negotiate remains exclusively with the bargaining unit.  K.S.A. 
72-5413(l) establishes the “terms and conditions of professional service.”  Included is 
the privilege granted to the PEO to disseminate information “regarding the 
professional negotiation process and related matters to members of the bargaining 
unit on school premises…and the use of the school mail system to the extent 
permitted by law.”  ONEA was granted the privilege of disseminating information 
through the district’s mail system, which meant the school district was statutorily 
prohibited from granting the privilege to any other PEO.  If the school district 
allowed another PEO to distribute membership materials, it could be accused of 
committing a prohibited practice and would be evidence of the district’s bad faith in 
negotiations.  KANAAE argued that the materials it wanted to distribute had nothing 
to do with the professional negotiations process.  The court disagreed, finding that 
“few matters are more related to the professional negotiation process than the 
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KANAAE’s brochures that openly encourage the dropping of membership in the 
recognized exclusive bargaining representative to increase the membership in an 
alternative organization” (p. 380).  Therefore, the appellate court held that the district 
court was correct in finding the school district properly denied KANAAE access to 
the school mail system.  Finally, the appellate court addressed KANAAE’s argument 
that denial of access to the school district’s mail system was a violation of its 
members’ right to freedom of association under the First Amendment.  The Supreme 
Court, in Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948, 
74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983), dealt with a similar issue.  In Perry, the court considered 
whether the Constitution had been violated when a union serving as the elected 
bargaining unit for teachers was granted access to the school mail, while a rival union 
was denied such access.  The Supreme Court determined that while constitutional 
interests were implicated, there were no violations of the rival union’s First 
Amendment rights.  The Court further noted that the differential access was 
reasonable because it was “wholly consistent with the district’s legitimate interest in 
preserving the property for the use to which it was lawfully dedicated.”  460 U.S. at 
54.  As the exclusive representative, the recognized union has a responsibility to keep 
its constituents informed and the school mail system is a way to get information 
disseminated.  A rival union has no official responsibility and “does not need to be 
entitled to the same rights of access to school mailboxes.”  460 U.S. at 51.  The 
appellate court further concluded that even if KANAAE were not a PEO, it failed to 
establish that the school district mail system was used by the general public, which 
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would qualify it as a “public forum.”  No constitutional rights of KANAAE members 
were violated.  The judgment of the district court was affirmed.      
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Chapter 8  
Torts 
 
A tort is a civil wrong independent of contract.  It may be malicious and 
intentional, or it may be the result of negligence and disregard for others.  Tort law 
"provides a way to sue for compensation for wrongful harm to, among others, one's 
body, property, or reputation" (Imber & Van Geel, 2004, p. 486).  An intentional tort 
is typically anticipated and intended.  A more common type of tort, especially in 
education law, is negligence.  Negligent acts are neither expected nor intended.  The 
courts will use the measure of reasonableness when deciding claims of negligence.  
For negligence to be present, a person must sustain an injury resulting from the 
unreasonable risk taken by another person.  Accidents that could not have been 
prevented by reasonable care do not constitute negligence.  
In the Kansas courts, very few public school employees have filed for 
negligence claims.  Of the two cases that reached the courts since 1980, both dealt 
with workers compensation issues.  K.S.A. 44-501(b) is the Workers Compensation 
Act.  It includes the "exclusive remedy" provision utilized in each of the following 
cases.  In order to state a claim for workers compensation the injury must arise out of 
and in the course of employment.  In order to be compensable, the injury must be 
caused by risks associated with the job and not the result of a personal or neutral 
activity. 
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Martin v. Unified School District No. 233 
615 P.2d 168 (Kan. App. 1980)  
 
Franklin Martin was a custodian for U.S.D. No. 233.  He had experienced 
lower back problems for several years.  On May 28, 1976, Martin parked his truck in 
the parking lot of Fairview School.  As he was getting out, he twisted to unlock the 
door and felt a sharp pain in his back.  Martin left school and went to the doctor later 
that day.  On June 4, 1976, Martin had a disc in his lower back surgically removed.  
The examiner and director found that the injury arose out of and in the course of 
Martin's employment.  The school district appealed and the district court found that 
"the injury was not compensable."  Martin appealed.  
The court turned to K.S.A. 44-501 and determined that the two phrases, 
"arising out of" and "in the course of" employment had separate and distinct 
meanings.  In order for an employee to receive worker's compensation, both 
conditions must exist.  In this case, the injury did occur in the course of Martin's 
employment.  The question that needed to be addressed was whether Martin's injury 
arose out of his employment.  In Hensley v. Carl Graham Glass, 226 Kan. 256, 597 
P.2d 641 (1979), the Kansas Supreme Court found that workplace hazards could be 
analyzed by using three general categories of risk:  (1) those associated with the job;  
(2) those that are personal to the employee; and (3) those that are neutral risks which 
have no particular employment or personal character.  Only risks that fall within the 
first category are compensable.  If the risk is incidental to the work, the injury can be 
said to arise out of employment.  In order to be incidental, the risk must be connected 
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to what the employee is required to do in fulfilling his duties.  In this case, Martin did 
not injure himself in the fulfillment of his duties.  Neither the vehicle nor conditions 
at the school had anything to do with his injury.  Martin's own actions in getting out 
of the truck caused him to injure his back.  The court noted that with Martin's history 
of back problems, "almost any everyday activity would have a tendency to aggravate 
his condition" (p. 170).  The court determined that this was a personal risk, not an 
incidental risk, and therefore was not compensable.  The decision of the trial court 
was affirmed.   
 
Wiseman v. U.S.D. No. 348 
44 P.3d 490 (Kan. App. 2002) 
 
Linda Wiseman was a special education teacher for the East Central Kansas 
Cooperative in Education (Cooperative) located in Baldwin City, Kansas.  On 
December 1, 1998, Wiseman was loading special education students into the district's 
vehicle when a school bus backed in to the car knocking Wiseman to the pavement.  
Wiseman suffered injuries to her back as a result of the fall.  Wiseman brought a 
negligence suit against the school district.  The district moved for summary judgment 
arguing that Wiseman's only course of action was to file under the Workers 
Compensation Act (Act).  The trial court granted summary judgment for the school 
district holding that Wiseman was a statutory employee under the Act and was 
therefore barred from bringing a tort action against the district.  Wiseman appealed 
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this decision arguing that she had been performing "abnormal work" at the time she 
was injured and so she was not a statutory employee within the terms of the Act.   
Under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, K.S.A. 44-501(b), an 
employee is barred from bringing a negligence suit against their employer if they can 
recover workers compensation for an injury.  Hanna v. CRA, Inc., 196 Kan. 156, 159-
60, 409 P.2d 786 (1966) provides the two part test to determine whether the work 
which gave rise to the injury was a necessary and integral part of a person's 
employment under K.S.A. 44503(a).  That test is: (1) is the work being performed by 
the independent contractor and the injured employee necessarily inherent in and an 
integral part of the principal's trade or business.  In addition (2) is the work being 
performed by the independent contractor and the injured employee such as would 
ordinarily have been done by the employees of the principal.  If either question is 
answered in the affirmative, the work being done will be considered part of the 
"principal's trade or business," and the only remedy for an injured employee against 
the principal is under the Act.  Wiseman argued that she was employed by 
Cooperative to teach preschool students with disabilities.  She claimed that U.S.D. 
348 personnel were not trained and did not engage in such activities as loading 
students into an automobile.  Wiseman also noted that neither the bus driver nor the 
driver of the car was her co-employee.  The appellate court noted that the evidence 
showed: Wiseman was an employee of the Cooperative, which had a contract with 
U.S.D. 348; U.S.D. 348 was responsible for the transportation of the children to the 
attendance center; and Wiseman was injured while loading her students onto the 
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school vehicle on school property.  The court concluded that helping students get into 
the district car, which was driven by the school district driver, was not "abnormal 
work."  The work performed in this case was inherent and integral to the trade and 
business of U.S.D. 348.  Thus, Wiseman's only remedy against the school district was 
under the Act.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed.   
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Suits by Outsiders 
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Chapter 9 
Contract Issues 
 
The sixteen cases in this chapter were brought either by outsiders filing claims 
based on contracts or by school districts filing claims against outside groups over 
contractual matters.  A majority of the cases brought by outsiders over contract issues 
in Kansas over the past thirty years have involved either construction companies or 
building materials.  Chapter 72, Article 67 of the Kansas Statutes deals with school 
unification acts.  Within these articles can be found information on the procedures for 
bidding, acceptance of those bids and procedures for construction.  K.S.A. 72-6760 
applies to bids and provides that in general, "no expenditure involving an amount 
greater than $20,000 for construction, reconstruction or remodeling or for the 
purchase of materials, goods or wares shall be made by the board of education of any 
school district except upon sealed proposals, and to the lowest responsible bidder."  
Chapter 84 provides information on the Uniform Commercial Code and encompasses 
things such as general construction, warranties and breach of contract. 
Another topic found in Kansas courts is that of the right to property.  School 
districts sometimes have the need to condemn property for their purposes.  Districts 
may also wish to sell property that was purchased many years past from a landowner 
whose relatives believe they have rights to the property once the school no longer has 
a need for it.  The relevant statute for this type of situation if K.S.A. 72-8212a, which 
provides the power and procedures for the acquisition of property under eminent 
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domain.  K.S.A. 72-8212a clearly outlines what a school district must do if they need 
to acquire a property interest.  
 
 
Board of Education, Unified School District No. 512 v. Vic Regnier Builders, 
Inc. 
648 P. 2d 1143 (Kan. 1982) 
 
USD 512 brought action against Vic Regnier Builders, Inc and two other 
former owners of real estate on which a school building was located.  The district had 
gotten the land as a result of eminent domain proceedings in 1956 and 1959.  The 
district built an elementary school on the site that was closed in 1978 due to 
decreasing enrollment.  The school board was seeking clear title to the property so 
that it could be sold.  The defendants claimed that the title should revert to the 
original owners because the land was acquired as a site for school buildings and since 
it was no longer being used for that purpose, it should be returned to the former 
owners.  The district court held that the school district acquired fee title and that their 
title should be quieted against the claims of the defendants.  The defendants appealed 
to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court.  The Supreme Court then 
granted USD 512's petition for review. 
At issue was whether the school district acquired the fee title to the real estate 
in question in the 1956 and 1959 condemnation proceedings.  The only two Kansas 
cases that involved this issue had determined that a school district acquires the fee 
title through eminent domain proceedings.  Buckwalter v. School District, 65 Kan. 
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603, 70 P 605 (1902) relied upon  Section 6131 of the General Statutes of Kansas of 
1901 which stated that after the county treasurer received payment for condemned 
land "the title to such site... shall vest in such school district."  The court in Devena v. 
Common School District, 186 Kan. 166, 348 P 2d 827 (1960), found that a school 
district was vested in the fee simple title to the land that had been taken through the 
power of eminent domain.  Numerous statutory changes involving the power of 
school districts occurred over the years and many of the old sections of the Laws 
were placed in other statutes.  The changes that brought about this lawsuit were the 
result of the legislative session in 1951.  During that session, the right to eminent 
domain was placed in Section 72-4701 and in this new legislation, the word "title" 
was no longer mentioned.  The issue addressed by the court in this case was whether 
the removal of the word "title" had the effect of taking from school boards the power 
to acquire fee title to land that had been condemned for school sites.  The language in 
72-4701 makes reference to the old statutes and "acts amendatory thereof" which is 
known as "legislation by reference."  Statutes that refer to other statutes and make 
them applicable to the new legislation are known as "reference statutes."  Johnson v. 
Killian, 178 Kan. 154, 283 P. 2d 433 (1955) states that "the adoption of an earlier 
statute by reference makes it as much a part of the later act as thought it had been 
incorporated at full length."  In applying the findings of Johnson to the new 72-4701, 
the court found that the eminent domain procedure section that had been contained in 
the old Articles would be considered a part of 72-4701 as if it were "set forth therein 
in full" (p. 1152).  After considering the statues and the decisions in Buckwalter and 
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Devena, the court concluded that the school board in this case did indeed acquire fee 
title to the land that had been condemned in 1956 and 1959.  The decision of the 
district court was affirmed and that of the Court of Appeals was reversed. 
This court looked closely at public policy and the legislative history of Kansas 
over the past one hundred years.  In doing so, they could find no language that would 
cause them to believe the legislature had intended to change the established principle 
of law that provided a school district that had condemned land for a school building 
site with the fee title to the property that they had taken over.  
 
Haysville U.S.D. 261 v. GAF Corporation v. Carmichael-Wheatcroft & 
Associates, P.A. 
666 P.2d 192 (Kan. 1983) 
 
In 1974, the Haysville school district's two elementary schools needed 
reroofing.  The district retained architects from Carmichael-Wheatcroft & Associates, 
P.A. to determine the repairs that would be required.  The architects prepared the 
specifications which included the use of products from W.R. Grace & Company and 
GAF Corporation and a requirement that GAF provide a 10-year inspection and 
service guarantee program.  On December 3, 1974, just before the reroofing was 
completed, the school district and GAF entered into two "Inspection and Service 
Guarantees."  After the roofs were installed, cracks appeared and leaks occurred 
which caused interior water damage.  The district alleged that the cracks were caused 
by defective materials provided by GAF.  They requested repairs to both roofs.  GAF 
denied liability under the contract with the school district.  In May 1980, the school 
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district sued GAF on several fault-based theories, which included breach of 
warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, negligence, fraud, and breach of the 
inspection and service guarantees between it and GAF.  GAF joined as third-party 
defendants the architects, the roofing contractor and the manufacturer of the 
insulating material upon which the roof had been placed.  GAF alleged it was the 
third-party defendants who were responsible for the damages.  The third-party 
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the inspection and services 
guarantees.  The district court granted the motions for summary judgment and found 
that the guarantees had not created a legal relationship between GAF and the third-
party defendants.  The court also found that "any liability GAF might have to the 
plaintiff under the inspection and services contract is not for conduct claimed to have 
been done by any of the third-party defendants" (p. 197).  GAF appealed and the case 
was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Kansas Supreme Court.   
The school district sued GAF under two theories: (1) fault-based and (2) 
contract.  Under the fault theory, the district sued GAF who answered the petition and 
joined the architect and roofing contractor as third-party defendants.  The school 
district did not amend its petition to include a claim against the added defendants and 
allowed the statute of limitations on the fault-theory (tort) against the third-party 
defendants to expire.  By suing only one defendant, the school district could only 
recover the percentage of damages for which GAF was responsible.  The second 
theory of recovery was for a breach of the inspection and services guarantees 
(contract) that the school district had entered into with GAF.  The district court found 
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that "the relationship between GAF and the school district was contractual and the 
third-party defendants were not parties to the contracts..."(p. 198).  The court also 
held that implied comparative indemnity was not applicable in a contract action.  
K.S.A. 60-258(a), the Kansas comparative negligence statute, allows a party in a civil 
action to recover damages for negligence resulting in death, personal injury or 
physical damage to property.  The amount of damages awarded is lessened in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the party.  When comparative 
negligence is an issue, the courts will deal with percentages of causal responsibility.  
The question for the Supreme Court to answer was whether GAF's guarantee to the 
school district created implied liability on the third-party defendants, which would 
require that they pay a percentage of any damages awarded to the school district.  The 
Supreme Court reviewed the language of K.S.A. 60-258(a) and discussed several 
comparative negligence cases.  In citing Heubert v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., Inc., 
208 Kan. 720, 494 P.2d 1210 (1972), the court noted that contributory negligence was 
"not a defense to an action based on breach of an express warranty" (p. 201).  GAF 
had entered into the inspection and services guarantees after they had inspected the 
nearly completed reroofing of the two schools.  The contract covered the roofs for ten 
years and guaranteed to repair leaks without any cost to the owner.  By its attempt to 
require a third party to be held liable for damages, GAF was applying comparative 
negligence and implied comparative indemnity, which are tort-based theories, to 
contract law.  The Supreme Court noted that the difference between contract law and 
a tort was that "a breach of contract is a failure of performance of a duty arising under 
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or imposed by an agreement, whereas a tort is a violation of a duty imposed by law" 
(p. 201).  In the case of a tort, a party is allowed to join all wrongdoers and require 
them to pay their share of damages.  The third-party defendants were not parties to 
the contracts between GAF and the school district and could not be held liable under 
the comparative negligence statute.  If GAF was required to pay damages to the 
school district under the terms of the agreement, it would then have the "right of 
subrogation against whose fault actually caused the damage to the roof in a separate 
action" (p. 202).  Legal subrogation would allow GAF to file suit against the roofing 
contractor and manufacturer of the roofing materials, but only after first paying any 
damages owed to the school district.  The Supreme Court held that GAF had "no 
claim against the noncontracting parties until it pays or is required to pay the school 
district under the contracts" (p. 203).  The decision of the district court was affirmed. 
 
Johns Const. Co., Inc. v. Unified School District No. 210, Hugoton 
664 P.2d 821 (Kan. 1983) 
 
A dispute arose between U.S.D. 210 and Johns Construction Company as to 
whether the construction company was entitled to extra compensation due to change 
orders.  The District claimed offsets for defects and delays in job completion.  The 
construction contract specified that any disputes arising would be decided by 
arbitration "in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association unless the parties mutually agreed otherwise" (p. 
822).  The dispute was submitted to a panel of three arbitrators who found some 
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points in favor of the contractor and some in favor of the District.  The contractor 
filed a motion in district court to confirm the award, but the school board moved to 
vacate the award.  The district court confirmed the decision of the arbitrators.  The 
school district appealed. 
The District first argued that closing the hearing to the public by the 
arbitrators violated the Kansas Open Meetings Act.  This Act found in K.S.A. 1982 
Supp. 75-4318 provides in part that all meetings for the "conduct of affairs of,  and 
transaction of business by, all legislative and administrative bodies and agencies of 
the state and political and taxing subdivisions thereof, ...receiving or expending and 
supported in whole or in part by public funds...shall be open to the public."  The court 
did not find this statute applicable to this case because the arbitration board was not a 
public agency as deemed by the statute.  The arbitration board, created out of a 
contract dispute between a private contractor and the school district, was not subject 
to the provisions of the Open Meetings Act.  Next, the District argued that they were 
denied a fair hearing because the arbitrators excluded all witnesses from the hearing, 
including the Board's architect and construction manager.  The court found "no merit" 
in this claim because the terms of the construction contract stated that arbitration 
hearings were to be conducted "in accordance with the Construction Industry 
Arbitration Rules" which were in effect at the time the contract was signed.  These 
rules gave the arbitrators the discretion to determine the attendance of witnesses and 
in this case, they excluded witnesses from both sides.  The same rule of exclusion was 
applied to the contractor and the school board.  For these reasons, the court found no 
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improper conduct or abuse of discretion by the arbitrators.  After considering all of 
the points raised by the school board, the court affirmed the decision of the district 
court.  
 
Donner v. Kansas Department of Human Resources  
691 P. 2d 21 (Kan. 1984) 
 
Before 1978, the Kansas Department of Human Resources (KDHR) was 
designated as the agency to administer federal funds received under the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).  CETA funds were to be 
used for the payment of costs that resulted from the administration of a job-training 
program for disadvantaged people.  In order to receive CETA funds, USD 270 
created staff positions whose salaries were paid with CETA dollars.  In 1979, 
employees of the school district sought a pay raise.  The district agreed to pay their 
salaries as well as their employee contributions to the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System (KPERS).  Contracts that provided for CETA funds to be used for 
KPERS contributions were submitted by the school district to KDHR in 1979, 1980, 
and 1981.  Each of these contracts was approved by school district representative and 
by the CETA administrator of KDHR.  Two audits done by KDHR approved several 
of these contracts, but a later audit held that the payment of the KPERS contributions 
were illegal.  The basis for the auditor's conclusion that the payment of KPERS 
contributions as "fringe benefits" was illegal was a provision found in K.S.A. 1983 
Supp. 74-4919.  This provision provided in part that each participating employer 
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"shall deduct from the compensation of each member 4% of the member's 
compensation as employee contributions" for deposit in the KPERS fund.  The 
auditor also relied on an opinion by an assistant attorney general who quoted K.S.A. 
74-4919 and then concluded in part that once employee compensation is determined, 
the amount of employee contributions for retirement purposes must be deducted and 
remitted to the retirement system.  The opinion further stated that there was "no 
authority for the employer to make such a payment on behalf of the employee in 
addition to the compensation received by the employee" and any such payment would 
be "contrary to law" (p. 23).  As a result of this third audit, the employee contracts 
were modified and, after 1981, the provision that had been objected to was removed.  
KDHR decided to try to recover the funds previously paid.  A formal hearing was 
held and the hearing officer, who relied solely on K.S.A. 74-4919 and the assistant 
attorney general's opinion, determined that the payments to KPERS had been contrary 
to law.  The hearing officer found that each of the employees owed a debt to the state 
of Kansas which would be set off against the future earnings of the various employees.  
All of the employees appealed to the district court.   
In district court, the employees presented three basic arguments:  (1) The 
employment contract was not illegal under K.S.A. 74-4919 which does not prohibit 
contracts in which an employer pays KPERS contributions as a fringe benefit; (2) If 
there was a debt, it was not owed by the employees.  Rather, it was a debt of USD 
270 which entered into the contracts directly with KDHR; and (3) The state, acting 
through its CETA administrator, approved the payment of KPERS benefits directly 
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by the school district.  The only contracting parties for the payment of the CETA 
funds were the state, acting through KDHR and the school district.  The district court 
interpreted K.S.A. 74-4919 to mean that the 4% KPERS contribution must be 
deducted from the employees' compensation.  In this case, they had been paid by the 
school district using CETA funds.  The district court also determined that the debt 
was owed by the school district, not the individual employees.  Finally, the court 
entered judgment setting aside the hearing officer's decision and found in favor of the 
employees.  KDHR appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court.  The employees filed a 
cross-appeal that attacked the finding by the district court that a school district could 
not legally enter into a contract with its employees providing that the 4% KPERS 
deductions be paid by the employer as a "fringe benefit."   
The issue for the appellate court to decide was whether the contractual 
provision that provided for the 4% KPERS payments to be paid as a "fringe benefit" 
was illegal and unenforceable under K.S.A. Supp. 74-4919.  To make this 
determination the court examined the provisions of the Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement Act (K.S.A. 74-4901 et seq.).  It found that the provisions of this act 
established the Kansas public employees retirement system as a "body corporate and 
as an instrumentality of the state of Kansas."  The legislative purpose of the statutes 
which created this system was to enable employees to "accumulate reserves for 
themselves and their dependents on retirement and to insure a fiscally solvent 
retirement system" (p. 25).  The court determined that K.S.A. 74-4919's requirement 
of a 4% deduction from each member's compensation served the purpose of making 
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KPERS financially sound so that money would be available to pay retirement benefits.  
It was the judgment of the court that K.S.A. 74-4919 did not render an employment 
contract that provided for the payment of KPERS contributions by an employer to be 
illegal because the statue did not contain any language that prohibited such an act.  
The court further held that the contract between USD 270 and its employees in which 
the KPERS benefit was payed as a "fringe benefit" was not invalid.  The court did 
point out that the sums paid by the school district as KPERS contributions should be 
considered as a part of each employees' compensation for income tax purposes and 
for purposes of calculating the amount which would constitute a proper 4% KPERS 
contribution.  The judgment of the district court in favor of the employees was 
affirmed.   
 
Board of Education, Unified School District No. 464 v. Porter 
676 P. 2d 84 (Kan. 1984) 
 
In 1979, USD 464 condemned a plot of land belonging to Alvin Shilling for 
school expansion.  The Porter land, which bordered the Shilling land, was considered 
unsafe because it was the site of a propane facility.  On April 10, 1980, the 
superintendent spoke to Mrs. Porter on the phone about the possibility of purchasing 
the property.  The Porters did not respond, and so on April 11 the school board 
authorized immediate condemnation of the property.  The Porters were notified by 
phone on April 11 of this action, on April 14 the condemnation action was filed, and 
on April 23, the Porters were personally served with process.  In the meantime, the 
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Porters had entered into a contract to erect a metal building on the site.  On April 10, 
the site was surveyed and cement foundation piers were poured in spite of the school 
board's notice.  The Porters contend that they were not aware of the district's 
intentions until they were received the summons on April 23.  In May, the court 
approved condemnation and appointed appraisers at which time the construction 
stopped.  The school district filed for, and was granted, a motion asking that the 
appraisers omit the partially completed building, storage tank, and equipment from 
their appraisal of the property.  Appraisers filed their report and the Porters appealed 
from the award.  In response to the school district's motion in limine, the trial court 
again excluded all evidence at trial relating to the partially completed building and 
other equipment found on the site when it determined the value of taking.  They ruled 
that the partially completed building, storage tank, and equipment were personal 
property and therefore not relevant in determining the value of the condemned 
property.  At trial, the remaining real estate was valued at $27,150 and the court 
entered judgment for that amount in favor of the Porters.  The Porters appealed the 
award arguing that the trial court erred when it granted the school district's motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of the value of the partially completed building and other 
equipment.   
A motion in limine is a proper method of excluding evidence not at issue in a 
trial.  The trial court had determined the partially completed building and storage tank 
were not attached to the property and should not be included in the appraisal.  As a 
trial court has "broad discretion in determining what evidence will be allowed" the 
 
489 
 
appeals court did not find an error in the sustaining of the motion in limine.  Water Co. 
v. Irrigation Co., 64 Kan. 247 (1902) provided three tests to apply when determining 
whether personal property had become a fixture and should be considered a part of 
the real estate:  (1) annexation to the reality; (2) adaption to the use of that part of the 
realty with which it is connected; and (3) the intention of the party making the 
annexation to make the article a permanent annexation to the freehold.  In this case, 
the storage tank was not a permanent fixture as it was easily movable and thus not to 
be considered part of the real estate.  The partially completed storage building was 
not considered in the landowners' award because the owner had knowledge of the 
condemnation and acted in bad faith by continuing construction in spite of this 
knowledge.  At the very latest, the Porters had knowledge of the condemnation action 
on April 23, yet construction was not halted until May 7.  The court stated that in 
such cases, the "value of such a building should not be considered in determining the 
value of the taking" (p. 89).  The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 
The court used the fact that construction on the storage building continued 
after the appellants had knowledge of the impending condemnation of their property 
to determine that the purpose was to enhance the damages they would receive upon 
appraisal.  The court saw this as an act of bad faith and so the Porters were only 
awarded the value of the land. 
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Board of Education, Unified School District No. 215 v. L.R. Foy Construction 
Company 
 697 P. 2d 456 (Kan. 1985) 
 
USD 215 and Foy Construction Company entered into a contract in 1978 in 
which Foy agreed to remodel a school building.  The two parties had a dispute, the 
specifics of which were not provided, and Foy sought arbitration to resolve the matter.  
The school board filed action in district court to stop arbitration proceedings.  
However, the district court ordered arbitration and the dispute was presented to a 
panel of three arbitrators.  After hearing the evidence, the arbitrators made their 
award on January 20, 1982, finding that the Board was entitled to $56,700.82 in 
damages.  Foy appealed this decision.  Foy’s main contentions were that (1) the 
arbitrators award was vague as they did not specifically address each of the issues set 
forth by Foy in its proposed findings of fact; (2) the arbitrators exceeded their 
authority by considering the Board’s counterclaim because the counterclaim was not 
in writing; (3) the arbitrators exceeded their authority by rendering an award more 
than thirty days after the close of the hearing; and (4) the district court was in error 
when it granted a rehearing after initially holding in favor of Foy.  The Board 
countered Foy’s arguments by pointing out that (1) Foy proceeded with the arbitration 
and never objected to the fact that the counterclaim was not in writing; (2) the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules provide that claims not originally 
submitted may later be submitted with permission from the arbitrators; and (3) a 
rehearing was necessary because when, at the initial trial, the trial court refused to 
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consider authorities cited by the Board  the court had not given the Board an 
opportunity to present all of its evidence. 
The Court of Appeals, in Rural Water Dist. No. 6 v. Ziegler Corp., 9 
Kan.App.2d 305, 677 P.2d 573 (1984), stated: “To be valid, an arbitration award must 
be a full and final disposition on all points submitted” and the “award is final when it 
conclusively determines the matter submitted, leaving nothing to be done but to 
execute and carry out the terms of the award.”  The arbitrators did not specifically set 
out their ruling on each of the items mentioned by Foy.  However, the final decision 
made by the arbitrators was an attempt to resolve all of the issues between both 
parties, which resulted in an award to the Board.  The court here found that “the 
award, while not detailed, is not vague” (p. 457).  When considering the issue of the 
counterclaim, the court again turned to Rural Water Dist. No. 6 and found that in 
arbitration proceedings, it is the “duty of an appellant to designate an adequate record 
on appeal to substantiate claims of error.”  The court found nothing in the record 
indicating the arbitrators erred in considering the counterclaim as neither party 
objected to the fact that it was not in writing.  Next the court turned to Foy’s claim 
that the award was rendered too late for it to be valid.  Both parties agreed that AAA 
rules set a thirty-day time limit and that more than thirty days had passed at the time 
the award was made.  There was nothing to indicate that the record was formally 
closed or that Foy had objected before the award was made.  In fact, Foy had filed an 
application with the arbitrators seeking clarification of the award.  By applying for 
clarification pursuant to K.S.A. 5-409, the court found that Foy was acknowledging 
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the validity of the award.  It was not necessary to determine if the thirty-day rule 
found in the AAA rules was mandatory because Foy waived his right to object the 
award by first moving to have the award clarified.  Finally, the court addressed Foy’s 
claim that the district court erred when it permitted a rehearing.  K.S.A.  60-259 
provides for the granting of a new trial to any of the parties involved if it appears that 
the rights of one party has been affected because of “abuse of discretion of the court” 
or for any cause in which the party has not been afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence.  The board had not been permitted to present all of its evidence at the first 
arbitration hearing, and so had not been afforded this opportunity.  The fact that this 
was an arbitration hearing did not matter in the eyes of the court as they found K.S.A. 
60-201 et seq., which is the code of civil procedure, applied in this case.  The district 
court could grant a rehearing for arbitration proceedings just as they could for any 
other civil case.  Judgment of the district court was affirmed. 
 
D-1 Constructors, Ltd. v. Unified School District No. 229, Johnson County 
788 P. 2d 289 (Kan. App. 1990) 
 
Seventeen general contractors filed claims against USD 229 on the grounds 
that they had not solicited sealed bids before they awarded a services contract to a 
construction manager.  Unified School District 229 had awarded a “construction 
management services” contract to J.E. Dunn Construction Company without 
soliciting bids from other general contractors.  A group of other general contractors 
filed seeking (1) declaratory judgment that K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 required that 
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school districts get sealed bids; (2) a restraining order and injunction barring the 
school board from approving the contract with J.E. Dunn until sealed bids were 
accepted and reviewed; and (3) a writ of mandamus ordering the school board to 
cancel the contract with J.E. Dunn and re-let the contract using the competitive 
bidding process.  The trial court denied the restraining order and dismissed all three 
counts on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.  The contractors appealed. 
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 requires sealed bids for construction or for the 
purchase of materials, goods, or wares.  It states in part that “no expenditure 
involving an amount greater than $10,000 for construction, reconstruction or 
remodeling, or for the purchase of materials, goods or wares shall be made by any 
school district except upon sealed proposals…”  The contract at issue is based on a 
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Construction Manager that was 
developed by the American Institute of Architects.  The contract required Dunn to 
develop construction plans, schedules, and cost analyses.  Dunn would also be 
required to establish bidding qualifications, to solicit bids, and to make 
recommendations for the award of a construction contract.  Dunn would not be 
allowed to bid on this project.  Once construction was underway, Dunn would be 
required to supervise and coordinate the various contractors.  Upon completion of the 
project, Dunn would conduct inspections and make recommendations to the architect 
regarding final inspection.  The management services provided by Dunn were not 
covered by K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760, as it makes no provision for “services.”  
Plaintiffs argued that the public policy underlying K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 72-6760 
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required the court to read into the statute the type of services that Dunn would be 
providing.  The court held that it was “not at liberty to read into the statute a provision 
requiring sealed, competitive bidding for contracts for services” (p. 291).  The 
decision of the trial court was affirmed. 
School districts are required to solicit sealed bids for construction exceeding 
$10,000 or for purchases of goods, materials, or wares exceeding this amount.  They 
are not required to solicit sealed bids for the rendering of services. 
 
Unified School District No. 500 v. United States Gypsum Company 
788 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Kan. 1992) 
 
This case is a products liability action in which the school district sought 
damages from the defendants for the removal and replacement of asbestos-containing 
building materials.  The defendants manufactured various asbestos-containing 
materials that were installed in buildings constructed from the late 1930's until the 
1960's.  In late 1979 and early 1980, the school district discovered that several school 
buildings were contaminated with asbestos.  In 1987, the district learned the identities 
of the manufacturers of the asbestos-containing products and sent them notice of the 
contamination.  On January 12, 1988, the school district filed suit to recover removal 
and replacement costs from the defendants.  The district's claims were based on 
theories of restitution, strict liability, negligence, breach of implied and express 
warranties, and fraudulent misrepresentation.  U.S. Gypsum argued that it was 
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entitled to summary judgment on all of the school district's claims except those under 
theories of strict liability and negligence. 
The school district claimed its restitution cause of action came out of the 
emergency assistance doctrine set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Restitution 
Section 115.  Section 115 provides in relevant part that a person, who has supplied 
things or services, although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is 
entitled to restitution from the other if the things or services were "immediately 
necessary to satisfy the requirements of public decency, health or safety."  The district 
argued that because U.S. Gypsum had put defective and dangerous products on the 
market, which were then installed in public buildings, they should be made to pay for 
the removal and replacement of those products.  The court held that based on Kansas' 
view of restitution, there was an implied promise on the part of the defendants to 
abate the asbestos contamination they created.  Thus, summary judgment was denied 
to U.S. Gypsum on the claim of restitution.  Summary judgment was also denied on 
the fraudulent misrepresentation claim.  In an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, 
plaintiffs must prove the following elements: an untrue statement of material fact, 
known to be untrue by the party making it, made with the intent to deceive or made 
with reckless disregard for the truth, where another party justifiably relies on the 
statement and acts to his detriment.  The district court believed that the record 
presented questions of fact concerning those elements, which precluded the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.  Finally, the court addressed the claims 
of a breach of implied and express warranties.  U.S. Gypsum argued that the school 
 
496 
 
district had failed to provide them with adequate notice of any alleged breach.  K.S.A. 
84-2-607(3)(a) provides that where a tender has been accepted, the buyer must notify 
the seller of any breach within a reasonable time after he discovers such breach or be 
barred from any remedy.  The district court concluded that there was a question of 
fact concerning whether the school district notified U.S. Gypsum of the alleged 
breach within a reasonable time, thus the motion for summary judgment was denied 
on this claim.  U.S. Gypsum also claimed that the school district failed to state a 
claim of breach of the implied warranty for a particular purpose because the asbestos-
containing products in question were used for their ordinary purpose.  K.S.A. 84-2-
315 provides in part that where the seller has reason to know any particular purpose 
for which the goods are required and the buyer is relying on the seller's judgment to 
select or furnish suitable goods, there is an implied warranty that the goods will be fit 
for such purpose.  A "particular purpose" under this statute means an unusual purpose.  
When goods are purchased for the ordinary purposes for which they are used, no 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises.  The asbestos-containing 
materials in this case were sold to the school district and installed in their buildings as 
acoustical plasters, fireproofing materials, and ceiling tiles.  These were all 
considered ordinary purposes for those products.  Accordingly, the court concluded 
that no implied warranty for fitness for a particular purpose applied to the sale of the 
asbestos-containing products.  The court granted U.S. Gypsum's motion for summary 
judgment on this claim.  Although the school district could not prove that they had 
any promise from U.S. Gypsum regarding its products, the court found this was not 
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needed to state a claim for breach of an express warranty.  Under Kansas law, an 
express warranty is contractual and reliance on the express warranty need not be 
shown.  Therefore, the motion for summary judgment on that ground was denied.  
U.S. Gypsum's motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part and denied 
in part.   
 
Unified School District No. 500 v. United Stated Gypsum Company 
788 F. Supp. 1178 (D. Kan. 1992) 
 
U.S.D. No. 500 brought action seeking damages against defendants W.R. 
Grace & Co., United Gypsum Company, National Gypsum Company, and The 
Celotex Corporation for the removal and replacement of asbestos-containing building 
materials.  In a previous case, Unified School Dist. No. 500 v. U.S. Gypsum, 788 F. 
Supp. 1173 (D. Kan. 1992), the district court denied defendant Grace's co-defendant 
U.S. Gypsum's motion for summary judgment.  In this case, the court addresses the 
school district's claims against Grace.  These claims were based on theories of 
restitution, strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of 
implied and express warranties.  Defendant Grace contended it was entitled to 
summary judgment on all claims, except those under the theory of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.   
Under Kansas law, a party may not recover damages for simple economic loss 
under theories of strict liability and negligence.  Grace argued that for this reason, the 
school district's claims failed.  However, the district court held that the school district 
 
498 
 
was able to show there was a question of fact as to whether they suffered property 
damage as well as economic loss.  Therefore, the motion for summary judgment was 
denied on those claims.  The court used the same rationale as in the first Gypsum case 
to deny summary judgment to Grace on the breach of express and implied warranties 
and restitution claims.  Finally, the court addressed Graces' claim that it was entitled 
to summary judgment on any claim for removal and replacement of asbestos-
containing materials found in the Administrative Building.  Grace argued that the 
school district did not own that building and so lacked standing to recover damages 
for any alleged contamination.  The district court rejected this argument because it 
found a question of fact existed as to whether U.S.D. 500 owned the Administrative 
Building.  Accordingly, the district court denied the motion of W.R. Grace & Co. for 
partial summary judgment.    
 
Unified School District No. 207 v. Northland National Bank 
887 P.2d 1138 (Kan. App. 1994) 
 
U.S.D. 207 and U.S.D. 453 entered into similar lease-purchase agreements in 
1992 with Century Office Products, Inc. (C.O.P.I.) for photocopying machines and 
sorters.  C.O.P.I. assigned its interests to Mid Continent Leasing, which assigned its 
interests to Northland.  Each agreement contained language that required the districts 
to make monthly payments over a 60-month period.  The agreements also contained a 
default provision enforceable "to the extent permitted by applicable law…to declare 
the entire amount of unpaid total monies for the balance of the contract due and 
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payable."  In 1993, both school districts sued to cancel the lease-purchase agreements 
after they had problems getting their machines serviced when C.O.P.I. suffered 
financial problems.  The trial court granted the school districts' motions for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the lease-purchase agreements were void because they 
violated the Kansas cash-basis law.  The agreements did not specifically include 
required provisions of K.S.A. 10-1116b and K.S.A. 10-1116c.  Northland appealed 
this decision. 
The Kansas cash-basis law was enacted in 1933 to require governmental units 
to operate on a cash basis and not spend money they did not have, thus preventing 
outstanding debt.  Statutes require municipalities, such as school districts, to contract 
all indebtedness in conformity with the act.  K.S.A. 10-1112 provides that with few 
exceptions provided for in the act, it is illegal for a municipality to create any debt "in 
excess of the funds actually on hand in the treasury of such municipality…"  One 
specific provision of the act found in K.S.A. 10-1119 states that any contract "which 
violates the provisions of this act, shall be void."  Statutes do provide a few 
exceptions to the cash-basis rule.  For example, school districts can issue cancelable 
purchase orders for equipment and other materials in anticipation of funds becoming 
available in an upcoming budget.  They can also exceed the limitation on 
indebtedness by a vote of municipality electors.  In 1980, the Kansas Legislature 
added K.S.A. 10-1116b, which listed the circumstances in which municipalities can 
enter into lease-purchase agreements.  Lease-purchase agreements are permissible if 
they "state that the municipality is obligated only to pay periodic payments or 
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monthly installments under the agreement as may be made from (a) funds budgeted 
and appropriated for that purpose during the current budget year or (b) funds made 
available from any lawfully operated revenue producing source."  The purpose of 
K.S.A. 10-1116b was to provide clarification for when municipalities could enter into 
lease-purchase agreements without violating the cash-basis law.  In 1990, conditions 
were added to permissible lease-purchase agreements.  K.S.A. 10-1116c provided that 
if the proposed lease-purchase agreement was for a term exceeding the current fiscal 
year, the agreement had to specify the amount required to purchase the item if it were 
paid for in cash, the annual interest costs, and the amount included in the payments 
for service, maintenance or other charges.  The lease-purchase agreement in this case 
created indebtedness to both school districts payable in the current year and in future 
installments.  The agreement also provided the districts with the option to return the 
equipment and cancel the lease-purchase contract if they could not make payments.  
However, the agreement imposed the obligation on the districts to purchase or lease 
equipment from C.O.P.I. if funds became available subsequent to early cancellation.  
This obligation was in violation of K.S.A. 10-1116b which prohibits a lease-purchase 
agreement from creating any binding obligation on a municipality in future years.  
The C.O.P.I. agreement obligated the school districts to pay amounts in future years 
that were not a part of their current budgets.  The school districts would remain liable 
if there were any funds available to pay on the contract, even if those funds were not 
budgeted for the lease-purchase agreement.  In effect, the provisions within the 
contract gave C.O.P.I. the right to declare the entire amount of the unpaid monies due.  
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The appellate court found that the lease-purchase agreements offended the wording of 
K.S.A. 10-1116b and violated the provisions of K.S.A. 10-1112, which therefore 
voided the agreements.  The lease-purchase agreements also violated K.S.A. 10-
1116c because they failed to include any of the cost amounts required by that statute.  
Lease-purchase agreements will only be permitted if they make the specific public 
disclosures required by statute.  None of the documents for either school district came 
close to filling the public notice requirement of K.S.A. 10-1116c.  The appellate court 
found that entering into the lease-purchase agreements without complying with the 
cash-basis act was illegal.  Thus, the lease-purchase agreements were deemed to be 
void.  The court also held that the provisions of the Kansas Uniform Commercial 
Code did not control over the specific requirements of the Kansas cash-basis law.  
The decision of the trial court was affirmed.         
 
Unified School District No. 259 v. Sloan 
871 P.2d 861 (Kan. App. 1994) 
 
Sharon Sloan was an employee of the school district and participated in its 
group health plan.  Sloan's husband became ill and died.  While he was sick, his 
health plan paid $32,570 in benefits.  Sloan filed a wrongful death suit against various 
chemical manufacturers asking for $1.95 million in damages and received $427,500 
as settlement.  The school district was not a party to the lawsuit, did not intervene in 
the suit, and did not receive notice of the settlement negotiations.  The school district 
brought suit against Sloan for breach of the insurance contract.  Paragraph XIV.B of 
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the group health plan stated that the insurance plan was allowed to recover from the 
employee any benefits that had been paid for an injury or illness caused by a third 
party as the result of their negligence if the employee recovered a settlement from the 
third party for charges that were allowed by the group insurance plan.  The district 
court found that Sloan was liable to reimburse her insurer for the health care benefits 
paid on behalf of her husband out of the settlement money she received from the 
chemical companies.  Sloan appealed the decision. 
Sloan argued that because the amount of money she received as compensation 
was unresolved and did not specify the amounts that were attributable to certain 
expenses, she should not have to pay the insurance company.  Sloan's suit against the 
chemical companies was for $1.95 million, which included $55,000 for medical and 
funeral expenses.  The school district's group insurance plan had paid Sloan $32,570 
in benefits.  She settled for a total sum of $427,500.  The settlement agreements she 
signed obligated her to be "responsible for the payment of all expenses, including but 
not limited to medical and hospital charges…to any person or entity so entitled by 
contract" (p. 863).  The appellate court, citing several cases both in and out of the 
state, determined that medical expenses had been included in the settlement Sloan 
received and that was the type of recovery found in the contractual language in 
paragraph XIV.B of the insurance contract.  The reimbursement provision found in 
the insurance contract was "clear and unambiguous."  In the mind of the court, there 
was no doubt that in this situation Sloan was required to reimburse the school 
district's insurer for the benefits that had been paid to her.  The final question 
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addressed by the court was whether U.S.D. 259 should be prohibited from enforcing 
the reimbursement policy because public policy does not permit such reimbursement.  
K.A.R. 40-1-20 provides that "an insurance company shall not issue contracts of 
insurance in Kansas containing a 'subrogation' clause applicable to coverage 
providing for reimbursement of medical, surgical, hospital or funeral expenses."  
K.A.R. 40-202 exempts certain "lodges, societies, persons, and associations from 
coverage under the state insurance code…"  Coverage under the school district's 
group plan was only provided to employees of the district and their eligible 
dependents.  The school district's plan did not operate for profit.  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the group insurance plan was exempt from the jurisdiction and 
regulation of the Kansas Insurance Department, which meant K.A.R. 40-1-20 was not 
applicable to the reimbursement provision.  The judgment of the district court was 
affirmed.    
 
Board of Education of Unified School District No. 443, Ford County v. 
Kansas State Board of Education 
966 P. 2d 68 (Kan. 1998) 
 
In the late 1970's, USD 443 formed an interlocal with several other districts in 
order to provide special education services for the exceptional children in their 
districts.  School districts in Kansas may provide special education services in one of 
three ways: (1) they may provide a "stand alone" program whereby a district provides 
services to its own students; (2) through a cooperative, which is one district serving as 
a sponsoring district with other districts sharing the costs; and (3) through an 
 
504 
 
interlocal agreement, which is an independent entity that provides services to all 
member districts.  Both a cooperative and interlocal are created with contractual 
agreements among all member districts.  Originally, the law required that the 
interlocal agreements be limited to not less than three years or more than five.  In 
1986, an agreement was signed between USD 443 and the other districts from the 
Southwest Kansas Area Cooperative District (SKACD) that was to expire in 1989.  
However, in 1987 the legislature amended K.S.A. 72-8230(a) to state that the 
interlocal agreements signed between districts "shall be perpetual unless the 
agreement is partially or completely terminated in accordance with this provision."  
The legislature applied to every interlocal agreement entered into prior to the date of 
the new legislation as well as to those following the effective date.  The amendment 
also provided that interlocal agreements could only be terminated by approval of the 
State Board of Education.  Thus, school districts were statutorily prohibited from 
unilaterally withdrawing from their interlocal agreements by virtue of this amended 
legislation.  In 1995, USD 443 attempted to negotiate some changes in the interlocal 
agreement, and when those negotiations failed, it attempted to withdraw from 
SKACD.  The request to withdraw was denied.  USD 443 appealed to the State Board 
as authorized by K.S.A. 72-8230(a)(6)(B).  The appeal was heard by a three-person 
panel.  The issues presented were whether the approval or disapproval of UDS 443's 
request was (1) in the best interests of the involved school districts, and (2) in the best 
interests of the state as a whole in providing services for exceptional children.  USD 
443 also brought up the concern that the amendment interfered with contractual rights 
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and was thus contrary to both state and federal Constitutions.  The State Board, as an 
administrative agency, could not rule upon the issue of contractual rights.  The 
hearing panel recommended denial of USD 443's request and the State Board adopted 
this recommendation finding it would not be in the best interests of the involved 
school districts or of the State to grant the requested withdrawal.  USD 443 appealed 
to the District Court, which upheld the State Board's decision.  The school district 
appealed this decision. 
  In Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Bott, 240 Kan. 624, 732 P. 2d, 710 
(1987) the court set out criteria for determining if a state law violates the contract 
clause of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution.  The three part test 
found in Bott is whether (1) the state law has created a "substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship"; (2) there is a significant and legitimate purpose to the 
legislation; and (3) the "adjustment of the contracting parties' rights and 
responsibilities is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate 
to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption."  The Bott court further 
stated that the legislation may be upheld as constitutional when there is a substantial 
impairment finding if there is a "significant and legitimate public purpose behind the 
legislation."  In looking at the 1987 amendment, the court found the statute to be 
reasonable in that it did not prohibit a school district from withdrawing from an 
interlocal; it simply required approval from the State Board.  The court also found a 
valid public purpose in restricting school districts from withdrawing from interlocal 
agreements stating that the amendment was a "reasonable method to attain the 
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legitimate State objective of providing the best special education services at the most 
economical cost to the State, the school districts, and the taxpayers" (p. 79).  Thus, 
the 1987 amendment passes the Bott test in that it is reasonable and serves a 
legitimate public purpose.  In looking at the language of the school districts' contract 
the court found a condition stating that the "agreement is subject to change or 
termination by the Legislature."  Both the Kansas Constitution and the statute 
provided for continuous legislative modification or termination.  The legislature had 
the right to amend K.S.A. 72-8230 and USD 443 had notice within its contract of this 
legislative right.  The court concluded that there was no violation of Article 1, Section 
10 of the United States Constitution.  The second issue addressed by the court was 
USD 443's argument that the amendment to K.S.A. 72-8230 denied it substantive due 
process and equal protection because "freedom of contract is a right protected under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" and that the court should use the strict 
scrutiny test to analyze the constitutionality of the 1987 amendment.  The court used 
Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20, 643 P. 2d 87 (1987) in pointing out 
that while freedom of contract is a protected right, it is not an absolute right.  
Therefore, the appropriate test of whether the 1987 amendment interferes with the 
districts freedom of contract would be that of rational basis.  In looking over 
testimony regarding the justification for the passage of the 1987 amendment, the 
court found its passage to be rationally related to the State's interests in providing 
services for exceptional children at a reasonable cost to districts.  The court also 
found that the 1987 amendment is "reasonably related to the State's compelling 
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interests in education because it does not categorically prevent a school district from 
withdrawing from an interlocal, but mandates that before a school district may 
withdraw, the State Board must find that such a withdrawal is in the best interests of 
the cooperating school districts as well as the State as a whole in providing special 
education services."  Finally, the appeals court pointed out that Article 6, Section 5 of 
the Kansas Constitution provides for school boards to enter into agreements with 
other districts for the provision of educational services under general supervision of 
the state board of education.  USD 443 had no vested right to enter or withdraw from 
its interlocal agreement because the constitutional provision specifically stated that 
"such agreements shall be subject to limitation, change or termination by the 
legislature."  A right is not vested if it can be changed or terminated at any time.  The 
decision of the district court was affirmed. 
 
Topeka Public Schools, Unified School District No. 501 v. American Home 
Life Insurance Company  
971 P.2d 1210 (Kan. App. 1999) 
 
Ben Bobbett began working for U.S.D. 501 as a full-time custodian in 1966.  
In 1980, Bobbett started doing part-time work for the American Home Life Insurance 
Company.  In 1993, Bobbett was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and had 
surgery.  He subsequently filed a worker's compensation claim against the school 
district.  In January of 1994, the District sent American a letter stating it believed that 
American should pay for part of Bobbett's treatment costs.  American refused to pay 
for any costs because Bobbett had been an independent contractor and not one of its 
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employees.  The District, which believed workers compensation would apply in 
Bobbett's situation with American, asked for the identity of American's carrier in 
order for the District to review the policy and file for participation and recovery.  The 
school district paid Bobbett's medical bills and all costs associated with Bobbett's 
workers compensation claim.  On December 15, 1995, the District filed a petition for 
declaratory judgment in district court alleging that American was also liable for 
Bobbett's injuries and should pay for part of his workers compensation claims.  
American filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that (1) there was no right of 
contribution among multiple employers under the Workers Compensation Act (Act); 
(2) the District waived any ability to share liability between employers when it settled 
Bobbett's entire claim; and (3) there was no evidence proving that Bobbett's injury 
was related to his work for American.  The district court granted summary judgment 
to American finding that U.S.D. 501 had waived any potential claim it may have had 
against American by not raising the issue of cost distribution between multiple 
employers as a defense in the workers compensation proceedings and by settling the 
entire claim with Bobbett.  The school district appealed this decision. 
At issue for the appellate court was whether the district court had properly 
granted summary judgment to American or whether the school district was correct in 
its assumption that the district court was the appropriate place to determine liability 
between insurance carriers.  To make its determination, the appellate court relied on 
American States Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 14 Kan.App.2d 492, 794 P.2d 662 
(1990).  In American States, the court reviewed several Kansas cases dealing with 
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workers compensation and found that when a worker's interests are not at stake, 
insurance companies may litigate their relative liabilities only where allowed under 
the Act.  The court in American States "plainly stated" that insurance companies have 
standing to litigate among themselves in district court their liability of a worker's 
compensation award.  In the case at hand, Bobbett was entitled to workers 
compensation for his work-related injury.  The question of how much, if any, 
American should have paid towards his claims was a dispute between the two 
insurance carriers.  The appellate court found that U.S.D. 501 had followed proper 
procedure when it filed a separate action in district court.  There was no basis in 
statute or case history for the district court's finding that U.S.D. 501 waived its ability 
to have part of Bobbett's workers compensation claim apportioned to American.  The 
judgment of the district court was reversed and the case was remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings to determine if any liability was owed by American.  
 
Belot v. Unified School District No. 497, Douglas County 
4 P. 3d 626 (Kan. 2000) 
 
Alan Belot was selected as the architect for a project at Central Junior High 
School.  He was to be paid a lump sum after completion of the final phase of a five-
phase renovation project that was to be finished by October 17, 1994.  Midwest Titan, 
the contractor, was not able to meet the completion deadline.  Belot claimed that the 
delay had required him to perform “contingent additional services” which were 
beyond those listed in the contract for a longer period of time than had been agreed.  
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He contacted the school district to discuss a fee increase for his additional time and 
services.  In August 1995, Belot filed a petition against the district alleging that they 
had breached their contractual duties.  He asked to be compensated for each day after 
October 17, 1994 at the rate of $317.65 per day, which totaled $91,165.55.  The trial 
court found that while “Belot performed contingent additional services under 
paragraph 3.3.6 of the contract” he had not met his burden of proof on damages and 
denied his claim.  The court determined that it was “impossible to differentiate 
between his performance of basic services” that had simply been performed at a later 
date and “contingent additional services” (p. 628).  Belot appealed the denial of his 
claim.  The school district cross-appealed the finding that Belot had performed 
contingent additional services, arguing that he had only performed basic services for 
the contract term of 60 months. 
The issue before the court was whether Belot had performed services that 
were not a part of his basic services.  The interpretation of two contract paragraphs 
was critical in the decision.  Paragraph 2.6.1 obligated Belot to “provide basic 
services until final payment or 60 days after substantial completion of the work.  
Paragraph 3.3.6 entitled Belot to “recover for additional services made necessary by 
Titan’s failure to perform.”  Midwest Titan had been found in default at a previous 
arbitration hearing and the district was awarded over $40,000 in damages.  This 
would satisfy the provision in paragraph 3.3.6 which said that Belot would receive 
additional compensation if Titan was found to be in default or if there were serious 
problems with Titan’s performance necessitating Belot perform additional duties.  
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Belot specified certain additional services, such as responding to questions from 
subcontractors and dissatisfied teachers, which were not a part of his basic services.  
The next problem the court faced was how to reconcile that finding with the language 
in paragraph 2.6.1 which required Belot to perform basic services until final payment 
was made by the District with paragraph 3.3.6 which authorized an award of 
additional fees for “contingent additional services if certain conditions are met.”  The 
evidence showed that Belot had been required to perform contingent additional 
services, beyond his basic services, due to Titan’s failure to perform.  Therefore, the 
District’s cross-appeal was denied.   
Next, the court turned to the issue of the amount of compensation due Belot.  
He claimed he was entitled to compensation for all services provided after Titan 
defaulted with the District.  The contract only provided for compensation for 
contingent additional services.  Belot did not keep daily time records of the tasks he 
performed, nor did he have record of his time spent on contingent additional services.  
The District had never agreed to an hourly rate schedule for Belot and the contract 
contained no per diem amount.  As Belot could not show how much time had been 
spent on contingent additional services, there was no way to determine how many 
hours had been dedicated to services that were beyond the basic services he was 
required to provide.  The burden of proving damages rests on the plaintiff and Belot 
could not meet this burden.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed. 
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Orr v. Heiman 
12 P.3d 387 (Kan. 2000) 
 
Curtis Orr was an employee of U.S.D. 281 for 23 years when he retired due to 
poor health on July 1, 1995.  As an employee, Orr had been a member of the Kansas 
Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS).  This membership included a 
$15,000 life insurance benefit.  Orr also had an additional employee benefit of health 
insurance that included a life insurance benefit rider for $15,000.  When he retired, 
Orr had the right to convert both of the group life insurance policies to individual 
policies.  This right was noted in riders and was clearly marked "conversion 
privilege," on the policies that had been provided to Orr.  No other written notice of 
the conversion policies was given to Orr when he retired.  Orr did convert a separate 
health insurance policy that he held, but he did not convert either of the two life 
insurance policies within the time allotted.  Orr died on October 2, 1996.  After his 
wife was denied coverage from both life insurance companies, Mrs. Orr's legal 
counsel sent demand letters to the superintendent of U.S.D. 281, Tom Heiman.  In 
July of 1997, Mrs. Orr filed suit against the superintendent, the clerk, and the 
members of the school board.  The trial court granted the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, finding (1) the notice of claim was sufficient under K.S.A. 1999 
Supp. 12-105(b), and (2) the employer/group policyholder was not required by K.S.A. 
1999 Supp. 40-435 to give any additional notice of conversion rights at the time of an 
employees retirement beyond what was provided in riders to the insurance policies 
that had been previously furnished to the employee.  Mrs. Orr appealed this decision 
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and the district cross-appealed the decision that the notice of claim delivered was 
sufficient under K.S.A. 12-105b. 
K.S.A. 12-105b(d) states in part that if a person has a claim against any 
municipality which could give rise to an action in court, written notice must be filed 
with the clerk or governing body of the municipality.  U.S.D. 281 argued that because 
the written notice from Mrs. Orr's legal counsel was mailed to the superintendent and 
not the school board, it failed to meet the requirements set out by 12-105b(d).  After 
reviewing case law, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding that notice 
to the superintendent was sufficient.  The court held that "while it obviously would 
have been better practice to mail the letter to the clerk,...by sending notice to the 
superintendent of schools, who is statutorily recognized to have charge and control of 
the public schools, substantial compliance with 12-105b(d) was met" (p. 390).  Next, 
the court addressed the issue of whether a common-law duty existed on behalf of an 
employer/group life insurance policyholder to notify and employee/insured of his 
conversion rights at the time employment is terminated.  The Orr's had received 
certificates and policies which contained notices of the conversion privilege, had been 
through the conversion process with a separate health insurance policy, and knew 
they were not paying premiums on the life insurance policies after Mr. Orr retired.  
The appellate court looked at the specific wording of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 40-435 and 
found nothing to indicate that an employer was required to notify an employee of his 
conversion rights upon retirement or termination of employment.  The court found it 
"was clear that the wording of both riders was designed to comply with and follow 
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the requirements of K.S.A. 40-435 as well as K.S.A. 40-434(8), (9), (10)" (p. 391).  
Neither statute required notice beyond that which was found in the conversion 
privilege riders.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed.  
 
Young Partners, LLC v. Board of Education, Unified School District No. 214 
160 P.3d 830 (Kan. 2007) 
 
In 1947, Richard and Virginia Wilks transferred a tract of land to School 
District No. 43, the predecessor of U.S.D. 214.  The deed contained a reversionary 
clause, providing that the transferred property was "to be used for school purposes 
only, and if therefore abandoned at any time, to revert back to the owner or owners" 
of the tract of land.  Over the years, the school district constructed a school building, 
a gymnasium with additional classroom space, and a house and garage on the 
property.  At the time of this case, the school district was not using the school 
building for classroom instruction, but it was used for other school programs and 
educational consultants.  The school district maintained all facilities on the property.  
Young Partners, LLC (Young) acquired the Wilks' property in 1997, making it the 
successor in interest to the grantors in the original warranty deed.  In August of 2005, 
the school district initiated condemnation proceedings against Young pursuant to 
K.S.A. 72-8212a in order to obtain by eminent domain Young's reversionary interest.  
Young filed action in district court to enjoin the eminent domain proceedings.  Young 
claimed that the school district's eminent domain action was not done for a public 
purpose and further alleged that K.S.A. 72-8212a(b) was overbroad in that it allowed 
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a taking of property without a finding of public purpose.  In July of 2006, the district 
court granted an injunction against the school district prohibiting it from pursuing 
eminent domain proceedings.  The district court rejected Young's claim that the 
district had failed to demonstrate it was taking action without a valid public purpose.  
Instead, the district court found that the school district's eminent domain proceedings 
would be an unconstitutional taking pursuant to Article 1, Section 10 of the United 
States Constitution in the Contract Clause.  The district court reached this conclusion 
by determining that because the original deed was executed in 1947 and K.S.A. 72-
8212a was not enacted until 1982, the statute was unconstitutional in that it interfered 
with "prior contractual rights" (p. 835).  Young agreed with this conclusion and 
further argued that K.S.A. 72-8212a was constitutional because it allowed a school 
district to condemn public property "for any purpose whatsoever."  The school district 
appealed the district court decision.   
Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides that, "No State shall…pass 
any…Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts…"  However, courts have held that 
contract rights are not absolute rights.  United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) explained that the strictures of the 
Contract Clause of the Constitution had to be reconciled with the "essential attributes 
of sovereign power reserved by the states."  This restriction is known as the 
"reserved-powers doctrine."  Id. at 21.  The doctrine provides that the "Contract 
Clause does not require a State to adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential 
attribute of its sovereignty."  431 U.S. at 23, 97 S.Ct. 1505.  The states' power of 
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eminent domain is one of the "essential attributes of sovereignty" that is not subject to 
the Contract Clause.  Although K.S.A. 72-8212a was not enacted until 1982, the State 
possessed the power of eminent domain before that time – and before the 1947 deed 
was signed in this case.  The school district's predecessor, as a State entity, could not 
enter into a contract that limited the State's exercise of the power of eminent domain.  
Accordingly, the court held that K.S.A. 72-8212a was not an unconstitutional 
impairment of contract rights and did not violate the Contract Clause of the US 
Constitution.  Next, the court addressed Young's argument that the provisions of 
K.S.A. 72-8212a are overbroad and unconstitutional because the statute permits a 
school district to condemn property "for any purpose whatsoever" (p. 838).  K.S.A. 
72-8212a(b) provides that a school district "may require condemnation, for any 
purpose whatsoever, any reversionary interest held by others in real property…if: (1) 
the district has constructed substantial improvements on the property; and (2) the 
school district has held an interest in the property for at least 20 years."  The taking of 
reversionary interest is only allowed if a district has met the two stipulations found in 
72-8212 a(b).  According to the court, these two requirements indentify the public 
purpose underlying the taking of the reversionary interest.  Once improvements have 
been made on a property with public funds and once the school district has had the 
property for at least 20 years, the district would have the public purpose of preserving 
the investment of public funds in the property.  K.S.A. 72-8212a(c) further provides 
for the procedures a school district must follow when condemning a property interest.  
Subsection (c) states that the board of education "shall declare the necessity by 
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resolution" and this resolution will "set forth…the purpose for which the property is 
and will be used."  K.S.A. 72-8212a(b) does not authorize an arbitrary authority for 
school districts to condemn property for whatever reason they choose, because school 
districts are required by that statute to provide the reasons for the taking in the board's 
resolution.  Subsection (c) of the statute further mandates that the "board of 
education…shall proceed to exercise the power of eminent domain in the manner 
provided by article 5 of chapter 26 and the Kansas Statutes Annotated."  This 
language requires any eminent domain proceedings be done as provided for in the 
Eminent Domain Procedures Act (EDPA).  Under the EDPA, the district court is 
required to determine if the taking is necessary and lawful.  The appellate court noted 
that the legislature had incorporated protections against arbitrary condemnation of 
private property by providing the following safeguards:  (1) K.S.A. 72-8212a(b) 
established two requirements relating to the improvements to property and the 
duration of ownership; (2) K.S.A. 72-8212a(c) requires the board of education to state 
the purpose of the taking; and (3) under K.S.A. 26-504, a district court must find that 
the taking is lawful.  In the case at hand, the school district had used and maintained 
the property for over 50 years.  The property had recently been appraised at $500 per 
acre, but the improvements were valued at over $100,000.  Under these circumstances, 
the legislature has deemed it in the public interest for the school district to protect its 
public investment against a reversionary interest.  The appellate court concluded that 
the provisions of K.S.A. 72-8212a were not unconstitutional and that a public purpose 
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existed for the eminent domain action filed by the school district.  The decision of the 
district court was reversed.      
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Chapter 10 
Fiscal Issues 
 
Other than a few cases dealing with local taxes, the majority of Kansas public 
education finance cases in the past thirty years have addressed challenges to the state 
funding formula.  Of the twelve cases in this chapter, eight deal with funding formula 
concerns.  State constitutional provisions empower the legislature with the authority 
to tax and distribute funds for public schools.  Article 6, Section 1 of the Constitution 
of the State of Kansas states that "the legislature shall provide for intellectual, 
educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining 
public schools, educational institutions and related activities…"  In Kansas, the 
legislature sets an amount for the Base State Aid per Pupil (BSAPP).  The amount of 
BSAPP a school receives is determined by its enrollment.  The BSAPP can then be 
adjusted by various weighting provisions, such as low-enrollment or the number of 
at-risk students.  These weightings are often challenged by school districts claiming 
they create a disparate impact.   
Concerns with the Local Option Budget (LOB) are also frequently mentioned 
in court cases.  K.S.A. 72-6433 sets the state prescribed percentage that school 
districts may adopt.  This statute also provides definitions, information on the 
authorization to adopt, conditions and limitations of a LOB.  The original purpose of 
the LOB was to allow schools to raise money to fund extra expenses for things not 
paid for out of the general fund.  However, schools today are often using their LOB 
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money to supplement the amount received by the state to keep their buildings 
operating.  Low wealth school districts have challenged the LOB because they 
typically cannot raise as much money as can higher wealth districts.  Because low 
wealth districts often have higher numbers of minority and special education students, 
the LOB and other parts of the state funding formula, have faced claims of violations 
to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.   
Article 6, Section 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution provides that "the 
legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the 
state."  This particular article is often cited in finance litigation in the state.  The 
courts have found it difficult to define "suitable" and will often turn to another state's 
legislation for guidance.  Challenges to the state's funding formula will likely persist 
as budget cuts in Kansas continue to impact funding to schools.  Currently, the 
BSAPP is below levels prescribed by the courts in Montoy v. State.  This 
noncompliance to a mandate from the court will most certainly bring about further 
lawsuits from underfunded school districts across the state.    
 
Application of Unified School Dist. No. 437 
757 P.2d 314 (Kan. 1988) 
 
In 1985, Gary Smith, Shawnee County appraiser, discovered personal 
property owned by Frito Lay had been assigned to the wrong taxing district.  Smith 
reported the error to the county clerk who requested the county commission to issue a 
correction order.  The county commission removed the property from Unified School 
 
521 
 
District No. 501’s district and reassigned it to U.S.D. No. 437’s district.  They 
approved change orders for tax years 1983, 1984, and 1985.  Under these change 
orders, taxes paid to U.S.D. 501 would decrease by $631,053.08 and the taxes paid to 
U.S.D. 437 would increase by $568,941.08.  This resulted in a net refund to Frito Lay 
of $62,112.00, due to a lower mill levy in U.S.D.437.  The county treasurer ordered 
the refund be made from the current collection in back tax refunds of U.S.D. 501 held 
by Shawnee County.  U.S.D. No. 501, to which the personal property had been 
incorrectly assigned, filed a grievance following the order to reassign the property to 
the correct district and to provide a tax refund to Frito Lay.  U.S.D.  437, to whom the 
property had been reassigned, also filed a grievance to recover taxes for all the years 
in which the error had occurred.  The Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) granted an extra 
year of taxation to U.S.D. 437, above the three years originally granted by the county 
commission, and dismissed the complaint of U.S.D. 501.  District 501 appealed to the 
District Court, which affirmed the decision of BOTA.  The district next took its case 
to the Supreme Court of Kansas.  
The court turned to K.S.A.1987 Supp. 79-1701 to determine whether the 
assignment of personal property to the wrong taxing district is a clerical error that can 
be corrected by the county clerk.  District 501 argued that the county’s mistake could 
not be deemed a clerical error because once the error was found, the county had to 
use discretion to determine if the property was correctly assigned.  The court found 
that K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 79-1701(g) “clearly and unambiguously makes the assigning 
of property to the wrong taxing district a clerical error correctable by the county 
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clerk” (p. 317).  The next question was whether the county and BOTA were able to 
issue the correction orders.  While K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 79-1701a grants the board of 
county commissioners the power to issue orders correcting clerical errors, District 
501 cited In re Order of Board of Tax Appeals, 236 Kan. 406 (1984) when it argued 
that because Frito Lay did not complain, the county did not have the authority to issue 
correction orders.  The court found In re Order of Board of Tax Appeals inapplicable 
to this case because it pertained to a situation where a taxing district made errors in 
property valuation in favor of taxpayer corporations.  In this case, the corporation 
property was assigned to the wrong taxing district.  This was not an error in favor of 
the corporation.  The court also pointed out that the legislature, in response to In re, 
had added language to 79-1701a which clarified legislative intent that, “in the event 
of an understatement of taxes as a result of a clerical error, the commissioners have 
the authority to order an additional tax bill.”  Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the 
findings of the District Court.  
The purpose of tax statutes is to create a uniform an equal plan of taxation.  
The county had a duty to correct the error upon discovery and to collect taxes on 
property that had escaped taxation.  U.S.D. 501 had no right to taxes from property 
that was located in another taxing district, and so was required to comply with the 
correction order. 
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Unified School District No. 229 v. State 
885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) 
 
These were four consolidated actions between 97 plaintiffs, four unified 
school districts, taxpayers and students challenging the constitutionality of the School 
District Finance and Quality Performance Act (Act).  The Shawnee District Court 
upheld the Act against the challenges of unconstitutionality in regards to the claims 
that it violated:  (1) Article 6, Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution by infringing upon 
the authority granted to local school boards to maintain and operate local public 
schools; (2) Article 6, Section 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution in that it did not 
contain "suitable provisions for finance of the educational interests of the state"; (3) 
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution concerning equal protection 
(except for low enrollment weighting); (4) Article 2, Section 16 of the Kansas 
Constitution as containing more than one subject; (5) the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of 
Rights of the Kansas Constitution on the claim that the recapture funds provisions of 
K.S.A. 72-6431(d) constitute an excessive taking of property; and (6) Article 2, 
Section 17 of the Kansas Constitution as a law of general nature which does not 
operate uniformly throughout the state.  In regards to the low enrollment weighting 
factor, the district court held that there was no rational basis for distinguishing 
between school districts with less than 1,899 students and those with more.  Because 
this part of the Act could not be removed, the Act was considered unconstitutional.  
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Interlocutory appeals were taken and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court 
of Kansas.    
Under the Act, the school board of each school district must levy an ad 
valorem tax upon the taxable tangible property of the district.  On June 1 of each year, 
the school district remits to the Kansas State Treasurer those revenues from the 
districts "local effort" which exceeded the district's "state financial aid."  K.S.A. 72-
6431(d).  These remitted funds are also called "recapture" funds.  The district's state 
financial aid is determined by a formula of the legislatively designated Base State Aid 
per Pupil (BSAPP) multiplied by the district's adjusted or weighted enrollment.  The 
adjusted or weighted enrollment is based upon a school district's full time enrollment 
adjusted by certain weighting factors that account for student populations to whom 
higher costs are associated, such as bilingual students, at-risk students, and students in 
low enrollment districts.  Once each of the weighting factors is determined, the 
amounts are added to the BSAPP multiplied by the total enrollment.  That is the 
amount available to the district, unless the district was affected by the cap imposed by 
the "transitional state financial aid" provision of K.S.A. 72-6410(c) or unless the 
school district adopted a local option budget.  To fund the local option budget, school 
districts may levy local property taxes.  Districts may also receive supplemental 
general state aid if the assessed valuation per pupil (AVPP) is at or below the 75th 
percentile of the AVPP across the state.   
Article 6, Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution provides in part that "local 
public schools under the general supervision of the state board of education, shall be 
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maintained, developed and operated by locally elected boards."  Plaintiffs in this case 
argued that the Act violates this constitutional article because the imposition of the 
statewide tax levy and the restriction on the local option budget infringes on the local 
control provision.  The Supreme Court did not agree with this argument.  The court 
pointed out that Article 6, Section 6 provides that "the legislature shall make suitable 
provision for finance of the educational interests of the state."  Article 6, Section 1 
further places the responsibility of establishing and maintaining a public school 
system on the State.  These articles show that Kansas school districts have no inherent 
power of taxation.  Schools have always been funded through legislation.  The court 
drew upon its decision in U.S.D. No. 380 v. McMillen, 252 Kan. 451, 845 P.2d 676 
(1993) where it stated that "the local school board's duties under Section 5 of Article 
6 are not self-executing but are dependent upon statutory enactments of the 
legislature."  Id. at 464.  Accordingly, the court in this case concluded that the Act did 
not violate Article 6, Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution.   
Next, the court addressed the challenge that the Act violated Article 6, Section 
6(b).  This article provides in part that the "legislature shall make suitable provision 
for finance of the educational interests of the state."  In the case at hand, it was 
alleged that the Act failed to make suitable provision because the financing provisions 
of the Act infringed upon local control.  At trial, school districts who had their 
funding reduced by the Act presented evidence of how they had to cut programs and 
personnel.  They argued that funding is not "suitable" when it results in the cutting of 
programs deemed necessary by local school boards.  The issue for the court to decide 
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was whether financing was suitable, not whether it was optimal.  The district court in 
its previous decision, and the Supreme Court in this one, considered decisions from 
other states and then analyzed Kansas law.  The standard found to be most 
comparable to the Kansas requirement of "suitable" funding was the requirement of 
"adequacy" found in several state constitutions.  The court here held that after looking 
at the evidence presented, there was nothing to compel a determination that the 
financing was not "suitable."  Thus, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's 
conclusion that the Act did not violate the provisions of Article 6, Section 6(b).   
The third issue addressed by the court, was that of equal protection.  The 
plaintiffs from Blue Valley alleged that certain provisions of the Act violated the right 
of equal protection contained in Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution which provides 
"all men are possessed of equal and inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness."  The Supreme Court first determined that the 
appropriate level of scrutiny with which to determine this issue was that of rational 
basis.  Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny.  This meant the State simply had 
to show there was a rational relationship between its funding provisions and a 
legitimate legislative purpose.  The specific provisions of the Act being challenged on 
equal protection grounds were: the BSAPP of $3,600; the bilingual education 
weighting factor of .2; the vocational education weighting factor of .5; the low 
enrollment weighting factor; the at-risk weighting factor of .05; the LOB provisions; 
and the Supplemental General State Aid (SGSA) provisions.  The Kansas 
Constitution mandates that the legislature establishes and maintain schools and 
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provide suitable financing.  Blue Valley's complaint was not with the legislature's 
authority to draw lines in these categories to determine funding amounts; rather, Blue 
Valley's claim was that there was no rational basis for where the lines were drawn.  
The court held that in order to make "suitable financing" available for school, the 
legislature had to make rules and draw lines in establishing adequate levels of funding.  
Sole reliance on local property taxes levies would not provide necessary funding for 
smaller and/or poorer school districts that depend upon state aid.  Schools with 
students and circumstances provided for in the provisions at question require more 
funding to meet the needs of their students.  After examining the testimony and the 
claims made, the Supreme Court held that there was a rational basis for each 
provision, including the low enrollment weighting factor.  The district court had 
determined there was no rational basis for the low enrollment provision and held the 
entire Act as constitutionally impermissible.  Unlike the other weighting factors, the 
low enrollment weighting factor is applied to all students in the district as opposed to 
a certain number of students having the characteristics necessary for a particular 
weighting factor.  Evidence provided showed the rationale for providing extra 
funding to districts with low student numbers.  Under the Act, weighting factors are 
applied to school districts having less than 100 students, 100-299 students, and 300-
1,899 students.  Blue Valley's complaint was that the 1,899 line was too high, not 
supported by data, and had no rational basis.  The district court agreed with this 
argument, but the Supreme Court did not.  Instead, the court held that there was a 
rational relationship between the legislature's legitimate purpose of more suitably 
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funding public schools and the classifications created in the low enrollment weighting 
factor.  The absence of scientific data approving the 1,899 line was not considered by 
the court to be a valid reason for concluding there was not a rational basis for the 
legislature drawing the line where it did.   
Next, the court turned to the contention by some of the plaintiff school 
districts that the Act violated Article 2, Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution, which 
provides in part that "no bill shall contain more than one subject..."  The court 
disagreed, holding that everything in the Act related to public education and there was 
nothing wrong with tying expenditures and the means of raising extra revenue 
together.  This, in the court's opinion, would allow the legislature to see where 
revenue will come from before voting on its expenditure.  The fifth issue addressed 
by the court was that of the claim that the Act's recapture provision constituted a 
"taking" which violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution, as well as Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Constitution.  Funds collected 
through the recapture provision are remitted to those school districts that do not have 
sufficient local effort.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution provides, "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation."  At issue was whether taxpayers in the recapture districts 
receive a benefit for the taxes that educate students in other school districts or 
whether the mill levy imposed in those districts imposed such an unfair inequality 
between the burden imposed and the benefit received that it constituted a "taking" in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The court held that establishing a uniform 
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mill rate across the state to fund public education was not an excessive taking.  The 
excess raised was used to help fund less fortunate district and all would benefit from a 
better quality of education for students in other state school districts.  The judgment 
of the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.  Because the issue was 
before the court on interlocutory appeals, the case was remanded to the district court 
for entry of the judgment.   
 
Kansas City, Kansas, Unified School District No. 500 v. Womack 
890 P.2d 1233 (Kan. App. 1995) 
 
Andrea Womack, Yolanda Stewart, and Mary Bryant (claimants) were all 
employed part-time by U.S.D. 500.  Womack was a substitute teacher, Stewart a 
substitute paraprofessional, and Bryant was a substitute secretary and teacher's aide.  
All three filed applications for unemployment benefits.  The school district was 
notified that its experience rating account could be charged for a portion of the 
claimants' unemployment benefits.  The District requested the examiner reconsider 
the rating charge pursuant to K.S.A. 44-710(c)(2)(F)(iii).  In all three cases, the 
examiner stated that the "appropriate pro rata share of benefits paid would be charged 
to U.S.D.500's rating account" (p. 1234).  The District appealed the examiner's 
decision and hearings were held in all three cases.  One referee heard the Stewart and 
Womack cases and found that they had been temporarily laid off because no work 
was available.  Another referee heard Bryant's case and found that because there was 
no evidence that she had been discharged for misconduct or left work voluntarily 
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without good cause, the District's account should be charged.  Both referees affirmed 
the examiners' decision.  U.S.D. 500 appealed the referees' decisions to the Kansas 
Employment Security Board (KESB) and KESB affirmed the referees' decisions.  The 
school district next appealed to the district court.  In the Womack and Stewart cases, 
the court ruled that the agency had misinterpreted the law and U.S.D. 500's rating 
account should not be charged because the employees were not unemployed at the 
time they applied for benefits.  In Bryant's case, the court found that the District's 
rating account should not be charged because Bryant was employed by an educational 
institution and was not entitled to benefits because she had a reasonable assurance 
that she would be employed the following year.  KESB appealed the district court's 
decision. 
KESB first argued that the district court should not have decided whether the 
claimants were eligible for benefits because the only issue determined by the referees 
was whether the District's rating account should be charged for its pro rata share of 
any benefits received by the claimants.  However, when reviewing the record it was 
found that when U.S.D. 500 was notified that it might be charged for benefits, it 
noted that the claimants had not been terminated and that work was available.  In all 
three cases heard by the referees, the school district presented evidence which showed 
the claimants were either still employed or had not left their employment due to lack 
of work.  The referees limited the scope of their decision to whether the school 
district's account should be charged.  Typically, a party cannot raise an issue to the 
district court which had not been raised at the administrative level.  In this case, 
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although the referee sought to limit the scope of the decision, the school district did 
raise the issue and presented sufficient evidence to warrant a review by the court.  
Next, the court turned to the issue of whether the district court erred in finding U.S.D. 
500's account should not be charged.  In making this decision, the appellate court 
reviewed Kansas statutes dealing with unemployment.  K.S.A. 44-706 reads in part 
that a person will be disqualified for unemployment benefits if they "(a)...left work 
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or the employer..." and "(i) 
For any week of unemployment on the basis of service in an instructional, research, 
or principal administrative capacity for an educational institution...if such week 
begins during the period between two successive academic years or, ... if the 
individual performs such services in the first of such academic year and there is a 
contract or a reasonable assurance that such individual will perform services in any 
such capacity for any educational institution in the second of such academic years."  
In terms of part-time employees, the court discussed K.S.A. 44-710(c)(2)(B) which 
states in relevant part that "where base wage credits of a contributing employer 
represent part-time employment and the claimant continues in that part-time 
employment with the employer during the period for which benefits are paid, then 
that employers' account shall not be charged with any part of the benefits paid..."  In 
determining Womack and Stewart's cases the appellate court cited Manpower, Inc. v. 
Kansas Employment Security Bd. of Review, 11 Kan.App.2d 382, 724 P.2d 690, rev. 
denied 240 Kan. 804 (1986).  In Manpower, the court held that in the case of a 
temporary employment agency, "the completion of one work assignment did not 
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amount to termination of the claimant's employment and failure to report for further 
work assignments constituted voluntarily leaving work without good cause." 11 
Kan.App.2d at 389. The court found this to be "almost identical" to the case at hand.  
The claimant substitute teachers accepted employment with the school district with 
the understanding that full-time work was not available but that work would be 
available.  At the time they applied for benefits, Womack and Stewart's names were 
on the substitute teachers list and work was available.  In fact, both Womack and 
Stewart had refused some assignments offered to them.  The appellate court 
determined that the district court was correct when it found that neither Womack nor 
Stewart were unemployed as defined by Kansas employment security law.  The 
referee's finding that a substitute teacher's employment "begins and ends with each 
assignment is analogous to, and is as untenable as, the premise that was rejected in 
Manpower" (p. 1241).  Although the facts in Bryant's case were slightly different in 
terms of when she filed for benefits, the appellate court found that the district court's 
judgment in her case was also correct.  KESB's position that it could determine if the 
employer's account was chargeable prior to or separate from a determination of 
whether the claimant was eligible for benefits was found to be flawed.  The district 
court held, and the appellate court agreed, that there must be a "valid entitlement to 
benefits prior to making the determination that the employer's account should be 
charged" (p. 1242).  The district court decision was affirmed. 
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Reed v. Seeman 
990 P.2d 1238 (Kan. App. 1999) 
 
Unified School District No. 315 passed a tax levy resolution on December 15, 
1997.  The resolution was published in the local newspaper on Thursday, December 
18, and Monday, December 22.  The plaintiffs, who were residents of the school 
district, circulated a petition that was opposed to the resolution.  The petition was 
filed with the Thomas County Clerk and Election Officer, defendant Rosalie Seeman.  
Seeman initially notified the plaintiffs that the petition contained enough signatures to 
submit the resolution to a vote.  She later informed them that the petitions were not 
valid because they had not been submitted to the Thomas County Attorney for review 
prior to circulation.  The plaintiffs filed suit claiming, among other things, that the 
petitions opposed to the tax levy resolution were valid under K.S.A. 72-8801 and that 
the publication of the resolution by the school board was void.  The district court 
found in favor of the defendants on both issues and the plaintiffs appealed.   
K.S.A. 72-8801 provides in part that a tax levy resolution must be published 
"once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper having general circulation in 
the school district."  The district court found that the school district had complied 
with this statute.  However, the plaintiffs argued that K.S.A. 62-102 had to be read in 
conjunction with 72-8801 in order to find the meaning of "once a week for two 
consecutive weeks."  K.S.A. 62-102 provides in relevant part that the public 
notifications had to be published at least once a week "on the same day of the week 
except that when there is no issue of the newspaper published on such day that it may 
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be made on the proceeding or following day..."  The appellate court found that the 
statutes did not conflict with one another and had to be "read together and 
harmonized."  Publication notices had to be published once in each period of seven 
days.  The school district had published its notification twice within four days, which 
did not constitute "once a week for two consecutive weeks."  The court concluded 
that the publication of the tax levy failed to meet the requirements of K.S.A. 72-8801 
and was invalid.  The court next addressed the issue of whether the petitions in 
opposition to the tax levy were invalid because the plaintiffs failed to get the opinion 
of the county attorney as required in K.S.A. 25-3601.  K.S.A. 25-3601 clearly states 
that before a petition could be circulated "a copy thereof containing the question to be 
submitted shall be filed in the office of the county attorney..."  The court concluded 
that this statute was applicable and held that the petitions were invalid.  The judgment 
of the district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.   
 
Robinson v. Kansas 
117 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Kan. 2000) 
 
Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of minority, foreign, and disabled students 
attending large, non-affluent Kansas school districts in Dodge City and Salina, 
Kansas.  They filed a multi-count complaint against the State of Kansas, its governor, 
Bill Graves, and two education officers, Linda Holloway and Andy Tompkins.  In 
their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that two provisions of the State School District 
Finance and Quality Performance Act, K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., created a disparate 
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impact against minority students, foreign students, and students with disabilities.  
Under the statutory funding formula, each school district receives a set amount of 
money per student enrolled in the district.  The statutory base rate per pupil can then 
be adjusted by several provisions.  At issue were the provisions for low enrollment 
weighting and local option budgets.  Low enrollment weighting provides extra funds 
for school districts with fewer than 1725 students.  School districts can also pass local 
option budgets to supplement state funding by levying additional taxes.  Plaintiffs 
claimed that these provisions resulted in less funding per pupil in schools that had 
higher percentages of minority, foreign and disabled students because these students 
are disproportionately enrolled in comparatively low wealth districts that are also 
ineligible for low enrollment weighting.  In their opinion, these provisions violated 
Title VI, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000d, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 
Section703 et seq., and the plaintiffs' rights to Due Process and Equal Protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, specifically 
requesting that the court order the defendants to revise the school finance law.  
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.  
The court first addressed the defendants' argument that the Eleventh 
Amendment of the United States Constitution provided immunity from the plaintiffs' 
suit.  The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State…"  
Exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity occur when (1) Congress has properly 
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abrogated state immunity, (2) the state has waived immunity by consenting to suit in 
federal court, or (3) a private party sues a state officer for prospective declaratory or 
injunctive relief from an ongoing violation of Constitution or federal laws.  A state 
can waive this immunity from suit by accepting gifts or gratuity from the federal 
government pursuant to statute that manifests clear intent that a condition of the 
receipt of these funds is waiver from immunity.  42 U.S.C. Section 2000d-7 provides 
in relevant part that a state will not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment from 
suits in Federal court for various violations prohibiting discrimination if they are the 
"recipients of Federal financial assistance."  The court here determined that by 
agreeing to accept federal education funds under Title IV, the State had effectively 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.  The defendants further argued that 
Governor Bill Graves should have been dismissed from suit because as an individual 
he was not the proper person to bring about the plaintiffs' requested relief.  The court 
disagreed finding that the Governor of Kansas was the appropriate defendant in the 
lawsuit because the state Constitution made him responsible for the enforcement of 
state laws.   
The court next addressed the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim under Title VI.  
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in part that no person 
"shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be…denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program…receiving Federal financial 
assistance."  The court here noted that the Supreme Court has held that agencies 
providing federal financial assistance have the authority to establish regulations that 
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prohibit the recipients of such funding from taking any action that results in a 
disparate impact or produces discriminatory effects on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin.  The defendants argued that the Title VI claim should be dismissed 
because non-minority students also attended the school districts in which the 
plaintiffs were enrolled and they received the same funding as the non-minority 
students in those schools.  To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs need only plead 
that a "facially neutral" practice's adverse effect falls disproportionately on a group 
that is protected by Title VI.  In this case, the plaintiffs pled that public school 
districts with fewer than 1725 students receive additional funds per student yet 
minority students are disproportionately enrolled in mid-size and large school districts 
that do not qualify for low enrollment weighting, thus resulting in less money per 
student.  They further pled that the Act permits school districts to pass local option 
budgets to supplement state funding and there is a direct correlation between the 
median income and property values in a school district and that district's ability to 
raise funds through an LOB.  As minority students are disproportionately enrolled in 
school districts with low incomes and property values, those districts collect less 
money through LOBs and thus provide less funding per pupil than districts that enroll 
higher numbers of white students.  The court concluded that it did not make sense to 
compare the plaintiffs to non-minority students in the same school district.  The 
comparison had to be made to other districts across the state.  When that comparison 
was made, the court found that the plaintiffs had successfully pled their disparate 
impact claim.   
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The court next turned its attention to the claims of the disabled plaintiffs.  The 
defendants argued that the claims of these plaintiffs should be dismissed because they 
did not exhaust their administrative remedies under IDEA.  Under the IDEA, states 
must provide the parents of a disabled student the right to seek review of any decision 
concerning their child's education.  Parents are first entitled to an impartial due 
process hearing conducted by a state or local educational agency.  Once the hearing is 
conducted, the parents are entitled to an appeal to the state educational agency.  Only 
after exhausting these two review procedures may the parent seek action in court.  
The disabled plaintiffs had not gone through either review process before bringing 
their claim to court.  The Tenth Circuit allowed for three exceptions to IDEA's 
exhaustion requirement:  (1) when administrative exhaustion would be futile, (2) 
when administrative exhaustion would fail to provide adequate relief, and (3) when 
an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is 
contrary to the law.  The disabled plaintiffs in this case were not challenging a state 
education department's policy or a school district's development of a specific IEP.  
They were seeking to have a state statute held in violation of federal law.  Following 
the administrative procedures under the IDEA would not address these concerns.  
Accordingly, the court found that administrative exhaustion would have been futile 
and the requirement was excused.      
Count III of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the school funding act had a 
disproportionate adverse impact on disabled students in violation of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Section 701 et seq.  The plaintiffs claimed that greater 
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numbers of disabled students were enrolled in school districts having low local option 
budgets and receiving less money per pupil from the state.  This disparate impact, 
according to the plaintiffs, caused disabled students to have inferior access to 
educational programs that are disproportionately available to non-disabled students.  
The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the alleged inequities in 
school districts do not occur solely on account of the plaintiffs' disabilities, and (2) 
the plaintiffs failed to allege the defendants acted in bad faith or with gross 
misjudgment.  The court rejected these arguments because neither was supported by 
any Tenth Circuit precedent.  The court also held that a finding of bad faith was not 
required because the plaintiffs did not ask for any compensatory damages.  The 
absence of any support for these claims by the defense caused the court to deny the 
request for dismissal.  
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' claims that the school funding act 
violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Due Process.  
Their complaint attacked two specific provisions of the Act; low enrollment 
weighting and the LOB.  The plaintiffs alleged that their equal protection rights were 
violated because the act, through these provisions, treated similarly situated students 
differently based on the number of students enrolled and the relative wealth of school 
districts.  They further claimed the defendants had no rational basis for setting the low 
enrollment weighting at 1725 or for the provision of the local option budget.  Because 
the two provisions were different, the court treated each separately.  Two Supreme 
Court cases were used to aid in the court's decision in this case.  Papasan v. Allain, 
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478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) governed the question 
regarding low enrollment weighting while San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. V. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) controlled the decision over the local 
option budget.  The court held that the low enrollment weighting was a disbursement 
of funds from the State to school districts.  The claim that the State was distributing 
these funds in unequal amounts was similar to Mississippi's unequal disbursement of 
funds in Papasan.  Thus, the court refused to dismiss the equal protection challenge 
to low enrollment weighting provision of the Kansas school funding act.  However, 
the local option budget challenge was similar enough to the challenges discussed in 
Rodriguez to cause the court to dismiss the claim.  The alleged disparity created by 
the LOB was attributed to varying wealth of the different school districts.  The court 
held that dismissal was warranted because it was not "the constitutional prerogative 
of the federal courts to nullify statewide measures for financing public services 
merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the 
relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live."  Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. at 54.   
The court concluded that the defendants had failed to present any argument 
warranting the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims, with the exception of the Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to the local option budget.  They held that litigation could 
proceed once the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in accordance 
with the court's opinion.  Accordingly, the defendants' motions to dismiss were 
granted in part and denied in part.   
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Robinson v. Kansas 
295 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2002) 
 
Earnestine Robinson, on behalf of her minor children, along with several other 
plaintiffs, filed suit against the State of Kansas, its governor, and two state education 
officials challenging the school funding formula.  The district court in Robinson v. 
Kansas, 117 F.Supp.2d 1124 (D.Kan.2000) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss 
holding, among other things, that the defendants did not fall under Eleventh 
Amendment immunity requirements.  The defendants filed an appeal on the Eleventh 
Amendment issue.  The defendants argued that the Eleventh Amendment of the 
United States Constitution barred the plaintiffs' suit.  They maintained that Congress 
had not abrogated their Eleventh Amendment immunity, that they did not waive their 
immunity, and that the actions against state officials did not fall under the Ex Parte 
Young doctrine.   
The Supreme Court of the United States interprets the Eleventh Amendment 
as being prohibitive of lawsuits brought in federal court against an unconsenting state 
by its own citizens.  However, this rule of state sovereignty is not absolute and 
congress can abrogate this immunity in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  
In addition, according to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 
L.Ed. 714 (1908) whenever a private party sues a sate officer for prospective 
injunctive relief or declaratory relief from an ongoing violation of the Constitution, 
the suit is not considered to be against the state itself and the Eleventh Amendment 
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does not apply.  States can waive their sovereign immunity in a variety of ways, one 
of them being the state's participation in certain federal programs.  42 U.S.C. Section 
2000d-7(a)(1) provides in part that states "shall not be immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment of the Constitution" from suit in Federal Court for violations of section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, title IX of the Education Amendments, the Age 
Discrimination Act, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or "the provisions of any 
other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial 
assistance."  Therefore, the court held that by accepting federal financial assistance, 
states and state entities waive their sovereign immunity from suit.  The Ex Parte 
Young doctrine further permits suits seeking injunctive relief against state officials.  
To determine whether the Ex Parte Young doctrine applied in this case, the court 
applied a four-part framework.  First, the court had to determine whether the action 
was against state officials or the state itself.  Second, the court looked at whether the 
alleged conduct of the state officials constituted a violation of federal law.  Third, the 
court assessed whether the relief sought by the plaintiffs was permissible prospective 
relief.  Finally, the court had to analyze whether the suit rose to the level of 
implicating special sovereign interests of the state.  In applying the facts of this case 
to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, the court first found that the action was against state 
officials acting in their official capacity.  The court found that the alleged conduct of 
the state officials violated the Fourteenth Amendment and, possibly, Title VI, thus 
meeting the second prong of the test.  Thirdly, the court held that the relief sought by 
the plaintiffs was permissible prospective relief; an injunction barring state officials 
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from enforcing the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA) 
in a manner that violated federal law.  Finally, the court found that the defendants in 
this case could present no arguments showing how the special sovereign interests of 
the state would be implicated if the legislature was required to revise their education 
funding laws.  Thus, the Ex Parte Young doctrine did apply and the state officials 
were not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.  The judgment of the district court 
was affirmed and the defendants' motion to dismiss based on their Eleventh 
Amendment immunity was denied.      
 
Montoy v. State 
62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003) 
 
This case is a constitutional challenge to Kansas' system of public school 
financing.  The case was brought to the district court by students representing 
African-American, Hispanic, and disabled groups, along with two large school 
districts.  The plaintiffs sued the State of Kansas, the Governor, the chairperson of the 
Kansas State Board of Education (State Board), and the Commissioner of the Kansas 
State Department of Education on three separate counts.  These counts alleged (1) a 
violation the requirement that the state legislature provide for the suitable finance of 
the educational interests of the State under Kansas Constitution Article 6, 
Section6(b); (2) a violation of equal rights protection under the Kansas Constitution; 
and (3) a violation of substantive due process rights under the Kansas Constitution.  
The district court sua sponte granted judgment to the defendants, concluding that the 
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plaintiffs had failed to present legally sufficient claims.  The plaintiffs appealed the 
district court's decision.  They claimed that the district court had erred when it 
excluded certain claims on the grounds that they were outside the pleadings; that the 
court had erred when it failed to treat the dismissal of their case as a dismissal based 
upon a motion for summary judgment; and that their claims were legally sufficient.   
The appeal was heard by the Kansas Supreme Court which first addressed 
whether the district court had erred when it excluded consideration of certain claims 
by the plaintiffs.  The district court had relied upon Missionary Baptist, Convention v. 
Wimberly Chapel Baptist Church, 170 Kan. 684, 228 P.2d 540 (1951), to make its 
finding that, because the plaintiffs had raised issues that had not been contained in 
their original pleadings, those issues would not be considered by the court.  The 
Supreme Court noted that the holding in Missionary Baptist was not appropriate for 
this case because in Missionary Baptist the excluded constitutional issues surfaced for 
the first time before the appellate court, not the district court.  Thus, the decision in 
Missionary Baptist did not provide authority for excluding consideration of the 
plaintiffs' additional challenges.  Count 1 of the plaintiffs' petition alleged a violation 
of Kansas Constitution Article 6, Section 6(b), which requires the legislature to 
"make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state."  The 
district court believed that the petition made the constitutionality of the School 
District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq, the 
issue.  They rejected the plaintiffs' three additional claims of capital outlay provisions, 
special education excess cost provisions, and the encroachment on the general 
 
545 
 
supervision responsibility of the State Board on the basis that those matters had not 
been specifically pled.  Kansas courts are to follow the rules of notice pleading.  
K.S.A. 60-208(a)(1) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief."  A rule of liberal construction applies when judging 
whether a claim has been stated and the period of discovery will fill any gaps.  In this 
case, discovery had not yet been completed when the plaintiffs brought the three 
additional items for the district court to consider.  Although the petition focused on 
the SDFQPA, it had alleged a violation of the suitability requirement.  For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court held that "under the liberal interpretation of the pleadings 
required by our rules of notice pleading, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
refusing to consider the three excluded issues" (p. 232).  The plaintiffs next alleged 
that the order entered by the district court was a summary judgment without any of 
the procedural safeguards set forth in K.S.A. 60-256.  The district court noted that 
their decision had not been based on a motion for summary judgment, but on the 
submitted briefs that had been brought to the court to determine whether the plaintiffs' 
claims were legally sufficient as a matter of law.  For that reason, the district court did 
not believe it needed to follow the rules set forth for summary judgment.  The 
Supreme Court found that the order by the district court disposing of the case was a 
judgment within the definition of K.S.A. 60-254 as a final determination of the rights 
of the parties in the case.  A trial court has an inherent power to dispose of litigation 
on its own motion as a matter of law as long as discovery has been completed, a 
thorough pretrial conference has been held, and all of the basic facts have been 
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developed.  If after these things are done and no genuine issue of material fact 
remains, then a judgment may be made.  In this case, however, the judgment made 
failed to address the factual allegations of the plaintiffs except to say that all of their 
allegations were without merit and resolved by the decision in U.S.D. 229 v. State, 
256 Kan. 232, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994).  The Supreme Court found that the decision in 
U.S.D. 229 was no longer applicable because the ten goals quoted in that case were 
no longer part of state statute.  In Count 1 of the plaintiffs' claims involving the 
suitability of school finance, the plaintiffs asserted that state law no longer contains 
educational goals or standards.  The statutory requirement in K.S.A.2001 Supp. 72-
6439(a) was now that of an accreditation system "based upon improvements in 
performance that reflects higher academic standards and is measurable."  Because of 
this, and other assertions made by the plaintiffs, the court concluded that there 
remained a "genuine issue of material fact not shown to be a sham, frivolous, or so 
unsubstantial that it would be futile to try the case" (p. 234).  The decision of the 
district court contained no findings of fact to support its sua sponte judgment for the 
defendants.  The Supreme Court rejected the district court's legal conclusion that 
U.S.D. 229 alone supported its judgment.  The district court was required to make a 
determination based on uncontroverted facts as to whether the school financing 
provisions were constitutional.  The plaintiffs should have been given an opportunity 
to substantiate their claims before the district court determined that the legislature had 
provided suitable provisions for financing the educational interests of the State.  In 
Count II, which involved a violation of equal rights protection, the plaintiffs advanced 
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a number of allegations.  These included the claim that the number of minority 
students in the plaintiff school districts had increased, that there was a substantial 
performance gap between minorities and whites, and that there was a substantial 
performance gap between students in the free and reduced lunch programs and those 
not in those programs.  The Supreme Court held that those allegations, as well as 
those in Count III, had to be addressed by the district court before they could make a 
final judgment on the case.  When the court considered the record presented in this 
case, they concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact which remained 
in dispute.  Thus, the decision of the district court was reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings.  
 
Bonner Springs Unified School District No. 204 v. Blue Valley Unified 
School District No. 229 
95 P. 3d 655 (Kan. App. 2004) 
 
In June 2002, four Johnson County school districts enacted resolutions 
requesting the Johnson County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) to submit to 
a vote a countywide retailers' sales tax with a percentage of the revenues to be 
distributed to public school districts located within Johnson County, Kansas.  The 
issue was approved by voters and the new local sales tax went into effect in January 
2003.  In March 2003, four Wyandotte County school districts and ten individual 
parents of Wyandotte County students filed an action in district court against the 
Johnson County districts, the BOCC, and the State Treasurer seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief to suspend the distribution of funds from the new sales tax to the 
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Johnson County schools.  The plaintiffs alleged that the use of the new sales tax 
revenues for public education was contrary to K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., violated Article 
6 Sections 1, 6 of the Kansas Constitution, and violated Section 1 of the Bill of Rights 
of the Kansas Constitution.  The plaintiffs also wanted the sales tax revenues to be 
declared "local effort" for purposes of K.S.A. 72-6410(c) which would affect the 
Johnson County districts' entitlement to state financial aid pursuant to K.S.A. 72-6416.  
At the same time they filed their petition, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for 
temporary injunction, requesting that the sales tax revenue not be paid to the Johnson 
County schools.  The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not met the standards 
for temporary injunctive relief and had no standing upon which to maintain this 
action.  The district court declined to grant a temporary injunction.  The court also 
chose not to address the issue of standing because it was "not directly related to the 
issuance of a temporary injunction" (p. 658).  The plaintiffs appealed this decision. 
Two issues addressed by the Court of Appeals were whether the plaintiffs had 
standing to challenge the distribution of the Johnson County sales tax and if the 
district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs a temporary injunction.  
Although the district court did not make a determination on standing, the Appeals 
Court needed to do so in order to decide whether or not the plaintiffs had "sufficient 
stake in the outcome of this controversy..."  (p. 659).  First, the plaintiffs claimed they 
had standing because they shop in Johnson County and would have to pay the tax.  
The court found this failed as a matter of law because (1) the plaintiffs are under no 
compulsion to shop in Johnson County, (2) anyone who shops in Johnson County 
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would pay the tax and therefore suffer the same injury, and (3) it is not the collection 
of the tax that is the subject of the alleged injury but the distribution of the revenues.  
The second claim brought by the plaintiffs was that they had standing because the 
additional revenues to the Johnson County schools would put Wyandotte County 
schools at a competitive disadvantage for things such as attracting and retaining 
quality teachers.  The court determined that this claim did not fail as a matter of law.  
Because they did not have the complete facts, the court remanded the issue to the 
district court for a "complete evidentiary hearing and legal determination of plaintiffs' 
claims of standing based on competitive disadvantage..."  (p. 661).  Next, the court 
turned to the issue of the denial of the plaintiffs request for a temporary injunction.  
Wichita Wire, Inc. v. Lenox, 11 Kan. App. 2d 459, 462, 726, P. 2d 287 (1986) adopted 
a four-part test for temporary injunction.  It required that any party seeking temporary 
injunctive relief must show (1) a substantial likelihood that the party making the 
motion will prevail; (2) the party making the motion will suffer "irreparable injury" 
unless the injunction is approved; (3) the threatened injury to the party making the 
motion would be greater than the damage the proposed injunction might cause the 
opposing parties; and (4) the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.  
These four factors were used by the court to make its determination.  After reviewing 
K.S.A. 12-187, K.S.A. 19-4101 through 4103, and K.S.A. 72-8210 the court found no 
evidence that the plaintiffs' claim had a substantial likelihood of success.  In regards 
to the second factor, the plaintiffs argued that they would suffer irreparable injury due 
to the competitive disadvantage that would result from the extra funding to the 
 
550 
 
Johnson County schools.  They claimed that if the Johnson County schools received 
the sales tax revenues for the duration of the case, the Wyandotte County schools 
could potentially be at a disadvantage for several years.  The Court of Appeals 
determined that the plaintiffs would have an opportunity to present their competitive 
disadvantage claims on remand for the purpose of standing.  They also pointed out 
that K.S.A. 72-6418 provides a mechanism for repayment should the plaintiffs 
succeed on the merits.  If the plaintiffs in this case were able to show irreparable harm, 
K.S.A. 72-6418(a) provides "In the event any district is paid more than it is entitled to 
receive under any distribution made under this act or under any statute repealed by 
this act, the state board shall notify the district of the amount of such overpayment, 
and such district shall remit the same to the state board."  Because of this, the court 
did not find substantiation for the claim of irreparable injury.  Potential injury was 
found to be equal for the plaintiffs and the defendants if a temporary injunction was 
granted.  Therefore, the claim failed the third factor of the test.  Finally, the court 
determined temporary injunctive relief would be adverse to the public interest 
because of the need to "uphold public elections and defer to legislative 
determinations" (p. 664).  After applying the four factors, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying temporary 
injunction.  Thus, the lower court's decision was affirmed in part and remanded with 
directions. 
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Montoy v. State 
102 P.3d 1158 (Kan. 2005) 
 
On December 18, 2003, a citizen's group filed a motion to intervene in 
Montoy v. State, which was pending.  The group, Kansas for the Separation of School 
and State, sought to intervene based the grounds that they had "an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that was the subject of the action" (p. 1159).  The group 
believed that the state of Kansas favored a tax increase to finance schools, while they 
were opposed.  On February 13, 2009, the trial court denied intervention.  In its 
decision, the district court cited the three factors necessary to allow intervention 
which had been set forth by the Kansas Supreme Court in Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986).  These factors were: (1) timely 
application; (2) a substantial interest in the subject matter; and (3) lack of adequate 
representation of the intervener's interest.  The action had been pending in the Montoy 
v. State trial for nearly five years, the facts had already been heard and determined in 
the action, and a preliminary interim order had been entered on December 2, 2003.  
The citizen's group did not file their motion until December 18, 2003.  The motion 
was denied on the grounds that the appeal was not filed in a timely manner and, as the 
Court's preliminary order contained no directive that the Legislature raise property 
taxes statewide, there was no property or transaction that was the subject of their 
motion.  The citizen's group appealed this decision. 
 The only issue that needed to be addressed was whether the district court 
abused its discretion when it denied the motion to intervene.  Judicial discretion is 
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only abused when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court.  
The provisions for intervention in a court action are found in K.S.A. 60-224(a) which 
states, in relevant part, "upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action...when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property 
or transaction which is the subject of the action..."  In Hukle v. City of Kansas City, 
212 Kan. 627, 512 P.2d 457 (1973), the court held that "the requirement for 'timely 
application' to intervene in an action as that term is used in K.S.A. 60-224(a) has no 
application until such time as adequate representation ceases."  The appellants argued 
that they had no adequate representation because the State would benefit from a tax 
increase to fund public education, and so would support one.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed, pointing out that the legislature's recent rejection of all proposals for tax 
increases to finance schools demonstrated that "the appellant's position was 
adequately represented by the State" (p. 1160).  In Hukle, the court determined that 
the right to intervene depended upon the concurrence of all three factors.  Without a 
showing of inadequate representation, there could be no concurrence.  Although the 
trial court did not address the issue, the Supreme Court held that, because the citizen's 
group had failed to show a lack of adequate representation of its interest, the motion 
to intervene was not timely.  The decision of the trial court was affirmed.    
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Montoy v. State 
120 P.3d 306 (Kan. 2005) 
 
In Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 145, 62 P.3d 228 (2003) (Montoy I), the Kansas 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court's decision that the plaintiffs, 
two school districts and numerous individual students had failed to present legally 
sufficient claims to the state funding formula.  The case was remanded, in part, 
because the higher court held that the issue of suitability had not been resolved by 
U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994) which was the case the 
district court relied upon for its decision.  The Supreme Court found that when the 
decision had been made in U.S.D. No. 229, the Kansas School District Finance and 
Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., as it was originally 
adopted in 1993, made suitable provision for the finance of public education.  
However, as changes had been made to the financing formula since that time, the 
district court was directed to determine on the basis of uncontroverted facts whether 
the school financing provisions were constitutional.   
As it had been directed, the district court held a bench trial in which witnesses 
who were considered to be experts in the fields of primary and secondary education 
provided testimony.  After the trial, the district court made findings regarding the 
statutory and societal changes that occurred after the decision in U.S.D. No. 229 that 
affected school funding.  In terms of societal changes, the district court found that 
36% of Kansas public school students qualified for free or reduced lunches, the 
number of students with limited English proficiency had increased dramatically, and 
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state institutions of higher learning were using more rigorous admission standards.  
The district court also found a number of statutory changes that impacted school 
funding, such as the fact that the goals that had been set out in K.S.A. 72-6439(a) 
were removed, the SDFQPA's provision requiring an oversight committee to ensure 
fair funding had been allowed to expire, at-risk pupil weighting had been changed, 
the mill levy had decreased from 35 mills to 20 mills, the cap on capital outlay had 
been removed, and special education funds were added to the calculation to increase 
the base on which local option budget funding was calculated.  As a result, the district 
court ruled that the SDFQPA was unconstitutional.  It held that: (1) the SDFQPA's 
financing formula was a violation of equal protection; (2) the SDFQPA financing 
formula had an unconstitutional disparate impact on minorities; and (3) the legislature 
had failed to meet its burden as imposed in Article 6, Section 6 of the Kansas 
Constitution to "make suitable provision for finance" of the public schools.  The State 
of Kansas and the State Board of Education appealed this decision.     
At issue in this appeal, was the constitutionality of the statutory scheme for 
funding Kansas public schools.  The Kansas Supreme Court first attempted to 
determine if the district court's findings of fact regarding the societal and legislative 
changes were supported by substantial, competent evidence.  To do this, they 
examined the standard for determining whether the current version of the SDFQPA 
made suitable provision for the finance of public schools.  The court noted that the 
concept of "suitable provision for finance" had to reflect a level of funding that met 
the constitutional requirement that "the legislature shall provide for intellectual, 
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educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining 
public schools..."  Kan. Const. Art. 6, Section 1.  This imposes a mandate that the 
public schools must show improvement.  In recognition of this concept, the 
legislature in K.S.A. 72-6439(a) includes a provision that requires the State Board of 
Education to "design and adopt a school performance accreditation system based 
upon improvement in performance that reflects high academic standards and is 
measurable."  These provisions have imposed the criteria for determining whether the 
legislature has made suitable provision for the finance of education.  If schools are 
meeting the accreditation requirements and if students are achieving an "improvement 
in performance that reflects high academic standards and is measurable" than the 
criteria will have been meet.  In 2001, the legislature directed that a professional 
evaluation be performed to determine the cost of a suitable education in Kansas.  The 
Legislative Education Planning Committee (LEPC) was given the task of overseeing 
the study and determined which performance measures would be utilized in 
determining if Kansas students were receiving a suitable education.  The evaluation 
was done by Augenblick and Myers.  The study concluded that both the formula and 
funding levels were inadequate to provide what the legislature had defined as a 
suitable education.  In looking at the record, the Supreme Court determined that there 
was substantial, competent evidence showing that a suitable education, as defined by 
the legislature, was not being provided.  The court noted additional evidence of 
funding inadequacies in that while the original intent of the local option budget was to 
fund "extra" expenses, some districts had been forced to use local option budgets to 
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finance general education.  Another factor taken into consideration by the Supreme 
Court was the district court's finding that the financing formula was "not based upon 
actual costs to educate children but was instead based on former spending levels and 
political compromise" (p. 310).  The failure to do any cost analysis distorted the low 
enrollment, special education, bilingual education, and at-risk student weighting 
factors.  Thus, the Supreme Court held that the legislature had failed to "make 
suitable provisions for finance" of the public school system as required by Art. 6, 
Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution.  The court reversed the district court holding 
that the SDFQPA's financing formula was a violation of equal protection because it 
found that all of the funding differentials provided by the SDFQPA were rationally 
related to a legitimate legislative purpose.  The court also reversed the district court's 
holding that the SDFQPA financing formula had an unconstitutional disparate impact 
on minorities and/or other classes.  In order to establish an equal protection violation 
on this basis, "one must show not only that there is a disparate impact, but also that 
the impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose" (p. 308).  The Supreme Court 
did not believe that any discriminatory purpose had been shown by the plaintiffs.  The 
court affirmed the district court's holding that the legislature had failed to meet its 
burden as imposed by Article 6, Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution.  The court 
determined that the legislature had a "constitutional duty" to alter the financing 
formula so that it would comply with Art. 6, Section 6.  The court left it up to the 
legislature to decide how this would be done.  The court did state that it was "clear 
increased funding will be required..."  (p. 310).  The Supreme Court did not remand 
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the case to the district court, but instead retained jurisdiction and stayed all further 
proceedings to allow the legislature a reasonable time to correct the "constitutional 
infirmity in the present financing formula."  The court further stated that if the 
legislature failed make the necessary corrections to the formula, the court would 
direct that action be taken.  To ensure that the legislature complied with its decision, 
the court decided to withhold its formal opinion and stay the issuance of a mandate 
until corrective legislation was enacted, or April 12, 2005, whichever came first. 
 
Montoy v. State 
112 P.3d 923 (Kan. 2005) 
 
This case required the Supreme Court of Kansas to review school finance 
legislation to determine if it complied with the court's January 3, 2005, opinion.  In 
January, the court found in Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 102 P.3d 1160 (2005) 
(Montoy II), that the state's school financing formula was not in compliance with 
Article 6, Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution.  The court held that the legislature 
had failed to make suitable provision for finance of the public school system and 
directed them to alter the formula before April 12, 2005.  The legislature responded 
by enacting 2005 House Bill 2247 on March 30, 2005, which was modified by 2005 
Senate Bill 43 (collectively H.B. 2247).  The new legislation was delivered to the 
court.  On April 15, 2005, the court issued an order directing the parties to file briefs 
"addressing whether the financing formula, as amended by H.B. 2247, met the 
legislature's constitutional burden to 'make suitable provision for finance' of the 
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public schools" (p. 926).  The parties were instructed to address: (1) whether the 
actual costs of providing a suitable education were considered and whether H.B. 2247 
exacerbated and/or created funding disparities among school districts; (2) whether 
additional fact-finding would be necessary; and (3) what remedial action should be 
ordered and on what timetable, in the event the court concluded that the financing 
formula as amended was still unconstitutional.  All parties were ordered to appear 
before court on May 11, 2005, to show cause as to why the court should or should not 
find that H.B. 2247 complied with the court's January opinion.  The defendants, State 
of Kansas (State), and the State Board of Education and Commissioner of Education 
(Board), filed separate briefs.  The plaintiffs filed a response brief.  Ten amici curiae 
briefs were filed and oral arguments were heard on May 11, 2005.     
The court first identified the changes H.B. 2247 made to the School District 
Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA).  H.B. 2247 modified the school 
finance system in several ways.  First, H.B. 2247 altered the Base State Aid Per Pupil 
(BSAPP) and several of the weightings and other factors that affect the formula.  It 
increased bilingual and at-risk weightings; it eliminated correlation weighting; it 
provided for phased-in increases in special education funding; and it provided for 
increases in general state aid based on the Consumer Price Index-Urban (CIP-U).  
Second, the bill gave certain districts the authority to raise additional revenue through 
local ad valorem taxes upon property within the district through increases in the Local 
Option Budget (LOB) cap.  Before H.B. 2247, a school district could enact a LOB 
that was as much as 25 percent of its state financial aid.  H.B. 2247 would allow for 
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yearly incremental increases in the LOB.  It also authorized districts with high 
housing costs to levy additional ad valorem taxes in order to raise funds to pay 
enhanced teacher salaries.  Districts with extraordinary declining enrollments would 
be allowed to apply to the Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) for permission to levy an 
ad valorem tax on the tangible property of the district in the amount authorized by 
BOTA.  Third, H.B. 2247 provided for statutorily mandated areas of instruction; 
established an 11-member "2010 Commission" to provide legislative oversight of the 
school finance system; and provided for a study by the Legislative Division of Post 
Audit to "determine the costs of delivering the kindergarten and grades one through 
12 curriculum, related services and other programs mandated by state statute" (p. 
927).  Fourth, it limited all new local capital outlay mill levies to eight mills.  
SDFQPA originally capped this at four mills, but the cap had been completely 
removed in 1999.  The estimated grand total for H.B. 2247's fiscal impact was 
approximately $142 million in additional state funding for the 2005-06 school year.   
The court next provided a discussion and analysis of the case as it was 
presented.  In its oral argument, the State claimed that the constitutionality of the 
school financing formula as amended by H.B. 2247 was not properly before the 
Supreme Court of Kansas because in its opinion the court could only address the 
former financing formula, which no longer existed.  The State repeatedly claimed that 
the court's focus should be limited to whether the legislature had the authority to pass 
school finance legislation and any further intervention by the court would "offend the 
separation of powers doctrine...among our three branches of government" (p. 927).  In 
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support of its argument, the State relied on Knowles v. State Board of Education, 219 
Kan. 271, 547 P.2d 699 (1976).  The court held that reliance upon Knowles was 
"misplaced" because that case was before the court "on an entirely different 
procedural posture."  In Knowles, the statutory amendments at issue were made in 
response to the district court's declaratory judgment while it still had jurisdiction over 
the case.  In the case at hand, H.B. 2247 was a remedy in response to a specific order 
from the Supreme Court while it retained jurisdiction.  The fact that the court retained 
jurisdiction allowed a review to determine if H.B. 2247 was in compliance with their 
opinion.  The court also rejected the State's argument that the doctrine of separation 
of powers limited its review of this case.  The final decision as to the constitutionality 
of any legislation "rests exclusively with the courts" (p. 930).  Similar arguments had 
been raised in other states and those states also consistently reaffirmed the authority 
and duty of the state courts "to engage in judicial review and, when necessary, 
compel the legislature and executive branches to conform their actions to that which 
the constitution requires" (p. 930).   
In contrast, the Board argued that the issue before the court was whether the 
State complied with the January opinion.  The Board argued that the changes to H.B. 
2247 were not based on the actual costs of providing a suitable education.  It strongly 
disagreed with the provisions that allowed increased funding authority based solely 
on local ad valorem property taxes because it believed those provisions would worsen 
the funding inequities based on the wealth of a school district.  The Board wanted the 
court to order additional fact-finding to determine the future costs of providing a 
 
561 
 
suitable education.  Since the legislation had commissioned a cost study in its 
proposal, the Board asserted that the court should uphold H.B. 2247's modifications 
to the financing formula as an "adequate first step in a multi-year remedial response" 
(p. 928).  The plaintiffs argued that the increases in funding provided in S.B. 2247 fell 
short of what was actually necessary to provide a suitable education.  They agreed 
with the Board that actual costs had not been considered and alleged that the new 
legislation was "the result of political compromise and what the majority of the 
legislation believed it could provide without raising taxes" (p. 928).   
Next, the court addressed its specific concerns about whether the actual costs 
of providing an adequate education were considered in each of the formula 
components and the statutory formula as a whole, and whether any unjustified 
funding disparities had been exacerbated by H.B. 2247.  To make this determination, 
the court used the 2001 Augenblick & Myers (A&M) study in spite of the State's 
criticism of it and the fact that it was dated.  The court relied on this study because it 
was "competent evidence admitted at trial" (p. 931) and was part of the record in this 
appeal.  See Montoy II, 278 Kan. at 774, 102 P.3d 1160.  The A&M study was also 
used because it had been commissioned by the legislature to study to actual costs to 
suitably and equitably fund public schools; it was the only analysis resembling a cost 
study before the court or the legislature; and both the Board and the State Department 
of Education had recommended that the study's findings be adopted when the study 
was completed.  Using the A&M study, the court examined the provisions of H.B. 
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2247 in light of the actual costs of providing a constitutionally adequate education 
and funding equity.   
State financial aid to schools is determined by multiplying the BSAPP by each 
districts weighted enrollment.  When the SDFQPA was first implemented in 1992, 
BSAPP was set at $3,600.  Small increases in the BSAPP were funded each year until 
the 2002-03 school year.  From 2002 until 2005, the statute allowed for a BSAPP of 
$3,890; however, only $3,863 was funded.  The A&M study recommended increasing 
the BSAPP to $4,650 in 2001, which would have resulted in $623.3 million in 
additional funding.  H.B. 2247 increased the BSAPP from $3,890 to $4,222.  This 
increase substantially varied from any cost information in court records and from any 
recommendation of the Board or State Department of Education.  H.B. 2247 
increased funding for at-risk students from .10 of the BSAPP to .145.  This increased 
weighting would result in an increase of $26 million targeted to at-risk students.  The 
A&M study recommended a weight of .20 to .60 depending upon the size of the 
district.  Neither the State nor the Board contended that the actual costs of educating 
at-risk students had been considered.  Weighting for bilingual programs was 
increased from .2 to .395 for the 2005-06 school year.  A&M recommended that the 
bilingual weighting be based on student enrollment and that it range from .15 to .97.  
The court noted that although the increase in this weighting was significant, it was 
still substantially different from the cost information on record.  In addressing special 
education, H.B. 2247 provided for a multi-year phased-in increase in state 
reimbursement from 85 percent in 2005-06 to 91 percent in 2007-08.  The State had 
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been funding only 85 percent of the excess costs of special education; however, for 
the fiscal year 2005 only 81.7 percent of those costs had been funded.  
Reimbursement at 85 percent would result in a funding increase of $17.7 million for 
the upcoming year.  The A&M study recommended a range, based on student 
enrollment, of weights from .90 to 1.50, resulting in nearly $102.9 million; a huge 
difference from the $17.7 million provided by H.B. 2247.  Another of H.B. 2247's 
provisions was that the LOB cap of 25 percent would be raised to 27 percent in the 
2005-06 school year and 30 percent in the 2007-08 school year.  The original intent 
and purpose of the LOB was to allow school districts to levy additional property taxes 
to fund enhancements to the constitutionally adequate education provided and 
financed under the legislative financing formula.  In Montoy II, the evidence showed 
that many school districts had been forced to use the LOB to fund what was the 
State's obligation to provide an adequate education rather than on enhancements.  The 
court here agreed with the Board and the plaintiffs that the legislation's increase in the 
LOB cap worsened the wealth-based disparities between districts.  Districts with 
higher assessed property values could reach the maximum LOB revenues with far less 
tax effort than those districts with lower property values and lower family incomes.  
This would permit the wealthier districts to "generate more funds for elements of a 
constitutionally adequate education that the State has failed to fund" (p. 934).  H.B. 
2247 also allowed for a new local property tax levy for cost-of-living weighting.  Its 
original purpose was to fund teacher salary enhancements, but that limiting provision 
was removed and no purpose for the additional funding was stated in the law.  The 
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court noted that this weighting, like the LOB cap, further demonstrated that the State 
was not meeting its obligation to provide suitable financing.  In addition, as with 
other property-tax based provisions, it had the potential effect of creating inequities 
based on assessed property values.  Low-enrollment weighting provides adjustments 
for districts with fewer than 1,750 students; as enrollment decreases, the size of the 
adjustment increases.  H.B. 2247 did not substantially change the low-enrollment 
weighting.  In their January opinion and April order, the court had requested cost 
justifications for the low-enrollment weighting.  In their oral arguments, the State 
could not provide any cost-based reason for using the 1,750 figure or for the weight's 
percentage.  The court also found the extraordinary declining enrollment provisions 
of S.B. 2247 to be troublesome as they had the "potential to be extremely 
disequalizing because they are unlimited and have been designed to benefit a very 
small number of school districts" (p. 936).  In support of its provision for the capital 
outlay cap in H.B. 2247, the State relied on the affidavit of a Representative who 
stated that the legislation had decided to set the cap at 8 mills after reviewing data 
from the Department of Education and hearing from various school districts.  Because 
the provision was based on local property tax authority, the amount of revenue a 
district could raise would be tied to property value and median family income.  This 
would not provide any equalization to those districts that would not be able to access 
this funding. 
With regard to the financing formula as a whole, the court concluded that, "a 
continuing lack of constitutionally adequate funding, together with the inequity-
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producing local property tax measures mean the school financing formula, as altered 
by H.B. 2247, still falls short of the standard set by Article 6, Section 6 of the Kansas 
Constitution" (p. 937).  While H.B. 2247 provided for a Legislative Post Audit (LPA) 
cost analysis study, the court felt it was deficient because it would only examine what 
the cost of delivering kindergarten through grade 12 curriculum, related services, and 
other programs mandated by state statute.  The court expressed that simply measuring 
the cost of "inputs" would not take into consideration the cost of "outputs"- 
achievement of measurable standards of student proficiency.  In fact, nowhere in H.B. 
2247 was there a reference to K.S.A. 72-6439(a) or (c), which provided the criteria 
used by the court in their January 2005 opinion to evaluate whether the school 
financing formula provided a constitutionally adequate education.  Therefore, the 
court determined that as part of an appropriate remedy, the post audit study had to 
incorporate the consideration of outputs and Board statutory and regulatory standards, 
in addition to statutorily mandated inputs.  The post audit report to the legislature also 
needed to demonstrate how this was measured.  Due to the failure of the legislature to 
meet the requirements set out in its January decision, the court was faced with the 
need to order remedial action.  The court expressed that "time was running out" for 
school districts to get their budgets ready for the 2005-06 school year.  It concluded 
that additional funding must be made available for the 2005-06 school year to help 
meet the needs of school districts.  The court decided not to wait for the results of the 
post audit study to determine the amount required, as it would not be completed until 
after the 2005-06 school year.  Therefore, by utilizing the results of the A&M study, 
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the court held that the legislature would implement a minimum increase of $285 
million above the funding level for the 2004-05 school year.  This included the $142 
million provided in H.B. 2247.  The implementation beyond 2005-06 would be 
contingent upon the results of the study directed by H.B. 2247 and the opinion of the 
court.  The court also held that, if (1) the post audit study was not completed or 
submitted in time for the legislature to act upon it during their 2006 session, (2) the 
post audit study was judicially or legislatively determined not to be a valid cost study, 
or (3) legislation was not enacted based upon actual costs of providing a suitable 
system of finance that would equitably distribute funding, the court would consider 
ordering that, at a minimum, $568 million in increased funding would be 
implemented for the 2006-07 school year.  In addition, the court ordered that the new 
funding authorized by H.B. 2247's provisions regarding the increased LOB, the cost-
of-living weighting, and the declining enrollment provisions were stayed.  The 
remainder of H.B. 2247, as amended by the legislature in compliance with the court's 
opinion, would remain in effect for the 2005-06 school year.  The court retained 
jurisdiction of the appeal and noted that it would take further action if necessary to 
ensure compliance with its opinion.   
 
Montoy v. State 
138 P.3d 755 (Kan. 2006) 
 
This was the fifth time this case had been before the Supreme Court of Kansas 
since the district court sua sponte dismissed the case in November of 2001.  In the 
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first appeal by the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and 
remanded for further proceedings in Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 145, 62 P.3d 228 
(2003) (Montoy I).  On remand, the district court held that the Kansas School District 
Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et. seq, was 
unconstitutional.  The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the 
district court in part, concluding that the legislature had failed to make suitable 
provision for the finance of the public schools as required by Article 6, Section 6 of 
the Kansas Constitution.  Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 120 P.3d 306 (2005) 
(Montoy II).  The court set a deadline of April 12, 2005, for the legislature to correct 
the school finance formula.  The legislature enacted changes to the formula under 
H.B. 2247.  In Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 112 P.3d 923 (2005) (Montoy III), the 
court reviewed these legislative changes and found that H.B. 2247 "failed to provide a 
significant funding increase, it still failed to provide constitutionally suitable funding 
for public education..."  The court used the results of the Augenblick & Meyers 
(A&M) study as a means to determine the cost of adequately funding a public 
education and ordered the legislature to implement for the 2005-06 school year a 
minimum funding increase of $285 million above the 2004-05 funding level.  This 
amount represented one-third of the $853 million estimated cost found in A&M's 
recommendations.  The court retained jurisdiction and stated that it would take further 
action if the legislature did not comply with its opinion.  One option the court would 
consider would be to order an increase in funding the remaining two-thirds of A&M's 
recommendation, which would amount to $558 million for the2006-07 school year.  
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The governor called the legislature into special session, but by July 3, 2005, the 
legislature had still failed to comply with the court's opinion.  The court then issued 
an order directing the parties to appear on July 8, 2005, to show why the court should 
not enter an order enjoining the expenditure and distribution of any funds for the 
operation of Kansas schools pending the legislature's compliance with the court's June 
ruling.  On July 6, 2005, the legislature enacted S.B. 3 which provided a funding 
increase of $289 million.  Among other things, S.B. 3 increased the BSAPP; 
increased the at-risk weighting; increased funding for special education; lowered the 
enrollment cut-off for low enrollment weighting and amended the cost study 
provision to require the Legislative Post Audit (LPA) to conduct two cost studies.  
One study would look at the cost of inputs, and the other would estimate the cost of 
meeting student performance outcome standards adopted by the State Board of 
Education.  The parties appeared before the court on July 8, 2005, and all agreed that 
S.B. 3 complied with the court's June 3 order.  The court approved the school finance 
formula, as amended by S.B. 2247 and S.B. 3, "for interim purposes."  Montoy, Order 
of July 8, 2005.  The court retained jurisdiction to review any further legislative 
action that modified or made permanent the temporary solution found in S.B. 3.  On 
January 9, 2006, LPA completed its cost study and submitted it to the legislature.  
The legislature referred to the report throughout its 2006 session and sought further 
input and explanation as needed from LPA.  Using the information in the study, the 
legislature enacted changes to the school finance formula in S.B. 549, which was 
signed by the governor in May of 2006.  On May 22, 2006, the court ordered all 
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parties to brief and argue the issue of whether S.B. 549 satisfied the court's prior 
orders.   
S.B. 549 adopted a three-year funding scheme for kindergarten through grade 
twelve public education.  Rather than simply modifying the provisions that had been 
found in S.B. 2247 and S.B. 3, the legislature fundamentally changed the way K-12 
was funded in Kansas.  It created two additional at-risk weightings: the high-density 
at-risk weighting, which would provide additional at-risk funding for districts with 
high percentages of at-risk students; and the nonproficient at-risk weighting, which 
would provide $10 million in additional funding in 2006-07 for students who were 
not proficient in math or reading.  S.B. 549 would also provide flexibility to local 
districts to spend the money they received for at-risk, preschool at-risk, and bilingual 
education programs interchangeably.  S.B. 549 also made significant changes in the 
LOB.  The original formula provided a feature designed to equalize the ability of 
districts with lower property wealth to raise money through the use of the LOB.  
Districts with an assessed valuation per pupil (AVPP) below the 75th percentile 
would receive supplemental aid in an amount that would bring them up to par with a 
district at the 75th percentile.  Districts with an AVPP above the 75th percentile 
would not receive this aid.  The new legislation increased the LOB threshold from the 
75th percentile to the 81.2 percentile of AVPP.  The LOB cap on supplemental 
general state aid was raised to 30 percent for the 2006-07 school year and 31 percent 
for 2007-08, with an election required to adopt an LOB above 31 percent.  S.B. 549 
further required that such supplemental state aid be used to meet accreditation 
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standards and improve student performance.  While the original purpose of the LOB 
was to allow individual districts to fund enhancements to a constitutionally adequate 
education, S.B. 549 would require that school districts use LOB state aid moneys to 
fund basic educational expenses.  In addition to those changes, S.B. 549 increased the 
BSAPP; lowered the low enrollment weighting adjustment; increased at-risk 
weighting; and increased the reimbursement for special education excess costs to 92 
percent.  S.B. 549 would provide a total funding increase of $466.2 million.  
The court determined that the constitutionality of S.B. 549 was not before the 
court.  It was new legislation, and if it were challenged, it would have to be litigated 
in a new action filed in the district court.  The school finance system that the court 
found to be unconstitutional in Montoy II and Montoy III had been completely altered 
by S.B. 549.  The only issue for the court to determine in this case was whether the 
legislation passed in 2005 and in S.B. 549 complied with the previous orders of the 
court.  The court first held that there was "no question that the legislation had 
substantially responded" (p. 763) to their concerns that the funding formula failed to 
provide adequate funding for school districts that had a high proportion of minority 
and/or at-risk and special education students as almost one-third of the increased 
funding was directed towards at-risk students.  The court believed that the legislature 
had also responded to their concerns about the equitable distribution of funding.  In 
the court's opinion, their concerns about low enrollment weighting, at-risk funding, 
and wealth-based disparities inherent in the LOB had been addressed.  The court 
concluded that the "legislature's efforts in 2005 and in S.B. 549 constitute substantial 
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compliance" (p. 765) with their prior orders.  While the court recognized that it could 
remand the case to the district court to allow the plaintiffs to amend their pleading to 
challenge the new school funding formula, it elected not to do so.  The changes made 
in S.B. 549 had so altered the formula that the court determined the school finance 
formula that had been the issue in the case no longer existed.  There were no facts in 
the record from which the court could determine how the formula would operate over 
the next three years.  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case 
to the district court with directions to dismiss the pending case.   
Judges Beier and Luckert concurred with most of the majority's opinion.  
However, they disagreed with the decision to dismiss the action.  Both believed that 
the more appropriate way to respond was to retain jurisdiction, acknowledge the 
factual deficiencies in the record, and remand to the district court for further 
proceedings focused on the constitutionality of the finance system found in S.B. 549.  
While they agreed that the legislature had made substantial efforts to improve the 
school finance system, they believed the new legislation needed to be studied further 
to determine if there was a need for further remedial action. 
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Chapter 11 
Negligence 
 
Suits by outsiders filing claims for negligence against school districts were 
fairly rare in the time frame studied.  This chapter contains only two cases filed by 
outsiders claiming negligence on the part of a school district.  One involves an 
accident involving a school bus and the other was filed by a parent injured as he was 
leaving a school gymnasium.  As with previous negligence cases, the Kansas Tort 
Claims Act (KTCA) was utilized by the court in making their decision in the case 
brought by the parent.  In order to avoid liability, a school district must prove that it 
falls within one of the exceptions found in K.S.A. 75-6104.  One exception to liability 
is the recreational use exception found in K.S.A. 75-6104(o).  Injuries occurring on 
public property used for recreation of any kind are typically not compensatory unless 
the school district is guilty of "gross and wanton" negligence.  Ordinary negligence 
on property used for recreation is held immune from claims in the state of Kansas. 
 
Felix v. Unified School District No. 202 
923 P.2d 1056 (Kan. App. 1996) 
 
Robert Felix brought a negligence suit against Turner Unified School District 
No. 202 following an accident involving his car and a school bus.  On May 25, 1994, 
Robert Felix's son was driving his car when he encountered a Turner school bus on an 
"S" curve and hit a guardrail.  Turner stipulated to ownership of the school bus and 
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the damage estimate for Felix's car.  At the close of Felix's case, Turner "moved for 
judgment" and argued that Felix had failed to show that the school bus driver was 
Turner's agent.  The district court denied the motion and awarded Felix damages, 
costs, and attorney fees pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2006.  Turner appealed the decision 
and argued that the district court had erred in denying its directed verdict motion. 
The standard for granting and reviewing a directed verdict was established in 
Hurlbut v. Conoco, Inc., 253 Kan. 515, 856 P.2d 1313 (1993).  The court in Hurlbut 
found that when ruling on a motion for a directed verdict pursuant to K.S.A. 1992 
Supp. 60-250 "the court is required to resolve all facts and inferences reasonably to be 
drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought and, 
where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the 
motion must be denied and the matter submitted to the jury."  253 Kan. at 524.  Felix 
argued that Turner had admitted to the agency relationship.  The court, however, 
found this to be contrary to the pleadings and evidence they had before them.  
Paragraph 1 of Turners response to Felix's petition stated that "all allegations of fact 
and conclusions of law in plaintiffs' petition are denied except those admitted herein."  
Turner did not admit to an agency relationship with the driver of the school bus.  
Turner relied on the rule cited in Alcaraz v. Welch, 205 Kan. 163, 468 P.2d 185 
(1970) in which the court held that "mere ownership of an automobile will not 
support an agency, and will not support liability."  Id. at 167.  Turner had stipulated to 
ownership of the school bus, but Felix had failed to prove that the bus driver was an 
agent or employee of the Turner school district.  Tice v. Crowder, 119 Kan. 494, 240 
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P. 964 (1925) also discussed the relationship between ownership of a vehicle and 
respondeat superior.  In Kansas, ownership of an automobile alone is not "sufficient 
to impute the negligence of the driver to the owner" (p. 1059).  The court pointed out 
that the bus driver could have been an independent contractor or employed by an 
independent contracting company.  Turner denied the driver's employment, agency, 
and negligence.  Felix did not prove that the driver was an employee or agent of 
Turner.  Therefore, the court found that he had failed to establish his case.  The 
decision of the district court was reversed.  
 
Poston v. Unified School District No. 387, Altoona-Midway, Wilson County 
189 P.3d 517 (Kan. 2008) 
 
On January 6, 2003, Kevin Poston went to the middle school to pick up his 
stepson from basketball practice.  He entered the south doors of the school, which led 
into a commons area that was connected to the gym.  Poston walked through the 
commons to a set of gym doors to let his stepson know he was there to pick him up.  
As he was leaving the school through the south doors, one of the door brackets came 
loose and fell on his head.  Poston filed suit in which he claimed U.S.D. No. 387 was 
negligent for allowing the door hinge to become loose and failing to warn him of the 
danger.  U.S.D. No. 387 responded by filing a motion for summary judgment arguing 
that the school district was immune from liability under the recreational use exception 
to the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA).  The District claimed that Poston's injury 
resulted from using public property that was intended or permitted for use as an "open 
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area" for purposes of recreational use immunity.  Poston argued that the commons 
was not a recreational area; instead, it was used as a cafeteria and as an access point 
to much of the school.  The district court found in favor of the school district, holding 
that the commons was a "transitional area" from outside the school into the gym.  
This made the commons an "appendage to, and therefore a part of, the gymnasium 
which is a recognized recreational use area" (p. 519).  Poston appealed this decision.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in Poston v. U.S.D. No. 
387, 37 Kan.App.2d 694, 156 P.3d 685 (2007).  Poston appealed, and the Supreme 
Court of Kansas reviewed the case.  On review, Poston argued that in its affirmation 
of the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals expanded K.S.A.2007 Supp. 75-
6104(o) beyond the application intended by the legislation.  U.S.D. No. 387 
countered this argument by claiming that because the commons provided access to 
the gym, and sometimes hosted recreational activities such as snack concessions and 
wedding receptions, it should fall under the recreational use exception.   
In order to avoid liability, a governmental entity must prove that it falls within 
one of the exceptions found in K.S.A. 75-6104.  One of these exceptions to liability is 
the recreational use exception found in K.S.A. 75-6104(o).  This statute provides 
immunity to "a governmental entity when it normally might be liable for damages 
which are the result of ordinary negligence."  The purpose of the recreational use 
exception is to encourage governmental entities to build facilities that benefit the 
public without fear of the high cost of litigation.  The statute further provides that a 
governmental entity or employee would not be liable for damages "from any claim 
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for injuries resulting from the use of any public property intended or permitted to be 
used as a park, playground or open area for recreational purposes, unless the 
governmental entity or employee is guilty of gross and wanton negligence..."  To 
establish that the exception applies in this case, U.S.D. No. 387 had to show that:  (1) 
Poston claimed ordinary negligence; (2) Poston claimed the negligence was the 
proximate cause of his injuries; and (3) Poston's injuries resulted from the use of a 
qualifying property.  It had been established in the previous trial that Poston's injuries 
were the result of ordinary negligence that caused his injuries.  Thus, the only dispute 
for the court to determine was whether the commons was a "qualifying property."  To 
qualify, the commons had to be (a) public and (b) intended or permitted to be used as 
a park, playground, or open area for recreational purposes.  The commons met the 
first prong of the test, as it was public property.  The argument in this case related on 
the second prong.  Had Poston been injured in the gym, there would be no issue 
regarding that requirement because a school gym had been found to be qualified 
"public property" for the purposes of K.S.A. 75-6104(o) in Jackson v. U.S.D. No. 259, 
29 Kan.App.2d 826, 31 P.3d 989 (2001).  In making its decision in the case at hand, 
the district court relied on two Kansas cases, Robison v. State, 30 Kan.App.2d 476, 43 
P.3d 821, and Wilson v. Kansas State University, 273 Kan. 584, 44 P.3d 454 (2002).  
In Robison, the plaintiff was injured when he slipped and fell in a wet hallway 
between the swimming pool at a community college and the locker room.  The 
plaintiff in that case argued that because his injury occurred in a hallway, the 
defendants were liable.  The court rejected that argument citing Nichols v. U.S.D. No. 
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400, 246 Kan. 93, 785 P.2d 986 (1990).  In Nichols, a football player was injured as 
he left the football field and crossed a "grassy swale or waterway" between the field 
and the locker room.  The court in Nichols had not focused on whether immunity 
applied when the injury occurred between the football field and locker room rather 
than on the field.  Subsequent cases have interpreted Nichols as meaning that school 
districts are not liable for injuries occurring on or near a football field.  The 
interpretation of Nichols was reaffirmed in Wilson.  In Wilson, the Supreme Court of 
Kansas found the university to be immune from liability arising when a patron was 
injured while in a football stadium restroom.  The court in Wilson held that although 
the restroom by itself had no recreational purpose, it was an "integral part of a 
football stadium."  273 Kan. at 589.  The restrooms allowed patrons to enjoy the 
recreational purpose of the football games at the stadium without leaving.  When the 
court applied Wilson to the facts of this case, it led to a similar conclusion.  Although 
the commons was not used exclusively for recreation, it was an integral part of the 
use of the gym.  Like the restrooms, the use of the commons to serve concessions 
allowed the public to enjoy the recreational events held in the gym.  In addition, the 
commons was connected to the gymnasium and was a principal means for the public 
to gain access to the gym.  The commons was more than just a cafeteria.  It was used 
as a multipurpose room and some of those uses were integral to the recreational 
purposes of the gym.  Therefore, the court found U.S.D. No. 387 to be immune from 
liability under the recreational use exception of K.S.A. 75-6104(o) for Poston's injury.  
The judgments of the Court of Appeals and District Court were affirmed.   
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Chapter 12 
Miscellaneous 
The eight cases within this chapter did not quite fit into any of the preceding 
classifications for education litigation.  Six cases would most likely fall under the 
heading of "school organization" as they deal with such issues as consolidation, 
transportation, and school board matters.  One case addresses a claim regarding the 
overtime pay of classified employees and another deals with the use of public school 
facilities by religious groups.    
School districts create a "public forum" when they open their buildings to use 
by the school district community for meetings and discussions during nonschool 
hours.  Once this public forum is created, a school district may not prohibit groups 
from using the facilities simply based on content of the group's intended speech.  The 
Establishment Clause required schools to be neutral in their relationships with 
religious groups.  So long as the policy of allowing equal access of both religious and 
non-religious groups passes the three-prong Lemon test, there will be no violation of 
the Establishment Clause.        
The cases dealing with consolidation issues all occurred in the early 1980's.  
Kansas schools underwent major consolidations in the early 1960's.  In his research of 
consolidation in the state of Kansas, Weeks (2010) found that the number of school 
districts decreased significantly, from 2,794 school districts in 1958 to 311 in 1969.  
Today there are 296 districts.  One major contributor to this consolidation was a piece 
of 1963 legislation, which divided the state into 106 planning units, one for each 
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county with one additional unit in Johnson County.  The lack of court cases in this 
area may well be due to the fact that little consolidation has taken place since the 
early 60's.   
Matters with school board members are another topic within this chapter.  
K.S.A. 72-8205 governs the number of board members it takes to pass a vote during a 
school board meeting.  No matter how many board members are present, four votes 
are required for an issue to pass.  A simple majority will not suffice.  Procedures for 
executive sessions during board meetings are defined in the Kansas Open Meetings 
Act, K.S.A. 75-4319.  In general, the school board business should be discussed in 
public unless it deals with personnel matters.   
The question of whether a teacher may serve on a school board was answered 
in U.S.D.  501 v. Baker.  There is no legislation that specifically forbids teachers to 
serve as board members so the court had to analyze the issue under the common-law 
doctrine of incompatibility of office.  Finding the position of a school board member 
to be in conflict with that of a teacher, the court determined that teachers who are still 
under contract with a district may not serve as school board members.    
 
Hobart v. Board of Education of Unified School District No. 309 
634 P.2d 1088 (Kan. 1981) 
 
An action was brought to the court to enjoin the school board of USD 309 
from holding an election to determine whether it had the authority to reduce the grade 
levels within one of its elementary schools from six elementary grades to two grades.  
 
581 
 
Prior to 1965, Mitchell Grade School had been operated by Grade School District 
#2C.  In 1965, the territory of Grade School District #2C became incorporated into 
USD 309 as a part of the Kansas Unification Act.  In 1980-81, Mitchell Grade School 
was comprised of grades K-5.  At a school board meeting on May 11, 1981, the 
Board unanimously voted to conduct an election of the resident voters of the 
Disorganized School District 2C who lived in USD 309 to determine if the Board 
would be granted the authority to change the use of the school building to permit its 
use by less than six elementary school grades in compliance with K.S.A. 72-8213.  It 
was further proposed that if the election passed, Mitchell Grade School would be 
reorganized to hold grades one and two.  Nelson Hobart, a resident of Disorganized 
School District # 2C, requested an injunction against the school board’s action.  
Hobart contended that the Board had no authority under K.S.A. 72-8313 to call an 
election for the purpose of reducing the number of grades from six to two.  He further 
argued that K.S.A. 72-8313(e) established the number of grades that had to be offered 
to keep any attendance facility open and a school board has no legal authority to 
reduce the number of grades offered.  The Board countered by arguing that boards of 
education are “endowed with general authority to organize and maintain schools, to 
include the authority to control and change grade configuration at attendance 
facilities” (p. 1091).  After considering the facts, the district court denied Hobart’s 
request and held that an election was not only permissible in this case, but required 
under K.S.A. 72-8213.  Hobart appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the case was 
transferred to the Kansas Supreme Court for a decision.   
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At issue was whether the Board of Education had the authority to call an 
election to change and reduce the grade usage at Mitchell Grade School.  The 
Supreme Court turned to state statute, case law, and regulations adopted by the 
Kansas Department of Education to make its determination.  K.S.A. 72-8313(e) stated 
that nothing in that statute could be deemed to limit the authority of a school board to 
change the use of any attendance facility, “so long as at least three (3) high-school 
grades, three (3) junior high-school grades, or six (6) elementary school grades are 
offered in such attendance facility.”  An attendance facility was defined as a school 
building that had been the property of a disorganized school district, but was owned 
by the unified district.  The court found no statutory provision other than subsection 
(e) which set a minimum grade usage in any attendance facility.  Because the 
legislature had not set requirements for minimum grades other than ones set for the 
disorganized districts, the court looked to regulations adopted by the Kansas 
Department of Education.  The court found no provision in these regulations setting a 
minimum number of grades to be maintained at an attendance facility.  In fact, K.A.R. 
1981 Supp. 91-30-14(a) provided that an “an accredited elementary school shall be 
organized to include any combination of grades kindergarten through nine (9).”  
When the court considered this regulation along with K.S.A. 72-8313(e), which 
restricted the authority of the board to reduce grade usage in an attendance facility, it 
concluded that the statutory limitation in K.S.A. 72-8313(e) merely drew the line 
where consent or an election would be required if a unified board wanted to close 
schools or reduce grade usage below the levels required at an attendance facility in a 
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disorganized district.  The Supreme Court did not believe that subsection (e) was 
intended to set a minimum grade usage in Kansas schools.  Under subsection (e), no 
election was required to reduce grade usage as long as the minimum levels prescribed 
were followed.  However, if a unified district wanted to reduce grade usage of a 
building in a disorganized district to levels below the minimum of three high-school 
grades, three junior high-school grades, or six elementary grades, it would be required 
to gain consent from the constituents of the disorganized district to do so.  Thus, the 
school board in this case was well within its authority to propose an election to 
determine if it could reduce the grade usage in Mitchell Grade School.  The judgment 
of the district court was affirmed. 
 
Provance v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District No. 512 
648 P.2d 710 (Kan. 1982) 
 
Pursuant to K.S.A. 72-8136a, the Shawnee Mission School District was 
divided into five geographical areas, or member districts.  Antioch Elementary School 
was located in the North member district.  Before unification in 1969, Antioch School 
was owed and operated by the Common School District No. 61.  Those residents 
living within the boundaries of old school district No. 61 were still subject to a 
property tax levy, which was used to help retire the bond indebtedness of District No. 
61.  On September 22, 1980, the superintendent of Shawnee Mission recommended 
that Antioch Elementary be closed at the end of the 1980-81 school year.  
Subsequently, the Board adopted a resolution stating its tentative intention to close 
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the school.  On December 17, 1980, after a public hearing, the Board made a final 
decision to close the school at the end of the 1980-81 year.  A petition was submitted 
to the Johnson County Election Commissioner demanding that a referendum election 
be held on the issue of the Antioch closing.  The election was held on April 7, 1981, 
and a small majority of voters voted in favor of keeping the school open.  In deciding 
who could vote in the election, the school district followed K.S.A. 72-8136e(b) and 
(c) which provided in part that all of the registered voters living within the member 
district of the unified school district in which the affected school was located could 
vote at the election.  The majority vote would then determine whether the facility 
would remain open.  D. William Provance, who lived in the northwest area of the 
school district, approximately 2.7 miles from Antioch Elementary School, was not 
allowed to vote in the referendum election.  Before the election, he filed a petition 
seeking a declaratory judgment finding the school district closing statutes to be 
unconstitutional because they limited participation in the referendum.  He also sought 
an injunction prohibiting the continued operation of Antioch School and a writ of 
mandamus directing the Board to conduct all elections held pursuant to K.S.A. 8136e 
on a district-wide basis.  After the trial, the district court held K.S.A. 72-8136e 
unconstitutional in part as violative of the 14th Amendment.  An appeal was filed.  
The main issue for the appellate court to determine was whether the Shawnee 
Mission School District, under the direction of a state statute, violated Provance's 
14th Amendment right to equal protection by not allowing him to vote on the closing 
of Antioch Elementary.  When ruling on the constitutionality of a state statute, "all 
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doubts must be resolved in favor of the statute's validity, and before it may be 
stricken down it must be clearly shown it violates the constitution" (p. 714).  The 
court's duty is to uphold, rather than defeat, a statute whenever possible.  Pursuant to 
K.S.A. 72-8136e, the school district created a classification.  In one group were those 
registered voters living in the North member district, in the other group were all of the 
other registered voters living in the rest of the school district.  The two classed were 
treated differently because one group was allowed to vote in the Antioch school 
referendum, while the other was not.  The question for the court was whether the 
unequal treatment amounted to a denial of equal protection.  When a special interest 
election is involved, it must be shown that the classifications bear some rational 
relationship to a legitimate state end, or "compelling state interest."  The only way an 
Equal Protection Clause violation will be found is if the classifications are based on 
reasons that are totally unrelated to the pursuit of that state goal.  In researching the 
history of K.S.A. 72-8136e(b) and (c), the court found it to be a statute of 
compromise.  During the 1977 legislative session, House Bill 2320 was offered as a 
response to declining enrollment in the Shawnee Mission school district.  It gave the 
Board the sole authority to close schools within the district.  There was opposition to 
H.B. 2320 from patrons who wanted some say in the decision to close schools.  
During consideration by the Senate Education Committee, a senator offered 
"compromise amendments" that formed the basis for K.S.A. 72-8136e(b) and (c).  
The statute was created out of a need to develop a workable policy regarding school 
closings while giving consideration to the wishes of the voters.  The State's purpose in 
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offering a public school system is to provide an environment where a quality 
education can be provided equally to all.  In pursuit of that goal, a workable plan to 
allow for the closing of schools due to declining enrollment was needed.  K.S.A. 72-
8136e was the legislatures' attempt to meet this State purpose.  In light of these 
findings, the appellate court determined that the statute bore a rational relationship to 
a legitimate state goal.  The judgment of the district court was reversed.    
 
State, ex rel., Stephan v. Board of Education of Unified School District No. 
428 
647 P.2d 329 (Kan. 1982) 
 
This action was brought to the Supreme Court of Kansas by the State of 
Kansas on relation of Robert Stephan, Attorney General.  The State asked that the 
court issue an order or writ to require the Board of U.S.D. 428 to provide students of 
that district with bus transportation.  On unification, the Board accepted the territory 
of a separate school district known as Bissell's Point.  Before unification, the Bissell's 
Point School District provided bus service for its students.  Following unification, this 
practice continued for the Bissell Point area, but not for other districts within the area 
of U.S.D. 428.  In June 1981, the Board voted to discontinue bus service to students 
residing in the Bissell Point area.  The Board notified the parents of those students 
affected and informed them that the Board would contract with them for the 
transportation of their children at a reasonable rate per mile.  During the fall of 1981, 
a questionnaire was sent to parents of pupils in the Bissell's Point area who were 
eligible to receive either bus transportation or mileage reimbursement.  Over two-
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thirds of those who responded to the survey favored mileage reimbursement.  The 
Board requested a legal opinion from the Attorney General as to the extent of its duty 
to provide or furnish transportation under statutes.  The Attorney General issued a 
formal opinion advising the Board it had a duty to provide transportation and "could 
not issue mileage reimbursement contracts except under limited special 
circumstances" (p. 330).  After obtaining an estimate of the cost of providing bus 
transportation, the Board reaffirmed its earlier decision to end bus service to the 
Bissell Point area and to substitute mileage reimbursement contracts for the entire 
unified school district.  This action by the Board resulted in action being filed by the 
Attorney General.   
To make its decision, the court relied on the statutes governing the 
transportation of students by school districts.  K.S.A. 72-8301(c)(5) provides as part 
of the definition of the words "provide or furnish transportation" as meaning the right 
of a school district to "reimburse persons who furnish transportation to pupils, 
students or school personnel in privately owned motor vehicles."  K.S.A. 72-8302 
relating to the transportation of students provides in relevant part that the Board "may 
provide or furnish transportation for pupils to or from any school of the school district.  
Every school district must provide or furnish transportation for every pupil who 
resides in the school district…" living more than 2.5 miles from the school building 
attended.  At issue in this case was the conflict between parties in their understanding 
of K.S.A. 72-8304 which states in part that in cases where it is "impracticable to 
reach a student's residence" by the prescribed route, and where the residence is more 
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than one mile from the prescribed route; and in cases where it is "impracticable to 
schedule a bus" for the transportation of a student, the board of education may 
contract for the transportation of each student to the regular route or to the school 
building.  Mileage contracts must provide for the payment at a rate not to exceed the 
rate fixed each year by the Secretary of Administration for public officials as 
prescribed in K.S.A. 72-3203.  The court cited two prior Kansas Supreme Court cases 
concerning school transportation.  Those were Harkness v. School District, 103 Kan. 
573, 175 P. 386 (1918), and Kimminau v. Common School District, 170 Kan. 124, 
223 P.2d 689 (1950).  Under state statutes in effect when those cases were decided, 
the court held that a school district had the option to pay the people transporting 
students or to furnish transportation by bussing.  Kimminau had been decided under 
the laws that appeared in the General Statutes of 1949.  Those statutes were rewritten 
in 1968 and the new laws concerning transportation of students appeared in K.S.A. 
1969 Supp. 72-8301 et seq.  The only change of note between the statutes was in the 
rate of reimbursement.  The Attorney General argued that 72-8304 limited the 
circumstances under which mileage reimbursements could be made to the existence 
of one of the two situations mentioned in the statute.  According to the Attorney 
General, it must either be impracticable to reach a student's home and the student 
resides one mile from the route, or it must be impracticable to schedule a bus for the 
student; a district should not be able to pay mileage for all eligible students.  The 
court disagreed.  The court found that there had been no great change in the meaning 
of the relevant statutes over time.  The definition of the term "provide or furnish 
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transportation," continued to include both transportation by bus and mileage 
reimbursement.  In light of the provisions in the present statutes, the court was of the 
opinion that the holdings with regard to providing transportation in Harkness and 
Kimminau were not changed.  The court thus held that under the provisions of K.S.A. 
72-8301 et seq. a school district may fulfill its obligation to "provide or furnish 
transportation" for students (1) by furnishing bus transportation, (2) by reimbursing 
persons who provide transportation in private vehicles, or (3) by a combination of bus 
transportation and mileage reimbursement.  Therefore, the petition by the State was 
denied.      
 
Country Hills Christian Church v. Unified School District No. 512, Johnson 
County 
560 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Kan. 1983) 
 
Country Hills Christian Church was a Kansas not-for-profit corporation that 
had been organized and operated as a religious and church organization.  The church 
had never had its own facilities for Sunday morning services and so utilized various 
buildings in the city.  Many of the previous facilities utilized were not easily 
accessible to the older members of the church due to stairs and other physical barriers.  
The pastor of Country Hills, Larry Kuhl, submitted requests to the school district for 
permission to rent space at one of the elementary buildings for Sunday morning 
services on special Sundays.  These six Sundays were days the pastor expected larger 
than normal attendance, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas.  All six requests were 
denied on the grounds that they would violate the policies of the district which only 
 
590 
 
allowed church organizations to rent school district facilities for "non-religious 
meetings."  School district facilities had been rented by non-school groups on 
numerous occasions.  Examples of the various groups that had been permitted to rent 
facilities were the Democratic Party, a Hebrew academy, the Y.M.C.A., sports 
leagues and the Fellowship of Christian Athletes.  School district policy No. 2000 
only permitted use of school facilities for religious purposes, upon approval of the 
school board, for: (1) emergency situations; (2) the destruction of the usual meeting 
place; (3) the lack of any other available facility; (4) the hours of use do not occur 
immediately before, during or after any activity involving students; and (5) the 
applicants pay all costs associated with renting the school district facility.  The school 
district would review all requests for use of facilities and any that were considered 
religious were denied.  Country Hills Church brought a lawsuit against the district for 
declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction ordering the district to make school 
facilities open for purposes of religious worship.   
The first question addressed by the court was whether the school district had 
created a public forum for non-school groups.  Traditionally, a public forum was a 
park or a public street.  However, those are not the only public places subject to the 
protection of the First Amendment.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) held that a public 
school is a public forum for its students and teachers.  Numerous other cases have 
found that if the public school is opened to the school district community during non-
school hours, then it becomes a public forum for the community.  USD 512 created a 
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public forum by and through their policies which allowed outside groups to use their 
facilities during non-school hours.  Guidelines can be imposed which regulate the 
activities of outside groups, but they must be reasonable.  Once a forum is opened to 
assembly or speaking by some groups, a school district may not prohibit other groups 
from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say.  Exclusions from 
use of a public forum "may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by 
references to content" (p. 1215).  The plaintiffs in this case were prohibited from 
using school facilities solely because of the content of their proposed speech.  The 
court found this to be a violation of the First Amendment.  The school district argued 
that allowing buildings to be used for religious purposes would be a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.  The court held that an equal access policy would not violate 
the Establishment Clause if it passed the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).  Applying the first prong, the court 
found that opening school facilities to community organizations for educational, 
cultural, political and other activities were entirely secular purposes.  The school 
district did not "undertake to endorse these groups nor promote their views or ideals" 
(p. 1218).  Allowing equal access to religious groups for purposes of worship would 
not weaken these secular purposes.  Next, the court sought to determine if an equal 
access policy would advance or inhibit religion.  Because an equal access policy 
permits all community groups to use school facilities, religious groups would share in 
the benefits with all of the other groups.  This would neither advance nor promote 
religion.  In terms of the third prong, the court found no excessive entanglement in an 
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equal access policy.  In fact, the court believed that the school district's current 
policies presented a high degree of entanglement because the district had to determine 
in every questionable case what words and conduct constituted religious use or 
worship.  An open access policy would eliminate the need for the school district to 
determine what uses were religious and what were not.  The court found that the 
Establishment Clause "did not justify excluding the plaintiffs' religious services from 
School District buildings" (p. 1219).  The court further held that the school district 
policies in question were unconstitutional and void.  The defendants were ordered to 
permit the plaintiffs to use school district facilities for religious purposes during non-
school hours on the same terms as other community organizations.   
The school district made a motion for a new trial, but it was denied by the 
court. 
 
Unified School District No. 407 By Boatright v. Fisk 
660 P.2d 533 (Kan. 1983) 
 
On February 8, 1982, Robert McCobb resigned from his position (position 7) 
as board member.  On April 26, 1982, board member Elmer Svaty resigned as well 
(member 3).  At the board meeting on May 10, 1982, which all five remaining board 
members attended, a motion was made and seconded that Lee Fisk fill position 7 on 
the school board.  The vote for Fisk was three to two in his favor.  On June 3, 1982, 
Fisk filed his oath of office with the election commissioner.  On June 10, 1982, action 
was filed in court on behalf of U.S.D. 407 for a determination of whether a three to 
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two vote was sufficient to legally name Fisk to the board.  While that suit was 
pending, at the June 14, 1982, board meeting it was moved and seconded that Jack 
Stoller be appointed to fill position 3.  Again, the vote was three to two in favor of 
Stoller.  Only five members were present because Fisk did not attend.  Later during 
that meeting, Charles Wilson, position 5, resigned from the board.  On June 21, 1982, 
the district court determined that Fisk had been duly appointed to position number 7.  
On June 22, 1982, Stoller filed his oath of office.  At the next regular board meeting 
on June 29, 1982, some of the board members questioned whether Stoller could be 
named to the board.  They argued that because there were six board members at the 
time the vote was taken on Stoller, a three to two vote would not have been a majority 
and so was insufficient.  They decided to take a new vote to fill position 3.  At the 
June 29 meeting, the board was back to five members due to the resignation of 
Wilson and the appointment of Fisk, with Stoller's appointment still undecided.  The 
names of Jay Thielen and Stoller were placed before the board and Thielen was 
appointed to fill position 3 on a three to two vote.  On July 14, 1982, the matter again 
went before the court to determine whether Stoller or Thielen, or either of them, were 
duly appointed to position 3.  The district court held that Stoller had been duly 
appointed at the July 14 meeting.  The district court ruling was appealed by different 
parties.  The school district appealed all rulings of the court to determine whether 
Fisk, Stoller, or Thielen were duly appointed to the school board, and whether a 
school board could conduct business, at a regular meeting, which was not included in 
the published agenda.  Fisk and Thielen appealed from the ruling that Stoller was 
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appointed to position 3, and Stoller appealed the ruling that Fisk was appointed to 
position 7.  Fisk and Thielen also appealed from the district court's holding that the 
published agenda of a school board meeting could be amended at the meeting.  To 
further complicate matters, two original board members were recalled from office at a 
special election held on November 2, 1982.  This left the school board with two 
original board members, Fisk claiming position 7 and both Stoller and Thielen 
claiming position number 3. In order for the school district to remain open and for the 
board to be able to carry on its business, the appellate court entered an emergency 
order authorizing the two remaining original members, along with Fisk and Stoller, to 
serve on the school board.  
The appellate court sought to answer two questions: (1) does a school board 
have the authority to consider matters at a board meeting that were not contained in a 
published agenda, and (2) how many votes are required to fill a vacancy on a school 
board?  To settle the first issue, the court turned to K.S.A. 75-4318 which provides in 
relevant part that "(b) notice of the date, time and place of any regular or special 
meeting of a public body…shall be furnished to any person requesting such 
information…" and "(d) prior to any meeting…any agenda relating to the business to 
be transacted at such meeting shall be made available to any person requesting said 
agenda."  The school board's written rules provided that "the superintendent shall 
make an agenda for each regular meeting and shall mail a copy of each agenda to 
members of the Board of Education" (p. 536).  The rules also required that the agenda 
be mailed to the news media no later than 5:00 p. m. on the Friday before the regular 
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meeting.  The appellate court noted that K.S.A. 75-4318 contained no requirement 
that a public body prepare and publish an agenda.  It simply states that if an agenda is 
prepared it should be made available to anyone requesting a copy.  The board 
procedures of U.S.D. 407 included an item on the agenda designated as "consent 
calendar" and at the beginning of every board meeting, additions or deletions could 
be made to the published agenda.  At the July 14 meeting, the matter of making an 
appointment to fill position 3 was brought up as an item on the consent calendar and 
was approved by a five to nothing vote.  Accordingly, the appellate court held that 
with no statute or board rule specifically prohibiting a school board from amending 
its previously published agenda, the agenda could be amended at any regular board 
meeting.  The second issue addressed was whether the appointments of Fisk by a 
three to two vote of a five-person school board and the appointment of Stoller by a 
three to two vote on a six-person board were legal.  The court had to consider several 
statutes in reaching a decision.  K.S.A. 72-8205 provides in relevant part that "a 
majority of the full membership of the board shall constitute a quorum for the purpose 
of conducting any business of the school district, and the vote of the full membership 
of the board shall be required for the passage of any motion or resolution."  K.S.A. 
25-2022 provides that boards have the power to "fill by appointment any vacancy 
which occurs."  K.S.A. 25-2022b deals with excessive vacancies on a school board 
and provides that if the membership of a board is less than four, the governor shall 
appoint sufficient members so that the membership totals four.  The four members 
then have six months to appoint members to fill the remaining vacancies.  The court 
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found that the words "full membership of the board" in K.S.A. 72-8205 clearly meant 
seven people, thus a majority of that membership would be four.  K.S.A. 25-2022, 
which grants authority to a school board when it consists of four or more members, 
does not specify the number of votes to fill a vacancy.  However, in the court's 
opinion, there was no reason for it to do so.  When read in connection with the statute 
that gives the school board its general authority, it becomes "obvious" that a vote of 
four or more is required to fill a vacancy.  The appointments of Fisk, Stoller, and 
Thielen all failed for lack of a sufficient vote.  In order for U.S.D. 407 to continue to 
function, the court decided to hold its final opinion for thirty days after the mandate 
was issued or until the governor appointed additional people to the school board to 
bring its membership up to four, whichever occurred first.  The judgment of the 
district court was affirmed in part and reversed in part.        
 
State v. Board of Education of Unified School District No. 305, Saline County 
764 P.2d 459 (Kan. App. 1988) 
 
The board of education of U.S.D. 305 faced an asbestos removal crisis and 
placed the issue before the public as a bond election to fund the removal process.  The 
dollar amount placed in the bond election for removal of the asbestos was determined 
by architect's estimates.  Actual bid amounts were submitted about two weeks before 
the election.  When the bids were opened, four nonelected administrators learned that 
the actual bid amounts were almost double the amount placed on the ballot for 
election.  None of the four administrators informed the Board or the public of the 
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difference in the amounts until after the election.  On April 11, 1987, the Board held a 
special meeting and met in executive session for all but the opening and closing 
minutes of the meeting.  During that time, the Board discussed the failure of the four 
administrators to inform the Board of the bid amounts; the extent of the 
administrators legal rights; whether other people could have had pre-election 
knowledge of the bids; whether an investigative committee should be formed; who 
could serve on such a committee; and what compensation for committee members 
might be in order.  Much of the discussion, according to Vicki Price, Board president, 
centered on who might be available to serve on an investigative committee without a 
conflict with the four named administrators or school board members.  The State 
claimed that the April 11 meeting went beyond the scope of the stated reason for 
going into executive session, which was "personnel matters relating to nonelected 
personnel."  The State further claimed that the Board also violated the Kansas Open 
Meetings Act (KOMA) during a meeting held on May 20, 1987, when it voted to go 
into closed session and stated its reason as being "for the purposes of discussing 
personnel matters of non-elected personnel because if this matter were discussed in 
open session it might invade the privacy of those discussed" (p. 460).  The State 
argued that the motion did not meet the purpose and justification requirements of the 
KOMA.  The district court found that the Board had not violated the KOMA at either 
meeting.  The State appealed.   
The purpose of the KOMA, K.S.A. 75-4319 et seq., is to promote an informed 
electorate through the open conduct of governmental affairs.  On appeal, the burden 
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was on the school board to show that the executive sessions in question did not 
violate the KOMA.  In regards to the April 11 meeting, the question for the court was 
whether the Board exceeded the limitation of the KOMA, which provided that "no 
subject shall be discussed in closed session except personnel matters of non-elected 
personnel."  While the KOMA does not specifically define "personnel matters," the 
court noted that it had been suggested that purpose of the exception was to protect 
privacy rights of employees, protect reputations, and encourage qualified people to 
remain in government employ.  The appellate court could find no Kansas cases that 
were directly applicable to the case at hand, but it was able to use federal cases as a 
guideline.  The Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 552b (1982), like the KOMA, 
provides that the government's business should be conducted in the open and 
exceptions to an open meeting are narrowly construed.  Federal cases finding a 
violation of the Sunshine Act have acknowledged that if the separation of "exempt 
and nonexempt topics would make a coherent discussion impossible, then it may be 
reasonable to close an entire meeting."  Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 674 F.2d 921(D.C.Cir.1982).  As it applied to this case, the district court 
had found it would have been "burdensome and impractical" to separate the topics of 
the April 11 meeting into open and closed sessions.  There was too much of a 
connection between the four administrators, whose privacy needed to be protected, 
and the events discussed to allow the board fluid transition between the topics that 
could be discussed in an open meeting and those that needed to be kept confidential.  
The appellate court agreed with the district court's rationale.  Next, the court 
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addressed the motion made by the Board at the meeting held on May 20, 1987.  The 
wording of the motion for the May 20 meeting was basically the same as for the April 
11 meeting.  As the State had no problem with the April 11 motion, the court did not 
see why it should have a problem with the May 20 motion.  K.S.A. 75-4319(a) 
provides that public bodies may go into a closed session by making a motion that 
states the reason for closure, the subjects to be discussed, and the time the open 
meeting will resume.  "Personnel matters of nonelected personnel" is a subject that 
may be discussed in a closed session.  The appellate court found it to be "logical that 
the privacy rights of nonelected personnel subject to discussion was sufficient 
justification for a closed session to meet the KOMA" (p. 462).  Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court was affirmed.   
 
Unified School District No. 501, Shawnee County, Kansas v. Baker 
6 P.3d 848 (Kan. 2000) 
 
Linda Baker had been employed as a teacher for U.S.D. 501 since 1984.  
Baker was elected to the Board of Education in 1999 and assumed her duties on July 
1, 1999.  The school district brought declaratory judgment action seeking to find out 
whether Baker could serve as a member of the Board while she was employed by the 
district.  The Board argued that holding both positions violated Kansas statutes and 
the common-law doctrine of incompatibility of office.  If Baker was indeed allowed 
to hold both positions, the Board claimed that Board Policy 1050 would prevent her 
from receiving her teaching salary.  Board Policy 1050 stated, "board members of 
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Unified School District No. 501 shall not receive compensation for services rendered 
as an employee of the school district."  The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Baker finding that: (1) the legislature had not specifically prohibited 
teachers from serving as school board members, (2) the Board's claim of 
incompatibility of office was supplanted by legislature, and (3) Board Policy 1050 
was ultra vires and void as an impermissible attempt to delineate who is qualified to 
serve on the Board.  The school board appealed and the case was transferred on 
motion to the Kansas Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a lack of clarity in Kansas 
statutes regarding this issue and cited four different Attorney General (AG) opinions 
that addressed this matter and came to opposite conclusions.  Legislative exclusions 
of school board membership are found in K.S.A. 72-8202 et seq.  Nothing in the 
language of these statutes expressly forbids teachers from serving on school boards.  
In examining prior language of the statute, the court could find no legislative intent 
on the question of whether a teacher could serve on a board.  Since 1979, eleven bills 
to prohibit teachers from serving on the school board had been introduced in 
legislature and none passed.  Baker argued that the failure to pass any of these bills 
indicated the legislature's intent to allow teachers to act as school board members.  
The Supreme Court, however, noted, "Legislative inaction is not necessarily 
indicative of legislative intent" (p. 853).  Because the legislature had neither 
specifically authorized nor prohibited teachers from serving as school board members, 
the court determined that it must analyze the issue under common-law doctrine of 
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incompatibility of office.  The incompatibility doctrine holds that the same person 
may not hold two offices that are incompatible with each other as a matter of public 
policy.  Whether or not the person draws a salary from the positions is not the focal 
point, it is based on public policy considerations.  The Supreme Court reviewed the 
opinions of courts in other states that had considered the same issue.  In doing so, the 
court found that other states have held the offices of teacher and board member are 
incompatible.  The court came to the conclusion that Baker's positions were also 
incompatible.  By assuming the role of a teacher and school board member, Baker 
occupied one position that was subordinate to the other.  As a Board member, she was 
the employer, and as a teacher, she was the employee.  In the court's opinion, it was a 
clear conflict of interest for Baker to sit on a policy-making body that negotiated with 
the teachers' representative who was also her representative as a teacher.  Baker, as a 
teacher, was subject to discipline by the school board.  She could be nonrenewed or 
terminated by the school board on which she served.  The court also pointed out that 
their research had not revealed a single case finding the positions of teacher and 
school board member compatible.  K.S.A. 77-109 provides that the common law "as 
modified by…statutory law, judicial decisions…shall remain in force in aid of the 
General Statutes of this state."  Thus, in the absence of clear legislative intent, the 
courts must rely upon common law.  The remaining question for the court was 
whether the incompatibility doctrine produced a forfeiture of Baker's office on the 
school board or on her position as a teacher.  Case law examined by the Supreme 
Court indicated that Baker's election to the school board acted as her resignation of 
 
602 
 
her teaching position.  However, the court deemed it would be unfair to find that 
Baker had vacated her tenured teaching position.  Instead, the court determined that 
because Baker had a contract with the school district her employment as a teacher 
would continue.  The decision of the district court was reversed and Baker was 
disqualified from serving on the school board.    
 
Holmes v. Unified School District No. 259 
46 P.3d 1158 (Kan. 2002) 
 
Brad Holmes and three other plaintiffs were employed as security personnel 
for USD 259 during a time when their holiday pay was not figured appropriately.  
After the school district found that there had been an error, it paid additional holiday 
compensation to all of the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs alleged they had not been fully 
compensated and sued the school district for additional pay.  The district court denied 
the school district's motion for summary judgment and allowed the case to go to trial.  
After the bench trial, the district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and ruled USD 
259 had to pay the requested additional sums for overtime.  The school district 
appealed.   
 
Policy 4504 (P4504) was the Board policy governing the rate of holiday pay.  
That policy was not followed as written even when the district realized it had 
underpaid the security personnel and tried to rectify the situation.  P4504 required the 
Board to pay its security personnel triple for a national holiday and double time and a 
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half for Board-adopted holidays.  The Board in this case paid the plaintiffs two times 
their rate of pay for the national holidays and one and a half times their regular rate 
for the Board-adopted holidays, then it provided one paid day off per holiday.  The 
Board argued that being paid for a day off in addition to the aforementioned amounts 
of overtime equated the requirements of P4504.  However, the plaintiffs were able to 
show that they lost money when paid for the one day off in addition to double time 
for national holidays and time and a half for Board-adopted holidays when compared 
to the amount they would receive if they were paid in accordance with P4504.  The 
court determined that USD 259 had not followed Board policy and as a result, the 
plaintiffs lost money.  The appellate court further held that the district court had 
correctly determined the amount owed the plaintiffs.  Accordingly, the judgment of 
the district court was affirmed.         
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Conclusion 
 
The 173 cases briefed in this study span almost thirty years.  Fifty cases were 
brought by students, eighty-seven by employees, and thirty-six were filed by 
outsiders.  School districts are much more likely to end up in litigation with 
employees than with students, as evidenced by the fact that exactly half of the total 
cases were brought by employees.  As the table below shows, a majority of education 
litigation in the state of Kansas has been brought by employees challenging the 
termination or non-renewal of their contracts.  School administrators would be wise 
to familiarize themselves with state statutes regarding evaluation deadlines, important 
dates for notification of nonrenewal and due process requirements for both tenured 
and non-tenured employees.  
 
Categories/Subcategories Number of Cases 
Suits by Students (Total) 50 
• Negligence 22 
• Control of Behavior 11 
• School Program 4 
• Equal Opportunity Issues 13 
Suits by Employees (Total) 87 
• Discrimination in Hiring or 
Promotion 
3 
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• Termination and Discipline 61 
• Professional Negotiations 19 
• Torts 2 
• Miscellaneous 2 
Suits by Outsiders (Total) 36 
• Contract Issues 16 
• Fiscal Issues 12 
• Negligence 2 
• Miscellaneous 6 
 
In order to draw a comparison between the number and types of education law 
cases in the state of Kansas during the writing of Betty Martin Dillon's book and the 
completion of this one, it was necessary to utilize Dillon's categorization system.  It 
was much easier to fit the cases within this dissertation into one of her more broad 
classifications than to attempt to read each of the cases in her book and place them in 
Imber & Thompson's typology utilized here.  In addition, many of the cases briefed 
by Dillon occurred well before 1960 and would not fit into the current system of 
typology.  It is important to remind the reader that the only cases included in this 
dissertation were published opinions found on Westlaw.  It is likely that there were 
cases that were not reported in Westlaw or any other source that were heard in the 
courts.  The comparisons presented in this conclusion were done to give the reader a 
sense of how the types of cases heard in the Kansas courts has changed over the years. 
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Dillon's book included cases in the Kansas appellate courts from 1868-1979.  
Her book was comprised of 504 cases relating to Kansas public education, which over 
the 111-year time span averaged to 4.5 cases per year.  This dissertation contains 173 
cases spanning the years from 1981-2009.  Over the 28-year time period studied, that 
averages out to 6.4 cases per year.  This might indicate that the rate of litigation 
related to education has increased slightly when comparing the two time spans.  
However, comparing a 111-year time span to only 28 years might not be a true 
reflection of the rate of litigation.  There were likely spans of time in the past one 
hundred years that had little education litigation.  Instead, these numbers seem to 
indicate that when looking at the number of appellate opinions the rate of education 
litigation in Kansas has remained fairly steady.  A comparison of the number of cases 
does not seem to support any notion that education has been any more litigious in the 
past thirty years than it was in the one hundred years preceding.      
While there does not seem to be support for the idea that the rate of education 
litigation has increased, a comparison of the number of cases within each category 
does show how the types of litigation in Kansas education litigation have changed 
over the years.  Appendix A provides the specific numbers comparing the typology in 
Dillon's study to this one. 
In Dillon's book, the category of "school organization" contained 140 cases.  
In this dissertation, only nine cases fell within that category.  School organization was 
made up of cases filed over the establishment of schools, high schools, school 
property, and school boards.  A review of these cases reveals the interesting history of 
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Kansas schools.  By 1980, most of the issues regarding property, consolidation, and 
establishing school boards had been resolved.  This could help to explain the low 
number of cases falling within that category today.   
School finance was the largest category of education litigation in Dillon's 
book with 212 cases.  That is in comparison to the 25 cases dealing with finance in 
this dissertation.  The largest group of cases within that category were those Dillon 
described as "bond issues."  There were no cases found in Kansas courts from 1981-
2009 regarding bond issues.  The greatest numbers of cases in school finance in 
recent history are those dealing with challenges to the state funding formula.  There 
have been eight cases since 1994 that challenged the state's finance formula with 
more looming on the horizon.   
Dillon's third group of cases dealt with matters of church and state.  She had 
twelve cases in that category with the majority of those falling under the headings of 
either compulsory attendance or aid to churches.  This dissertation contains two cases 
related to church and state.  One on the use of public school facilities for religious 
purposes and one on the benediction and invocation given at a high school graduation.  
The low number of cases in Kansas within this category is interesting given the 
number that can be found nationally.  Dillon suggests this might due to the "rural 
character of the state" (Dillon, 1981, p. 304).  Kansas' rural nature could make it 
possible that even if a public school supports religious activities so long as the local 
community does not disagree, no court action is taken.   
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A fourth category of cases involves teacher and other school employee issues.  
While Dillon only had 58 cases within that category, this dissertation contains 78 
cases.  This makes up 45% of all cases reported in this dissertation.  In both studies, 
teacher dismissal dominated the category with 42 cases found in the past 28 years.  
Imber & Thompson's national research from their 1991 article found that employees 
suing to contest their firing made up 67% of all reported opinions from 1960-1988 
(Imber & Thompson, p. 233).  While not quite as high as that national average, it 
would seem that statistic held fairly true in Kansas.  The large number of cases 
dealing with employee termination would certainly indicate that school districts 
should place an emphasis on the knowledge of contract law and state statutes 
pertaining to due process and nonrenewal procedures. 
The numbers in Dillon's fifth category of student rights were comparable, with 
44 cases during the time of her research and 24 from 1981-2009.  However, one 
category in this area has increased considerably in recent years: special education 
cases.  Dillon did not find any cases that would fall under this heading; this study 
produced ten.  Changes to the IDEA and the emphasis on providing an appropriate 
education to students with special needs, as well as the likelihood that parents of 
special education students today are much more aware of their rights, could be 
credited with this increase.  The increase in SPED cases suggests that school districts 
would be wise to educate their administrators and teachers on relevant state and 
federal laws pertaining to the IEP process and FAPE. 
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Another category of cases more prevalent in recent times than in the past is 
that of tort liability.  Dillon found fourteen cases that were attributed to torts, with ten 
of those falling under the description of liability due to the negligence of employees.  
From 1981-2008 twenty-five cases that could be placed under the heading of tort 
liability were found in Kansas.  Of those twenty-five, twenty-two were claims of 
negligence against the employees in a school district, the majority of which were 
brought by students.  School districts should ensure that all personnel are well versed 
in the elements of negligence and measures that can be taken to avoid that type of 
litigation. 
Dillon's final category was that of civil rights.  Several of the twenty-four 
cases found in her book dealt with racial segregation and the efforts to desegregate 
Kansas schools, with the most well known being Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka.  Dillon found eighteen cases of racial discrimination brought by students.  
This study only produced two.  In total, the current study found ten cases that could 
be categorized as civil rights issues with three falling under the description of racial 
discrimination among the faculty and three claims of discrimination based on a 
disability.   
An examination of the Kansas court cases provided in both Dillon's book and 
the current dissertation provides a thorough look at the history of public education 
litigation in the state of Kansas.  The court cases in each study are placed in 
chronological order thus providing a timeline of the number and types of cases 
throughout the years.  The open-ended nature of this study allows for future updates 
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and it could be used as the first step for further research projects.  The potential 
certainly exists for one to look back at historical events, such as the civil rights 
movement or the inception of Public Law 94-142, to determine whether a correlation 
exists between those events and the number of education litigation cases found in 
Kansas during those times.  It would also be possible to compare the types and rate of 
litigation in Kansas to national findings over a similar time span. However it is 
utilized, this study provides a closer look into education litigation in the state of 
Kansas and its relevance to public school districts across the state.   
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Appendix A 
The tables within this appendix compare the number and typology of cases 
found within Betty Martin Dillon's handbook and this dissertation.  Percentages of 
each total were provided to give a better picture of how certain categories have 
changed over the years.  Dillon's categories and subcategories were utilized for the 
most part.  However, in a few instances sub classifications had to be added in order to 
place newer cases, such as challenges to the State funding formula, which did not fit 
into the older system.  
 
Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
School Organization (Total) 140 (27.8%) 9 (5%) 
• Adjacent Territory 14 0 
• Disorganization/Consolidation 30 3 
• District Board Officers 13 3 
• High Schools 37 0 
• Local Organization as a District 8 0 
• Role of County and State Reps 13 0 
• School Acre 10 3 
• School Buildings 13 0 
• Textbooks 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
612 
 
Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
School Finance (Total) 212 (42%) 25 (14.5%) 
• Actions by County Superintendents 7 0 
• Bond Issues and Elections 48 0 
• Construction of Schools 15 4 
• Disorganization and Annexation of 
Property 
9 0 
• District Board Treasurers 17 0 
• Federal Funds 1 1 
• Furniture and Supplies 16 4 
• Higher Education 3 0 
• State School Fund (Bonds) 5 0 
• No Fund Warrants 7 0 
• Opposition to School Tax by Special 
Interest 
33 0 
• Reorganization Property Tax Levy 10 0 
• Sin Taxes 1 0 
• Tax Levies 36 3 
• Tuition Recovery 4 0 
• Challenge State Funding Formula 0 8 
• Employee Insurance Benefits 0 3 
• Unemployment Benefits 0 1 
• Overtime Pay 0 1 
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Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
Church and State (Total) 12 (2.4%) 2 (1.2%) 
• Challenge Parochial Attendance 1 0 
• Compulsory Attendance 4 0 
• Flag Salute 2 0 
• Aid to Churches 4 0 
• School Prayer 1 0 
• Use of Facilities by Religious Groups 0 1 
• Benediction at Graduation 0 1 
 
Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
Employee Relations (Total) 58 (11.5%) 78 (45%) 
• Certification 5 0 
• Collective Negotiations 8 19 
• Other School Employees 6 13 
• Recovery of Wages by Teachers 12 0 
• Teacher Dismissal 17 40 
• Teacher Retirement 3 0 
• Valid Teacher Contracts 7 3 
• Supplemental Contracts 0 3 
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Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
Student Rights (Total) 44 (8.7%) 24 (14%) 
• Compulsory Vaccination 1 0 
• Expulsion/Suspension 2 3 
• Extracurricular Activities 2 3 
• Hair and Dress Code 1 0 
• Searches 1 3 
• Student Transportation 13 0 
• Tuition 20 0 
• Truancy 1 0 
• Uniform Textbooks 3 0 
• Free Speech 0 1 
• Censure of Library Books 0 1 
• SPED/IEP Issues 0 10 
• Peer-on-Peer Harassment/Bullying 0 3 
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Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
Tort Liability (Total) 14 (2.8%) 25 (14.5%) 
• Freedom from Liability Due to 
Negligence of Employees 
10 22 
• Use of School Facilities 4 1 
• Worker's Compensation 0 2 
 
 
Category/Sub Categories Dillon's Findings Fitzgerald's 
Findings 
Civil Rights (Total) 24 (4.8%) 10 (5.8%) 
• Economic Discrimination 1 0 
• Opposition to Desegregation 1 0 
• Racial Discrimination against Faculty 1 3 
• Racial Discrimination against 
Students 
18 2 
• Sexual Discrimination 3 1 
• Age Discrimination 0 1 
• Discrimination based on Disability 0 3 
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Glossary 
Action – a lawsuit in which one party (or parties) sues another. 
Agency relationship – the relationship of a person (called the agent) who acts on 
behalf of another person, company, or government, known as the principal.  The basic 
rule is that the principal becomes responsible for the acts of the agent, and the agent's 
acts are like those of the principal (Latin: respondeat superior). 
 
Amicus curiae – Latin for "friend of the court," a party or an organization interested 
in an issue which files a brief or participates in the argument in a case in which that 
party or organization is not one of the litigants.  Usually the court must give 
permission for the brief to be filed and arguments may only be made with the 
agreement of the party the amicus curiae is supporting, and that argument comes out 
of the time allowed for that party's presentation to the court. 
 
Appeal – to ask a higher court to reverse the decision of a trial court after final 
judgment or other legal ruling. 
 
Appellant – the party who appeals a trial court decision he/she has lost. 
Appellee – in some jurisdictions the name used for the party who has won at the trial 
court level, but the loser (appellant) has appealed the decision to a higher court.  Thus, 
the appellee has to file a response to the legal brief filed by the appellant.   
 
Class Action – a lawsuit filed by one or more people on behalf of themselves and a 
larger group of people who are similarly situated. 
 
Declaratory Judgment – a judgment of a court that determines the rights of parties 
without ordering anything be done or awarding damages. 
 
Defendant – the party sued in a lawsuit. 
Directed verdict – a verdict by a jury based on the specific direction by a trial judge 
that they must bring in that verdict because one of the parties has not proved 
his/her/its case as a matter of law (failed to present credible testimony on some key 
element of the claim or of the defense). 
 
Eminent domain – the power of a governmental body to take private real estate for 
public use, with or without the permission of the owner.  The owner must then 
receive "just compensation." 
 
Et seq – and the following; it is commonly used to include numbered lists, pages or 
sections after the first number is stated. 
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Ex rel – on information supplied by. 
Fee simple – an absolute title to land, free of any other claims against the title. 
Gross negligence – carelessness that is in reckless disregard for the safety or lives of 
others, and is so great it appears to be a conscious violation of other people's rights to 
safety. 
 
Injunction – a writ (order) issued by a court ordering someone to do something or 
prohibiting some act after a court hearing. 
 
In limine – from Latin for "at the threshold," referring to a motion before a trial 
begins. 
 
Interlocutory appeal – any court (state or federal) which hears appeals from 
judgments and rulings of trial courts or lower appeals courts. 
 
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict – reversal of a jury's verdict by the trial 
judge when the judge believes there was no factual basis for the verdict or it was 
contrary to law.  The judge will then enter a different verdict as "a matter of law." 
 
Mandamus – Latin for "we order," a writ (more modernly called a "writ of 
mandate") which orders a public agency or governmental body to perform an act 
required by law when it has neglected or refused to do so. 
 
Negligence – failure to exercise the care toward others that a reasonable or prudent 
person would do in the circumstances; or taking action which such a reasonable 
person would not. 
 
Plaintiff – the party who initiates a lawsuit by filing a complaint with the clerk of the 
court against the defendant(s) demanding damages, performance and/or court 
determination of rights. 
 
Plurality opinion – A plurality opinion is the controlling opinion when no majority 
opinion exists, consisting of the majority of the majority.  It is written when only a 
majority of the majority of judges agrees on the reasoning behind the decision. 
 
Prima facie case – a plaintiff's lawsuit or a criminal charge that appears at first look 
to be "open and shut." 
 
Pro se – Latin term meaning “for himself.”  A party to a lawsuit who represents 
himself. 
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Rational basis – a test of constitutionality of a statute, asking whether the law has a 
reasonable connection to achieving a legitimate and constitutional objective. 
 
Remanded – sent back to the lower court from which the case was appealed. 
Res judicata – Latin for "the thing has been judged," meaning the issue before the 
court has already been decided by another court, between the same parties.  Therefore, 
the court will dismiss the case before it as being useless. 
 
Respondeat superior – a key doctrine in the law of agency that provides a principal 
(employer) is responsible for the actions of his/her agent (employee) in the course of 
employment.  
 
Review – the judicial consideration of a lower court judgment by an appellate court, 
determining if there were legal errors sufficient to require reversal. 
 
Statute – a federal or state written law enacted by the Congress or state legislature, 
respectively. 
 
Strict scrutiny – a test of constitutionality as it applies to suspect categories and 
fundamental rights.  Application of strict scrutiny requires that there be a compelling 
governmental interest for the discrimination. 
 
Sua sponte – Latin for "of one's own will," meaning on one's own volition.  It usually 
refers to a judge's order that has been made without a request by any party to the case. 
   
Summary judgment –  a court order ruling that no factual issues remain to be tried 
and therefore a cause of action or all causes of action in a complaint can be decided 
upon without trial.  It is appropriate only when there are no material facts in dispute 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  The court views the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party. 
 
Tort – a civil wrong or wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, from which 
injury occurs to another.  Torts include all negligence cases as well as intentional 
wrongs that result in harm. 
 
Ultra vires – Latin for “beyond powers,” refers to acts of a corporation and/or its 
officers outside the powers and/or authority allowed a corporation by law.  In the 
cases within this book, a school board would be the example of a corporation. 
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